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Abstract
This thesis will argue that 1945-51 was a seminal period in the development of 
communication between the Government, the media and the people in Britain. 
The Attlee Government was the first British Government to fully engage with the 
dilemma of how a Government communicates with its citizens to sustain a 
credible democracy. To do this it established the modern machinery of 
Government communication and used the mass media extensively. Its 
experience, and in particular the crises it faced during its two terms in office, 
caused it to shift away from an idealistic vision of helping to develop an informed 
electorate towards the pragmatic use of information as a means of persuasion 
and a tool for engineering consent. The period laid the framework, in other words, 
of modern information management.
In order to demonstrate this the thesis will show how the Government’s attitudes 
changed over its period in office, and how its approach towards communication 
altered. It will start by examining how and why the Government established the 
machinery of communication in 1945. It will then seek to explain why the 
Government’s relationship with the Press deteriorated so far and so fast, and with 
what consequences. It will try to demonstrate that there was the genuine 
possibility of radical reform of the Press and that it is important to understand why 
this did not happen. The thesis will go on to consider the closeness of the 
Government-BBC relationship after the war and how that closeness seriously 
damaged the credibility of the Corporation’s monopoly. It will assess the 
Government’s major experiment in film-making and why it found it so difficult to 
use film as a means of informing the public. And, it will show how the 
Government ignored, alienated and eventually collaborated with the newsreels. 
The thesis will end by assessing the distance the Government had travelled in its 
use of communication.
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Introduction
This thesis will argue that 1945-51 was a seminal period in the development of 
communication between the Government, the media and the people in Britain. 
The Attlee Government was the first British Government to fully engage with the 
dilemma of how a Government communicates with its citizens to sustain a 
credible democracy. To do this it established the modern machinery of 
Government communication and used the mass media extensively. Its 
experience, and in particular the crises it faced during its two terms in office, 
caused it to shift away from an idealistic vision of helping to develop an informed 
electorate towards the pragmatic use of information as a means of persuasion 
and a tool for engineering consent. The period laid the framework, in other words, 
of modern information management.
In 1945 the Labour Government did not think too much about the dilemma of how 
to communicate within a democracy. It had much else on its mind. The war was 
ending and there was the huge task of making the transition to peace. Moreover, 
the Government had plans to overhaul the entire economic infrastructure of the 
country.
Yet it is important to recognise that Labour was in a distinctly different position 
from its predecessors as regards to communication. Pre-1914 Governments had 
not engaged with the dilemma because they had not needed to. Before 1918 less 
than a third of the adult population, under eight million people, could vote.1 This 
rose to 30 million, just under the whole of the adult population, by the 1930s.2 
Prior to the Second World War the civil service, though growing, was still limited.
1 Electorate 1910: 7,694,741. Electorate 1931: 29,960,071, Butler & Sloman, British Political Facts 
(Fifth Edition, 1980), p.208.
2 Ibid. By far the largest increase was in 1918 itself.
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And before the 1920s, it was not possible to deliver a similar message to virtually 
the whole population simultaneously.3
By 1945 this had all changed. Not only did almost the whole adult population 
have the vote but they had been politicised by the war. Everyone had a more 
immediate relationship with the state at the war’s end than at its beginning. This 
was not surprising since the ‘bureaucratic empire’ had, in Richard Crossman’s 
words, ‘been both enormously enlarged and dangerously centralized during the 
war’.4 Between 1939 and 1947 the total number of civil servants jumped from 
397,570 to 722,294.5 In addition, the penetration of the contemporary news 
media was approaching saturation point. The national daily press, whose 
circulation had jumped from 3.1 million in 1918 to 10.6 million on the eve of World 
War Two, was now read by 87% of the adult population (its circulation would 
continue to rise to its all time peak in 1950).6 Over 30 million people went to the 
cinema, and saw the newsreels, each week.7 Almost 10 million homes had a 
radio.8
The significance of these structural developments should not be underestimated. 
For the first time it seemed as if the democratic ideal, of ‘common information’ for 
the whole community, could, theoretically, be fulfilled. Walter Lippman wrote in 
1922, that whereas ‘the pioneer democrats did not possess the material for 
resolving the conflict between the known range of man’s attention and their
3 Thanks to the introduction of radio broadcasting in the 1920s and cinema sound in 1930 the inter­
war period was ‘the point in British politics at which the medium and the message became 
inescapably intertwined’, John Ramsden, Appetite for Power (1999), p.256.
4 Richard Crossman, The Lessons of 1945’, in Perry Anderson et al., Towards Socialism (1965), 
p.155.
5 Cabinet Paper, CP(47)150, The Number and Cost of the Civil Service’, 15-5-1947, CAB 129/18.
6 Murdock and Golding, The Structure, Ownership and Control of the Press’ in Boyce, Curran and 
Wingate, Newspaper History from the Seventeenth Century to the Present Day (1978) p. 130.
Hulton Readership Survey (1947).
7 Perilli, ‘Statistical Survey of the British Cinema Industry’ in Curran and Porter, British Cinema 
History, (1983), p.372, Table 1.
8 The number of households paying a BBC Radio Licence Fee passed 10 million in January 1946. 
See Programme Policy Meeting minutes, 29-1-1946, R34/615/4, BBC-WAC.
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illimitable faith in his dignity’, the material, in the form of the mass media, was 
now available.9 By 1945 it was therefore possible for a Political and Economic 
Planning broadsheet to state that ‘it is high time, in consonance with democratic 
principle, that fuller and simpler explanations be given to the great majority of 
people, who have a right to know why and what their government has done, is 
doing, and wishes to do’.10
In addition to these structural changes, Labour’s attitude in 1945 was 
fundamentally different from its pre-war predecessors. Communication, if not at 
the forefront of their mind, was implicit in much of the new Government’s thinking. 
The war had generated a huge confidence in the potential positive influence of 
the state. Peter Hennessy has said of the new Ministers in the administration 
that, They really did think that Jerusalem could be builded here’.11 But it could 
only be built if the Government organised it, planned it, and led it. This was what 
ministers believed the war had shown and was what the electorate had voted for 
in July 1945. As Hilary Marquand, the Secretary for Overseas Trade, said in a 
speech in autumn 1945, The verdict of the election was unmistakably in favour of 
planning’.12 Communication would be vital in translating planning into action.
Labour was also committed to a much closer partnership with the people. The 
Party’s legitimacy was based very consciously on its belief in its role as the 
representative of the people’s interest, as compared with the Conservative 
representation of ‘Big Business’ (according to the Labour manifesto). 
Nationalisation meant an unprecedented alliance of the people with the state. 
The war and the election landslide gave Labour the confidence that such an
9 Walter Lippman, Public Opinion (1922), 1997 Edition, p. 165
10 PEP Broadsheet, No.230, ‘Government Information Services’, 2-2-1945.
11 Peter Hennessy, Never Again -  Britain 1945-51 (1992), p.118.
12 Marquand, ‘Our Production Plan’, essay based on lecture given in the autumn of 1945, re-printed 
in Forward From Victory! Labour’s Plan (1946), p.52.
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alliance was both necessary and attainable. Just as the war ‘persuaded 
Government that victory hinged upon a frank and acknowledged partnership 
between the Government and the people’ so too, they believed, would success in 
the peace.13
Therefore it was with idealistic intentions and democratic principles in mind that, 
at the end of the war, the Government decided to establish the machinery of 
communication (the Central Office of Information, the departmental press offices, 
and the Prime Minister’s public relations adviser). At this point Ministers assumed 
that packaging the information would be simple, that channelling it to the public 
via the mass media would be straightforward, and that ensuring it was seen, 
understood and acted upon by the public would not be a problem. All these 
unexamined assumptions would be challenged over the following six years.
1945 was, therefore, a critical turning point in the history of Government 
communications. It was the moment at which the Government recognised the 
need for communication within a democracy, though not yet the obstacles to it or 
the difficulties of achieving it.
The subsequent experience of this administration proved instructive for 
subsequent Governments. It learned, over the course of its first term of office, 
how disruptive the mass media could be to the process of communication, how 
difficult it was to produce effective Government information without resorting to 
persuasion, and how hard it was to make people ‘informed’. In the process of 
trying to resolve some of these difficulties it began to think of presentation as 
distinct from policy making. It began to consider how it could and should relate to 
the independent mass media within a democracy and then how to use these 
media to its advantage. And, for the first time, it began to systematically measure
13 Ian McLaine, Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War
II (1979), p.281.
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the public’s attitudes to its policies, not just to inform policy making, but also to 
make the presentation more effective.
Ministers within the administration were convinced that they were justified in 
taking such action. They were simply trying to gain the consent of the people to 
plans which they were persuaded would be to everyone’s benefit. Indeed the 
period is characterised by sincere politicians and earnest officials struggling to 
deal with overwhelming economic and social adversities as best they could. 
Therefore it was only when Ministers like Herbert Morrison felt their policies were 
being undermined by what they saw as gross misrepresentation in the 
newspapers, in mid 1946, that they considered altering the structure of the Press. 
It was only when the Cabinet saw the failures of Government communication in 
the wake of the 1947 fuel crisis that it sanctioned its centralisation and the 
employment of communications specialists. And it was only when Ministers 
began to realise the constraints on their original ambitions regarding information 
that they sought to infiltrate their messages through the existing media. But the 
effect was that in trying to find solutions to these difficult situations, Ministers and 
officials began to devise and institutionalise the techniques of modern information 
management.
The term ‘information management’ has been much used recently. It is a broad 
and complex concept. Although many writers have endowed the phrase with 
sinister significance, here it is used in a non-pejorative sense to mean the ways in 
which a state exercises editorial control over the flow of information from 
Government. Governments have always sought to control information to some 
extent but this period, it is argued, was materially different from previous ones. 
This is partly because of the development and wide diffusion of the mass media, 
and partly because of the establishment of Government information services.
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In an article published in 1987, Robins, Webster and Pickering argued that 
‘propaganda and information management are normative aspects of modern 
democratic societies’.14 Without the sophisticated use of both democratic 
governments would, they suggested, be unable to ensure cooperation. This 
thesis will attempt to show how the post-war Labour Government came to believe 
this was true. It will do so by examining how this administration was first 
presented with the dilemma of how to inform the public once it had accepted the 
responsibility to do so. And, by showing that in trying to resolve this dilemma, 
Labour developed many of the methods and mechanisms of information 
management that have since become integral to the operation of modern 
governance.
In order to do this the thesis will show how the Government’s attitudes changed 
over its period in office, and how its approach towards communication altered. It 
will start by examining how and why the Government established the machinery 
of communication in 1945. Chapters Two and Three will then seek to explain why 
the Government’s relationship with the Press deteriorated so far and so fast, and 
with what consequences. It will argue that there was a genuine possibility of 
radical reform of the Press and that it is important to understand why this did not 
happen. Chapter Four will go on to consider the closeness of the Government- 
BBC relationship after the war and how that closeness seriously damaged the 
credibility of the Corporation’s monopoly. Chapter Five will assess the 
Government’s major experiment in film-making and how its difficult experience 
altered its ambitions and encouraged it to work more pragmatically with the 
contemporary news media. The thesis will end by assessing the distance the 
Government had travelled in its use of communication.
14 Kevin Robbins, Frank Webster and Michael Pickering, ‘Propaganda, Information and Social 
Control’, in Jeremy Hawthorn (ed.), Propaganda, Persuasion and Polemic (1987), p.8.
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Although there is a considerable amount of literature on this period, most of it
does not deal with Government communication. The few exceptions approach it
in quite a different way from this thesis.
On the 1945-51 period specifically there is one published volume about
Government communication, by William Crofts, and two unpublished PhDs. 
Crofts’ dense and valuable book, Coercion or Persuasion?, examines Labour’s 
economic publicity campaigns, such as ‘Work or Want’, women to work and 
Lancashire cotton. Using the original campaign material and official papers Crofts 
gives a very good illustration of how extensive Government economic 
propaganda became in these years. ‘No former Government of the United 
Kingdom had allocated so great a proportion of its resources to the tasks of 
informing and cajoling its citizens’.15
The publicity surrounding social legislation was more limited but still widespread, 
as Thomas Wildy has shown in his 1985 PhD thesis. Wildy examines this 
publicity, setting it in the context of the introduction of the information services, in 
order to demonstrate ‘the effectiveness with which the COI and other information 
services were absorbed by the Civil Service Establishment and generally 
accepted by politicians and public alike’.16
Both these accounts represent essential background for this thesis. However, 
both of them concentrate on the publicity campaigns themselves. This thesis will 
look at the campaigns as part of the Government’s overall relationship with the 
contemporary media. More importantly, this thesis will assess how the 
Government’s relationship and understanding of communication evolved over this 
formative period.
15 William Crofts, Coercion or Persuasion? Propaganda in Britain after 1945 (1989), p.250.
16 Thomas Wildy, ‘Propaganda and Social Policy in Britain 1945-1951: Publicity for the Social 
Legislation of the Labour Government', PhD, Leeds, 1985.
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The other PhD thesis on domestic Government communication at this time is by 
John Dwight Jenks. Jenks’ well-researched study looks at how the state used the 
media to build and sustain a Cold War consensus between 1948 and 1953. It is 
particularly useful in illustrating the growing links between the overseas and 
domestic agendas of the information services as the Cold War deepened. His is 
also one of the few studies which connects some of the developments in 
Government information to the evolution of the state’s relationship with the 
media.17
There are two more general studies on the history of Government Information 
Services in Britain, by Marjorie Ogilvy-Webb and Thomas Fife Clark, but both are 
quite dated and suffer from being official accounts. The first is the more useful, 
describing, in slightly Whiggish terms, the progress of information services up to 
the mid 1960s.18
Mariel Grant has written the only study of the development of Government 
communication up to 1945.19 She is joined in the late 1930s by other writers who 
look at the preparations, or lack of preparations, for the use of information in the 
Second World War.20 These works show how reluctant Whitehall was to create 
information machinery, and its distaste for propaganda, given the criticisms of its 
use in the First World War and its abuse by the contemporary Governments of 
Germany and the Soviet Union.
It was not until just before the outbreak of war itself that the British were able to 
overcome these sensibilities and set up the Ministry of Information (MOI). The
17 John Dwight Jenks, ‘Hot News / Cold War: The British State, Propaganda and the News Media 
1948-53’, PhD, University of California, 2000.
18 Marjorie Ogilvy-Webb, The Government Explains: A Study of the Information Services (1965), Sir 
Thomas Fife Clark, The Central Office of Information (1970).
19 Mariel Grant, Propaganda and the Role of the State in Inter-War Britain (1994).
20 Philip M. Taylor, ‘If War Should Come: Preparing the Fifth Arm for Total War 1935-39’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol.16:1 (1981), pp.27-53, Temple Willcox, ‘Projection or Publicity? Rival 
Concepts in the Pre-War Planning of the Ministry of Information’, Journal of Contemporary History, 
Vol. 18:1 (1983), pp.97-117.
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subsequent experience of the war was decisive. As Ian McLaine has described, 
in his enjoyable and informative account of the MOI, though the initial years were 
chaotic and confused, the Ministry eventually became useful and effective.21 
James Chapman has recently argued the Government went through a similar 
process in its use of film.22 From the perspective of this thesis these accounts are 
particularly important because they illustrate how much the Government learnt 
during the war and how much the conflict influenced its attitudes and approach 
towards communication.
There are a number of books and articles on specific sectors of the media which 
are also relevant to this thesis. On the press, Stephen Koss has provocatively 
suggested that 1947 represents the ‘ultimate destination’ when newspapers 
broke free from political parties. Equally intriguing is James Margach’s claim that 
that this newfound independence led to ‘an unbridled campaign of screaming 
irresponsibility, in my experience the worst period for the reputation and 
standards of journalism’23. And yet neither these nor other authors go into detail 
about the behaviour of the press or how its relationship with the Government 
reached such a nadir that Aneurin Bevan was to call it ‘the most prostituted press 
in the world’.24
Only Tom O’Malley has focused on an aspect of this problem in two interesting 
articles he wrote in 1997 and 1998.25 O’Malley believes the importance of the 
Royal Commissions on the Press has been underestimated, especially that of 
1947-9, and even calls for someone to look at this one in the broader context of
21 McLaine, Ministry of Morale, op.cit. (1979).
22 James Chapman, The British at War: Cinema, State and Propaganda 1939-45 (1995).
23 James Margach, The War Between Downing Street and the Media from Lloyd-George to 
Callaghan (1978), p.8.
24 Aneurin Bevan to a pre Labour conference rally in Blackpool, May 1948.
25 Tom O’Malley, ‘Labour and the 1947-49 Royal Commission on the Press’, in Bromley and 
O’Malley (eds.), A Journalism Reader (1997). O’Malley, ‘Demanding Accountability: the Press, the 
Royal Commissions and the Pressure for Reform 1945-77’, in Stephenson and Bromley (ed.), Sex, 
Lies and Democracy (1998).
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Labour’s relationship with the media. Hopefully this thesis will respond to that 
challenge.
On broadcasting, the most comprehensive study remains Asa (Lord) Briggs’ 
fourth volume of his massive History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom 
(1979, revised 1995). Briggs’ work is very detailed, but written from the 
perspective of the BBC rather than that of the Government. Briggs also tends to 
emphasise the constant vigilance with which the BBC protected their 
independence. That eternal vigilance has since been questioned. In Power 
without Responsibility, Jean Seaton and James Curran write that the reason ‘the 
BBC could claim independence [during the war] was at least partly because it 
suited the Government that it should do so’.26 Sian Nicholas’ absorbing history of 
the BBC during the war also highlights its close links to the Coalition 
Government.27 Briggs’ comment is more applicable after the war but even then 
the BBC’s position in relation to the Government remained ambiguous and open 
to abuse, as will be illustrated in this thesis.
On films and newsreels there is a quite distinct historiography. A number of 
writers on film have commented on this period because it represents the sunset 
of the celebrated British documentary movement. But this has led to a slightly 
imbalanced focus on the vicissitudes of this movement as compared to the use of 
official films for information and propaganda. This gap has been partially filled by 
Albert Hogenkamp’s useful PhD, but given that the Government made over 600 
films during these years there is still ample room for research.28 On the 
newsreels, by contrast, there is virtually nothing published on the post-war period.
26 James Curran and Jean Seaton, Power without Responsibility -  The Press and Broadcasting in 
Britain, (5th Edition, 1997), p. 147.
27 Sian Nicholas, The Echo of War: Home Front Propaganda and the Wartime BBC 1939-45 
(1996).
28 Albert Hogenkamp, The British Documentary Movement and the 1945-51 Labour Governments’ 
(PhD, Oxford, 1991).
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Even now some seem to consider communications peripheral to the practice of 
governance in Britain, despite the remarkable explosion in media interest in ‘spin’ 
in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. But there has been a 
significant increase in writing devoted to the subject over the past decade. The 
vast majority of this is focused on the recent past. Some books go back to the 
Margaret Thatcher-Bernard Ingham partnership of the 1980s, but few venture 
earlier than this. One of the main functions of this thesis is to argue that to 
understand the use of communication by the Government now, one has to look 
back at least as far as the Second World War.
Government communication does, however, have to be distinguished from 
political communication. The latter mainly denotes electioneering and Party 
political communication. It is characterized by books such as Norris’ On 
Message: Communicating the Campaign (1999).23 While fascinating, political 
communication is outside the scope of this study.
This thesis is based as much as possible on primary source material. Since it is a 
study of the Government and the media, these sources have necessarily had to 
be broad. To gain an understanding of the Government perspective the study 
makes extensive use of the official papers at the Public Record Office. These 
have been supplemented by private and Party papers where possible. These 
include the biographical papers of Herbert Morrison, the papers and 
correspondence of Clement Attlee, Francis Williams, Patrick Gordon Walker and 
Thomas Fife Clarke. The official reports and evidence of the various 
contemporary commissions, such as the Royal Commission on the Press, have 
also been used.
To gain an understanding of the Government’s relationship with the media and 
the perspective of the media itself, the thesis has naturally had to rely on
29 Pippa Norris et al., On Message: Communicating the Campaign (1999).
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contemporary newspapers, journals, newsreels, broadcasts and films. Trade 
journals such as World’s Press News have been particularly helpful in giving an 
insight into the attitude of the press, especially since the individual newspaper 
archives hold very little of relevance. It has been possible to view many official 
films and newsreels thanks to the NFTVA at the BFI and the Imperial War 
Museum Archive. And, it is now even possible to watch Pathe News online within 
the UN archive. The chapter on the BBC benefited considerably from the use of 
the diaries and papers of the Director General at that time, Sir William Haley. I 
would like to thank the archives for giving me access to the material and all the 
archivists who have helped me in my research. I am also very grateful to the 
AHRB for helping to support my research.
12
Chapter 1
Chapter 1: Establishing the Machinery and Methods of 
Government Communication
This chapter will assess the establishment and use of the information services by 
the Government between 1945 and 1951. It will argue the Government moved 
from an unexamined confidence that the communication of information was a 
straightforward task, to a growing realisation of its complexity, and an eventual 
willingness to deal with that complexity by managing information.
The first section will look at how and why the Labour Government established the 
machinery of communication after the Second World War. It will argue that 
Herbert Morrison, who was in charge of the organisation of post-war information 
services, believed that communication was a responsibility of modern democratic 
government. He also thought it was a simple technical function which could be 
performed on behalf of the departments by a common service unit.
The second section will show how Morrison’s assurance of the simplicity of 
communication was dispelled during the course of 1946. By the end of that year 
he was becoming convinced that the Government had to think more carefully 
about how it presented itself and how the communication of policy affected its 
successful execution.
Morrison’s concerns were catapulted to the forefront of the Government’s thinking 
by the fuel crisis of February 1947. The crisis triggered a major review of the 
importance and manner of communication, examined in the third section. It led to 
the establishment of a powerful central unit, the Economic Information Unit (EIU), 
which was responsible for initiating and co-ordinating the communication of 
economic information. Due to the continuing difficult circumstances with which 
the Government had to deal, most notably the 1947 currency crisis and the 
descent into Cold War, ministers such as Morrison and Cripps felt justified in
13
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using the machinery of communication not just to inform but to persuade. As a 
consequence the more calculated approach to communication characterised by 
the EIU spread to other areas of Government.
The fourth section examines how the Labour Government drew back from the 
centralisation of economic information policy. This was as a result of the 
reactions of the departments, the opposition, and the media, and due to the 
budgetary constraints imposed by Sir Stafford Cripps. The final section will show 
how these constraints did not lead to a retreat from information management, but 
to a shift to a more cost effective and sophisticated usage.
This chapter is focused on the Government’s approach to communication. As 
such it concentrates on structural and attitudinal developments within Whitehall. 
Future chapters then look at specific areas of the media -  the press, the BBC, 
films and newsreels. A detailed examination of the Government side is a pre­
requisite, however, before these areas can be properly assessed.
SECTION 1: Rationale for the Creation of Information Services
Herbert Morrison and the Establishment of the Information Services
On the 4th September 1945 Sir Edward Bridges, the Cabinet Secretary, 
distributed a memorandum by the Labour Minister of Information, Ted Williams, 
to members of the Cabinet. Williams wrote that ‘A decision is urgently required on 
the post-war organisation of Government publicity at home and abroad’.1 The 
memorandum elicited a number of responses.2 The Prime Minister formed a 
small committee to discuss these on the 18th September. As a consequence, 
Attlee invited Herbert Morrison, the Lord President, ‘to review, in consultation with
1 GEN 85/1, Memorandum, ‘Post-War Organisation of Government Publicity’, Minister of 
Information, 4-9-1945, CAB 78/37.
2 From Lord President (GEN 85/2), SOS Dominion Affairs (GEN 85/4), and SOS India (GEN 85/5), 
CAB 78/37.
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the Minister of Information, the technical publicity services which ought to be 
continued in peace; and to submit a report... clarifying the issues involved and 
recommending how Government publicity services as a whole should be 
organised if the MOI were abolished’.3 Morrison’s task was, as Mariel Grant has 
commented, 'quite monumental’.4
However, Morrison was the natural candidate to fulfil the role. He had always 
been interested in press and publicity, dating from his job with the Labour run 
Daily Citizen in 1912. In 1949 he even said “Of course, if I had not got to where I 
am in politics, I believe I could have been a good newspaper editor”.5 He also 
‘first pioneered Labour’s use of volunteers from the professional advertising 
world’ in 1934.6 As his biographers, Donoughue and Jones, wrote ‘He was in 
advance of his time in his awareness that Governments of the twentieth century 
must communicate to the people and that public relations had become an 
essential instrument of modern mass politics’.7
Morrison wrote up a plan and sent it to other Ministers on November 14th 1945. 
He recommended that individual Departments should retain responsibility for their 
own publicity policy. The Ministry of Information (MOI) should be dissolved, but 
some of its Production Divisions should be retained to form a central publicity unit. 
This would include poster advertising, exhibitions, photographs, publications and 
films, and a central channel for the distribution of Government news. The 
Departments would employ the central agency to produce their information (to 
become the Central Office of Information). Four Committees would coordinate
3 GEN 85/2nd, Minutes, Post-war Organisation of Government Publicity, 3-10-1945, CAB 78/37.
4 Mariel Grant, Towards a Central Office of Information: Continuity and Change in British 
Government Information Policy 1939-51’ in Journal of Contemporary History 1999, Vol. 34, No. 1,
p.60.
5 From Donoughue and Jones, Herbert Morrison (2001), p .28.1949 quote referenced in The 
Guardian, 8-3-1965.
6 Dominic Wring, Media Messiahs, Tribune, 5-4-1996.
7 Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p.359.
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overall Government publicity, two Ministerial (Home and Overseas) and two 
Official (composed of members of the civil service). Responsibility for overseas 
information services would return to the Foreign Office. There would be no 
Minister of Information but there would be a Minister of Cabinet rank who would 
head the Committees and oversee broad policy. The new Central Information 
Office would be funded on a Treasury vote.8
Factors Informing Morrison’s Plan
Morrison’s plan was informed by three factors. First, by the belief that 
communication had now become a responsibility of modern Government. Second, 
by his conviction that communication was simply a functional task. Third, by his 
awareness that Government communication was still a politically sensitive issue 
as a result of its use by fascist and communist Governments over the previous 
two decades.
A Responsibility of Modern Government
Morrison’s belief that communication was now a responsibility of Government 
was due mainly to the experience of the war, bolstered by his own Party political 
views. The war’, Morrison wrote in 1944, ‘has shown the need for it 
[communication] and pointed the way to its proper development in peace’.9
Up till 1939 there had been intermittent, sporadic development of Government 
information services. In 1931 there were only 45 people employed wholly or 
partially in Government publicity.10 Though this number grew throughout the 
1930s there was significant discomfort with the use of Government publicity and
8 From Lord President’s Report, later to become CP(45)316, CAB 124/987.
9 MG(44)12, Memorandum, Home Secretary, The Future of the Ministry of Information and 
Government Publicity’, 2-6-1944, CAB 87/74.
10 According to replies to Treasury departmental inquiry of civil servants deployed on publicity work 
1930-31, cited in Mariel Grant (1994), p.45.
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propaganda. So much so that the Ministry of Information was put on hold until the 
onset of war made it absolutely necessary.11
The war provided a massive learning experience. At its start, the MOI was 
considered incompetent and unnecessary. By its end the Government had ‘built 
up an organisation, and developed a technique, which are [sic] impressive in the 
extreme’.12 Francis Williams, the MOI’s Controller of News and Censorship during 
the war, echoed many when he said The Government information services 
proved their value many times in war’.13 And, as another Treasury Study group 
wrote in 1944, the ‘experience of war-time conditions has shown the need for 
much more extensive and continuous information’.14
This newfound need for continuous information was confirmed in the 
recommendations of an official committee, asked in 1944 to examine the post­
war role of the MOI and its functions. ‘We started our study’, wrote the chair, Sir 
Alan Barlow, ‘on the assumption that a Ministry of Information would not in any 
event be retained as part of the permanent machinery of Government. In the 
course of it, however, we have been driven to the view... that, purely on the 
grounds of organizational efficiency, there is a strong case for retaining a 
permanent Ministry’.15
This change of viewpoint may have been driven partly by self-interest. By 
January 1944 there were 3,999 Government staff employed by the MOI and by 
the departmental press offices on home information services.16 There were
11 See Philip M. Taylor (1981), Temple Willcox, (1984), and Mariel Grant (1994) in bibliography.
12 MGO(47), Official Committee on the Machinery of Government, ‘Distribution of Government 
Business’, 24-4-1944, CAB 87/74.
13 Francis Williams, Press, Parliament and People (1946) p.81.
14 Treasury Study Group 1944 -  original memorandum date unknown, re-circulated to Home 
Information Services Committee in July 1947, IH(0)(47)35, 1-7-1947, CAB 134/356.
15 MG(0)47, Report by Official Committee on Machinery of Government, 24-4-1944, CAB 87/74.
16 IS(48)6, Cost of Government Information Services, 12-4-1948, figures for 1944-45, CAB 134/458.
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another 1,661 people working within Britain on overseas information services.17 
From early 1945 many of these public relations advisors were manoeuvring to 
hold onto their positions in Government. Self-preservation helped some of them 
to find justification for their services. An anonymous civil servant felt it necessary 
to report to the Treasury that there was ‘active “jockeying” for permanent 
positions... among various PROs [Public Relations Officers]’.18
But the Barlow report also represented an increasingly common view within 
Whitehall that communication had become integral to the process of modern 
Government. This is illustrated by a broadsheet published by the think tank, 
Political and Economic Planning (PEP), in February 1945. There is evidence that 
this PEP report, and subsequent ones, helped inform the new administration’s 
belief in the need for the permanent machinery of communication.
PEP had been formed in 1931 to emphasise the importance of planning to the 
country and the responsibility of the state in developing plans. Its principles were 
based on those laid down in an article by Max Nicholson, The National Plan for 
Great Britain’.19 It published regular pieces on issues ranging from the control of 
national utilities to the state of the Press. Its reports were written by committees 
of between three and ten people and then published anonymously. During the 
Thirties its ‘inquiries played a vital part in the emergence of what has been called 
a “consensus on social responsibility”’.20
17 Ibid. Figure for those working abroad on overseas information services at this time is not given.
18 Letter from Civil Servant (who chose to conceal identity) to Treasury, undated -  by implication 
January-February 1945, T 213/404.
19 The National Plan for Great Britain’ supplement to Week-End Review, 14-2-1931, cited by Max 
Nicholson in prologue of John Pinder (ed.), 50 Years of PEP -  Looking Forward 1931-81 (1981).
20 Cook and Stevenson, The Slump (1977), p.29.
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Throughout its history PEP had consistently championed the cause of greater 
information. 21 And in February 1945 it published an in-depth report on 
Government Information Services in Britain. The report gave a detailed rationale 
on why information services should be retained and highlighted how some of the 
dangers of Government information could be avoided.22
Though the reports were written anonymously, we know from a letter sent to 
Edward Bridges in 1955, that the Committee that wrote the report on information 
services was chaired by S.C. (Clem) Leslie.23 Leslie was Herbert Morrison’s 
Principal Private Secretary, as well as being a close friend. They had first been 
introduced in 1935 when Morrison was preparing to fight his campaign for 
London. Leslie was a successful advertiser at the time, known for the creation of 
‘Mr. Therm’ for the gas industry, and he and Morrison ‘immediately became very 
attached to each other’.24 In 1940 Morrison took Leslie from the Ministry of 
Supply to head up his public relations team at the Home Office (setting a 
precedent for high salaries that would raise the profile of public relations in all 
Government Departments25). Leslie remained there until 1943 after which time he 
became Morrison’s Principal Private Secretary (till 1945).
Therefore Leslie’s PEP report was informed both by the Barlow report and by his 
previous work with Morrison. We also know, by the fact that PH ‘Puck’ Boon, 
Morrison’s Public Relations Officer, refers to the report in the Lord President’s 
files, that the broadsheet itself fed into Morrison’s plan in late 1945.26
21 For example, 1936 Planning Broadsheet, 3/71, quoted in Mariel Grant (1994), p.54.
22 PEP Broadsheet, ‘Government Information Services’, No.230, 2-2-1945.
23 SC Leslie to EE Bridges, regarding new PEP Press committee, 25-5-1955, T 273/20.
24 Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p.209.
25 Correspondence to JIC Crombie at the Treasury 1939-41 from range of Ministries requesting 
sanction for employment of Chief Information Officers and Press Officers, T 213/404.
26 PH Boon to Morrison, 10-9-1945, ‘A Broadsheet on 'Government Information Services’ was 
published by P.E.P. in February 1945 -  I have a copy if you wish to examine it’, CAB 124/985.
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The findings of the report, even in its minutiae, reflect this. For example, the 
report is uncomfortable with the term ‘Public Relations’ and recommends that it 
be abolished in favour of ‘Information’. Morrison tried to institute this change 
consistently throughout the late 1940s, even though quite a number of 
Departments objected. Similarly, the report constantly emphasises rights, both 
those of the Government, which has the 'right to make its purposes and methods 
effectively known’, and those of the people; ‘it is high time, in consonance with 
democratic principle, that fuller and simpler explanations be given to the great 
majority of people, who have a right to know’. Both these ‘rights’ are also referred 
to by Morrison, who said it was ‘the right and indeed the duty of the Government 
to inform the public of the facts necessary for the full understanding of its actions 
and decisions...[and] the people have a “right to know”’.27
The links with PEP actually go much deeper than just this report. Max Nicholson, 
the founder of PEP and ‘a man of mercurial intelligence’, was also the head of 
Morrison’s office.28 Michael Young, a frequent contributor to PEP, wrote the 
Labour manifesto for the 1945 election with Morrison. A series of PEP reports on 
the Press in 1938 formed the basis of the research done by the Royal 
Commission on the Press formed by Morrison in 1947 (see next chapter). And, 
PEP Planning Broadsheets litter the Lord President’s files throughout the mid to 
late 1940s.29
Though he might not explicitly express it, Morrison’s belief in the need for greater 
communication was also influenced by his Party political perspective. Implicit 
within Labour’s plans in 1945, for nationalisation and for universal welfare, was 
the idea of a much closer partnership with the people. Communication was
27 GEN 85/2, Memorandum, Morrison, 14-9-1945, CAB 78/37. ’
28 Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p.350.
29 PEP’s July 1947 report, The Plan and the Public’, was also important and will be discussed later. 
See also ’Men, Management and Machines’ No. 260, 3-1-1947, in CAB 124/908.
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critical to the success of this partnership. Morrison expressed this in a speech to 
the Fabian society in the autumn of 1945. His vision was of, “the people, the 
Party, the electorate... steadily reasoning out the Government programme as it 
goes along, in partnership so to speak with Parliament and Government itself. 
That” Morrison said, ‘would be true democracy”.30
Though there may be a growing belief that communication was a responsibility of 
modern Government, there were considerable differences of opinion about how 
this responsibility might be fulfilled. Many politicians, especially Conservatives, 
saw no justification for a central office of information. Chamberlain had made this 
very clear in 1939 and Brendan Bracken, the Minister of Information from 1941, 
reiterated this view throughout the war.31 Even some of those within the Labour 
Cabinet, such as Aneurin Bevan, thought the same in 1945.32 Other Conservative 
politicians went even further, believing that there was not even any need for 
departmental press offices, except ‘in departments with something to sell’.33
Morrison brushed over some of the differences of approach. ‘I am convinced of 
the importance of the right kind of Government publicity’ he told the Cabinet 
committee on information’.34 Like the Prime Minister he was persuaded that 
‘Every Government must present to the public the facts necessary for an
30 Morrison speech,’ The Labour Party and the Next Ten Years’, Autumn 1945 to Fabian Society, 
Forward from Victory! Labour’s Plan (1946) p.16.
31 Chamberlain, Parliamentary Debates, Vol.348, col. 1501-02,15-6-1939. Bracken, response of 
Minister of Information to PM’s Directive WP(43)476, ‘With regard to the Ministry of Information 
itself the Minister proposes that it should be dissolved at the conclusion of the war with Germany... 
In the Minister’s opinion it is inevitable that, as a general rule, Government Departments should 
resume responsibility for the conduct of their individual activities in the field of publicity’, BCS, 11- 
11-1943, INF 1/941.
32 See letter from Ministry of Health (signature illegible) to WS Murrie regarding Bevan’s views, 
Cabinet Offices, 10-9-1945, CAB 21/2011.
33 MG(44)13, Memorandum, Postmaster General, The Future of the Ministry of Information and 
Government Publicity’, , 6-6-1944, CAB 87/74.
34 Morrison to Attlee, 14-11-1945, CAB 124/987.
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understanding of the Government’s activities’.35 At this time they did not question 
which facts would be necessary or whether the public would seek to understand 
them.
A Purely Functional Task
Morrison believed that communication had become a responsibility of 
Government, but in 1945 he was convinced it was purely a functional task. Once 
again the war was critical in helping to lead Morrison to this view.
The idea had become prevalent during the war that the MOI, after an ‘unfortunate 
start’, had, by late 1941, ‘relapsed into being little more than a convenient funnel 
through which news and publicity was passed to the Press and the public’.36 This 
idea of a ‘convenient funnel’ was attractive to those worried that the Ministry 
might be perceived as Machiavellian.
By 1944 Cyril Radcliffe, the director-general of the MOI, was so converted to the 
functional idea that he was able to tell Sir Alan Barlow’s committee that 'a small 
central organization with projections in each of the Departments’ would be 
adequate to channel information to the public. News could be distributed to the 
Press, for example, ‘by a small Government office in Fleet Street, connected by 
teleprinter with Government Departments’. The need for other wartime aspects of 
information services, such as home intelligence (public opinion testing and the 
Social Survey), would, Radcliffe thought, be ‘extremely limited’.37
Barlow’s committee followed Radcliffe’s lead and suggested that the peacetime 
job of communication was essentially mechanical, representing simply a 
‘dissemination of facts’. The MOI could therefore be replaced by a ‘common
35 GEN 85/1st. Minutes, Post-war Organisation of Government Publicity, 19-9-1945, CAB 78/37.
36 ‘Unfortunate start’ from Barlow Report, MGO(44), April 1944, CAB 87/74. ‘Relapsed into...’, 
Michael Balfour, quoted in Ian McLaine, Ministry of Morale, p.250.
37 MGO(44)41st, Minutes, Official Committee on the Machinery of Government, 8-2-1944, T222/68.
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service unit’ which would fulfil all the production functions on behalf of the 
departments.38
Morrison read the Barlow report and agreed with its essentials. Although he saw 
the peacetime job as ‘more difficult and delicate’ it was, Morrison believed, ‘a 
largely technical one’.39 The primary function of the machinery would be to 
‘convey to the public the facts, pleasant or unpleasant, which are necessary for 
the understanding of operative Government policy’.40
Morrison’s conviction that communication was functional is borne out by his plan 
for restructuring the information services. He could ‘see no justification for it [the 
new central information office] being under the charge of a separate Minister’.41 
He thought ‘it should be kept on a light rein, free from over meticulous Ministerial 
control’. He made it clear that it was the responsibility of the Departments to 
initiate campaigns, not the central office. And, the limited amount of attention 
Morrison subsequently bestowed on the information services in 1946, despite 
being head of both Ministerial Committees to oversee them, indicates that he was 
convinced that the process of communication was simple and straightforward.42 
The Prime Minister’s statement to the House regarding the formation of a new 
central information service, which was drawn up by Morrison’s office, stated 
unequivocally, ‘this is merely a technical organisation’.43
Our knowledge of Morrison’s character also suggests that he believed the task 
would be straightforward. He was, in his biographers’ words, ‘practical, detailed, 
direct and clear’ and had ‘a passion for efficiency, tidiness and order, and for
38 Barlow Report, MGO(44), April 1944, CAB 87/74.
39 GEN 85/2, Memorandum, Lord President, 14-9-1945, CAB 78/37.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 The Ministerial Committee on Home Information Services (IH) met only twice in 1946 and three 
times in 1947, CAB 134/354.
43 Attlee, Hansard, 7-3-1946, Vol.420, Col.522.
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business-like enterprise’.44 In an interview after Morrison’s death Christopher 
Mayhew said that ‘He had a simple trust and belief that if one put the facts in a 
reasoned way, in a common sense way, the people would come round’.45
There were a number of people who questioned the premise that communication 
was such a straightforward task. Leslie himself, after reading the Barlow report in 
May 1944, wrote to the chairman to tell him that after the war information would 
be much more important than the Committee realised.46 Leslie objected to ‘this 
limited come-and-go approach to public relations’.47 The Committee sympathised 
with Leslie’s position but did not think he had taken account of the political 
context. They regarded him as too much of an ‘enthusiast with no inhibitions’.48
Ted Williams, the Labour Minister of Information, also questioned the premise, 
believing that without a Minister the new information service would lack unity and 
coherence and would be unable to attract good recruits. Morrison assuaged 
Williams, ‘As you know’, he told him ‘I have a great deal of sympathy with your 
point of view and I am anxious that, so far as is practicable, we shall continue to 
secure that unity in British publicity policy which is so clearly desirable’.49 But 
privately Morrison dismissed the charges, agreeing with his Private Secretary that 
Williams’ ‘real quarrel is with the basic assumptions which have already been 
decided against him’.50
Others suggested that far from simply being functional, information machinery 
could be a positive force for political change. Stephen Taylor was one of these.
44 Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p.34.
45 Interview with Christopher Mayhew, 3-7-1968, Morrison Biographical Papers, Section 6-3, 
Interviews L-R, BLPES.
46 Leslie to Barlow, ‘A Note on the Future of Departmental Public Relations’, 15-5-1944, T222/68.
47 Leslie to Barlow, follow-up letter, 18-5-1944, T222/68.
48 BD Fraser to Barlow, regarding Leslie’s letter, 22-5-1944, T222/68.
49 Morrison to Ted Williams, 23-11-1945, CAB 124/988.
50 E.M. Nicholson to Morrison, 20-11-1945, CAB 124/988.
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Taylor had been head of Home Intelligence and championed the cause of public 
opinion surveys after the war. He was elected to Parliament in 1945 and later 
became Morrison’s Parliamentary Private Secretary. His 1945 article, The Future 
of Government Information Services’, printed in the Fabian Quarterly, provided 
another aspect to the debate on the continuation of the communication 
machinery. The article is also contained within Morrison’s correspondence for 
November 1945.51
Taylor tried to offer comfort to those who feared information services would be 
used as they had been in the fascist states. Information machinery was just a tool 
of Government, he said. If the Government was fascist then it would promote 
fascism, if democratic then it would promote democracy. He argued this was a 
natural development emerging from the growth of mass communication and 
commercial advertising, ‘Sooner or later it was inevitable that those with ideas to 
sell, rather than toothpaste, would enter the field’. This connection of politics and 
commercial advertising appeared to cause him no concern. The war’, Taylor 
argued, ‘has provided a large scale demonstration that the ideas and ideals of 
democracy can be successfully handled in the same way’.52
A Politically Sensitive Issue
For the same reason that Taylor was excited about the ideological potential of 
Government communication, others were very concerned. These anxieties 
represented the third factor influencing Morrison’s plans for the information 
services.
51 Stephen Taylor, The Future of Government Information Services', Fabian Quarterly, No.48,
December 1945, filed in CAB 124/988. Also in LP’s correspondence for November 1945, CAB 
124/988.
52 Ibid.
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Goebbels’ shadow hung over the idea of Government sponsored information 
machinery. Captain Harry Crookshank, Coalition Postmaster-General, 
responding to the Barlow report in June 1944, wrote that he was concerned that 
the machinery proposed by the Barlow Committee would tend towards ‘too great 
Governmental power over public opinion’ and set it on ‘the road all the dictators 
have travelled’. Therefore he recommended that after the war the information 
services be cut back not by the ‘pruning hook’ but by ‘the axe’. By this he meant 
restoring ‘Public Relations Departments to their pre-war scale’ and closing down 
the MOI entirely.53
In addition to Conservative politicians like Crookshank, most of the Press were 
strongly against the perpetuation of any central machinery of information. When 
news leaked out about the Government discussions on the MOI on 17th 
September 1945 it immediately led to articles accusing Labour of trying to create 
a totalitarian style propaganda machine. The Press speculated that Cabinet was 
conspiring to keep the MOI and pointed to Morrison as the ‘leader of the 
survivalist group’.54 The Daily Express said that ‘if the Ministry is not wound up 
there is sure to be a first class rumpus. The Opposition will insist that it is 
improper for Party Government to use for propaganda a Ministry financed by 
public money’.55
The Lord President was well aware of these political sensitivities. As well as 
being a pragmatic politician, Morrison was also a very sharp one.56 Francis 
Williams, in 1945 the public relations advisor to the Prime Minister, said Morrison
53 MG(44)13, Memorandum, Postmaster General, The Future of the Ministry of Information and 
Government Publicity’, 6-6-1944, CAB 87/74.
54 Evening Standard, 18-9-1945, “Who wants the MOI?”, “Leader of the survivalist group is Mr. 
Herbert Morrison”. Clipping in LP’s files, CAB 124/985.
55 Daily Express, ‘Keep the MOI -  Socialist Demand’, 17-9-1945, p.1.
56 His biographers called him the “The maestro of cunning’, Donoughue & Jones, Morrison, p.150
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had that ‘instinctive awareness of the political consequences of unpolitical events 
which is the mark of the genuine man of politics’.57
He predicted the new Department would attract far less hostility without a Minister, 
and said as much to Attlee: There would be the advantage under this scheme 
that, having abolished the Minister of Information, you would not have to say that 
you had appointed another Minister to give whole time attention to Government 
information work’.58
Similarly, he knew that home information services were far more controversial 
than overseas ones, and made sure it was the overseas services which were 
emphasised in the Prime Minister’s statement to the House on 7th March (which 
his office drafted).59 Kenneth Grubb, from the MOI, put this clearly to his Minister 
the previous September: ‘It comes to this. We cannot justify the Ministry solely by 
reference to its past work as a central agency of home publicity. The case rests 
on arguments in favour of greater activity and initiative on the fringe of political 
controversy. These arguments are the crux of the whole issue and are debatable. 
But we are spared this stormy passage if our craft has already reached 
permanent moorings through the calmer waters of overseas publicity’.60
This also helps to explain why Morrison excised the Social Survey from the final 
version of his plans. He knew that public opinion testing during the Second World 
War had been one of the most unpopular measures instituted by the MOI (the
57 Francis Williams, The Triple Challenge (1948) p.87-88.
58 Personal Note on ‘Government Publicity’, Morrison to Attlee; ‘My dear Clem, I have been trying 
my hand at helping you in connection with the Government information problem. Result is enclosed 
which is not for the Committee but for your own information’ 2-10-1945, CAB 124/985.
59 Preparation of PM’s statement, JAR Pimlott to Bamford, Rowan et al, 5-3-1946, CAB 124/990.
60 Grubb to Williams, 10-9-1945, INF 1/942.
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surveyors were referred to as ‘Cooper’s Snoopers’). Therefore, despite his own 
belief in it, he removed it from the original remit of the COI.61
The Eventual Plan
The conflicting pressures on Morrison meant that there were significant 
contradictions in the eventual plan that emerged. Morrison had removed the 
Minister of Information only to replace him with two Ministerial policy-making 
Committees. He wanted the Central Office of Information to be a purely technical 
agency servicing the needs of the Departments but he also wanted it be an 
‘instrument for infusing vitality into the Government’s information services as a 
whole’, staffed by people ‘of lively imagination’ -  in other words, a creative 
agency.62 He was determined that the Government should project a ‘common 
line’ so that ‘publicity at home is consistent and overlapping and conflicts are 
avoided’.63 Yet the Departments were supposed to commission their publicity 
independently and there was only limited machinery to coordinate action. He 
thought that the service would be limited and controllable and even called for 
‘drastic cuts in expenditure’.64 But then in the first committee meeting used open- 
ended language to encourage its use. ‘Ministers and Departments’ he said 
'should feel that it [the COI] belonged to all of them and should make the fullest 
possible use of its officers and the help they could give’.65
Even so, Morrison’s plan was presented to Cabinet on 6th December 1945 
virtually unchanged.66 Ted Williams was the only Minister to object to it, arguing
61 Comparison of draft plans for organisation of post-war Government publicity, October 1945, CAB 
124/987.
62 ‘Government Publicity Services’, Morrison draft, 14-11-1945, CAB 124/987.
63 Ibid.
64 CP(45)316, ‘Government Publicity Services’, Annex 1 by Lord President, 23-11-1945 CAB 129/5.
65 Ol & IH(46), Overseas and Home Information Services Joint Meeting, Minutes, 8-4-1946, CAB 
124/990.
66 Cabinet Papers, CP(45)316, CAB 129/5; discussed at CM(45)60, 6-12-1945, CAB 128/2.
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again that the department needed a Minister. The Prime Minister replied briskly 
that “it seemed to him politically dangerous that there should be a minister with 
no other responsibility but the conduct of publicity”.67 The rest of the Cabinet 
ratified the plan and Morrison was invited to organise a committee of officials to 
work out the details of a new central organisation.
On December, 17th, in the pre-Christmas lull, Attlee read Morrison’s text to the 
House, concentrating on the less controversial overseas information services.68 
Two days later Barlow met with his new official Committee that would draw up the 
structure of the new Central Office that would replace it -  based on Morrison’s 
plan.69 By February 11th most of the Ministries had responded to Barlow’s draft. 
Though there were criticisms, particularly from the Department of Health and of 
Labour and National Service, the Cabinet approved the plans almost unchanged 
on Monday 18th February.70 At the end of March 1946 the MOI was dissolved. On 
the first of April the Central Office of Information (COI) took over.
SECTION 2: Communications Machinery Does Not Run Itself
In 1946 the Government approached communication with a blithe sense of 
assurance. It assumed that it could still act as though it were a coalition 
Government during wartime and enjoy the same benefits. It thought that the 
objectives of communication were straightforward. It believed that it could create 
messages that were consensual and apolitical. It assumed that it could continue 
to distribute information through a compliant media towards grateful workers. And 
it thought that people would demand information to the same degree as in
67 Cabinet Conclusions, CM(45)60, 6-12-1945, CAB 128/2.
68 Attlee reply to Maurice Webb, Hansard, Vol.417, Col.916-917, 17-12-1945.
69 First meeting of Official Committee on Government Information Services, GIS(0)(45)1, 19-12- 
1945, T219/38. Report of the Official Committee on Government Information Services, CP(46)54, 
CAB 129/7.
70 W. Douglas, DoH, 6-2-1946. Ministry of Labour, ‘Semi-detached Departments always land the 
Government in trouble’, 8-2-1946, INF 1/958. Cabinet (46)16, 18-2-1946, CAB 128/5.
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wartime. As Morrison said in a speech in January 1946, “I think the years 
immediately ahead will see a great increase in public interest in our national 
economy, and an enlivened public opinion which will insist on having the facts”.71 
It was set for a rude awakening.
The Challenge to Functionalism: Publicity Free-for-AII
Even before the Central Office was set up the Labour Government had embarked 
on a major programme of information and publicity. There were two main reasons 
for this. First, there was momentum as a result of the Second World War. Most of 
the domestic controls, like rationing, still existed in 1945. While these still 
survived the Ministries saw no reason to curtail information about them. Also, the 
end of the war led to an enormous dislocation of the population.72 Information 
was seen as a means by which to reorient people and help them settle back into 
peacetime life.
Second, the war had convinced Government of the continuing need for extensive 
publicity. Government had grown to such a size, and society had become so 
complex, that it could not operate without Government sponsored information. 
This attitude was apparent in a Treasury report to civil servants written in 1944: 
'...in the past there was insufficient attempt except on the political side to 
sweeten the pill of Government. The war has meant that the pill has swollen to 
something very large, and, unless care is taken, difficult to swallow. This in turn 
has made it clear that the public must not only be told what to do, but also why 
and how’.73
71 Morrison speech to News Chronicle Centenary dinner, 21-1-1946, Labour Party Archives, 
Manchester.
72 There were still 5 million men in the Services -  most to be demobilized. 500,000 homes had 
been destroyed, and a further 250,000 severely damaged. 5 million people were working in civil 
defence or munitions -  from Peter Hennessy, Never Again (1993) p.99.
73 Treasury Report 1944, exact date unknown - re-circulated at meeting of Home Information 
Services, IH(0)(47)35, 1-7-1949, CAB 134/356.
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Each Department was also hungry for the chance of more publicity. Thomas Fife 
Clark, the Public Relations officer for the Ministry of Health, sent a letter to his 
Minister, Aneurin Bevan, before the end of August 1945 telling him that The full 
and proper presentation of news and policy to the general public must be an 
essential factor in administration during the post war period. It was never so 
important to have a good publicity organisation’.74 This was, he asserted, a new 
start. Although there had been an office since 1935, ‘to the beginning of the war 
very little was done in the way of mass publicity on health education, apart from a 
single and abortive campaign’.75 Even during the war ‘we have had to deal with 
health education in a piecemeal way’. Only now, he suggested, was there an 
opportunity for ‘a much more planned and long term approach’.76
Therefore the Departments launched into campaigns with no sense of guilt and 
were engaged in publicity from the start of the administration. The Ministry of 
Food continued to publish regular ‘Food Facts’ giving advice and recipes for 
rationed food.77 The National Savings Committee placed ads urging people to 
save.78 The Ministry of War Transport still earnestly urged people to ‘Keep Death 
off the Road’.79 Many other Departments maintained or increased their wartime 
communication. By the time the COI was set up they had been working on their 
own propaganda for eight months. They were very loath to concede any of their 
autonomy to the new central office and before it was even launched ten 
Departments tried to claim ‘special treatment’ to avoid using the service. There
74 Fife Clark, ‘Public Relations Policy’, 20-8-1945, forwarded to Aneurin Bevan 27-8-1945, MH 
151/62.
75 Fife Clark to Neville, 10-9-1945, MH 151/62.
76 Fife Clark, ‘Public Relations Policy’, 20-8-1945, op.cit., MH 151/62.
77 E.g. The Times, 20-11-1945, This Winter its Vital not to Waste Bread’, p.7.
78 E.g. The Times, 24-12-1945, Santa Claus, ‘And thank you, Savings Workers; May your energies 
never flag, you shorten my road, you lighten my load, and put savings in the bag'.
79 E.g. Manchester Guardian, 18-12-1945 (‘Remember, ‘A second spent in looking is worth weeks 
in hospital’).
31
Chapter 1
were certain functions, they wrote to Barlow, which they thought ‘could better be 
performed by them’.80 They took exception on 32 specific issues, and followed 
these with another 11 'suggestions that may require further consideration’ in the 
relationship between Departments and the Central Office.81
There is little evidence of a planned or long term approach in the actions of the 
Departments in 1946. Even once they started using the Central Service they 
pelted it with campaigns and campaign ideas without any regard for overall 
strategy. The Central Office was quickly overwhelmed. The Official Committee on 
Home Information Services (IH(O)) was supposed to oversee publicity and 
arbitrate when disagreements arose. The minutes of their first meeting look more 
like those of a media buying company than a Committee on Government 
communication. The 23 attendees spent most of it arguing over the distribution of 
advertising space in the national press.82 By the third meeting they were trying 
desperately to secure some additional space, a gap in the newspaper advertising 
programme that could be saved for emergency information or fast turnaround 
campaigns.83 But Sir Eric Bamford, the acting head of the COI until Robert Fraser 
took over said ‘the demands of Government advertising were so much greater 
than the space available that it was impossible to leave a margin for 
contingencies’.84
In an attempt to create some sort of plan the Official Committee started setting up 
sub-Committees and working parties. These too proliferated quickly. By the
80 Meara’s summary of ‘Points arising from correspondence between the Treasury and the Home 
Departments in connection with the constitution and fuctions of the COI’, 1-3-1946, attached to 
letter from Bamford (acting DG) to Fraser, INF 1/958.
81 Ibid. Also following Barlow Report on Structure of Information Services sent to Ministerial Meeting 
of Home and Overseas Information Services, February 1946, INF 12/308.
82 IH(0)1st, Minutes, 11-4-1946, CAB 134/355.
83 IH(0)3rd, Minutes, 19-6-1946, CAB 134/355.
84 Ibid. Eric Bamford.
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spring of 1947 there were 27 of them co-ordinating inter-Departmental publicity, 
plus a further 11 ad hoc groups that met irregularly.85
It was quickly becoming apparent that not everything could be communicated at 
once. Yet each department found it difficult to accept that its own information was 
less important than that of another. The COI also lacked the authority to 
distinguish between them. There were therefore increasing demands for more 
Ministerial management and direction.
Responsible for What? Defining the Limits of Communication
As the departments were busy pursuing their own publicity agendas it was also 
becoming clear that not only did these need some coordination, but they required 
some guidelines. For example, in the communication of legislation. One of the 
original objectives of the post-war information services was that legislation should 
be popularised in order to make it comprehensible to the masses.86
Morrison reiterated this at the end of 1946. He ‘thought it might be useful to issue 
a series of pamphlets explaining important new Acts of Parliament so soon as 
these received the Royal Assent’. But this raised a number of questions, 
including which acts should be defined as ‘important’, and how they should be 
popularised. The COI tried to define some criteria to limit its involvement by 
restricting this to major legislation or ‘wherever there is need for a practiced 
editorial technique, for popularising through the simplification of the text and the
85 List of standing committees and working parties, IH(0)(47)29, CAB 134/356.
86 In 1943 a decision was taken under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Acts that explanatory 
material be issued along with subordinate legislation (and instructions issued in TC7/43). After 
these expired, ‘the Legislation committee had decided that explanatory material should be issued 
with all subordinate legislation and that central machinery should be established to supervise their 
form and scope’. IH (0)(46)2, Minutes, 16-5-1946, CAB 134/355.
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use of visual material, and generally for investing the pamphlet with “sales 
appeal” and “reader interest" by an active editorial approach’.87
But this still left many questions unanswered. The Ministry of National Insurance, 
for example, wanted to know how access to information altered a citizen’s 
responsibilities. In the past it had been assumed, the Ministry wrote, that 
’’’Ignorance of the law is no excuse” but, in a democracy, during an intensive 
legislation period, can the onus be said to shift to Government?’. Similarly, how 
far does the Government’s commitment extend, ‘Is a piece of legislation which 
affects the whole adult population to be explained in a publication that costs 
money?’. If so, then surely the audience will be restricted; ‘Is the group’ he wrote 
‘represented by these purchasers likely to be the group most in need of 
enlightenment?’.88
Equally, it was not clear why the Government should stop at legislation. What 
about the other roles and responsibilities of the Government and the citizen? In 
January 1947, for example, Robert Fraser remembered a request from Morrison 
‘that something should be done to explain the social purpose of taxation. He 
thought that an effective approach to the problem could be made in the form of a 
15 minute cartoon type film’.89
The Committee eventually fudged the issue by agreeing ‘that information officers 
should automatically consider the publication of an explanatory memorandum or 
a pamphlet whenever their Department was involved in legislation leading to the 
passing of an act’. 90 But the discussions illustrated that only when the
87 IH(0)(47)3, Memorandum, ‘Pamphlets on new Acts of Public Importance’, 4-2-1947, CAB 
134/356.
88 IH(0)(47)6, Memorandum, Ministry of National Insurance, 20-2-1947, CAB 134/356.
89 PC(0)C(47)3rd, Minutes, Robert Fraser, 16-1-1947, CAB 124/908.
90 IH(0)(47)4th, Minutes, 2-4-47, CAB 134/356.
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Government committed itself to communication did its repercussions begin to 
become apparent.
Challenge to Ambitions: The Prosperity Campaign. 1946
When a department committed itself to an information campaign it had to define 
that campaign’s objectives. The experience of the Prosperity Campaign of 1946-7 
showed that in defining these objectives the Government might have to 
compromise its ambitions. The campaign was launched in February 1946 
because Morrison, as head of economic planning, had calculated that there 
would be a manpower shortage of 1.3 million people by the end of 1946 which 
would seriously effect production.91 He wanted to appeal to industry to increase 
output. If people could be moved more quickly out of the Services back to 
industry and encouraged to put in extra effort now, then, the idea was, they could 
be assured ‘employment for all’ and ‘fair shares for all’.92
Francis Williams, who had been head of News and Censorship at the MOI, was 
asked to head a committee to translate this appeal into action. Williams’ wartime 
experience had given him the confidence that the public had both the appetite for 
information and the common sense to comprehend it. He decided, therefore, that 
the Prosperity Campaign should be based on a ‘simple presentation of the facts’ 
without exhortation.93 The only thing that seriously upset the British people’, 
Williams wrote in 1945, ‘was to withhold facts from them’. His committee 
therefore settled on a slogan they believed was free from political sensitivity and
91 Cabinet Papers, CP(46)32, ‘Economic Survey for 1946’, memorandum by Lord President, 30-1- 
1946, CAB 129/6.
92 Report of Douglas Jay, 28-5-1946, CAB 124/905.
93 Original meetings of PC Committee not minuted. Reference from IH(0)(46)2, Minutes, 16-5-1946, 
CAB 134/355.
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because ‘it had not the character of an exhortation’; Extra Effort Now Means 
Better Living Sooner.94
Consistent with the idea of steady reasoning, the campaign was due to run in 
long phases. The first phase, running from March to October 1946, would include 
Ministerial speeches, national production conferences and a ‘large scale 
approach to the masses’ (the publicity was not to be targeted yet).95 The second 
stage would see the campaign broaden out to a regional level with local meetings 
and discussions in factories. The Committee believed it was key to keep it factual 
and be meticulously consensual. ‘Let us all be quite clear’ Robert Fraser wrote, 
‘that we are concerned to present the successive stages of progress factually as 
steps forward in a national effort, not politically as feathers in the Government’s 
cap’.96
It might have been non-controversial, and, as an observer wrote to Williams ‘It 
can hardly be faulted by the economists, the statisticians or the historians who 
are always ready to pounce if the Government puts a comma out of place’. But, 
as the same writer continued, ‘oh! It’s cold!.... cold and impersonal... Cannot 
there be found something warmer, more human, more tangible to offer?’.97
In addition to its remoteness, the campaign had perilously high hopes of the 
electorate. For its second stage, due to start in October, the Committee had 
grand visions of ‘a campaign for economic literacy’. This is a very large order’, 
the members wrote on 1st October, ‘involving in the first place mass education in
94 PC(0)C meeting, 1-5-1946, CAB 124/904.
95 ‘Central Office of Information -  National Production Drive Publicity’, Note by DG, 16-7-1946, CAB 
124/906.
96 Ibid.
97 A.G. Millikin to PC(0)C, 14-1-1947, CAB 124/908.
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elementary mid-twentieth century economics’.98 The ambition, it would appear, 
was to teach the population Keynesian economic theory, since, in the Committee 
memorandum’s words, ‘the mass of the nation suffers from a mixture of economic 
illiteracy and a litter of economic half-truths’.99
The memorandum went on to define in more precise terms the Committee’s 
thoughts on national re-education. It need not be over-complicated, it argued, the 
Government ‘can merely hammer in the salient points such as:
1. the dependence of standards of living on production;
2. the need to export in order to import;
3. the need to adjust industrial practice to the prospect of full employment
and to sweep away restrictionist attitudes and arrangements both on the
employers and trade union side;
4. the need to maintain controls where shortages of supplies persist or fair 
shares are essential;
5. the need for relating wage policy to the required distribution of manpower; 
and
6. the need for balancing consumption against investment’.100
It is remarkable that the Committee members did not see this plan as over- 
ambitious and patently political. It only seems explicable if we accept Paul
98 PC(0)C(46)25, Memorandum, ‘Prosperity Campaign -  Future Arrangements’, 1-10-1946, CAB 
124/906.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
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Addison’s thesis that there was an unquestioned Keynesian economic consensus 
after the war, especially within Whitehall.101
It took an outsider to suggest that the Committee might be being unrealistic. Clem 
Leslie, who was now working for the Council of Industrial Design, found out about 
the Committee’s plans (probably through his friend Robert Fraser who supported 
Leslie’s observations). He wrote a memorandum diplomatically suggesting that 
the Government ‘must be on guard against over-intellectualising the problem’.102 
He felt a long term programme of adult education was ‘unfeasible’. Referring 
back to the war he cited the National Savings Committee’s “Save to Buy Guns” 
campaign which, while not sound economically, got its point across without 
requiring any knowledge of supply side economics. Leslie’s appeal to limit 
ambitions would soon be reinforced by surveys indicating persistent low levels of 
economic understanding amongst the people.
Reaching the People: the Problems of Distribution
Only once the administration had committed itself to producing information did it 
begin to grapple with the consequent problems of distribution. During the war it 
had made agreements with the newspapers to provide advertising space, with 
the cinemas to screen Government films, with the BBC to allow the Government 
airtime, and with industry to appeal to factory workers via posters, exhibitions, 
speakers and films.103 At the end of the conflict the justification for these 
agreements ended. But the production of information by the Government
101 Paul Addison, ‘Keynesianism... was so deeply embedded in Whitehall that it had to come and, 
whether they realized it or not, the party leaders were proto-Keynesians already', The Road to 
1945 , p.289
102 PC(O)C(46)30, 'Publicity for Production (Notes prepared by Mr. Leslie)’, 11-10-1946, CAB 
124/906
103 During the war the newspapers agreed to allow the Government paid for advertising space as 
part of a ‘gentleman’s agreement’. The Cinema Exhibitor’s Association (CEA) agreed to screen 
Government short films and trailers free of charge. The BBC gave the Government airtime each 
week and Ministers access to broadcast. Factories agreed to put up posters and allow speakers, 
exhibitions and film screenings (see IH(0)(46)12, 16-7-1946, CAB 134/355).
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continued. By late 1946 departmental information officers were desperately 
unsure how their material would find an outlet.104
Without help or direction from senior Ministers, officials tended to cling onto any 
channels that remained available to them. Their retention did not, therefore, 
represent a considered policy, but an attempt to retain the privileges negotiated 
during the recent conflict. Though at the time their resolution often did not seem 
overly consequential, some had a fundamental impact on the subsequent 
practise of Government communication.
News distribution is an illustration of this. During the war each of the newspapers 
and the agencies had kept reporters at distribution points to collect Government 
news announcements. Once the war was over they were unwilling to make this 
commitment since they did not feel it was ‘economic or worthwhile’.105 Rather 
than revert to the haphazard pre-war method when each of the Departments had 
been wholly responsible for issuing their own news to whichever media outlets 
they wanted Robert Fraser thought ‘we could consider... whether some new 
system might not work more satisfactorily from the point of view of the user and 
from the point of view of the issuer than either the pre-war or wartime systems’.106 
He suggested that all Departments send their news to a central news distribution 
unit which would then, having made sure there was no duplication, send it to the 
newspapers. This was agreed and was later to become the ‘celebrated “COI 
Run”” , by 1984, 'known to all journalists for its transfusion of Government 
announcements, processed and packaged in story form by the press officers of
104 E.g. ‘Memorandum on Issue of Trailers’, IH(0)(46)11, 12-7-1946, and ‘Memorandum on Works 
Relations’, IH(0)(46)12, 16-7-1946, CAB 134/355.
105 COI Meeting Minutes, 9-4-1946, INF 12/135.
106 Ibid.
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the Government Information Services. For most newspapers and broadcasters it 
forms the spine of each day’s news agenda’.107
Questions Raised bv the Adoption of Government Communication
By the autumn of 1946 senior officials were becoming increasingly aware that 
Government communication was not as straightforward as it had been in the war 
and that the provision of information, as a separate function of Government, was 
a genuinely new departure that required reflection and attention.
In 1938-9 the Government had spent £495,045 on home information services.108 
This was already a considerable increase on the previous decade.109 By the end 
of the war the Government was spending £4,889,848.110 Despite Morrison’s calls 
for cuts this figure remained stubbornly over £4.5m.111 There were over 1,600 
people working at the COI in 1946 and about another 800 working on 
communication within the departments, the vast majority of whom had only been 
employed since 1936.112 And yet, there had been remarkably little discussion 
about their role and responsibilities.
In September 1946 Robert Fraser was concerned enough to write a letter to DJ 
Wardley (Treasury). ‘When you come to think of it’, Fraser wrote, 'the growth of 
the Government information services, even leaving the Ministry and the Central 
Office of Information out of the picture, is a large and dashing administrative
107 Cockerell, Hennessy and Walker, Sources Close to the Prime Minister (1984), p.59.
108 From The Report of the Committee on Cost of Home Information Services’, Cmd.7836, 
November 1949.
109 The Report of the Treasury Select Committee on Estimates 1938 calculated that the amount 
spent on staff wholly or partially employed on press, intelligence and/or public relations in 1931 was 
£18,650. T162/479/36055 cited in Mariel Grant (1994), p.225.
110 Op.cit., Cmd.7836, 1949.
111 Figure for 1947-48, according to Cmd.7836; £4,537,883.
112 Annual Report of the COI, 1949-50 reports that that there were 1,601 staff at the COI in 1946 
(p.31). The figure of 800 departmental staff is from letter from Fraser to Wardley, 30-9-1946, INF 
12/29. In 1931 there were 44 people employed wholly or partially on publicity work (Treasury report 
1938 cited in Mariel Grant (1994) p.45).
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event. In 1936 they hardly existed. Now all of the Departments have information 
divisions, some of them 60-70 strong, with a total membership, it seems, of some 
800. In less than ten years that is, the Government has acquired and accepted a 
new function, and the Civil Service a new branch’. And yet, Fraser pointed out, 
‘we are without anything that any of us, I think would care to call a policy’.113
In addition to failing to define information policy, Labour Ministers had not 
properly considered the significance of the adoption of communication as a 
separate function of the State. If anyone was to blame for this it was Morrison, 
and Fraser wrote to the Lord President, as Minister responsible for information, 
about his concerns, hoping to organise a regular weekly meeting to overcome 
what Fraser thought was a dangerous drift in information policy and to come to 
terms with this major extension of governance. ‘War as a simple non- 
controversial subject, and the political cover of the coalition are both gone’ Fraser 
wrote, ‘Our topics are drawn from domestic problems and some of them are 
subject to controversy... I don’t believe any Government in the world is 
attempting something similar’.114
But Morrison was still more worried about the existing means of communication 
than the new apparatus. He was busy trying to push an enquiry into the Press 
through Cabinet. Other Ministers were even less interested in communication 
than Morrison. Indeed Attlee often suggested that his Cabinet be careful of the 
media. In a number of Cabinet directives he recommended that 'Ministerial 
broadcasts should be kept to a minimum’, and that articles should only be written 
‘in order to supplement the means already used for enlightening the public in 
regard to measures before Parliament and other administrative questions
113 Robert Fraser to DJ Wardley, 30-9-1946, INF 12/29.
114 Fraser to Morrison (via JAR Pimlott), 28-9-1946, CAB 124/1017.
41
Chapter 1
affecting the work of their Departments’.115 Attlee’s own uncommunicative nature 
was infamous. When he asked Williams to be his public relations advisor he said, 
‘”As you know, Francis, I am allergic to the Press”.116 It was not just modesty 
either, Williams himself wrote that ‘Attlee is one of the most difficult men in the 
world to publicize and possesses fewer of the political arts of self-presentation 
than any public man I know’.117 The new information services were, for some 
Ministers, a means of avoiding the media rather than communicating through it.
Therefore throughout 1946, though there was significant amounts of publicity 
emerging from the COI, it lacked cohesion, organization, or focus. Where, one 
newspaper asked, ‘is that co-ordination and toning up of press facilities that was 
looked for by the appointment of Francis Williams to be PRO adviser at 10 
Downing Street? And, further, what balanced coordination obtains between 
Downing Street, the other departments interested and the newly-fledged 
COI?’.118
Meanwhile, the opposition maintained its attacks on the information machinery. 
Churchill attacked the premise for the new services. ‘Is it not a fact’ he asked, 
'that during the war we had a national coalition Government, officially 
representing all parties, and that the use of publicity in those days was for the 
essential purpose of national survival? Now that we have a two party system 
again it is very questionable how far public funds and public money 
[interrupted]... it is a different situation altogether1.119
115 Cabinet Papers, CP(49)95, ‘Questions of Procedure for Ministers’, 29-4-1949 (collection of notes 
issued since 1945), CAB 129/34.
116 Quoted by Francis Williams in his autobiography, Nothing So Strange (1970), p.215.
117 Francis Williams, Press, Parliament and People, p. 100.
118 World’s Press News, 29-8-1946, p.9.
119 Winston Churchill, Hansard, 17-10-1946, Vol.427, Col. 1054 (Oral Answers).
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Even the Government’s own supporters were lambasting Labour’s information 
policies. Although their complaint was that the administration was not nearly 
vocal enough. JB Usher (Education) thought the Government positively supine in 
the face of growing criticism of Labour policies and offered his own diagnosis: 
‘Permit me to indulge in teaching my grandmother how to make daisy chains. I 
know that between the Party in the House, the bright boys at Transport House 
and the Fabians, you can muster a fair opinion on public psychology but it does 
seem to me the Labour Government is missing one terrific thing: it is not telling 
the people about itself and its work’ (his underlining).120
A Review of the Government Approach to Communication
In November Pimlott wrote a draft Cabinet memorandum on behalf of Morrison 
trying to address the problem. There had, he pointed out, ‘been a good deal of 
criticism in Parliament and outside’ of the way in which the Government had 
presented its policy. His assessment was that There is not a sufficiently close 
link between policy and publicity’. The memo then went on, in considerable detail, 
to describe the way in which the Government should approach both 
Departmental and Government wide publicity.121
Success in the presentation of policies relied, it said, ‘upon the publicity aspect 
being kept in mind from earliest practicable stage in their formulation’. This 
included ‘steps which may not seem directly related to publicity’. But the initial 
announcement itself was critical: ‘the way it is handled by the press and the BBC 
at the very start may make all the difference to the reaction upon the public and 
to subsequent publicity’. This meant the information division had to be integral to 
the process. The Minister should work with them on timing, (‘in relation, for
120 JB Usher to Leonard (Hornsby? CIO at Ministry of Labour), June 1946, CAB 124/1004.
121 John Pimlott, first draft to Nicholson and Boon, sent 28-11-1946, to become IH(47)2, ‘Some 
Observations on Information Policy’, CAB 124/1004.
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example, to the desirability or otherwise of the first appearance of the news in the 
evening papers’), date, (‘What, too, is the most advantageous date of 
publication?), explanation (‘Should there be a summary for the press?’), delivery 
(‘Should there be a press conference? If so, should the Minister take it personally, 
and who should be invited?), and support material (‘should the announcement be 
printed as a leaflet?’). Equally they should have asked the same questions of 
themselves about the follow-up. Particularly if they wanted to make a film or use 
other publicity that required significant lead time.122
The memorandum put particular emphasis on relations with the established mass 
media. ‘I attach special importance to Press relations’ Pimlott (as Morrison) said, 
Too much care can hardly be given to the establishment of good contacts with 
Fleet Street and Broadcasting House’. The Chief Information Officer as well as 
the Press Officer should be alive to this relationship, and should ask the advice 
and help of the Number 10 PR advisor if necessary.
The memorandum recognised that one of the continuing frustrations of Morrison 
and his team was 'how to get over to the public the general background against 
which the activities of the various Departments should be seen and a picture of 
Government policy as an integrated whole’. The individual, they believed, could 
not understand his or her role without a sense of the national situation. This was 
however, very difficult given that most publicity policy emerged from the 
Departments. Though the memorandum encouraged Departments ‘not to be shy 
about throwing up ideas for general Government publicity’ it did not propose a 
solution. That would have to wait for a few months.123
Pimlott sent the memorandum to Nicholson and copied it to Boon. Both agreed 
with his sentiments and even extended them. Boon re-emphasised the need to
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
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draw out the wider picture, saying to Pimlott “you are shooting at too small game. 
What the public needs is more of the wide general picture. If people are given a 
simple and easily understood explanation of what the Government is aiming at as 
a whole I think they will quite readily fit into the general picture domestic and 
departmental events’.124 With minor adjustments it was then sent on to Morrison, 
Robert Fraser and Francis Williams. Fraser accepted that there was ‘a certain 
deadness in the relations between the Government and the people’ at the 
moment, but argued this was the fault of Ministers, not machinery.125 His 
response implied that Ministers had abdicated their responsibility for 
communication, expecting the new systems to do their job for them.
At the same time as Pimlott was adapting the draft to reflect Morrison and 
Fraser’s thoughts, circumstances were conspiring to propel the change in 
attitudes towards communication. The economic situation was worsening. 
Immediately before Christmas Morrison had received the 1947 Economic Survey 
and the draft White Paper. They made depressing reading. To make sure the 
Government remained stable he believed it would have to convince people that 
there was a plan to see them through their current hardship. The idea of giving 
people a sense of the broader perspective and using communication as a 
deliberate weapon in the Government arsenal seemed even more necessary.126
An article printed in The Observer shortly after Christmas substantiated this link 
between positive communication and the success of Labour policies. The article 
caught Morrison’s attention for this reason and he sent it to the Prosperity 
Campaign Committee ‘to consider and report on the problems raised’.127 The
124 Boon to Pimlott, 29-11-1946, CAB 124/1004.
125 Fraser’s comments to Pimlott, Boon, Nicholson & Morrison, 2-1-1947, CAB 124/1004
126 Reference to Morrison’s Christmas reading in Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p.390
127 Morrison to PC Committee, quoted in PC(OC)(47)1, 31-12-1946, CAB 124/908.
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article, by Charles Davy, argued that there was a malaise, and that there were 
genuine national anxieties with the way things were going. Planning and social 
welfare encouraged passivity, he suggested. ‘If they are not to lead to the Servile 
State they require the counterbalance of positive steps to foster initiative and 
responsibility among the workers -  bolder steps than Socialist doctrine usually 
admits’. Davy asserted that there was an aspect of the Labour programme which 
had not yet been addressed. ‘So far’ he wrote, ‘the Labour Government has paid 
much more attention to the technique of planning than to its psychology’.128
The article confirmed for Morrison the urgency of his communications 
memorandum. He quickly had it drafted in order to send it to Ministers and 
officials on the Information Services Committees. ‘Some Observations on 
Information Policy’, dated 10th January 1947, was an explicit appeal to Ministers 
and their departments to renew their information policies. The move towards a 
new attitude had begun.
However, on 12th January Morrison fell ill with a blood clot in his left calf. When 
his condition worsened the following week he was admitted to hospital. He 
continued to deteriorate throughout January and February. By March he was 
finally beginning to improve but was still not allowed to do work and in April was 
dispatched for a fortnight to the south of France to recuperate. He did not return 
to Government until the end of that month.129 While he was away ‘his Department 
came to a standstill’.130 Stafford Cripps, the Secretary of the Board of Trade, took 
over information and publicity while the Lord President was ill.
Morrison’s timing was unfortunate for the Government. As his health declined, so 
did the country’s. Coal supplies were fast running out. Despite his confidence in
128 The Observer, Charles Davy, 29-12-1946. Copy in CAB 124/908.
129 Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p.391.
130 Ibid. p.393.
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1946, Emmanuel Shinwell, the Minister for Fuel and Power, had failed to secure 
enough coal to last the winter. Then, on the night of 23rd January 1947, ‘the cold 
weather and the fuel crisis fused in a cruelly malign fashion’.131 Snow started to 
fall and for the next four weeks Britain was caught in one of its worst winters on 
record, without heat or power.
SECTION 3: Imposing Direction and Control
The Fuel Crisis as Catalyst for a Change in Attitudes to Information
The fuel crisis seemed to make a mockery of the idea of Government planning -  
how could a Government whose rhetoric centred on forecasting the nation’s 
health have failed to prepare for such an obvious emergency. The newspapers 
leapt on the Government’s failure with alacrity. A.J. Cummings wrote in the News 
Chronicle, ‘Ordinary people blame, not the hostile weather, but the Government 
in general and the Minister of Fuel in Particular. They think they have been 
misled, or kept in the dark, and (rightly or wrongly) that reasonable foresight 
would have mitigated, if not entirely avert [sic], the crisis’.132
The Daily Mail was even more critical about the Government’s lack of 
communication: ‘Now they [the Labour Party] are in office, and those who won 
through to the high places by means of their silver tongues have nothing to say. 
The so-called “People’s Government” are further away from the mass of the 
people than any administration of modern times’.133
But the most painful censure came from the Daily Herald, the Labour supporting 
newspaper which had stood by the Party up till then. It called for the Government
131 Peter Hennessy, Never Again, p.277.
132 News Chronicle, A.J. Cummings, ‘Spotlight’, 11-2-1947.
133 Daily Mail, Editorial, ‘Why be Afraid of the British People’, 11-2-1947.
47
Chapter 1
‘to attend to its duty of informing the public about the difficulties which confront 
the nation’.134
A member of the IH(O) committee looked at the headlines and commented 
prophetically, The national calamity -  for it was a calamity -  would erupt violently 
into the pattern of publicity in the forthcoming year’.135 Even Attlee was quoted as 
admitting his administration currently had ‘no sense of public relations’ and that 
there is 'something wrong with our publicity’.136
Attlee’s comments were reinforced by the findings of a Mass-Observation survey 
the following week. The survey assessed the degree to which people understood 
the economic situation, as explained by the Government’s 1947 Economic 
Survey and its popular version, The Battle for Output’. It concluded that both 
were incomprehensible to the average citizen and that there was ‘a wide gulf still 
existing between the languages of leadership and of the general public’. There 
were also indications, according to Mass-Observation, ‘that the language -  
indeed much of the approach -  of politics is somewhat out of gear with modern 
mass mentality’.137
The pressure for radical change was mounting, particularly amongst the 
Government’s own supporters. One of these, Ritchie Calder, was so convinced of 
the need that he wrote a lengthy memorandum in April, titled The Place of 
Information in Democratic Planning’. 138 It is apparent that this fed into the 
Government’s plans and helped accelerate change. Calder was a close friend of 
Francis Williams, having worked with him at the Daily Herald in the 1930s.
134 Daily Herald, 10-2-1947.
135 IH(0)(47)2nd, Minutes, 28-2-1947, CAB 134/356.
136 Daily Mirror, 11-3-1947, p.1.
137 FR 2462, The language of leadership’, 20-3-1947, Mass-Observation Archive. Attlee responded 
to survey in the Commons, 24-3-1947, see March correspondence in T 273/299.
138 Memorandum from Ritchie Calder, 14-4-1947, T 245/2.
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Though now a journalist at the N e w s  C h r o n i c l e  he had worked in the Political 
Warfare Executive during the war, planning subversive propaganda against 
enemy forces in Europe.139 His memorandum is particularly useful since its 
diagnosis and recommendations closely reflected the Government’s subsequent 
actions.
Calder started by directly linking democratic planning with communication. If 
Labour wanted to be successful, he wrote, ‘it means not only the endorsement of 
the electorate of the need for planning... but the rational and imaginative 
realization by the individual worker, the housewife and so on of his or her part in 
the scheme of things’. Like many others at the time Calder then criticized current 
Government communication. There was a ‘lack of consistency’ and no ‘coherent 
policy’ amongst Departments. He proposed that the administration should make 
the information services much more integral to Government. At the moment ‘they 
have usually been left to explain things once they have happened. They have not 
had... any effective say in the development of plans, or any influence on 
Departmental policy’. Therefore ‘we have a static information service in a 
dynamic situation’.
For this reason he called for a ‘drastic re-evaluation of its [the Government’s] 
information policy.’ His model of comparison was the European Service of the 
BBC during the war which, though ‘no-one could doubt its veracity... was much 
the servant of the Chiefs of Staff. Its effectiveness, he claimed, was based on 
two important elements - intelligent use of the facts, and a detailed 
understanding of the audience. The BBC insisted on facts, but ‘facts were 
marshalled to ensure the right response’. And the ‘"Stimmung”, or the
139 Entry for Ritchie Calder, 1982. Calder also wrote Francis Williams’ entry in the DNB.
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atmosphere, mood and circumstances of the recipient, was as important as the 
facts delivered’.
This, he believed, was directly applicable to the current situation: ‘...in a fast 
moving peace-time situation fraught with opportunity as well as difficulty, facts 
can be made to “work for their living”’. Not that Calder was recommending 
manipulation, ‘It is a question of discretion and never of suppression’. Depending 
on which audience you were addressing, ‘the presentation and the selection is 
different’. This, he ended, ‘is the human aspect of “Democratic Planning” aimed 
at making the individual a willing party and active participant in the plans’.
This was clearly in radical contrast to the previous idea that a literal translation of 
the facts to the whole population would enable them to come to rational decisions. 
Calder’s approach did not suggest involving people in shared decisions but 
directing them towards the Government’s objectives through the selective use of 
information.
There was further pressure to adopt a more dynamic approach to communication 
at the 46th Annual Conference in Margate in May. Labour MPs, searching for a 
reason why the crisis came with such suddenness, came round to the view that it 
was not the Government’s fault for not having planned, it was the Government’s 
fault for not having explained the situation, and for not putting it in the context of 
the Government successes of the past two years. It was the surprise more than 
anything that they took issue with. In future, the Government had to take the 
people into its confidence and reconcile them to the situation.
E. Castle (Hornsey, DLP), who had brought forward a motion to ‘tell the people 
the facts’, knew where the blame lay and suggested a simple solution: “In these 
last 22 months things have gone pretty badly with the public relations machinery 
of the Government. What we are asking for from the Government is not Socialist
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propaganda -  that is the job of the Party -  but a recital of the facts of what the 
Government has done”.140
And yet the Government thought this had been what it was trying to do since it 
took office. That was part of the problem. Maurice Webb, chairman of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party and a friend of Morrison, was much more astute and 
tapped into the views already expressed by the Morrison memorandum: “What is 
important is that our debate today should lead to one definite and clear 
conclusion, the conclusion that adequate instruction in the meaning and purpose 
and consequences and applications of public policy is an indispensable part of 
democratic Government. It is important that it should be understood by us and by 
the Government that the presentation of policy is just as important as the 
content”. 141 In addition he was advocating a more flexible attitude towards 
information, “We cannot coerce in a democracy, we cannot direct: we have to 
persuade and coax and win co-operation”.142
The ideological link between communication and ‘democratic planning’ was 
reiterated by a PEP document published in July 1947. The Plan and the Public’ 
criticised the haphazard use of the phrase ‘Democratic planning’ -  ‘an important 
ideological term that should not just roll off the tongue’, and said that to be 
effective this must consist of three elements: consultation, communication, and 
execution. Consultation, the equivalent of Calder’s detailed understanding of the 
audience, had, according to PEP, been formalised and expanded during World 
War One, and confirmed as a recognised and essential instrument of 
Government in World War Two. But in peace time its use was still improvised 
rather than integral to Government. Communication, PEP believed, meant
140 E. Castle, 46th Labour Annual Conference, 29-5-1947.
141 Maurice Webb, 46th Labour Annual Conference, 29-5-1947.
142 Ibid.
51
Chapter 1
situating the individual in the larger plans of the Government. This too was like 
Calder, who recommended making the worker realise their ‘part in the scheme of 
things’.
The Broadsheet recommended the Government use information and 
communication in a more sophisticated way to help the people understand what 
to do. To engage in ‘... a sustained and intensive attempt over a period of time, 
with a clearly thought out strategy, to raise the level of public understanding and 
to change the attitude of ordinary people towards their social and economic 
responsibilities’. This was the nub of the socialist endeavour. And, in PEP’s view, 
it was the responsibility of the Government information services to ‘work out a 
comprehensive policy of public information in light of the facts of the situation and 
the Government plan’.143
The authors of this PEP Broadsheet are not known but it must have reflected 
thinking within Government because Robert Fraser distributed it to all the 
members of his Home Production meeting of 8th August 1947.144 Moreover, the 
actions of the Government at this time show that the recommendations were 
taken to heart.
A New Approach to Information - The Formation of the Economic Information Unit
Calder brought home to the Government their previous naivete. Combined with 
the Morrison memorandum, the criticisms of Labour’s own supporters, and 
enhanced by the prevailing sense of emergency, it helped affect a sea change in 
the Government’s approach to communication. From now on the administration 
would seek to integrate communication to policy-making and use information in a 
much more dynamic way. Central to this change was the formation of a small,
143 ‘The Plan and the Public’, PEP Broadsheet, No.269, 25-7-1947.
144 Home Production Conference Minutes, 8-8-1947, INF 12/66.
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central Economic Information Unit (ElU) explicitly dedicated to considering, 
coordinating and commissioning economic publicity.
The creation of this unit followed the reorganisation of the central economic 
planning machinery. The fuel crisis had finally convinced the Cabinet that the 
current machinery was inadequate. In early March Attlee had therefore endorsed 
Sir Edward Bridges proposals to enhance it.145 A fortnight later Francis Williams, 
Stafford Cripps and Robert Fraser agreed that to make this more effective the 
machinery of economic publicity also needed to be overhauled. They suggested 
to Attlee that the solution may be the formation of a new inter-departmental 
unit.146 The Prime Minister endorsed their plan at the end of March.147
The new unit was established over the following three months. It was to work 
within the office of the Lord President (subsequently shifted to the Treasury) and 
alongside the enhanced Central Economic Planning Section. It would be small, 
high-powered, and staffed by communications professionals (from journalism, 
advertising, and other departmental press offices). Morrison drafted in Clem 
Leslie, at a salary 50% higher than the DG of the COI, to run it.148 It would be 
directed by an Economic Information Committee (IH(0)(E)), also run by Leslie, 
and comprising many of the familiar names from the Home Information Services 
Committee.149 Though technically a sub-committee to the IH(O) this Committee 
acted in concert with, and often led, its official parent. It was empowered to plan 
and coordinate economic publicity, and, to commission its own publicity for
145 GEN 169/2nd, Minutes, Ministerial Economic Planning Committee, 7-3-1947, CAB 130/17.
146 Williams to Attlee, 25-3-1947, T 273/20.
147 EE Bridges, note regarding Cripps authorisation, 1-4-1947, T 273/20.
146 Leslie’s salary would be £3,750 a year compared to £2,500 for Fraser. Dalton agreed the figure 
‘with great reluctance’, Dalton to Morrison 15-5-1947, T 273/20.
149 IH(0)(E)(47)1st, Minutes, CAB 134/361. For members see Appendix A.
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themes ‘beyond departmental limits’.150 In practise Leslie and Robert Fraser 
worked closely to ensure the primacy of economic themes. Its objective would be 
to make people understand the seriousness of Britain’s economic situation and 
persuade them to take action to alleviate it.
Like Calder, Leslie immediately drew on the experiences of the war to inform the 
new approach. In a note to Morrison at the end of June he wrote that ‘the work of 
economic information is in many ways like “psychological warfare" when this is 
conducted on a basis of truth. In each the task is to project, and win acceptance 
for, news information and ideas about a complex and changing situation’.151 The 
‘basis of truth’ idea represented a new willingness to separate policy from 
presentation and to use the basic aspects of policy simply as a foundation, from 
which the Unit could build persuasive arguments and direct their distribution 
through the mass media.
The ElU also sought to gain a much greater understanding of public attitudes 
than currently existed in order to target audiences more effectively. The current 
means of intelligence was, Leslie complained, sparse and inaccurate. The time 
honoured tradition of hearing the people through the "feeling of the house” has’, 
he said, ‘within fairly recent memory shown itself capable of wide divergence from 
the feeling of the country’. By comparison, the newspaper press ‘holds up to the 
mind of the nation a series of mirrors that may be concave, convex, tinted or 
partially blacked out’. But Leslie saved his most scathing words for the senior civil 
servants who based their ideas on ‘their own and their neighbours’ wives and 
conversations in first class carriages from the outer suburbs’. Therefore there
150 EPC(47)14, Economic Policy Committee, Memorandum, ‘Economic Information Unit, Functions 
Of, 10-11-1947, CAB 134/215.
151 SC Leslie to Morrison, 30-6-1947, T 245/2.
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was ‘an increasingly opaque barrier between the mind of the centre of 
government and the mind of the mass of the people’.152
Leslie intended to rectify this by overhauling the Government intelligence service: 
The proposal which I wish to put forward is for a continuous systematic survey of 
public opinion about economic affairs, with monthly reports’. 153 This was 
approved by Ministers at the end of July and from December 1947 the COI began 
doing extensive monthly surveys into public attitudes towards economic affairs.154 
These continued throughout 1948 before become becoming bi-monthly in 1949. 
The surveys were especially useful for identifying who was resistant to economic 
policies and for what reasons. The ElU could then tailor the message to those 
groups through the media in the way most effective for overcoming that 
resistance.
This was particularly useful for targeting women. Leslie believed that a different 
approach was required for women. This perception was consistently supported 
by the economic surveys which suggested that women were much less well 
informed than men.155 The ElU therefore developed a communications strategy 
directed at women. It prepared talks and discussions for women’s groups.156 It 
worked with the editors of women’s magazines.157 And it produced ‘Report to the 
Women of Britain’. This information advertisement was carried in most of the 
national press and other relevant journals. The information contained in these
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 IH(47)1st, Minutes, 31-7-1947, CAB 134/354. Subsequently called the ‘Survey of Knowledge and 
Opinion about the Economic Situation’.
155 IH(0)(E)(48)8th, Minutes, 7-5-1948, CAB 134/364.
156 IH(0)(E)(47)13°1, Minutes, 31-10-1947, Economic Information Programme -  included ‘special 
material for women’s organizations’, CAB 134/361.
157 IH(0)(48)26, Memorandum, 20-4-1948, report on meeting with Group of Editors of Women’s 
Magazines. Unlike the actual material produced by the Government for women’s organisations, 
these editors had actually initiated the meeting with the Home Information Services Committee,
CAB 134/357.
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reports, and the manner in Which the information was presented, was aimed to 
appeal specifically to women. “I’d give anything for more clothing coupons”, 
report No.9 read, ‘But would you? Of course you’re tired of having to manage on 
four coupons a month -  we all are. But would you be willing to give up your own 
food, or your children’s, to get more?’.158
As well as measuring public attitudes, the ElU started to collate and distil 
intelligence for Ministers to use in set pieces or to add substance to their 
arguments in the media. For this reason the ElU set up a ‘briefing section’, 
according to Leslie one of the most important parts of the Unit. The section 
accumulated information from official sources, Government economic studies and 
‘a good deal of material from outside sources’.159 It soon had ‘a continual stream 
of information of every kind’ which was organised by a ‘librarian’ or ‘intelligence 
officer’ and then passed on to a ‘briefer’. The briefer would then use this material 
to prepare briefs for Ministerial speeches, broadcasts, press conferences, for an 
economic and industrial bulletin for opinion formers, and ad hoc briefs for 
publicity.
By October the ElU was preparing a fortnightly economic Bulletin ‘designed 
solely to help Ministers in their speechmaking by providing material and 
suggesting topics’.160 It organised an economic press conference twice a month 
with press packs for the media containing the Minister’s speech and statistics to 
help them in their reports.
158 ‘Report to the Women of Britain', No. 9, CAB 134/365.
159 IH(0)(49)18, Memorandum, ‘On the Work of the ElU Briefing Section’, SC Leslie, 1-3-1949, CAB 
134/358.
160 ‘Crisis Publicity’, Note by the ElU to EPB, October 1947, T245/2.
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So effective was the briefing section that it soon became a model for other 
Departments.161 This was important because it was this section which was able 
to reverse the natural dynamic and influence the preparation of policy as well as 
its presentation. In a memorandum reviewing the work of the briefing section in 
1949, Leslie said that it ‘safeguards the Unit against the risk of becoming a 
passive recipient or routine transmitter of information, enabling it to deal 
constructively with its material, and to take initiatives with its own Department on 
a basis of some mutual understanding of function and aim’.162
The ElU was also supposed to coordinate the release of economic information. 
This meant controlling its timing and choosing its outlet. It was particularly 
concerned that unpopular information was timed so as not to damage the 
Government. For example, when considering the economic information film 
programme the ElU suggested that ‘in regard to the films on the National Health 
Service and National Insurance it was felt that these films should be produced as 
explanatory films against the time when pay packets were docked for these 
services’.163
Morrison re-emphasised this issue to Ministers in 1948. He wrote that ‘when a 
Minister had an unpopular announcement to make he [Morrison] thought it 
important that the Minister should consider carefully and, if necessary, consult his 
colleagues about both the timing and terms of such an announcement’. As a rule 
he suggested that when a Minister was seeking authority for a particular course 
of action ‘he should, as a regular practice, give some indication of how the
161 Ibid. ‘It is for other information divisions to decide whether and how far its [the briefing section’s] 
methods, and its relation to the operations of the Unit as a whole, contain any lessons for them’.
162 Ibid.
163 IH(0)(E)25, Memorandum, 6-8-1947, CAB 134/362.
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publicity would be handled... bear in mind the publicity value and, where 
appropriate, to consult with their publicity experts’.164
This consciousness of context illustrated a growing awareness of the media 
agenda. For example, the ElU emphasised the importance of ‘all public 
utterances by all ministers, senior and junior’, especially speeches and 
broadcasts. These were, the ElU told ministers, ‘the most powerful single method 
of reaching and influencing the public, and they have powerful secondary effects 
in their influence upon the scale of news values adopted by the press’.165 This 
concept of establishing news values was not present in the earlier advice of the 
information services and indicates an increasing appreciation of news 
management.
Though some of the functions carried out by the ElU had been done before, the 
difference was the degree of autonomy the ElU was given, its development of 
information management (timing announcements, selective use of facts etc.), its 
systematic use of intelligence to inform publicity (via its briefing section), its 
speed, and the explicit use of information to persuade rather than simply to 
inform. Due to the economic circumstances, it felt it was justified in taking radical 
action. Working during a crisis constantly compared to a war situation which 
called for a revival of the ‘Dunkirk spirit’ the Unit had the authority to initiate 
publicity campaigns, to work with any Department, and to report directly to the 
Minister for Economic Affairs and Cabinet Committees. It was also, for the first 
time, trying to plan and execute publicity policy in the light of public opinion 
surveys. It was, in Calder’s words, trying to gauge the ‘mood and circumstances 
of the recipient’ before it decided which facts to deliver and how. And, it was
164 IS(48)1, Memorandum, Morrison, 21-1-1948, CAB 134/354.
165 Leslie to Fraser, Memorandum, ‘Economic Publicity Policy’, 27-1-1949, T245/3.
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targeting its message at specific audience groups, like women, and trying to 
consider its content and tone in respect to that audience.
The ElU was very ahead of its time, as the American Government Administrator 
Mr. Hoffman told Morrison in 1949, “I thought I knew something about 
informational activities. I want to say that having spent the morning with the 
Economic Information Unit, having learned something of their plans to try and 
impress all the people of Great Britain with the importance of productivity, I think, 
to a certain extent, we in America are amateurs. In other words, when it comes to 
resourcefulness and ingenuity, I take off my hat to ... his [Morrison’s] 
organisation’.166 It was so advanced that many of its methods did not initially gain 
acceptance and it was hampered by the less highly developed attitudes of most 
Ministers.
The ElU was the most visible, but certainly not the only way in which the 
Government began to use communication in a more deliberate and calculated 
fashion. Also in 1947 the Government decided to try to raise awareness of, and 
increase national confidence in, the British Empire. The Empire Publicity 
Committee (EPC) had been set up in October 1946, but it was not until the 
following year that Ministers instructed it to ‘consider ways and means of 
overcoming the prevailing ignorance at home and overseas about the 
Commonwealth and Empire and to initiate energetic action for the achievement of 
this purpose’.167 A small unit, the Empire Advisory Unit (EAU), was set up to act 
on behalf of the committee.
166 Mr. Hoffman (American Government European Aid Administrator) to Morrison, 1949, quoted by 
Morrison in the Commons Supply Debate, 23-5-1949, Hansard, Vol.465, Col.1009.
167 Empire Publicity Committee: The EPC was set up in October 1946 as a sub-committee of the 
Home and Overseas Information Services Committees and reports to both these’ Back of file hand 
written note, 9947/181/950, EPC(48)7, 25-10-1948. Quote from EPC Memorandum, 'Schools 
Broadcasting on Empire Subjects’, 3-2-1948, FO 953/132.
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In contrast to the ElU the EPC decided to focus its attention on convincing 
younger minds, particularly through schools curriculum.168 Children needed to be 
told, the Committee said, ‘that this free company of nations is no self-centred and 
self-seeking society but a positive force for peace and a vital element in the 
solution of economic problems affecting Europe and the world today’ and that 
The peaceful evolution of the Colonial Dependencies towards full nationhood 
provides an outstanding example of the progress of the human race towards 
maturity along democratic lines’.169 It might be argued the curriculum was slightly 
premature.
Even less visible, but arguably more influential, was the Information Research 
Department, set up by Christopher Mayhew, ex-PPS of Morrison, at the 
beginning of 1948. The purpose of this secret unit was to ‘selectively gather, 
package and publicize facts about the Soviet Union and its friends that would 
lead to a negative conceptual framework at home and abroad, which would 
support British foreign policy’.170 There is already an extensive literature on the 
IRD but of particular interest here is the timing of its launch, immediately 
subsequent to the ElU, and that Leslie was corresponding with its originators 
even before the unit had officially started work.171 On the 8th January Leslie 
congratulated CFA Warner on his new position (as head of the IRD) and wrote 
that we must ‘meet some time soon to exchange background information about 
our work and to explore possibilities of mutual help’.172 Discussing the IRD with 
the Chancellor the previous day Leslie wrote that, ‘So far as the unit requires data 
about economic and industrial achievement at home, some provision should
168 'Schools Broadcasting on Empire Subjects’, op.cit.
169 Ibid.
170 John Dwight Jenks, Hot News/Cold War, p.131.
171 In particular, Paul Lashmar and James Oliver, Britain’s Secret Propaganda War (1998). For 
fuller list see bibliography.
172 Leslie to CFA Warner, 8-1-1948, T245/2.
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perhaps be made for proper liaison from the outset with the ElU’.173 In mid-1948 
Morrison recommended that Warner attend meetings of the information services 
committee.174
Given the astonishing problems that Britain faced in 1947 it is not surprising that 
the Government sought to cope as best it could. Domestically, the fuel crisis and 
subsequent currency crisis threatened to undermine any credibility the 
Government had for managing the economy. Internationally, relations with the 
Soviet Union were deteriorating quickly and in the autumn the newly established 
Cominform began to target propaganda against Britain. This was combined with 
the fissiparous tendencies already latent within the British Empire. India gained 
its independence in 1947, Burma and Palestine in 1948.
To deal with these problems the Government chose to try to adapt the machinery 
of communication and use it much more effectively in order to persuade people of 
the need to work harder, of the evils of Communism, of the benefits of social 
democracy, and of the magnanimity of the Government’s policies towards the 
colonies. This represented a major shift from the original intentions behind the 
establishment of the information services and a transformation in attitudes 
towards information within Government. The ElU was at the forefront of that 
change.
However, there were problems associated with coordination and centralisation. 
First, the departments had information agendas of their own and were not happy 
to see them sacrificed on behalf of a small, non-departmental unit. Second, 
centralisation and co-ordination created higher profile campaigns and attracted 
the criticism of the Opposition and the Press. Third, in the context of the Cold 
War, when repressive socialist Governments were monopolising media outlets,
173 Leslie to Cripps, 7-1-1948, T245/2.
174 Norman Brook, ‘Note for the Record', 4-6-1948, CAB 21/2219.
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promoting a single message across all media began to make Labour look 
dangerously authoritarian.
SECTION 4: Reaction Against Centralisation
Centralisation and the Departmental Reaction
Robert Fraser approved of the 1947 shift to bigger campaigns and broader 
themes. He believed these had a greater impact on ‘public enlightenment’ and on 
morale. However, he was also conscious that this required the COI Divisions to 
turn down the smaller requests of departments. He encouraged the Division 
heads to do this. The only way of counteracting an inordinate number of trivial 
requests’ he told them, ‘was by filling the divisional programme with big 
projects’.175
This suppression of smaller projects in favour of larger themes did not make the 
COI popular. By the end of 1947 the departments were angry enough to take 
remedial action. One of them (or possibly more than one) spoke to Frank 
England, an investigative journalist from the World’s Press News, and offered to 
give him an exclusive scoop on the inner workings of the Government’s 
information services.176 It resulted in a five part expose run in weekly instalments 
from 4th December 1947 to the 8th January 1948. The main purpose of the 
articles was to rubbish the COI. England accused it of being ‘the refuge of third 
class brains’, ‘home of delays’, ‘duplication’, ‘extravagance of useless material’.177 
This was particularly serious, he felt, because Britain needed inspiration and 
encouragement to help pull it out of its dire economic situation. But, with an 
interesting twist of logic, England also accused the Central Office of a sinister
175 Fraser, Home Production Conference, 19-6-1947, INF 12/65.
176 After the first article was published on 4-12-1947, Morrison began a search of the Information 
Divisions to find out who leaked the information, CAB 124/992.
177 Frank England, World’s Press News, 4-12-1947.
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policy of ‘expansion by infiltration’ and ‘excessive and increasing centralization’ 
such that 'if carried to its logical conclusion, must result in the complete 
“Goebbelisation” of the Government’s information services’.178 The ‘suspiciously 
powerful’ ElU was evidence both of this dangerous centralization and this 
creeping infiltration.179
England maintained this contradictory dualism throughout the articles. On the one 
hand the COI was a bureaucratic mess that had ‘allowed the MOI machine to go 
rusty’ and caused ‘interminable delays’ to Government information and publicity. 
Yet on the other hand it was over-powerful and bent on national domination. 
There is an increasing feeling’ England wrote on 1st January, ‘that the ground is 
being prepared, willy-nilly, for the day when a still more weakened Press, faced 
by a more centralized and strengthened Government propaganda machine, will 
tempt some Government to carry the process to its logical conclusion and 
“Goebbelization” will become a fact’.180
The articles fuelled the paranoid fears of those on the right that Britain was 
building towards a Nazi or Soviet superstate with an Orwellian propaganda 
machine. Yet at the same time they managed to criticize the British machine for 
not being any good. England’s answer was to dissolve the COI and redistribute 
responsibility amongst the Departments. This tidy solution was not the only clue 
as to the source of England’s articles. They also contained information that was 
only known to those within Whitehall. For example, England knew that the 
Ministerial Committees on information services had not met often.181 And, he 
made uncannily accurate estimates of the cost of the Central Office, its number of
178 ibid.
179 Ibid. There was even a photo of a suitably enigmatic-looking Leslie beside one of the articles, 
World’s Press News, 1-1-1948.
180 World’s Press News, 1-1-1948
181 World’s Press News, 4-12-1947.
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employees, and the membership of its Committees. Morrison had no doubt that 
the source was internal: ‘It is quite clear that (a) the articles could not have been 
written without access to documents which could not properly be shown to 
anyone outside Government information services, and (b) that glosses on these 
documents unfavourable to the COI have been supplied by someone with 
intimate knowledge of the current workings of the information machine’.182
The Departmental source of the leaks was never found (despite the questioning 
of each Public Relations Officer), but their wrecking operation had significant 
repercussions. Morrison called a meeting of the key figures in the Government 
Information Services for 12th January 1948.183 Its agenda suggests Morrison was 
ready to take a back to basics approach. The first point was 'what is the function 
of the information services?’. They were then to discuss the relationship of the 
central services with the Departments, particularly the roles of Clem Leslie and 
Philip Jordan (who replaced Francis Williams as public relations advisor to the 
Prime Minister in late 1947). Followed by the relationship of home and overseas 
information, and finally ‘teamwork amongst Ministers’.
In the meeting itself, the minutes suggest an unfortunate lack of clarity as to the 
purpose of Government information services: ‘Little doubt or difficulty arose as to 
the general conception of the purpose and object of Government information 
services. These were to inform and educate the public’ (these words are crossed 
out in the minutes).184 They also struggled to determine the difference between 
partisan and non partisan information: ‘in theory the dividing line between party 
and Government publicity was tolerably clear. In practice differences of opinion
182 Morrison to Nicholson, 14-1-1948, CAB 124/992.
183 Included Patrick Gordon-Walker (Morrison’s assistant in charge of Information Services), 
Stephen Taylor (Morrison’s new PPS), Max Nicholson, Robert Fraser, Philip Jordan, Puck Boon, 
David Stephens, CAB 124/71.
184 Ibid.
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arose only in those cases where the Government deliberately went beyond 
information (as it had every right to do) in order to create an attitude in the public 
mind and to persuade the public to act in some particular way’.185 Despite this 
confusion, Morrison left the meeting confident in the continued need for the COI 
and information services. At the end of the month he merged the Ministerial home 
and overseas information services committees in order to share learning and 
meet more frequently.186
The High Water Mark of Ideological Debate on the Information Services. 1948
However, the articles sparked a public controversy that led to questions in the 
House throughout January, February and March 1948, and culminated, on 13th 
May, in the most significant debate on information services since the war. This 
debate was significant for a number of reasons. It represented the high water 
mark of ideological dissent with the information services. After this point the 
debate shifted to efficiency and cost reduction. It identified the increasing 
tendency of the Government to manage information, for example by selecting 
facts that supported its objectives. And it highlighted the continual problem 
inherent to Government communication -  how to explain Government policy 
without creating a rationale and justification for it.
As Harold Macmillan, who opened the debate for the opposition, said: “I have no 
doubt that the temporary civil servants in charge of this vast machine try to be 
objective... Nevertheless, the analysis of a problem, whether positively or 
negatively, almost invariably tends to be one-sided. The Central Office is a 
Government agency. It cannot very well attack or criticize the Government it 
serves. It can make no reference to its failures and it must pass lightly over its 
lack of foresight. The fuel crisis must be represented not as a failure of the
185 Ibid. Minutes also in CAB 124/992.
186 See Morrison to Attlee, proposal for amalgamation of committees, 6-12-47, PREM 8/723.
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Minister but as an act of God... What happens is that all the facts are 
emphasised which are favourable to the Government, who are represented as a 
kind of band of heroes struggling bravely against adverse conditions and events 
outside their control’.187
Though he does not refer to it, it is likely Macmillan had in mind publications like 
the ‘Battle for Output’, written in early 1947 by Max Nicholson. This popular 
version of the Economic Survey began by explaining that it was ‘the plain story of 
Britain’s production in the first full year of peace. It is the story of a great 
beginning towards recovery, against heavy odds’.188
The determination of the Government to overcome this one-sidedness by only 
presenting ‘the facts’ was equally fraught with difficulties (as they had already 
found). The Conservative John Boyd Carpenter pointed this out: “The Lord 
President has talked of factual statements. I am not going to suggest that, on the 
whole, these statements are not factual, but the question is which facts. No 
information service in the world can disseminate all the facts about the situation 
in the world today. Even the Government’s present lavish expenditure of paper 
cannot carry that. So we are driven to the conviction that the officials of this 
Department have to select between one fact and another’.189 And the illusion of 
objectivity was perhaps one of the greatest dangers of the information services 
since the patina of truth added to their power. This could, Macmillan argued, lead 
to the ‘sapping of individual judgment and substitution of the state machine’.190
In a similar way, if the Government tried to promote its cause through its 
machinery, ‘as it has every right to do’, it necessarily compromised the objectivity
187 Harold Macmillan (Conservative), Information Services Supply Debate, Hansard, 13-5-1948, 
Vol.450, Col.2295-6.
188 The Battle for Output’, February 1947, CAB 124/909.
189 John Boyd Carpenter (Conservative), op.cit., Col.2319-2320.
190 Macmillan, op.cit., Col.2300.
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of that machinery. The Labour MP S. N. Evans admitted as much when he said, 
Today we are engaged in the greatest experiment of all time; one to abolish want 
without, at the same time, abolishing liberty... It is in the service of this 
experiment that the COI has a great part to play’. 191 As Kenneth Lindsay 
(Independent) commented, ‘Implicit behind the whole of the arguments 
[presented by the Government information services] was that a very important 
change was going on in this country, and it was important that the people here 
and abroad should know about it. But supposing they do not agree with the 
change?’.192
The opposition also argued that the information services were leading Ministers 
to bypass the constitutional route of communication -  Parliament - and go directly 
to the media. “Ministers are detaching themselves more and more from the 
House of Commons. They are proceeding far more by method of Press 
Conferences, broadcasting, and now this Central Office of Information’.193 The 
importance of the fortnightly economic Press Conferences were evidence of this, 
as was the high number of broadcasts made by Ministers as part of the 
production drive in 1947.
On the larger point of the justification of information services, Labour had argued 
that the world was much more complex than it had been in the past, and it was 
the duty of the Government to explain that complexity to its citizens.194 However, 
as Kenneth Pickthorn, a professional historian, responded, ‘the past looks easy 
only because it is not here, and because, comparatively speaking, we do not
191 SN Evans (Labour), op.cit., Col.2351.
192 Kenneth Lindsay (Independent), op.cit., Col.2388.
193 Gurney Braithwaite (Conservative), op.cit., Col.2353.
194 See Patrick Gordon Walker, 19-3-1948, Hansard, Vol.448 Col.2541.
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know anything about it’, hence, ‘the notion that things are infinitely more complex 
now than they used to be is an illusion’.195
Unfortunately the Labour responses to some of their counterparts’ challenges did 
not engage with the fundamental difficulties of Government communication raised. 
They were so prepared to counter the charges of Party politics that they did not 
connect with the overarching dangers of Government control of information. ‘It is 
not a question of party politics’ as Kenneth Lindsay unsuccessfully tried to make 
clear, ‘We have had too much of party politics here today... Suppose a 
Conservative Government get into power and they have these creative civil 
servants, what is the position? ...they would focus its propaganda on the 
legislation which they were going to put through. That is inherent in a domestic 
propaganda service’.196
But the Government benches refused to take on the complexities or nuances of 
the debate. They told the Conservatives their evidence of Party propaganda was 
unconvincing or petty (Morrison, Granville and Driberg), that the justification of 
information services in a democracy was straightforward (Gordon Walker), and 
that given the level of commercial advertising the Government had to shout to get 
itself heard (Driberg). Their only criticism was that the information services were 
not powerful enough given the growing Communist threat (Woodrow Wyatt).
The single aspect of debate on which the Conservatives could properly engage 
with Labour was expenditure. This was the original focus of Macmillan’s speech. 
‘Expenditure has grown year on year’ he said, and was now ‘impressive’ and 
‘extravagant’. His own calculations had given him a figure of £7.5 million on home 
information services and £9 million abroad. The cost of this ‘vast machine of 
Government information’ could easily be cut back, Macmillan said. Frederic
195 Kenneth Pickthorn (Conservative), Vol.450, Col.2375.
196 Lindsay, Hansard, 13-5-1948, Vol.450, Col.2388-2389.
6 8
Chapter 1
Harris accused it of ‘wanton extravagance’.197 Though Gordon Walker, the deputy 
information head, defended it, saying it saved as much as it cost thanks to 
preventative healthcare advice and recruitment campaigns, this was the one 
aspect of debate that the Government took seriously. With Stafford Cripps as 
Chancellor and Economic Overlord constantly exhorting people to austerity, the 
Government could not be perceived to be spending profligately. Therefore, in the 
autumn of 1948 the Treasury appointed a Committee of enquiry, headed by Sir 
Henry French, to examine the costs of the Home Information Services.
SECTION 5: Save Money and Simplify the Message
Austerity
Even before its appointment, Morrison had been aware of the rising costs and 
had started to think about cutting back. He was conscious that after the 
immediate post-war reductions, costs had been rising since 1946.198 The 
estimates for 1948/9 were only 8.5% below the level of 1944/5 (the wartime peak 
in spending) despite Attlee’s assurances in December 1945 and March 1946 that 
post war information services would be significantly reduced. For the information 
services meeting in April Morrison prepared a memorandum showing the total 
cost of the information services now amounted to about 6/- per head of the 
population.199 This equated to over £13 million, a figure estimated to rise to over 
£16 million for 1948-49. Even still, Morrison told the Committee he was not 
looking for large scale cuts, just for more care in departmental spending.
However, in his memorandum Morrison also outlined three major reasons why 
information had now become so critical to Government. The reasons indicate the
197 Frederic Harris (Conservative), op.cit., Col.2347.
198 Correspondence with Robert Fraser, from 25-2-1948, CAB 124/1029.
199 IS(48)6, Memorandum, Cost of Government Information Services, 12-4-1948, CAB 124/1029. 
Attlee to Commons 17-12-1945 and 7-3-1946. This did not even include Food and National Savings 
publicity which was substantial.
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importance of the change in the nature of governance and the significance of this 
change happening while this particular Government was in power. ‘Before the 
war’, Morrison wrote, 'the Government Information Services were in their infancy. 
During the war Departments learned the value of publicity and information work. 
They are now great believers in its efficacy and importance’. There had also been, 
since the end of the conflict, a ‘great flow of post-war social and economic 
legislation’ which needed to be explained to the public. Finally, there was ‘the 
continuation, and indeed intensification, of the nation’s economic difficulties’ 
which meant the information services had the task ‘not only of persuading the 
public to act in a certain way’ but also explaining the reasons for the economic 
difficulties.200
After the Supply debate in May the Government sought to make further cuts in 
the budget for the information services. In October the Chancellor told Cabinet 
that any expenditure on new services or increase in existing services had to be 
taken from the existing budget.201 In December Morrison wrote that ‘the time has 
come to call a halt’ in rising costs, and, if possible, try to reduce the estimates for 
1949-50 below the total figure of £16.7 million.202
But the reduction in spending and consequent cancellation of many of the 
Government’s campaigns disguised the most important aspect of the debate and 
its aftermath. The principle of Government information had been upheld. After 
1948, the arguments against information services dwindled. The Government had 
successfully defended the practice of communication and the machinery that 
went with it. And it continued to develop its techniques of communication. By May 
the following year (1949) Robert Fraser was able to write to Morrison, ‘I do not
200 IS(48)6, op.cit.
201 Cabinet Conclusions, CM(48)66, 25-10-1948, CAB 128/13.
202 Morrison letter on ‘Cost of Information Services’, 15-12-1948, T245/6.
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think this [the need for information services] is seriously questioned now. Among 
the newspapers it is only the Express Group that occasionally clamours for 
abolition’ and Boyd Carpenter was now the sole voice in the Commons.203
The French Committee confirmed this the same month: The justification for some 
Government information services is beyond question. The citizen has a right to 
be told, and the Government has a plain duty to tell him, what it is doing in his 
name and with his money, and why’. Though the French Committee identified 
areas in which the Government could make savings on the cost of the home 
information services, most notably press and poster advertising, they also ratified 
the responsibility of the Government to use information services to communicate 
with the people.204
The Impact of Austerity
Other than upholding the concept of Government information, there were three 
principal effects of the austerity cuts. First, they pushed the debate further away 
from politics and ideology towards expenditure. Second, as a consequence, they 
made the Government reduce the use of expensive publicity campaigns as an 
aspect of policy and led it to be more creative in its use of free or inexpensive 
media. Third, they ensured the continuation of the public opinion research as a ‘a 
valuable adjunct to the information services’ and means by which to measure the 
success of publicity.205
The shift away from ideology to cost was apparent in the 1949 information 
services debate. There were some echoes of the six and a half hour session of a 
year earlier, but these were sporadic, repetitive and half hearted (‘the first step 
towards dictatorship’ etc.). Instead, Brendan Bracken, then David Renton, and
203 Fraser to Morrison, 23-5-1949, CAB 124/995.
204 Report of the Committee on the Cost of Home Information Services, Cmd.7836, 1949.
205 Ibid.
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Edward Keeling, all complained about the ‘costly absurdity’ of the COI, and that 
‘Government publicity is too expansive and too expensive’.206 The Government 
was also very studious in seeking to reduce information services costs. It cut 
expenditure on all campaigns -  including food and Services recruitment.
However, the consequence of austerity was not the abandonment of 
communication, but simply the reduction of most Government paid publicity. 
Information officers were told they had to show more initiative in accessing free 
media to get their message across. Morrison said just this to the Information 
Services Committee in 1950: ‘It seems to me... that we should give further 
thought to methods of economizing in Government publicity without detriment to 
its effectiveness. Indeed in some cases it may be possible to get better results by 
cheaper methods’. He was thinking particularly of the mass media -  Press, 
newsreels and the BBC. This form of publicity is all the more effective’ he said 
'because it does not come from official agencies’.207
The EIU had already been using ‘free’ media whenever it could. Indeed its 
briefing unit was ‘the main basis on which effective exploitation of “free” media 
rested’.208 Leslie’s team listed many of its methods and outlets to the French 
Committee. They included; the preparation of briefs as background material for 
Ministers, the Press and the BBC; special feature material for popular magazines; 
stories for newsreels (‘Unit had six Production “Credit Column” stories used 
during first six months of 1948’); BBC broadcasts (e.g. industrial features and
206 ‘Costly absurdity’ -  Brendan Bracken, Hansard, 23-5-1949, Vol.465, Col.972, ‘Government 
publicity is too expansive and too expensive’ -  Edward Keeling, 23-5-1949, Vol.465, Col.1004.
207 Morrison, Memorandum to Information Services Committee (Official), 16-11-1950, CAB 124/81.
208 IH(0)(49)2nd, Minutes, 3-3-1949, CAB 134/358.
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radio newsreel), and the development of commercial advertising themes.209 Other 
departments were now encouraged to do the same.
Morrison’s office also explored alternatives to excessive spending on newspaper 
advertising. ‘It might be possible’, Stephens wrote to Morrison, ‘though it would 
be more trouble and would take more staff, to achieve something like the same 
results [as newspaper advertising] by “penetration” of the news and feature 
columns of the newspapers -  at no cost whatever to the taxpayer’.210 At the end 
of January 1949 the Economic Information Committee agreed that ‘one of the 
most important means of publicizing economic information was through news and 
the presentation of it in such a way as to influence editorial comment’.211
Moreover, the Government found that if it was amenable to the approaches of 
commercial companies, then it could integrate some its own themes into private 
advertisements. At the beginning of 1949 the IH(O) Committee was approached 
by the Incorporated Society of British Advertisers (ISBA) and asked if they were 
interested in closer cooperation between the information services and advertising. 
After initial nervousness they concluded that, as long as they were careful it 
should not cause any harm. Pimlott wrote, ‘I should have thought, as a rough and 
ready goal, the aim should be to make reductions in Government advertising 
broadly corresponding to the contribution received from outside interests’.212 
According to this plan, Government publicity would not diminish but be replaced 
by commercial coverage.
Similarly, it would be easier to enhance relationships with the newsreel 
companies and point them towards stories, than to try to publicise them oneself.
209 ‘Note for French Committee -  ‘Free’ Publicity for Home / Economic Production Themes’, HI 
Kitchin, 11-1-1949, T245/6.
210 Stephens to Morrison, 2-12-48, CAB 124/1029.
211 IH(0)(E)(49)3rd, Minutes, 28-1-1949, T245/3.
212 Pimlott, Note on advertising, 17-2-1949, CAB 124/1005.
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This was one of the reasons why Robert Fraser hired Fred Watts, head of Pathe 
news for 25 years, to head up a newsreel desk at the COI. Watts was supposed 
to smooth some of the relations with the newsreels which had become strained, 
and ensure an ‘appreciable increase in newsreel coverage for Government 
themes’ (see Chapter Five).213
A third consequence of the austerity drive was the perpetuation and promotion of 
the Social Survey which measured people’s attitudes. The survey was critical, the 
French Report said, in evaluating the success of Government information. 
‘Whenever practicable’ Sir Henry French therefore recommended, ‘the results of 
publicity should be measured’.214 Indeed such measurement had already had a 
substantial impact, although not perhaps in the way intended. Research 
appeared to be showing that many of the Government information campaigns 
were a failure. Or, at least, that campaigns which sought to educate and inform 
the public were only marginally effective. Most people either saw the information 
and failed to digest it, saw it but did not connect it to their own situation, ignored it, 
or missed it entirely.
This came across vividly in some research done on behalf of the Economic 
Information Committee by Dr Mark Abrams in 1947. Abrams had been asked to 
test the public reaction to Report to the Nation -  a series of Government 
information advertisements placed in the national press. In October 1947 his 
company interviewed readers of the Daily Mail and the Daily Mirror. The readers 
were asked whether they had read the recent Report to the Nation advertisement 
completely, had read it partly, had only glanced at it, or had missed it entirely. 
45% of Daily Mail readers said they had read the ad completely whilst only 18%
213 IH(0)(49)2nd, Minutes, 3-3-1949, CAB 134/358. The Government relationship with the domestic 
newsreel companies is examined further in Chapter Five.
214 Report of the Committee on the Cost of Home Information Services, Cmd.7836, 1949.
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had missed it entirely. By comparison, not one Daily Mirror reader had read the 
ad completely. 84% had missed it entirely.215
This type of finding was combined with other broader survey results which 
showed that much economic information was having little discernible effect. The 
economic survey report for March 1948, for example, reported that ‘there is no 
appreciable change in public knowledge or opinion about the manpower problem 
and exports’.216
These reports discouraged those with idealistic expectations of a new democratic 
dialogue based on shared knowledge. Though they did not give up hope of 
eventually raising the economic understanding of the nation, they shifted towards 
simple publicity intended to elicit a specific reaction. In March 1949 the Ministerial 
committee on information services decided, ‘that the time had come when the 
emphasis should be more and more transferred to specific “action” publicity, 
telling the citizen what he himself might do in particular directions’.217 Not only 
was this more straightforward and easier to measure, it was also cheaper.
215 Mark Abrams wrote to Robert Fraser, 27-10-47, regarding recently completed interviews with 
readers of the Daily Mail and Daily Mirror, RG 40/25.
216 ‘Survey of Knowledge and Opinion about the Economic Situation', NS 502, January 1948, 
circulated as IH(0)(E)(48)61, 25-3-1948, CAB 134/365.
217 IS(49)1, Minutes, 25-3-1949, CAB 134/459.
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Conclusion
Paul Addison noted that in the 1930s ‘Both Marxists and progressives became 
obsessed by the problem of communicating with the mass of the public’.218 In 
1945 this progressive obsession was institutionalised by the Attlee Government. 
Its initial attitude is best summed up by a quote from William Beveridge made in 
1944; ‘Ignorance’, Beveridge wrote, ‘is an evil weed, which dictators may cultivate 
among their dupes, but which no democracy can afford among its citizens’.219 
Morrison thought Labour could and should commit to informing the public about 
what was being done in its name. It was for this idealistic reason that he 
established the Government Information Services.
Within 18 months he and other Ministers were made to realise that information 
services, and the commitment to comprehensive communication, was much more 
complex than they had imagined. Indeed it was an entirely new aspect of 
governance that required definition, direction, and management. As Robert 
Fraser told a Home Production Conference in June 1947, professional 
communication ‘was an entirely new function not previously discharged by the 
government or by any other government in a free country in any part of the 
world’.220
When, in 1947, the Government became more aware of this complexity, it 
decided that its problems, which were legion, had to be addressed by a 
combination of forward planning coupled with much greater management of 
information. Hence the formation not only of the powerful economic information 
unit, but later of the EAU, and the IRD. There was no intention to mislead the 
public, but to use the machinery of information now available as an aid to the
218 Addison (1994), p.143.
219 William Beveridge, ‘Full Employment in a Free Society’, Part 7, 1944.
220 Robert Fraser, Home Production Conference, June 1947, INF 12/65.
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execution and acceptance of government policy. In the difficult circumstances of 
the time it was considered legitimate to marshal the facts and shape them into a 
form that would be most convincing. But the effect was to shift the purpose of 
Government information from a general democratic responsibility to an important 
adjunct of policy -  a means by which to persuade rather than inform.
This Government’s use of communication was not sophisticated by later 
standards. But this was a period of experimentation which established the 
apparatus of communication, introduced new methods and created important 
precedents. As Clem Leslie said to the Institute of Public Administration; ‘We 
know well that we are not finished practitioners, but experimenters. It is not 
usually given to those who have to explore new territory to find the best route at 
the first attempt and go straight to their objective. We have to feel our way toward 
the best methods, and to content ourselves meantime with a good deal less than 
complete achievement’.221
By the end of the administration information professionals were permanently 
established within Government. The Treasury finally accepted the findings of the 
Crombie Committee (initiated by Fraser’s concerns in 1946) and, by the end of 
1949, instituted civil service positions, remuneration and recruitment criteria, and 
career paths for information officers.222 The EIU continued to function, although it 
was the organisation most directly effected by the cuts recommended by the 
French Committee. It was integrated into the Treasury shortly afterwards and
221 SC Leslie speech to Institute of Public Administration on The Work of the Economic Information 
Unit’, 1949.
222 This report was not published but was issued as an appendix to a Treasury instruction 
(Establishments circular 5/45 of August 20,1949) - Whitley bulletin, October 1949, pp. 176-82.
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renamed.223 Leslie continued to head it during the Conservative Government of 
1951-54.
The scale of Labour’s communications efforts vividly illustrated both the potential 
and constraints on Government communication. In particular, it became clear that 
the Government would have to use established channels of communication more 
effectively, and rely on them to translate its message to the population. The most 
important contemporary channels of political communication were the 
newspapers. Labour’s attempts to ignore, avoid, reform, marginalize and 
eventually come to terms with the press are assessed in the next two chapters.
223 IH(0)(E)(51)1st, Minutes, 12-1-1951, ‘On 4th December 1950, the EIU was renamed the 
Information Division of the Treasury. The duties of the division remain unaltered’, CAB 134/373.
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Chapter 2: The Government and the Press 1945-47
As outlined in Chapter One, in 1945 the Labour Government thought that in order to 
strengthen democracy it had to make it inclusive and participatory. Free and fair 
information was a prerequisite to this. Since most of the population already received 
most of their political information via the newspapers, these seemed the most natural 
channel through which to communicate. But Morrison, and many others on the 
political left, came to believe that the role of the newspaper as the channel of free 
and fair information had, by 1946, been compromised by the overweening power of a 
few, politically biased proprietors, by commercial imperatives which dictated the 
agenda of the papers, and by the lack of professionalism amongst journalists and 
their limited commitment to accuracy.
For this reason the Government appointed a Royal Commission on the Press in 
1947. This was the first ever full investigation of the press by a British Government. It 
lasted two years, asked over 200 people 13,239 questions, and analysed the 
coverage of all the major newspapers of the period. But its importance has 
sometimes been dismissed by historians.1 This is because its recommendations, not 
to introduce regulatory legislation of the press in favour of self regulation, were seen, 
at the time and since, as modest and timorous. What has been overlooked is how 
surprising they were. Appointed at the high point of nationalisation and during a 
period of increasing Government control an important question is why the 
Commission did not propose some sort of Government intervention in the press, 
positive or negative. Morrison had given it a very broad brief partly in the hope that it 
might devise some alternative means of protecting the press from owners and
1 See Stephen Koss (1984) p.641, AJP Taylor’s Beaverbrook (1972) p.585, and Curran & Seaton 
Power without Responsibilty, p.297.
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commercial pressures. As he wrote in a confidential paper before its appointment, 
the object of the inquiry should be ‘a general review of the place which the press 
should occupy in a democratic community’.2
The press was, understandably, uncomfortable about being the subject of such close 
scrutiny. By 1945 most of those within the press were very keen to free themselves 
from the strict Government control that had characterised the war years. They felt 
they had, through their conduct between 1939-45, proved their responsibility and 
should now be trusted. Even Churchill, always highly aware of the press, praised it in 
1943, “our vast influential newspaper press has known how to combine 
independence and liveliness with discretion and patriotism”.3 For some of those 
within it the experience of the 1930s and of the war had heightened their sense of 
independence. The Observer, for example, put this into its statement of principles in 
1942.4 In 1944 the press baron Lord Beaverbrook set up an independent body to 
oversee the Express Group of newspapers.5 And the election of a new Labour 
Government enhanced their impression of a new era free from the unhealthy Tory- 
Press Baron collusion of the late 1930s. But the different newspapers’ interpretations 
of independent coverage and impartial reporting conflicted, over time, with those of 
the Government. The more they did so, the more the Government came to question 
their commitment to free and fair communication.
2 Cabinet Paper, CP(46)360, 27-9-1946, CAB 129/13.
3 Quoted in Derek Hudson, British Journalists and Newspapers (1945), p.7.
4 ‘Amid this chaos the transient nature of existing Parties and alignments becomes obvious, while the 
permanence of principles is plainer and more precious than ever. The Observer should not be a Party 
paper. It must be tied to no group, no sect, no interest. It should belong to no combine of journals. Its 
independence must be absolute' Ivor Brown, The Observer, 1942, quoted Koss (1984), p.621-22.
5 London Express Newspapers, reply to questionnaire of Royal Commission (NC1) 1947, B.S.77/3(1), 
Part 3, ‘Since November 7 1944 a committee consisting of members of the managerial and editorial 
staffs has determined the policy of these newspapers'.
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This chapter and the one following will examine how these differing interpretations 
led to a fundamental reappraisal of the relationship of the Government and the press 
within a democracy. This one will look at how the relationship deteriorated between 
1945-46 and how that deterioration led the Government to question the entire role of 
the press within society. It will show how Herbert Morrison pushed through the 
appointment of a Royal Commission, even though he tried to hide his involvement. 
The chapter will end with the appointment of the Commission. The following chapter 
will look at the progress of the Commission in the context of developing Government 
policy towards the media and assess how and why it came up with its 
recommendations.
That there was no clear resolution to the problem (of how a Government relates with 
its press without compromising its freedom) was, in itself, a very important outcome. 
Due to the almost continual friction between the Government and the press they both 
came to examine their roles much more closely than otherwise they would have 
done. In the process they clarified and matured these roles and this then had a major 
effect on their subsequent development. Though Britain did not choose to impose 
regulatory legislation on the press as in many other contemporary nations, they did 
use hostile tactics to influence the press and they flirted with alternative measures of 
control. That they came to settle for more diverse and covert methods of information 
management was by no means pre-determined in 1945.
These chapters show how the Labour Government became frustrated with the 
existing means of political communication and attempted to restructure them, while, 
at the same time developing alternative channels of communication. The attempt to 
develop alternative channels will be examined further in Chapters Four and Five.
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SECTION 1: Communicating Through the Press
Why the Government Wanted and Needed to Communicate
As discussed in Chapter One, Labour had a theoretical commitment to communicate 
with the people. Everyone had a part to play in Labour’s plans for Britain. The plans 
were, ideologically and pragmatically, universalist. The National Health Service and 
comprehensive National Insurance were being introduced to cater for everybody. 
The plans to nationalise coal, gas, electricity, transport, communications, and iron 
and steel would affect each person, regardless of age, status or wealth. No-one was 
exempt and therefore everyone needed to be told how they would be affected and 
what they were expected to do. As Stephen Koss has written ‘the triumph of the 
Labour Party symbolized a revolutionary spirit that demanded nothing less than a 
reappraisal of national institutions’.6
Attlee spelt out the implications of this at the Scarborough conference in 1948. 
“Socialism is a way of life, not just an economic theory’ he said, ‘and in the process 
of achieving Socialism we have got to be good citizens of the Socialist state. 
Socialism demands a higher standard of civic virtue than capitalism. It demands a 
conscious and active participation in public affairs”.7
It was at the moment that these new plans were being introduced that there would 
be the greatest need for communication. The Government was critically responsible 
for providing information and support for the new legislation as well as for shifting 
millions of people from a war to a peace footing.
6 Stephen Koss, Political Press Vol.II (1984), p.632.
7 Clement Attlee, Labour Conference, Scarborough, 19-5-1948.
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Stephen Taylor, who had been head of Home Intelligence during the war and was 
voted into Parliament as a Labour MP in 1945, wrote to The Times in October 1945; 
‘It is clear that in the next five years the calls which the Government will make on the 
ordinary citizen are going to increase. If he is to know what Parliament has done in 
his name, and what part he has in the post war social structure, he must be told and 
told repeatedly in language he can understand. This is not Socialist propaganda, but 
simply a condition of the survival of democracy’.8
The Importance of the Press in Britain as a Means of Communication
The press was integral to the Government’s plans to communicate. It had to be. 
Exposure to the press was practically universal. In 1947 the Hulton Readership 
Survey calculated that only 13% of the adult population did not read a daily paper, 
and only 7.5% did not read a Sunday paper.9 The total weekday newspaper 
circulation was over 15.5 million for nationals and almost 13 million for provincial 
dailies but the readership was even greater.10 Since paper rationing meant that 
newspapers were restricted in numbers of copies as well as in size, each paper 
would almost certainly be read by more than one person. The Hulton Survey 
estimated, for example, that each copy of the Daily Telegraph was read by an 
average of three people.
The post-war administration, like those before it, expected people to gain their 
understanding of politics from society and via the news media. It had, as the 
contemporary editor of the New Statesman wrote, ‘deliberately left the job of political
8 Stephen Taylor, letter to The Times, 5-10-1945, p.5.
9 Hulton Readership Survey, Hobson, Henry, Abrams (1947).
10 Circulations for four weeks up to 29-6-1947 (Cmd.7700, p.12): 15,567,883 for national dailies, 
12,982,099 for provincial dailies. The figure for national dailies in May 2004 was 11,055,258 (UK, Audit 
Bureau of Circulation).
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education to be a by-product of the business of news-selling’.11 The press was the 
most convenient and natural means of communication for the Government. Morrison 
put it even more strongly during the debate on the Press in October 1946, “in our 
subtle British way the press of this country is, so to speak, an unofficial part of our 
Constitution”.12
Some newspapers took this responsibility much more seriously than others. The 
Times would print by far the most political news and comment, normally publishing 
verbatim important speeches from the House and Government statements. In the 
severely shortened papers of this period The Times devoted about 18% of its space 
to Parliamentary reports and international political news. The Telegraph also carried 
political news, although with fewer direct transcripts and more features.13
Of the popular press the News Chronicle covered the most political news while the 
rest of the tabloids had a broader agenda which included politics but also general 
home news, sports, features, finance and of course photographs and cartoons. The 
News of the World made it very clear that its agenda was not driven by politics. ‘We 
have never claimed to take a very prominent part in the political life of the country’ its 
editor told the Royal Commission in 1948, ‘We think that a newspaper will fail (I am 
looking at it from a circulation point of view) if it does not deal with entertainment’.14
The News of the World was the biggest selling Sunday paper, selling over 7.5 million 
copies each week in 1947. Its readership was estimated to be over 16 million. There
11 New Statesman and Nation, Editorial, 5-4-1947.
12 Herbert Morrison, Parliamentary Debates, Press (Ownership and Control), Vol.428, Col.556, 29-10-
1946.
13 Figures taken from an analysis done by the World’s Press News in June 1947 (5-6-47). Based on one 
week’s coverage.
14 Minutes of Evidence, Royal Commission on the Press (ME-RCP), News of the World, Day 22 (19-2- 
48) q.7411 & q.7425, Cmd.7398.
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were six other national Sunday tabloids or ‘picture papers’ -  The Sunday Express, 
the People, the Sunday Dispatch, Reynolds News, the Sunday Graphic and the 
Sunday Pictorial. Two ‘class’ (the contemporary term for broadsheet) papers 
competed with one another, the Sunday Times (not linked to the daily paper) and 
The Observer. Their circulations together added up to less than one million.
There were 112 daily newspapers published in Britain.15 Nine of these were general 
national morning papers. The biggest selling daily newspaper was the Daily Express, 
selling almost 4 million copies (when its circulation was pegged in June 1947). It was 
closely followed by the Daily Mirror. The Daily Telegraph was the best selling class 
paper, hitting one million sales in mid 1947, while The Times, the newspaper of 
record, sold approximately 270,000.16 The Manchester Guardian was only now 
making the jump from a regional to a national paper.17 There were six significant 
national political periodicals: the Spectator, the New Statesman and Nation, Tribune, 
the Economist, Time and Tide, and Truth. Combined, their circulations totalled just 
over 200,000 (compared to the Radio Times which, by mid 1947, was selling over 6 
million copies a week).18
Politically, contemporaries classified the Express, the Daily Mail, the Daily Sketch 
and Telegraph as right wing. The Mirror, ‘the people’s paper’, was considered left 
wing, while the Herald had its political affinity to Labour written into its Articles of 
Association. The Times was simply the paper of the establishment (although had
15 Includes all ‘general interest’ daily newspapers in 1948, (Cmd.7700, p.7).
16 Circulations for four weeks up to 29-6-1947 (Cmd.7700, p.12).
17 At the prompting of Laurence Scott, the grandson of CP Scott. See David Ayerst, Guardian, 
Biography of a Newspaper (1971), p.596.
18 Cmd.7700, p.14, paragraph 47, and World’s Press News, 11-9-1947, circulation for first 6 months of
1947.
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seriously angered the Conservatives during the war). The News Chronicle was 
sympathetic to the Liberals.
Though radio was increasingly important for straight news, it was not considered the 
means by which people made political judgements. As Wilson Harris wrote in 1943, 
‘In spite of the wireless... the newspapers may properly be described as the eyes 
and ears of every man and woman in the land... through the papers they form their 
estimates of public men, of political issues, of foreign countries’.19 Moreover, the 
BBC still held the monopoly for radio broadcasting and was bound, by its charter, to 
remain apolitical.
Television had yet to be restarted, having been suspended during the war. And since 
so few people had a television set it was virtually ineffectual as a means of mass 
political communication before 1950.20
The Economics of the Press in the 1930s vs. the 1940s
The economics of newspaper production in the 1930s were entirely different to those 
of the late 1940s. This difference changed the dynamics and extent of influence of 
different forces acting on the papers. The first and most important difference was in 
the cost and availability of the raw materials. Since there was no wood pulp 
produced in Britain all of it had to be imported -  either as raw pulp and then 
converted to newsprint in British mills, or as finished newsprint. Before the war most 
of the pulp came from Scandinavia, and the newsprint from the US and Canada.21 
The war cut off the supply of pulp from Scandinavia. British newspapers banded
19 Wilson Harris, The Daily Press (1943), p.1.
20 By 1950, 343,882 television licences had been sold. Perilli, in Curran & Porter, British Cinema History 
(1983).
21 PEP, Report on the British Press (1938).
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together and formed the Newsprint Supply Company to ensure that they could 
maintain imports from the US and Canada and keep printing.22 After the war it took a 
long time for Scandinavian industry to revive so newspapers continued to import 
most newsprint from across the Atlantic. Though this was expensive, it was also so 
strictly rationed that the average paper was a sixth of the size of its 1930s 
predecessor. And yet, they were selling at the same cover price. This made each 
paper sold that much more profitable.
They were made more profitable still by much lower staff costs. In the 1930s, due to 
the aggressive circulation battles, most papers employed armies of canvassers to 
knock on people’s doors, offering all sorts of gifts and enticements to convince 
people to subscribe to their newspaper. By 1938 40% of the staff on a typical 
national morning newspaper were canvassers.23 In 1945 the interest in news was so 
great and the supply of newspapers so limited (in both pagination and circulation due 
to paper rationing) that almost every national newspaper sold all the newspapers 
they produced. Plus, since the ‘no returns’ policy was still in force (ie. the newsagent 
had to pay for and could not return any of the papers they ordered) all newspapers 
distributed corresponded to guaranteed income. There was therefore no need for 
many canvassers. Similarly, it took far fewer journalists to write a four page paper vs. 
a twenty-four page paper. Again, this reduced wage bill added to the profitability of 
the paper.
Advertising revenue could not, however, be maintained at pre-war levels. Even 
though papers could charge more for space in the much depleted post-war 
newspapers, the increase could not make up for the enormous reduction in size.
22 ME-RCP, Lord Layton and F.P. Bishop, Newsprint Supply Company, Day 24 (4-3-1948), Cmd.7409.
23 PEP, Report on the British Press (1938), p. 132.
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Therefore where advertising income made up almost 60% of the revenues of the 
pre-war paper, by 1943 this had dropped to 31% and stayed low while the 
newspapers remained so small.24 However, the other increases of revenue made up 
for this loss.
Reappraising the Ability of the Press to Fulfil Its Political Responsibilities
By the late 1930s the ability of the press to fulfil what many saw as a necessary 
political function -  of informing -  was being questioned in a series of books, 
pamphlets and studies. This was mainly as a result of three factors. The first was an 
increased concentration in ownership, particularly of the provincial press. It was 
thought this might lead to a narrowing representation of political views and a 
restriction of the freedom of editors and journalists. In the 1920s Allied Newspapers, 
run by the Berry brothers, had competed with Lord Rothermere in a frantic buy-out of 
national and provincial newspapers. Shortly afterwards, in 1931, they had used 
these newspapers in a failed campaign to destabilise the Opposition, attacking the 
leader of the Conservative party Stanley Baldwin (leading to his famous attack on 
them and their willingness to use power without responsibility, “the prerogative of the 
harlot throughout the ages”25). The fear grew, as the Economist noted in 1943, that 
‘a handful of newspaper proprietors are themselves able to... impose upon the public 
the newspapers that they (the proprietors) think they ought to read and to stereotype 
public opinion in a few primitive and not always very sightly moulds’.26
24 Net advertising revenue as a percentage of total net revenue, calculated by The Economist, 28-2- 
1948, ‘Newspaper Revenues and Earnings’, pp.350-351.
25 Baldwin speech at Queen’s Hall, Langham place on 17-3-1931 (reported in The Times the following 
day).
26 The Economist, The Government and the Press’, 11-9-1943.
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The second factor was the commercialisation of the newspapers, as characterized 
by the circulation wars of the 1930s. The Daily Herald, trying to nudge its way into 
the handful of mass circulation dailies, began offering a series of promotions to 
attract readers. These ranged from the complete works of Dickens to free life 
insurance. So successful were these that all the other popular dailies did the same. 
Once circulation reached a certain point advertising revenue increased significantly. 
It was due to this escalation in advertising revenue that the financial structure of the 
national newspaper actually changed fundamentally at this time. By the start of the 
Second World War many national papers had come to rely for over 50% of their 
revenue on advertising. This search for circulation and advertising revenue also led, 
it was believed, to the sensationalisation of news and the suppression of political and 
economic coverage.
The third factor was the use of the press for partisan political objectives in other 
countries. On the continent the fascist parties were successfully using propaganda 
and the national press to gain and maintain power. In Germany, Italy and Spain the 
Government and the press worked closely together. So much so that commentators 
in Britain saw them no longer as a check or balance to the actions of the 
Government, but as a prop and sop to the established powers. Some writers felt that 
Britain was moving in the same direction (with the press owners, rather than the 
Government, as the key power brokers). Wickham Steed, in his book The Press 
published in 1938, went so far as to write that ‘the British Press has -  with one or two 
notable exceptions -  made further progress on the road that leads to totalitarian 
servitude’.27
27 Henry Wickham Steed, The Press (1938), p.249.
89
Chapter 2
All these factors, it was feared, tended to suppress free and fair political coverage. 
Politics was either being drowned out by non-political, ‘human interest’ stories 
designed to boost circulation, or the undiluted voice of Parliament and the 
Government was being replaced by opinion and comment. As the circulation of 
newspapers grew, it was believed, more and more it was the voice of the individual 
newspaper people were hearing, not the voice of their political representatives. This 
compromised the position of MPs as the representative political voice of specific 
communities, and the position of Parliament as the most important forum for the 
discussion of politics. Wilson Harris worried about this in his 1943 book The Daily 
Press, arguing that the newspapers had begun to replace Parliament and that since 
Parliament’s proceedings were now ‘so inadequately reported... it is in the leader 
columns and correspondence columns of the press itself that the great debate must 
be mainly conducted’.28
PEP wrote the most comprehensive of a number of critiques of the press between 
1938 and 1945. 300 pages long and written over the course of three years, its report 
set the agenda for debate on the press until the Royal Commission was appointed.29 
There were others by Wickham Steed, Wilson Harris -  already briefly mentioned -  
Lord Camrose, and Ivor Thomas.30 All these publications, and a growing number of 
articles in weekly journals, sought to examine similar issues: whether the control of 
the media by a small number of men was inherently detrimental to Government, 
society and democracy; how a Government ought to relate to its press and the 
degree and type of control it ought to exert; whether the shift of the press from a
28 Wilson Harris, The Daily Press (1943), p. 16.
29 The report was edited by Max Nicholson. SC Leslie was also one of the members of the PEP Press 
group (Pinder, 50 Years of PEP, p.26).
30 Ivor Thomas, The Newspaper, Oxford Pamphlets on Home Affairs No.H2(1943), p.12.
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‘calling’ to an industry which consciously sought profit and influence should be 
prevented or at least moderated by Government support for minority voices (for 
example by subsidising minor presses). By the end of the war these publications 
created a mood of underlying discomfort amongst some within the Establishment 
about the role of the newspaper within contemporary democracy.
Labour and the Press
There was also, in 1945, a widely held belief amongst Labour politicians that the 
press was Tory dominated. This was not surprising given the four right wing Press 
Lords who overshadowed the newspaper world. The first, Lord Camrose -  
‘industrious, thrifty, sober, serious’ -  owned the Daily Telegraph, the Financial Times 
and 80 periodicals.31 Camrose was a close friend of Winston Churchill’s and the 
Telegraph was unstintingly loyal to the Conservatives (Camrose even threw the 
biggest Tory party on the night of each election).32 He had been so worried about the 
cataclysmic financial effects of a Labour victory that in July 1945 he sold the 
Financial Times.33
The second, Lord Kemsley (Camrose’s brother), owned the Daily Sketch and 
Sunday Graphic, the Sunday Times, two smaller national papers, and seventeen 
provincial papers.34 Kemsley had been particularly close to Chamberlain and Halifax
31 ‘A Private Enquiry into the British Press’, in The Public’s Progress, Contact Publications, June 1947, 
contained in Morrison Papers, Part 1, Section 1-3, BLPES.
32 Duff Hart-Davis, The House the Berry’s Built -  Inside the Telegraph 1928-86 (1990). He was still 
throwing these parties for the Conservatives into the 1970s.
33 Ibid. 'Camrose later confided to one of the FT’s managers that this was the greatest mistake he ever 
made’, p.120.
34 The Daily Sketch was an amalgamation of the Daily Graphic and Daily Sketch and changed its name 
from the Sketch to the Graphic and back again.
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before the war and was outspokenly rightwing.35 His Daily Sketch could be 
considered a shriller tabloid version of the Telegraph.
The third, Lord Rothermere, was a more reluctant press Lord.36 He owned the Daily 
Mail, The Sunday Dispatch and the Evening News, as well as 16 provincial dailies 
and weeklies.37 Unlike his father, one of the pioneers of popular newspapers, 
Esmund Rothermere was polite and accommodating. Partly as a result of his political 
quietude, and due to the overbearing influence of his wife, Lady O’Neill, the Daily 
Mail was perceived to have lost much of its political influence.38 However, it still had 
a readership of over five million people.39
The fourth right wing press Lord was Lord Beaverbrook, owner of the Daily Express, 
the Sunday Express and the Evening Standard. Beaverbrook was perhaps the most 
influential because of his previous Government positions (he was in the Coalition 
Cabinet during the war), the circulation of the Daily Express, and his role in the 1945 
election. Beaverbrook’s role as the planner and architect of the Tory campaign had 
already, by 1946, acquired mythical proportions. So much so that the political 
magazine Truth could talk about 'the now hoary legend that he [Beaverbrook] lost 
the election for the Conservatives’.40
35 This went so far that he met with Hitler for an hour, six weeks before the outbreak of war, to discuss 
how the British Press could promote Anglo-German accord, from Charles Wintour, The Rise and Fall of 
Fleet Street (1989), p.41.
36 Reference to S.J. Taylor’s biography, The Reluctant Press Lord -  Esmund Rothermere and the Daily 
Mail (1998).
37 Under Associated Newspapers, of which the new Lord Rothermere became chairman in 1937 (Lord 
Camrose, British Newspapers and their Controllers, 1947, p.54).
38 Stephen Koss, Political Press Vol.ll. (1984), p.621.
39 Hulton readership survey (1947).
40 Truth, 18-1-1946.
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The potentially damaging role of the proprietors appeared to be borne out by their 
behaviour in the late 1930s. By that point many of the owners had become very 
intimate with the Conservative Government. Chamberlain, Halifax and Hoare 
cultivated them and encouraged them to support their policy of appeasement and 
play down their criticisms of Germany. They willingly did so and consequently 
became associated with Cato’s ‘Guilty Men’ after the war. The only newspaper to 
denounce the Munich agreement, Reynolds News, ‘was the one paper which had 
absolutely no contact with the Government’.41
There were other press barons who cast less imposing shadows. Lord Layton, who 
in conjunction with members of the Cadbury family, ran the News Chronicle and the 
London evening paper The Star. Lord Southwood, who acquired the Daily Herald 
from the Labour party in 1929 in order to increase investment in the paper and to 
ensure there was at least one pro-Labour, pro-Union popular newspaper in Britain. 
And Colonel J.J. Astor, who bought The Times from Lord Northcliffe in 1922. The 
other national papers had no individual owners but were within a larger holding or 
part of a trust42
The influence of these proprietors could be over-emphasised. Even in the election of 
1945 there was a mixture of viewpoints and a reluctance within each newspaper to 
toe the Party line43 Only the Daily Telegraph and the Daily Herald maintained 
doctrinaire positions. Others, like The Times and The Observer, went out of their way
41 Richard Cockett, Twilight of Truth (1989), p.83.
42 The Daily Mirror was part of Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd. With approximately 10,000 shareholders. 
The Observer was held by the Astor family but ownership was transferred to a trust by David Astor at 
this time. The Manchester Guardian was run by a trust.
43 McCallum and Readman, in their 1947 study of the 1945 election, first took issue with the idea that 
the newspapers were highly skewed to the right in The British General Election of 1945 (1947). Since 
then, Koss and others have further questioned the partisan political consistency (Rise and Fall of 
Political Press II)- Roy Greenslade has recently called McCallum and Readman’s analysis ‘badly 
flawed’, underestimating the level of Tory support (Press Gang, 2003, p.34).
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to prove their independence. And, perhaps more significantly, the coverage of the 
election was limited due to the quantity of other news at the final stages of the war.
And yet there was an ingrained belief within some of the Labour party that the press 
in Britain was owned and controlled by a group of men who were categorically set 
against them. The belief was even written into their manifesto: ‘In the years that 
followed [WWI], the "hard-faced men" and their political friends kept control of the 
Government. They controlled the banks, the mines, the big industries, largely the 
press and the cinema’.44 Of these same ‘hard-faced’ men Beaverbrook, Camrose 
and Kemsley were still around in 1945.
Therefore after July 1945, before the newspapers had said anything, there was 
concern about how the press Lords might act towards a Labour administration. In 
these circumstances Labour was highly sensitive to their actions and open to the 
opportunity of reappraising the role of the press.
A Very Different Perspective -  the Press’s View of Itself
At the same time that Labour was preoccupied by the right wing dominance inherent 
within British newspapers, the newspapers themselves were congratulating 
themselves on their patriotism during the Second World War and looking forward to 
being rewarded with much greater freedom and independence.
The public spirit of the press during the war has been exemplary’, William Redfern, 
president of the Institute of Journalists, said in his annual address in November 
1944.45 In this and in his articles for the industry publication, The Journal, he praised 
the behaviour of the press who played ‘no mean part in the mammoth fight for
44 The Labour Party Election Manifesto 1945, ‘Let us Face the Future'.
45 Annual Address of William Redfem to the Institute of Journalists, ‘Unfettered Press is Vital for World 
Peace', printed in The Journal, November 1944 (monthly publication).
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freedom. It [the press] has made its stand for truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth’.46 He looked forward to the end of the war and the quick ‘restoration of all 
our liberties’.47
For some of the newspapers the Second World War was a watershed in the growing 
autonomy of the daily press and independence from the influence of the proprietor. 
The Observer’s statement of principle in 1942 has already been mentioned, and the 
paper followed this up by converting ownership into a trust after the war, explicitly so 
that it could remain free from overt influence.48 The Express Group’s Policy 
Committee, formed in 1944, met monthly and laid down ‘the broad lines of policy’ 
which governed all newspapers in the company -  ‘Lord Beaverbrook has never 
made the slightest attempt to override the decisions of the Policy Committee’, the 
General Manager claimed in 1948.49 Even The Times, so profoundly a newspaper of 
the establishment that abroad it was considered the voice of the Government, 
asserted its individual voice during the war. E.H. Carr, the left leaning leader writer, 
promoted the Russian cause and later that of Greek independence against pressure 
from the Coalition. According to Stephen Koss, by the end of the war ‘Of the major 
dailies, only the Telegraph adhered to a discernible party position’.50
The aspiration to independence was the same for provincial newspapers as for 
national ones. Shortly after the end of the war more and more regional newspapers
46 ‘1944 Calls Journalists to Great Tasks’, The Journal, January 1944.
47 The Journal, December 1944.
48 Arthur Mann, the Observer, The primary purpose [of the Trust] is to secure independence from 
Government or Party control, and from being brought into a combine” ME-RCP, Day 9, (26-11-47), 
q.2756, Cmd.7339.
49 ME-RCP, interview with E.J. Robertson, General Manager of Express News, Day 16 (8-01-48), 
q.4834 & q.5062, Cmd.7364.
50 Stephen Koss, Political Press VolJI (1984), p.616.
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were defining themselves as independent. As the Institute of Journalists told the 
Royal Commission, 76 out of 134 said they were unconnected to any political party.51
This was partly because while the war was going on the newspapers had no need to 
worry about circulations (which were rising constantly), they did not have to worry 
about political allegiance since there was a coalition; they only had to think about 
their readership. This motivated some editors to look to introduce a broader news 
agenda at the end of the war. Tom Hopkinson, editor of the Picture Post, thought 
that his readers had been through so much they wanted more realism and coverage 
of more of ‘the subjects people talked about and argued about amongst themselves’, 
like life in a mental hospital or life as a prison officer.52
Therefore the Government and the newspapers were, at the close of conflict, coming 
from diametrically opposed positions -  the former thinking that they had to be very 
wary of the press and remind it of its responsibilities, the latter thinking that they had 
earned the right to enjoy as much freedom as they chose.
SECTION 2: Labour’s First Year
High Hopes - The Situation When Labour Took Office
When Labour came to office in August 1945 there seemed a chance that they might 
maintain a productive relationship with the press. Despite the vitriol that 
characterised some of the coverage of the election, certain right wing newspapers 
called a truce and claimed they would judge Labour by its deeds, not its words. The 
Sunday Express wrote, ‘Let us all give the new team the fairest chance, a candid
51 ME-RCP, Institute of Journalists, Day 6 (30-10-47), q.1663, Cmd.7328.
52 From Tom Hopkinson’s autobiography, Of This Our Tim e-A Journalist's Story 1905-50 (1982), 
p.243.
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criticism, an unstinted approval where and when it is earned, and a firm support for 
all good causes and courses’.53
Less partisan newspapers were still more optimistic about the possibilities inherent in 
a Labour victory. Some were hopeful that Labour would introduce a new openness to 
Government. World’s Press News, the trade paper of the British press, felt that since 
Labour was dependent on popular appeal, ‘It is likely therefore that the Labour 
government will make it its business to see that the electors get a better flow of 
governmental information on policy and practise than ever before’. Newspapers, it 
suggested, would be the means by which Labour would transmit this information, 
which could only have a positive impact on the press: ’we consider it likely that the 
change of Government will intensify the importance of the press and the regard 
which the press can establish for itself in the public mind’.54
Ernest Jay, shortly to become President of the National Union of Journalists, was 
brimming with confidence about the effect of the new Government. ‘I happen to 
know’ he wrote on the front page of The Journalist, 'that the new Government is 
anxious and ready to introduce a new era in the relations between the Government 
and the Press, and in return it will expect fair treatment in the presentation of its 
attempts to implement the policy it was elected to carry out’.55
Thanks to the war there was also the machinery in place to facilitate a fuller 
relationship. All the Government departments now had press offices. The Ministry of 
Information still existed, although most expected it to disappear soon. In 1944-45
53 Sunday Express, 29-7-1945, opinion column, 'Our hopes’, p.4.
54 World’s Press News, 2-8-1945, p.1 & p. 19.
55 The Journalist, Ernest Jay, September 1945, p.1.
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there were still approximately 4,000 people working on home information services, 
either in the departments or at the MOI.56
There were other reasons to believe the relationship would be happy and 
constructive. Herbert Morrison, the information director of the Labour Government, 
had good relations with many of the editors and proprietors. He had even reversed 
some of the damage done by his actions as Home Secretary during the Second 
World War (when he closed the Daily Worker and threatened to close the Daily 
Mirror). Before the election he had met and charmed Guy Bartholomew (Editorial 
Director of the Mirror) and used the Mirror’s cartoonist, Zee, to draw some of 
Labour’s election posters.57 He befriended Percy Cudlipp, editor of the Daily Herald, 
Maggie Stewart at the News Chronicle, and Kingsley Martin at the New Statesman, 
as well as other journalists, editors and all the Parliamentary Lobby 
correspondents.58 David Keir, a journalist on the News Chronicle, remembered how 
Morrison knew ‘most of the Lobby men and took trouble to cultivate them... He 
courted journalists and earned a reputation as a man who talked to the Press’.59
This was also a Labour Government and Parliament packed with journalists. There 
were over 40 accredited journalists and editors elected to the House in 1945, 20 of 
them members of the National Union of Journalists.60 This included: Michael Foot 
(Labour), previously editor of the Evening Standard and shortly to be editor of
56 From ‘Cost of Government Information Services’, 12-4-1948, IS(48)6, Home Information Services: 
number of staff 1944/5 -  3,999, CAB 124/1029.
57 Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p.335.
58 Interviews with Ernest Jay, James Griffiths and Kingsley Martin. Ernest Jay said ‘Herbert was very 
close to Percy Cudlipp, always playing around him'. Morrison Biographical Papers (Jones/Donoughue), 
BLPES.
59 Interview with David Keir, Morrison Biographical Papers (Jones/Donoughue), BLPES.
60 The Journalist, 1-9-1945. ‘Union has 20 MPs. NUJ Form 3rd Largest Group in New House’. 19 of the 
20 were Labour (the twentieth, Vernon Bartlett, was an independent). The total of 40 journalists was 
calculated by Eric Harrison, a Parliamentary reporter for The Times, cited in Koss, p.636.
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Tribune; Ernest Thurtle (Labour), regular writer for the Sunday Express, Wilson 
Harris (Independent), editor of the Spectator, Gary Allighan (Labour), columnist for 
the Daily Mail, Vernon Bartlett (Independent), Tom Driberg (Labour), Jennie Lee 
(Labour), Hector McNeill (Labour), and Maurice Webb (Labour). This was reflected in 
the number of MPs writing regularly for the papers throughout this period.
Moreover, in late September, Attlee appointed Francis Williams as Public Relations 
advisor to Number 10. This was a significant step. Williams had considerable 
journalistic and Government experience. He had edited The Daily Herald between 
1936 and 1940, then headed the Ministry of Information’s News and Censorship 
division during the war. In 1945 he acted as the head of public relations for the 
British delegation at the first conference of the United Nations in San Francisco, with 
great success. When Attlee asked him to coordinate Downing Street’s political 
communications, on a salary of £2,000 a year, the Prime Minister sent a signal to the 
newspapers that media relations were going to be taken seriously.61
The importance of Williams’ appointment was accentuated by the book which he had 
just finished writing when he agreed to take the post. Press, Parliament and People 
is an examination of the way in which a modern Government can and should 
communicate with its people. The central problem is how to secure continuing power 
to the people given the ‘inevitable extension of the authority of central government in 
economic and social matters’.62 Williams concluded that ‘modern Government 
increasingly requires the knowledge and understanding of the mass of the people if it
61 Though all the newspapers reported Williams' salary as £2,000 a year, the original offer from Attlee 
was for £1,700 (Francis Williams Private Papers, letter from Attlee 27-9-1945). It is not clear whether 
this was increased after negotiations.
62 Francis Williams, Press, Parliament and People (1946), p.85.
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is to be effective’.63 This was especially the case with the current Labour 
administration which, ‘pledged to the kind of policies that the present one is, cannot 
afford not to use to the full every possible channel of public information and 
education available to it’.64 Therefore the new Government information services were 
necessary and justified, and it was imperative that the Government use the press as 
much as it could. At the same time Williams was scrupulously conscious of the 
freedom of the press and the dangers of Government control. It was this dilemma, 
the need to inform without impinging on press freedom, that Williams raised in his 
book and sought to resolve in his subsequent two years at Downing Street.
The book was widely reviewed and well received. Kingsley Martin, editor of the New 
Statesman, saw it as recognition of the extended role of the ‘positive State’.65 If 
Government was to take a much more active role in economic and social affairs, it 
made sense that it should do the same with publicity and information. Wilson Harris, 
Martin’s opposite at the Spectator, was interested in the book but disagreed with it. 
He worried that in Williams’s world, the Government would seek to determine the 
news agenda.66
Once in his new position, Williams acted almost immediately to increase the amount 
of information released to the press and the public. He introduced daily lobby 
briefings for the first time.67 He sought to professionalise the public relations officers 
within each department. And he spoke about opening up Government to public
63 Ibid. p.116.
64 Ibid. p. 129.
65 Review of Press, Parliament and People, New Statesman and Nation, 2-2-1946.
66 Review of Press, Parliament and People, The Spectator, 1-2-1946.
67 Jeremy Tunstall, The Westminster Lobby Correspondents (1970), p.94, ‘Regular daily briefings [from 
No. 10]... only began in 1945’.
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scrutiny.68 These decisions mark the end of secrecy and understatement’ World’s 
Press News wrote, ‘and the determination adequately to interpret to the world the 
plans and purposes of the British people’.69
Therefore it seemed as though there was potential for an extended constructive 
relationship between the Government and the press. However, within ten months 
almost a hundred Labour MPs were calling for a Royal Commission on the press, 
members of Cabinet were regularly lambasting the press in public, and much of the 
press itself was alienated and remote from Government. The next section explores 
the reasons for this deterioration and why it was important in provoking a formal 
examination of the role of the press in a democracy.
August 1945 to July 1946 - The Deterioration of Government-Press Relations
The reasons for the deterioration of relations in this period can be found partly in the 
actions of the press and the Government and partly due to factors out of their 
control. These factors included certain practical problems that prevented the free 
flow of information through the press. The first, and most important, of these was 
paper rationing.
The shortage of newsprint after the war meant that the average popular newspaper 
was only four pages in length (folded to tabloid size this made eight). The average 
‘class’ newspaper was eight pages. The Times was ten. Even if they reduced the 
size of their font, reduced the number of advertisements, reduced the number of 
photographs and increased the number of columns per page -  all of which the 
newspapers did -  there was only a limited amount of news they could fit inside each
68 World's Press News, credited Williams with slimming down the ndmber of departmental PROs but 
increasing their professionalism, 8-11-1945, p.14.
69 Ibid.
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issue. Naturally some items had to be covered briefly and some not at all. 
Parliamentary news was reduced in most papers -  although they all continued to 
print some.70 The lack of paper also meant that newspaper circulations were pegged. 
In other words they were not allowed to sell more than a certain number of copies 
each day (judged by their circulation when rationing was introduced).
A second practical reason was the sheer quantity of news, much of it not directly 
related to the Government. For example, in one week in March 1946, Stalin called 
Churchill a warmonger for his ‘Iron Curtain’ speech at the same time as he moved 
Soviet troops south through Persia, Herman Goering entered the dock at the 
Nuremberg trials, 33 spectators were crushed to death in the worst disaster in the 
history of British football, the already striking dockers were joined by many of the 
motor workers, and a Europe-wide emergency food conference was called as many 
countries on the continent spiralled towards starvation. At the same time the issues 
of Indian independence, a Jewish homeland in the Middle East, an American loan, 
and atomic bomb tests rumbled in the background.71
The newspapers’ difficulty in covering political news fully was increased by Labour’s 
plans to pass an enormous raft of legislation during 1946. During the 1945-46 
Parliamentary session, 169 bills and amendments came in front of the House.72 To 
speed the passage of many of these Morrison, as Leader of the House and Minister 
in charge of Labour’s legislative programme, began to use standing committees 
which would review bills in parallel with the House. Both the pace of legislation and
70 A newspaper conference on The Press and the Future’ in November 1945 explicitly blamed the lack 
of Parliamentary news on the lack of newsprint. See ‘Press and the Future’, World’s Press News, 29- 
11-1945.
71 Taken from range of newspapers, week beginning 11-3-1946.
72 Based on index of bills, ordered chronologically, January-July 1946, Parliamentary Papers, 
Vol.XXVII, 1945-46.
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these new methods of review made it difficult for newspapers to report bills 
thoroughly. This led some of them to accuse the Government of deliberately trying to 
suppress public debate and trying to slip things past the public unnoticed. ‘An 
uninstructed democracy is an unhealthy democracy’, the Daily Telegraph intoned, 
‘and a Parliament relegated in practice to semi-secrecy by deficient facilities for 
publicity abdicates its primary function as the forum of the nation’.73
The press must share some responsibility for the worsening relationship with the 
Government. They were naturally enthusiastic about the end of the war and the 
release of Government controls. This led some of them to cover more light, 
entertaining stories than they had been able to in the last six years. This was not ‘an 
unbridled campaign of screaming irresponsibility’ as described by James Margach, 
but a spontaneous release of some of the pent up emotions of the war years.74 As 
J.J. Astor, Chairman of The Times, explained ‘After a war I believe there is always 
an emotional phase, but that is only transient’.75 More often than not it tended to lead 
to exuberant inaccuracy rather than political irresponsibility. For example, the theft of 
some of the Windsor jewels caused an enormous sensation in October 1946 and 
many of the popular papers, without specific information on the jewels themselves or 
their value, made ill-judged guesses which later proved wildly off the mark.
The worsening relationship was also due to the more ideologically entrenched 
positions some of the newspapers took which, contemporaries argued, influenced 
their news coverage as well as their commentary and opinion pieces. From the late 
autumn of 1945 onwards, animated by the confrontational language of class war
73 The Daily Telegraph, Opinion, 1-2-1946.
74 James Margach, The Abuse of Power (1978), p.8.
75 ME-RCP, Colonel J.J. Astor, Day 15, (7-1-48), q.4681, Cmd.7357.
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used by front bench Labour Ministers in the House, some of the national press 
became more and more fixated by the idea that Socialism represented a threat to 
freedom. In November a Sunday Times editorial claimed that 'Socialism is not 
merely economically dangerous, but morally wrong’.76 The Daily Sketch, with its 
rabidly anti-Left commentator ‘Candidus’, argued that 'Socialism is, by definition, 
totalitarian’.77 The Daily Express splashed its political policies across the paper on 
the 1st January 1946.78 These included its faith in freedom for the individual, free 
industry, and no censorship.
The left wing journal Tribune believed these policies had a direct and detrimental 
effect on news coverage. From early 1946 it kept a record of stories it believed were 
inaccurate, were unnecessarily emotive, or were simply excluded for political 
reasons. On February 1st it suggested that the Daily Sketch had deliberately kept 
information regarding the Government’s social security scheme off the front page. 
On the 15th it claimed that the Daily Express had tried to create a general food panic 
by its headline the previous Saturday, ‘Rush to Buy Flour -  Shops Sell Out*. And on 
March 8th it claimed that the Daily Telegraph misused facts about the housing 
situation to mislead its readers into believing Labour had under-performed.79
Though Tribune identified some examples of inaccuracies and might have been right 
in suggesting the inclusion or exclusion of some stories was politically motivated, it 
was far from immune from political polemic itself. It called Lord Kemsley’s influence 
on provincial journalism ‘profound and deplorable’, said the right wing press was
76 Sunday Times, Opinion, 4-11-1945, p.4.
77 The Daily Sketch, Candidus, 2-1-1946, p.2.
78 Daily Express, ‘The I946 Campaign -  This is the Policy and Purpose of the Daily Express’, 1-1-1946,
p.2.
79 Tribune, 1-2-1946,15-2-1946 and 8-3-1946.
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doing its ‘despicable worst’ to bring down the Labour Government and that all of 
them were ‘professional merchants of falsehood’.80 Therefore as objective tools for 
political communication all the newspapers had distinct drawbacks.
But the Government also had itself to blame for many of its communication 
problems. Having sought to maintain the machinery of information and having 
introduced new personnel to coordinate communication policy, it then failed, or 
forgot, to communicate. There are various possible explanations for this failure. The 
first is that they were spoilt by the war. Until 1945, with the newspapers almost 
wholly reliant on Government sources of information, and keen to support the war 
effort, the Government could normally count on their support. Ministers became 
accustomed to power and positive coverage. A second is that Government officials 
and civil servants had an ingrained tradition of discretion and reserve which had 
been nurtured by the wartime culture of secrecy and persisted after its end (despite 
the principled rhetoric).81 The final, and most likely, explanation is that many 
Ministers were too busy and too distracted to focus enough attention on it. The 
failure is important since it led to a crisis in Government -  press relations and the 
fundamental reappraisal referred to earlier.
Food and the Politicisation of News
The issue which best illustrates the politicisation of news and the Government’s 
inability to control communication is food. Food rationing persisted after the end of 
the war in Europe. However, there was some hope that, as time went on, rationing
80 Tribune, 1-3-1946,15-2-1946 and 24-3-1946 respectively.
81 The PEP press report referred to this tradition of anonymity and silence in 1938 (p. 199). As for its 
persistence, World’s Press News noted in November 1945 that ‘It seems about time that Whitehall 
dropped its wartime habit of “embargoing" every silly little hand-out their P.R.O.s issue’, 22-11-1945,
p.10.
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would be relaxed and eventually removed entirely. Sir Ben Smith, the Minister of 
Food, had given encouraging hints and signs from the end of 1945 that there may be 
some improvement over the coming months.82 Therefore it came as a stunning 
surprise when, on January 31st 1946, with no previous warning, he announced that 
the Government was to end the availability of dried eggs. Though a poor substitute 
for the real thing, dried eggs had become a staple of most households’ diet. ‘After six 
weeks press silence in his [Ben Smith’s] department this bombshell is dropped’, the 
Daily Mail reported.83 The press objected less to the stoppage of dried eggs than to 
the manner in which it was done and the lack of public preparation for it.
Though there is nothing in the Ministry of Food files about this episode, from certain 
newspaper reports and by the reaction of the Cabinet it is possible to work out what 
happened. According to the World’s Press News, Smith himself was so nervous and 
unsure about how to deal with the dried eggs announcement, and so doubtful about 
the abilities of his Public Relations Officer (P.R.O.), that he wrote a press release 
himself, waited until after 7pm (when his P.R.O. had left), and handed it directly to a 
press officer for distribution. So not only was there no prior warning, but all the other 
Government information about dried eggs (advertisements for them in the papers, 
and Government pamphlets with dried egg recipes) was not stopped, but was printed 
and circulated despite the stoppage.84
Worse was to follow. The world food situation became more perilous. Britain had 
barely enough wheat stocks to last the summer and was having terrible trouble
82 For example, before he left for Washington in January he said, ‘‘During 1946 I shall continue to do my 
utmost to provide more variety in our diet. We can look forward to some improvements, at any rate”, 
quoted in The Times, 15-2-1946, p.4.
83 The Daily Mail, Opinion, 1-2-1946.
84 World’s Press News, ‘Ministers Don't Use the Press Properly’, 28-2-1946, p. 10.
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importing more. There was a likelihood of famine in India and the Germans in the 
British zone in Germany were trying to survive on close to 1000 calories a day. At 
the end of January the Cabinet discussed how they might alleviate the domestic and 
international situation.85 Attlee was to set up an emergency food committee, headed 
by himself. Morrison was to take over the communication of food policy to the British 
public: The Lord President should supervise the preparation and coordination of this 
publicity campaign [for food economy]’.86 To fulfil his responsibility Morrison planned 
to launch a ‘Save Bread’ campaign.
The campaign would be centred around Ben Smith. He would begin by making a 
statement to Parliament on 5th February 1946 outlining the full gravity of the food 
situation. This would be followed by a press conference which would, from then on, 
become a weekly staple. The Lord President recognised that food was an emotional 
issue and the Government would have to think carefully about how to communicate 
its policy: ‘We must set in motion long-term as well as short term publicity measures’ 
he wrote, ‘It is important that these should give the least possible opening for hostile 
and partisan criticism’.87
Unfortunately, Ben Smith’s announcement did just that. The opposition and the 
newspapers, appalled that the situation was so grave and the news so sudden, 
attacked the Government for its lack of preparation and foresight.88 At the next Food 
Supply Meeting, on the 12th February, Morrison assessed the reaction: ‘Since
85 Cabinet Conclusions, CM(46)10, 31-1-1946, CAB 128/5.
86 According to memorandum WFS(46)1, 2-2-1946, PREM 8/200.
87 WFS(46)6, Memorandum, Morrison, discussed at Food Supply Meeting, WFS(46)1, 4-2-1946, CAB 
134/730 & 729.
88 ‘Yesterday was a black day for the people of Britain', Daily Mail, 6-2-1946. The Government has 
apparently never had a food policy worth the name’, Daily Sketch, 7-2-1946. ‘Why nation is resentful -  
not treated with frankness', 9-2-1946, Daily Telegraph.
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WFS(46)6 was circulated, press comment on the food situation has been very 
heavy’. There were three main lines of criticism: the ‘lack of warning and 
information’, an ‘unsatisfactory treatment of priorities’, and ‘inconsistency in 
agricultural policy’. But the Lord President was confident that this initial shock had 
passed and now ‘the country is ready for a full and fair factual review of the whole 
subject’.89
The Government tried to give this review in the debate and corresponding statistical 
paper of 14th February.90 But already the issue was heavily politicised, with the 
Conservatives accusing the Government of ignoring the basic needs of the country 
in the pursuit of an ideological agenda (the debate was held after the Trade Disputes 
Act had been discussed), and of being unnecessarily and damagingly secretive.91 
These two charges also characterised newspaper coverage and dominated their 
headlines. ‘Mr. Attlee’s Government have been prodigal in their measures and 
beggarly in their explanations’ J.L. Garvin wrote in the Daily Telegraph, ‘If the Prime 
Minister and his colleagues cannot give us more food, at least let them give us more 
facts’.92 The subsequent ‘Save Bread’ campaign suffered from this politicisation. It 
also kept the issue of food on the front page, encouraging a constant high pitched 
discussion that drowned out other political coverage.
For the campaign Morrison adopted the same strategy as the Government had in the 
early stages of the war -  encouraging frugality and discouraging waste. The
89 WFS(46)17, Memorandum, Morrison, 11-2-1946, discussed on 12-2-1946, CAB 134/730 & 729.
90 ‘Statistics and documents relating to world grain position’, February 1946, Cmd.6737. This paper was 
only 10 pages long, provided very few statistics and none related to grain stocks held within Britain.
91 Anthony Eden; ‘It does not seem to us that the Government took the proper steps to inform and warn 
the House and the country of what was impending, and Mr. Eccles; This food debate, and the crisis 
behind it, is one more proof that what the people really wanted from their Government were first-aid 
repairs in a state of emergency, and not a revolutionary upheaval in their economic system’. 14-2-1946, 
Vol.419, Cols.547-548 and 582.
92 Daily Telegraph, Editorial, 14-2-1946, p.4.
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newspaper advertisement campaign began with an earnest, polite plea signed by the 
Minister of Food.93 This restrained message was overwhelmed by negative 
headlines in much of the press. The campaign was not, Morrison felt, ‘having a big 
immediate impact on public emotions and it was for consideration whether a more 
dramatic appeal was now required’.94
There had been some thought given to making it much more sensational, for 
example by using ‘illustrations as a contrast between a starving woman and child in 
India or in one of the European countries with a dustbin containing half loaves of 
bread wasted by the British public’ 95 This was too much for Morrison and the Food 
Supply Committee, however, and they persisted with heavily text based ads 
imploring the public to ‘Join the Crusade Against Bread Waste’.96 The campaign was 
supposed to take precedence over some other Government campaigns but it still 
regularly had to compete for space and attention with ‘Save more Fuel’ (Ministry of 
Fuel and Power), save more money (National Savings), ‘Keep Death Off the Road’ 
(Ministry of War Transport), recruitment for the fire service (Home Office) and ‘What 
Exports Mean to Us’ (Board of Trade).97
From mid March the Government increased its direct appeals to the people. Letters 
were sent to women’s organisations, to the bakery trade associations, and to 
divisional food officers.98 From 15th April there would be a posters stuck on about
93 WFS(46)17, Memorandum, Morrison, 11-2-1946. See, for example, ‘Our Bread’, in Daily Express, 12- 
2-1946, p.2.
94 WFS(46)5th, Minutes, 5-3-1946, CAB 134/729.
95 WFS(46)53, Memorandum, Morrison, ‘UK propaganda campaign', 4-3-1946, CAB 134/730.
96 See Daily Express, 19-3-1946, p.2.
97 Ads taken from Daily Express and Daily Mail for February-May 1946. Issue of precedence 
highlighted by Sir Ben Smith to R.C. Griffiths, 10-3-1946, T223/249.
98 Shelton Smith to Edith Walker, Food Advice Division, ‘Bread Economy Schemes', 8-3-1946, MAF 
84/199.
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10,000 sites nationwide. For May and June all letters sent were to be franked by the 
Post Office with ‘Don’t Waste Bread -  Others Need It’. Food flashes would be 
screened in cinemas. The BBC agreed to insert references to the Bread Campaign 
into its talks on food. And five million dustbins labels were prepared."
But despite this escalation of exhortation, the Government did not release factual 
information on the stocks held within Britain as against the available imports. This 
fuelled the idea that the Government was still being too secretive. For the next eight 
weeks newspapers focused on rationing rumours while leader articles kept calling for 
‘Food Facts’.100 The situation was made worse by further media mismanagement by 
the Government. On 21st March, Shelton Smith (no relation to Sir Ben), the hapless 
P.R.O. in the Food Office, gave a press conference to the food correspondents 
telling them to expect further cuts in fat rations. But when the headlines broke the 
next day Sir Ben Smith announced there had been a mistake. There would not be 
further reductions and his P.R.O. had got it wrong. Needless to say, the following 
day the papers led with ‘Ration Cuts Warning Was Government Blunder’.101
To extricate itself the Government held another debate and released a more detailed 
White Paper on April 4th.102 The aim of the White Paper was ‘to set out the facts of 
the present crisis in the world’s food supplies, to show how the crisis developed and 
to trace the steps taken by the Government in the face of it’. Instead it showed, the
99 WFS(46)57, Memorandum, Morrison, 8-3-1946, CAB 134/730.
100 Daily Mail, Opinion column -  ‘Food Facts Wanted’, 11-3-1946.
101 Daily Mail, Front Page, 23-3-1946. It turned out that Shelton Smith had not been wrong and fats 
were indeed reduced subsequently.
102 Debate on World Food Shortage, 4-4-1946, Vol.421. White Paper, The World Food Shortage', April 
1946, Cmd.6785.
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Opposition said, that the Government knew much more than they admitted in 
December and January.103
By this time Morrison had begun to lose confidence in Sir Ben Smith and in May he 
decided to travel to Washington himself to negotiate more wheat imports from the 
Americans. Christopher Mayhew, Morrison’s PPS at the time, travelled with him. 
Though Mayhew says Morrison argued hard with the US he was unable to secure 
more wheat.104 Indeed, in exchange for a US concession to help Britain feed the 
local population in the British zone in Germany and send food to India, Morrison 
actually had to commit 200,000 more tons of British wheat abroad. In order to avert a 
food crisis in other countries Morrison was diverting food away from his own. 
Unsurprisingly, most of the popular press did not emphasise the magnanimity of 
these actions: ‘Morrison Gives Away 200,000 Tons More' yelled the Daily Express.™5 
Morrison 'has done a worse stroke of business than Smith ever accomplished' the 
Daily Mail reported.106 To add further to Morrison’s embarrassment, a press officer 
from the US State Department then flatly contradicted his earlier statement and 
claimed they had made no such commitment to further concessions.107
The press coverage of the food situation became more and more vicious, especially 
whilst the Government continued to fail to give out adequate information. Against Sir 
Arthur Salter’s charge that the Government was not telling Parliament or the people
103 Mr. Hudson, They [Labour Ministers] knew exactly the same thing as long ago as 4th September', 
Hansard, 4-4-1946, Col.1417, Vol.421.
104 Interview with Christopher Mayhew, Morrison biographical papers (Donoughue/Jones), Section 6-3, 
BLPES.
105 Daily Express, front page headline, 18-5-1946.
106 Daily Mail, opinion column, The “sheer gamble’", 20-5-1946.
107 Daily Mail, ‘Morrison was Wrong -  Say U.S.’ 25-5-1946. Winston Churchill referred back to this snub 
when opening the food debate of 31-5-1946; “There is, I am sure, irony of fate in the right hon. 
Gentleman being ill-used by a public relations officer. It is rather like the case of the engineer being 
hoist with his own petard’, Hansard, Col.1490, Vol.423.
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enough Sir Ben Smith replied weakly that ‘we have been thinking of giving quarterly 
reviews’.108 But this and other comments that failed to mollify the press meant Smith 
became the first minister to resign from Attlee’s government, at the end of May 1946. 
He was replaced by Sir John Strachey.
There was another important reason why the British Government did not release 
more facts and figures regarding the food situation. Economising on food 
consumption and bread rationing was done partly for negotiating leverage with the 
Americans rather than to feed directly into export. Since Sir Ben Smith’s trip to 
Washington in January the British had been unable to convince the Americans that 
the world food situation was not a short term problem but potentially catastrophic. 
This is what they believed they had to do in order to make the American government 
adopt compulsory domestic measures to secure higher quantities of wheat for 
export. When, in early April, after receiving information that international conditions 
had significantly worsened, the British food mission was still unable to shift the 
Americans, the Cabinet sent a telegram to Washington and authorised a press 
statement which they hoped would prompt action.109 The statement announced that 
Britain would be prepared to take the radical step of adopting bread rationing ‘in the 
interests of the peoples of the world who are faced with starvation and famine’.110 
Though the statistics suggested the actual impact of British bread rationing on the
108 Sir Ben Smith, Hansard, 22-5-1946, Oral Answers, Vol.423, Col.330.
109 ‘It can scarcely be denied that the long foreseen bread crisis is now upon us’, copy of cable from 
British Food Mission in Washington dated 7-4-1946 to the Ministry of Food, AMAZE 7020, MAF 
128/436.
110 The Cabinet approved, on 10-4-1946, ‘the despatch of a telegram to Washington, which was 
prepared during the meeting, instructing the United Kingdom representative to state, at the meeting of 
the Combined Food Board, that Her Majesty’s Government would be prepared to introduce bread 
rationing in the U.K., if it were also introduced in the U.S.', CM(46)32, CAB 128/5. Press Notice, 10-4- 
1946, in MAF 128/436.
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world situation might be marginal, the Cabinet hoped the proposal would induce the 
Americans to act.111
The statement did have a profound effect on the American government and people. 
Lord Halifax wrote from Washington on the 13th April, The British offer to introduce 
bread rationing has made a deep impression [on the US] and sharpened the 
appreciation of the extent of the food shortage in Europe’.112 Just over a week later 
the US Government agreed to set aside 25% of the domestic millers flour expressly 
for export. The problem was, having made the gesture, the Americans were very 
keen that the British see it through. ‘I wish you would ask your government if it would 
regard the institution of this limitation on the domestic consumption of flour to be a 
comparable step to the one heretofore proposed by your government namely bread 
rationing’ wrote the US Secretary for Agriculture, Clinton Anderson.113 Though the 
British Government would not have introduced such a radical measure simply under 
pressure from America, it was a factor in their decision. But since the statistics were 
ambivalent as to how much effect British rationing would have, it was difficult to 
justify the proposition to the British people with facts and figures. So the Government 
released some, but not all, the statistics. For its persistent lack of candour, and 
withholding of facts, the Conservative Opposition and much of the British press 
continued to attack the Government.114
111 Tom Williams to Attlee, 9-3-46, ‘Any further sacrifice by us can have but a trivial practical effect on 
world food supplies. The importance of such a sacrifice would be in the main psychological and 
political’, MAF 84/77.
112 Lord Halifax to F.O., 13-4-1946, MAF 128/436.
113 Note from Clinton Anderson written up in AMAZE 7091 from British Mission in Washington, 19-4- 
1946, MAF 128/436.
114 Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska has also argued that the Labour Government introduced bread rationing 
for political and psychological rather than practical reasons, in 'Bread rationing in Britain, July 1946-July 
1948', Twentieth Century British History, Vol.4, No.1,1993, pp.57-85.
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It was at this time that the Government became more generally concerned about the 
negative influence of the press. Attlee expressed this concern in his opening speech 
to the delegates of the Imperial press Conference at Grosvenor House in June. He 
called for all those in the media who reported the news to “do so with a steadfast 
awareness of the responsibility they bear and of the obligation upon them to place all 
the facts before the public and not simply those which support one particular 
case”.115
Francis Williams, speaking later in the week, indicated that he was beginning to give 
up on newspapers as a means of political communication. He warned against the 
growing commercialisation of newspapers and their excessive concentration on 
entertainment value. Due to their excesses they now had, he believed, “less 
influence [on politics] than at any time in their history” (ironic since they had just 
precipitated the resignation of a Government Minister). Williams used this argument 
to justify the increasing use of Government information services which would act as 
an essential bridge “built on the information world between Government and 
people”.116
Attlee and Williams were expressing diplomatically what other Labour voices were 
expressing more bluntly. The Daily Herald accused the Conservatives and the Tory 
Press’ of using food to make political capital. 'Of all the Tory tricks since the General 
Election... none has been more blatant, more consistently practised and more 
repugnant to human decency than the attempt to exploit the world food shortage for
115 Attlee opening address to Imperial Press Conference, 3-6-1946, reported in The Times, 4-6-1946, 
p.4.
116 Francis Williams, speech to Imperial Press Conference, 7-6-1946, reported in The Times, 10-6- 
1946, p.6.
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party ends’.117 Food had become explicitly political. The unwillingness of the 
Government to release the full official facts about the world and domestic situation 
led many papers to make their own calculations and rely on stories from abroad 
about full German bakeries and vast untapped stocks of Argentinian wheat. The 
Daily Mail, under the headline ‘Planned Famine’, suggested that there was no food 
shortage and that Government rationing was a policy decision to save dollars.118
But no-one was more infuriated by the anti-Government press than Herbert 
Morrison. Morrison had always had a certain sensitivity to the newspapers. As 
outlined earlier in this chapter he cultivated journalists and was highly conscious of 
positive coverage (of himself as much as the Government). But he was also very 
aware of negative headlines and kept grudges, and clippings.119 Since the end of 
1945 some of the right leaning papers had targeted him as the ‘evil genius of 
discord’ stage managing Labour policy.120 After he took over the communication of 
food policy and returned empty-handed from the US in May, many other papers 
joined in the attacks against him. The magazine Truth sarcastically referred to 
‘Morrison’s Triumph’ and most of the national papers emphasised his personal 
failure to secure more wheat for Britain from the US.121 Mayhew, who saw both 
Morrison’s actions and the press’ response, recalled later that Morrison ‘was very
117 Daily Herald, Opinion -  ‘Food and Faction’, 18-6-1946, p.2.
118 Daily Mail, Opinion column, 26-6-1946, p.2.
119 “Herbert could not take criticism. He was over sensitive to the press and very much annoyed at the 
way he was reported. He often complained of distortion. He had an insatiable urge for publicity which 
presented him in a good light” Ernest Jay interview, Morrison biographical papers (Donoughue/Jones), 
Section 6-1, BLPES.
120 Sunday Times, The People v. Socialism’, 9-12-1945, p.4.
121 Truth, ‘Mr. Morrison’s Triumph', 24-5-1946. See also references in Daily Mail and Daily Express.
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sensitive about the press. He read them all, everything about himself and had a 
cuttings book’.122
It is clear that from the spring of 1946 Morrison was becoming concerned by the 
level of reporting in the press. Shortly after this time he started keeping records of 
mistakes he found in the papers.123 We have an idea of the level of accuracy 
Morrison sought from newspaper coverage by his reaction to an article in the Daily 
Herald in June 1946, reporting on his Party conference speech. Morrison wrote an 
angry letter to the paper telling them that the headline, 'Herbert Morrison tells 
Conference Delegates the Government has Gone as Far to the Left as is Wise' was 
inaccurate and irresponsible. ‘I think an apology is due to me... Quotes should be 
quotes and not sub-editorial revised versions’ Morrison wrote rather pompously.124 
Not content with the seven inches the letter took up in the newspaper itself Morrison 
went round to the Herald offices and lectured them on their sloppiness.125
It is not surprising therefore, that as the vitriol of the national press reached its peak, 
immediately after Strachey announced rationing on 27th June 1946, it was Morrison 
who helped to revive an idea first raised in Parliament by Tom Driberg a few months 
earlier, for a Royal Commission on the Press.
122 Interview with Christopher Mayhew, 3-7-1968, Morrison Biographical Papers (Donoughue/Jones), 
Section 6-1, BLPES.
123 This sensitivity [to Press criticism] was certainly one motive behind his support for setting up a Royal 
Commission to inquire into the press in October 1946. Over the next two and a half years while the 
Commission sat he carefully built up files of clippings illustrating press misrepresentations and 
personally submitted some of the items as evidence, Donoughue & Jones, Morrison, p.359.
124 Herbert Morrison letter to Daily Herald, 12-6-1946, p.2, ‘Government of the Left -  To The Editor’; 
regarding headline on 10-6-1946, p.3.
125 The staff of the Herald were so appalled by his actions that they passed a resolution, placing on 
record their ‘disapproval of the letter... It resents his [Morrison's] gratuitous advice on newspaper 
production’, resolution from the Daily Herald Chapel, WAE Jones (Clerk, NUJ) to Morgan Phillips, 14-7- 
1946, CAB 124/1070.
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SECTION 3: The Decision to Launch an Inquiry
Herbert Morrison and the Appointment of a Roval Commission on the Press
Tom Driberg was a member of the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) as well as a 
Labour MP, and had been a successful journalist in the 1930s, writing under the 
pseudonym of William Hickey for the Daily Express. He had been sacked from the 
paper in June 1943.126 At their 1946 conference in Liverpool the NUJ passed a 
resolution calling for the Government to set up an independent commission 
examining the ownership and control of British newspapers.127 Driberg sent a copy of 
the NUJ’s resolution to Clement Attlee and, on April 30th 1946, asked the Prime 
Minister in the House whether he would consider setting up a Royal Commission to 
study the issue.128 Attlee said he would not: “I have given careful consideration to 
this matter’ he said, ‘which, however, I do not see my way to adopt”.129
Morrison had advised Attlee to respond in this way.130 But by early July Morrison was 
having second thoughts. On the second of the month he received a note from 
Clement Bundock, General Secretary of the NUJ, repeating the proposal for an 
investigation of the press within a more ‘general inquiry into the channels of public
126 Orchestrated by Christiansen not Beaverbrook (see Francis Wheen, The Soul of Indiscretion 
(2001)), pp. 194-195).
127 In his evidence to the Royal Commission Maurice Webb of the NUJ, claimed that “The real genesis 
[of the idea for an independent investigation]... was when, towards the end of 1943, we sat down as a 
Union to consider our post war problems...” ME-RCP, Day 2 (16-7-47), q.311, Cmd.7317.
128 Driberg specifically referred to the preservation of the freedom of the Press in his question, 
suggesting it be set up ‘with a view to establishing freedom of the Press in Britain”, Hansard, 30-4-1946, 
Vol.422, Cols.28-29.
129 Clement Attlee, Hansard, 30-4-1946, Vol.422, Cols.28-29.
130 From Morrison note to Prime Minister, 4-7-1946. The views of the Annual Delegate Meeting of the 
union were, of course, the subject of the Question by Driberg on 30th April to which, on my advice, you 
gave a negative answer', CAB 124/1070.
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information’.131 His Private Secretary and personal assistant, John Pimlott, 
suggested Morrison advise the P.M. to say just what he said in April. But Morrison 
scribbled a note at the bottom of Pimlott’s memo saying, “‘I’m not sure. I wd like him 
[the P.M.] to say that he will consider the idea in relation to any enquiry abt the 
BBC”.132 So, instead, the Lord President wrote to Attlee saying that there was now 
strong support for a Press inquiry both from within the Party and from the NUJ and 
that it might be wise for the Government to reconsider.133
In case there was any confusion as to how Morrison felt about the press, he resolved 
it in a speech in Lewisham on the 8th July. “The great Tory newspaper combines 
have been seen at their worst” he said, “Suppressions, misrepresentations, 
inventions: these things happen day by day and constitute a disgrace to journalism”. 
He was particularly critical of the “Kemsley gramophone chain” where he believed 
the irresponsible voice of the proprietor was projected throughout his group of over 
20 newspapers.134
Three days later 91 Labour MPs, led by Haydn Davies and Michael Foot, tabled an 
Early Day motion in Parliament for a Royal Commission on the Press. It is hard, 
given Morrison’s actions over the previous ten days, not to conclude that the Lord 
President played a part in encouraging the motion. As John Gordon, editor of the 
Sunday Express, wrote in an editorial on 21st July, ‘By an odd coincidence, just at the 
moment when Mr. Morrison is so deeply concerned about the newspapers, up jump 
90 MPs like rabbits out of a conjurer’s hat, to demand the very thing Mr. Morrison is 
trying to think of -  a Royal Commission’. Morrison’s involvement seems even more
131 Clement Bundock to Morrison, 2-7-1946, CAB 124/1070.
132 John Pimlott note to Morrison, 2-7-1946, CAB 124/1070.
133 Morrison to Attlee, 4-7-1946, CAB 124/1070.
134 As reported in World’s Press News, 11-7-1946, p.4.
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likely since at dinner on the night of the 11th, he and his PPS, Christopher Mayhew, 
were putting together a shortlist of names that might serve on the Commission.135
And from that point on Morrison championed the idea of a Commission until, in a free 
debate on 29th October 1946, Parliament voted in favour of an investigation. In 
Cabinet on the 15th July he told other Cabinet members that he ‘thought that some 
sort of enquiry on the lines suggested in the Motion might well be useful’.136 The 
following day in the Broadcasting debate (on BBC Charter renewal and whether 
there should be an inquiry into the Corporation) Morrison deliberately broadened the 
question from broadcasting to the press and suggested to the House that “All great 
channels for the dissemination of information to the public -  all of them -  would, the 
Government believes, benefit from having their state of health examined by 
independent inquiry, and I don’t exclude the press from that consideration”.137
On 23rd July, after meeting with a deputation of the National Union of Journalists 
(NUJ) the previous day, Morrison submitted a memorandum to Cabinet in which he 
personally recommended a Royal Commission on the Press be set up.138 It seems 
as though he was even pressing for the Commission to be announced before the 
summer break but was held back by a note from Attlee and by the reservations in 
Cabinet of Stafford Cripps.139 What, Cripps asked Morrison, would such an inquiry 
achieve? If it was supposed to lead to legislation, what kind of legislation? And how
135 Note from CM (assumed to be Christopher Mayhew given the context) to Morrison, 12-7-1946. The 
note also mentioned ‘that it [the Royal Commission] should be timed to report before the next General 
Election', CAB 124/1070.
136 Cabinet Conclusions, CM(46)68,15-7-1946. CAB 128/6.
137 Parliamentary Debates, Broadcasting, 16-7-1946, Vol.425, Col.1084.
138 Morrison memorandum regarding a Royal Commission, CP(46)298, 23-7-1946, CAB 129/11.
139 On July 26th Pimlott asked Morrison if he would like a question put forward about the Commission in 
the Commons so that he could make an announcement. However, on the 28th Clement Attlee sent the 
Lord President a personal minute (M251/46) telling him action should be postponed till after August, 
CAB 124/1070.
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would you get credible evidence from journalists and editors about their proprietors? 
Morrison was unperturbed. If nothing else, he said, an inquiry would ‘serve a useful 
purpose in bringing to light undesirable practises which would cease as soon as the 
light of publicity had been directed onto them’.140
The summer break did not break his ardour. He brought a revised proposal to 
Cabinet on 3rd October again encouraging them to appoint a Commission. But some 
of his colleagues were still unconvinced.141 They felt that the chances of finding hard 
evidence were low. If none were found the report would then look like a whitewash. 
Even if abuses were found, it would be difficult to deal with them and would reflect 
poorly on the Government that they existed in the first place. ‘Was it not preferable’ 
they asked, ‘to seek a practical remedy for the present state of affairs by improving 
the presentation of the Government’s case through those newspapers which were 
independent and through other methods of publicity?’.142 But Morrison was adamant. 
An inquiry would have the time to consider new ways in which to regulate the press 
and maintain its independence, he thought. Some of his comments indicate that he 
had a retaliatory motive. For example, The exposure of the facts in an authoritative 
report would in itself educate the public to a truer judgment of the reliance to be 
placed on statements appearing in the Press’.143 He also made an addition to the 
original motion, adding ‘accuracy’ to the list of issues that needed to be investigated. 
He had not forgotten the Herald headline in June. However, the two camps in 
Cabinet could not be reconciled. After they argued once again on 17th October
140 Cabinet Conclusions, CM(46)75, 30-7-1946, Morrison to Cripps, CAB 128/6.
141 Cabinet Conclusions, CM(46)84, 3-10-1946, 'in discussion doubts were expressed about the wisdom 
of initiating such an inquiry', CAB 128/6.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
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Morrison agreed to give time to the proposal through a debate in the House, after 
which a free vote would determine whether the Commission went ahead.
Morrison’s role in reviving and championing an investigation into the press was, 
therefore, critical. But it would be wrong to think that Morrison drove the investigation 
through Government and Parliament single-handed. He had strong support from 
some other members of the Cabinet. Hartley Shawcross for example, the attorney 
general, spoke publicly against the press twice in July, condemning their ‘selection or 
misrepresentation of facts to suit opinions’. He did not, however, think their 
behaviour ‘can be stopped by law’.144 There was also sympathy from many within the 
Party and their supporters. The left wing Tribune had waged a campaign against the 
calumnies of their right wing counterparts since the beginning of 1946. And there 
was also, as has been discussed above, a latent anxiety about the state of the press 
and political communication in general. But it was very difficult to focus this anxiety 
and pinpoint its cause. Morrison tried to do this through the proposal he brought up 
for debate in the House on October 29th 1946.
The Parliamentary Debate on the Roval Commission. October 29th 1946
The debate, which lasted six and a half hours, was interesting for two main reasons. 
It illustrated how difficult it would be to prove who influenced the press and with what 
effect. And, even if it were possible to identify the source and the extent of influence, 
how hard it would be to do anything about it.
144 Hartley Shawcross, speaking in East Ealing, 30-7-1946, reported in The Times, 31-7-1946, p.3. He 
had also, more famously, spoken in Battersea on the 19th, when he referred to the ‘gutter Press’ and 
was forced, later, to apologise to Lord Kemsley (letter printed in Sunday Times, 11-8-1946).
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The arguments fell along quite clear Party lines.145 The Left were convinced that the 
press was no longer free or fair. The press barons were responsible for this; they 
had bought up independent newspapers and created chains in which opinions were 
dictated from above and policy driven purely by commercial interest (for circulation 
and advertising). “The process of monopoly is not receding. It is getting worse” 
Michael Foot said, “During the war newspapers made huge profits. They have built 
up great financial resources. They have undertaken large advertising campaigns... if 
no action is taken following this Royal Commission inquiry, these financial resources 
are going to be unloosed on the newspaper market”.146 However, it was not obvious 
what action could be taken. Patrick Gordon Walker thought, like Morrison, that the 
light of publicity would rectify abuses. Mallalieu was in favour of legislation to restrict 
ownership and advertising. No-one had damning evidence of newspaper vices. Tom 
Driberg suggested the influence of advertisers was constant but tacit.
The Right were obsessed with understanding the motivation for the Commission. 
They saw Morrison as the driving force behind the motion, pushing forward the 
investigation due to his own “wounded vanity” and in reaction to press criticism of 
Government policy.147 They could not see what an investigation would achieve and 
thought it was based solely on socialist self interest. “What is really wanted, and 
what is behind this Motion, is not freedom of expression at all; hon. Members want to
145 Although with some notable absences from the Labour benches. Douglas Jay, for example, spoke 
against the motion, believing that the situation was a lot better than it had been, that the inquiry might 
be misunderstood by the public and abroad, and that it would not produce any results (Hansard, 
Vol.428, Col.529).
146 Michael Foot, Parliamentary Debates, Press (Control and Ownership), 29-10-1946, Vol.428, 
Cols.469-470.
147 Derek Walker Smith, Ibid., Col.544.
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saddle the country with a number of papers of their own way of thinking” Maxwell 
Fyfe argued for the Conservatives.148
Most of the speakers had personal experience of working for the Press. This might, 
logically, have added substance to their arguments. It did not. They each talked 
about their own experience and elevated it to an indictment or exoneration of the 
whole industry. Michael Foot had been a young editor of the Evening Standard under 
Lord Beaverbrook. He talked about the enormous reduction in the power of the editor 
in favour of the proprietor. Had he worked with Rothermere or Camrose he would 
almost certainly have had a very different impression. Beverley Baxter, also with the 
Express Group though many years earlier, thought the Motion was “preposterous”.149 
Only once in his experience as an editor had an advertiser sought to influence him 
and he had told them where to get off. He assumed his own experience was 
indicative of the industry as a whole.
Both sides tended to caricature the newspaper world. There was a transparent 
ideological subtext to the Labour picture of small, independent newspapers and 
idealistic editors in a desperate struggle against greedy, corrupt magnates. 
Conversely, the Conservatives saw benign proprietors singled out by a mischievous 
Government bent on revenge. Everything, from the left and the right, was justified as 
‘securing the freedom of the press’ -  freedom from Government interference vs. 
freedom from capitalist proprietors, freedom to say what they like vs. freedom of 
news from opinion, freedom from advertisers’ pressure vs. freedom from state 
subsidy. The trade paper, the World’s Press News, was not impressed by the level of 
debate: ‘We imagine that the ultimate verdict of history on those responsible may be
148 Major Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, Ibid., Col.480.
149 Beverley Baxter, Ibid., Col.488.
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a little amusing’.150 But the debate was not so much amusing as demonstrative of the 
difficulties to come.
Another Nationalised Industry?
The Motion for a Commission passed by 270 votes to 157. Its passage inaugurated 
a new phase in the relationship between the Government and the press. Now the 
newspapers were in the dock. They understandably saw the Commission as ‘a 
Grand Jury or Grand Inquest’.151 And if, as the Government had said in the debate, 
the press was now an industry, what would stop them being nationalised like any 
other industry? Indeed, less than two weeks after the debate the Government 
announced the nationalisation of railways, ports, inland waterways, and long 
distance road transport.
This led some people to believe that ‘the definite development of the full Socialist 
State is envisaged’.152 The Sunday Times, Lord Kemsley’s flagship which had been 
at the centre of so much criticism, began a series of editorials about the Twilight of 
Freedom’ on 27th October 1946. They described how freedoms won over centuries 
were now being whittled away. The course is plainly being set’ the editorials stated, 
‘towards the one-party system’. The remarkable popular response to the editorials 
indicated that many people shared the same concern. By the 17th November the 
Sunday Times claimed to have received well over 750,000 requests for reprints of 
the series. By December this had reached a million. For many readers the assault on 
the press was symptomatic of the growth of state control.
150 World’s Press News, Editorial, 7-11-1946.
151 Particularly since this was the intention of some within Government: Gordon Walker to Morrison, 8- 
10-1946, ‘We want a Royal Commission to serve as a Grand jury or Grand Inquest', CAB 124/1070.
152 World’s Press News, Editorial, 5-12-1946.
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However, before a Commission could be appointed, and before the Government 
could congratulate itself on putting the press in its place, the consequences of a very 
cold winter were about to erode its self-confidence severely.
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Chapter 3: The Government and the Press 1947-49
Though some of the papers talked about the threat of newspaper nationalisation in 
November 1946, there is little evidence that this was Labour’s intention at this time. 
There is, however, substantial evidence to suggest that from mid 1946 to mid 1948 
the Government did want to change its relationship with the press, and to alter the 
dynamics of political communication within Britain. Many within the Government and 
the Labour Party genuinely believed that overly powerful, irresponsible individuals 
were controlling the press and that this was a serious threat to democratic 
participation. Similarly, they thought that the increased commercialism which had 
characterised the development of the British media in the 1930s, was compromising 
journalists’ freedom to write objectively. There is therefore no reason to believe that 
the Government appointed a Royal Commission without the intention of taking some 
action.
Indeed, the way it acted throughout 1947 suggests it did not need the Commission’s 
consent to flirt with much greater regulation and control. The problems within the 
wider economy (the dollar drain and fast rising deficit) led Labour to impose stringent 
regulations which had immediate repercussions on the ability of the press to perform 
its function. The power that these regulations conferred on the Government over the 
press, an initially unintended consequence, once introduced proved too attractive not 
to use. Regulatory levers, like paper rationing and control of engagement orders, 
became an additional means of control, as will be shown below. The Government’s 
simultaneous sustained bullying and belittling of the newspapers suggested that it 
was creating an environment in which radical change might be possible.
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At the same time the Government sought to bypass the newspapers as much as 
possible. If the press could not fulfil its democratic responsibility the Government felt 
it must find alternative means of communicating with the population. As a result it 
centralised some of its direct communication via the Economic Information Unit (see 
Chapter One), sought to invest more effort in Government publications, films and 
advertising, and explored how it could use the existing media more effectively.
This chapter will therefore show how the Government sought to alter the nature of 
democratic communication between 1946 and 1948. It will demonstrate that, by early 
1948, most of the press were seriously concerned that Labour intended to enhance 
its control of the newspapers and their regulation. Had it not been for economic 
constraints and international political developments, the Government may well have 
done so. However, by 1948 the political environment had changed significantly. 
Labour did not have the means to establish and maintain new channels of political 
communication. Moreover, its attempts to increase its control of the press were 
beginning to look authoritarian. The members of the Royal Commission had become 
so anxious of this that they even considered changing their terms of reference to 
include an investigation of Government influence (but eventually decided against it).
The Royal Commission on the Press is in fact a very useful means of charting the 
changing political climate of these years. It was appointed when Labour’s frustrations 
with the press were paramount. It began collecting its evidence and hearing 
witnesses as Labour introduced new measures of control and new means by which 
to circumvent the press. It was weighing up its evidence when the controls imposed 
by a newly installed Communist Government in Czechoslovakia illustrated the 
inherent dangers of a highly regulated press. Therefore the changing views of the
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Commission, as reflected in its deliberations, provide an excellent expression of the 
changing temper of the political landscape.
The Commission’s failure to make radical recommendations, and the Government’s 
lack of enthusiasm for instituting even its more conservative proposals, disguises the 
importance of this period in shaping the future relationship between the State and 
the press. The Government went through three major shifts in its approach towards 
the newspapers; from initial acceptance of the situation, through a desire for 
significant structural changes, to a recognition that it had to work within pre-existing 
parameters. This eventual outcome came about despite the important parallel 
changes that were occurring in the machinery of Government communication and in 
the structure of the press. By 1949, though both had themselves changed massively, 
their relationship had not altered to take account of this.
But in early 1947 the Government had other problems to attend to. A lack of planning 
and a harsh winter meant that by late February Britain was, quite literally, powerless.
SECTION 1: Government-Press Hostility Deepens
February 1947 & the Repercussions of the Fuel Crisis
The fuel crisis of February 1947 not only sparked a wholesale review of Government 
communication, as described in Chapter One, but provoked intense criticism of the 
Government’s behaviour by the press. Much of this criticism was focused, as it was 
the year before regarding food, on the Government’s failure to keep the public 
informed. Though understandable, this criticism did not endear the press to the 
Government. Their relationship deteriorated further as a consequence.
The Economist set the tone. After Emmanuel Shinwell made his unscheduled 
announcement about the drastic power cuts the magazine complained that, ‘Even in
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default of inspiration, plain ordinary horse sense should have sufficed to keep the 
public abreast of the facts about fuel, and almost anything short of imbecility would 
have broken the news of the power cuts otherwise than late on Friday, at the fag end 
of a vituperative political speech, in a debate that the Government had tried hard to 
avoid’.1
Like The Economist, much of the press’ criticism was of the manner and 
amateurishness of the Government’s communication as much as of the action they 
took. There has not been that cohesion and coordination of policy and interpretation 
which we expected’ The World’s Press News said.2 It even put this in a wider political 
context saying, ‘A bigger issue now emerges, the general standard of public relations 
between the Government and Press and people’.3
Yet the Government gave no immediate indication that it wanted to solve this by 
improving its relationship with the press. In fact, in a public relations blunder, shortly 
after his announcement on the 7th Shinwell gave instructions that all periodicals, 
without exception, should stop printing to save fuel and power.4 This draconian move 
was an unprecedented curtailment of the modern press in peacetime. Some journals 
printed part of their contents in daily or weekly papers (at the specific invitation of 
those newspapers), but most simply followed the instructions and ceased publication 
for two weeks.5 As it turned out, they were under no obligation to do so since though
1 The Economist, ‘Mr. Micawber’s Crisis’, 15-2-1947.
2 World’s Press News, editorial, 13-3-1947.
3 Ibid.
4 ‘After February 15 there will be a suspension of publication of “at least" two consecutive issues of all 
periodicals irrespective of whether they are printed or published inside or outside the restricted area or 
from what source they draw their paper supplies’, Newspaper World and Advertising Review, 15-2- 
1947, p.193.
5 The instructions were ‘voluntary’ but carried out by almost periodicals. Only two defied the ban that 
there should be no duplicated substitutes, according to Newspaper World and Advertising Review, the 
British Medical Journal and Liberal News (8-3-1947, p.227).
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the Government could have gained legal authority by gaining an Order in Council 
they had failed to do so.6 Shinwell also suspended the BBC Third Programme and 
television.
Though Shinwell’s actions are probably best seen (like many of his at this time) as 
clumsy and misjudged, Philip Noel-Baker, Secretary of State for Air, cast a more 
sinister light on them when, a short while after the suspension he made a speech in 
which he told the press if they did not behave then the Government could ‘close 
down a newspaper at any time, simply by withholding its newsprint supplies’.7
Nor did other ministers seek a reconciliation with the press. Though Attlee admitted 
in March that he had 'no sense of public relations’ and that there is ‘something wrong 
with our publicity’ he also pointedly remarked to backbenchers that ‘the Government 
was being misrepresented to the country’.8 The Government was clearly not going 
to resolve its communications problems by seeking succour from the newspapers.
The relationship declined still further at the end of March. To the indignation of the 
House, the MP Will Nally accused MPs of accepting bribes from Lord Beaverbrook in 
return for news stories. Garry Allighan, another Labour MP and regular columnist, 
reiterated the claims in the trade press and broadened the accusation: ‘Every 
newspaper in the Street has anything up to half a dozen MPs on its “contacts’” list, 
he wrote, ‘Some of the “contacts” are on a retainer, some get paid for what they 
produce, some are content to accept “payment in kind” -  personal publicity’.9 Since 
Allighan had been news editor of the Daily Mirror, and wrote regularly for the Daily
6 The Economist, 8-3-1947. The Economist was particularly cross at the Government’s illegal instruction 
-  ‘their “instruction”,’ it said ‘for all its peremptory language, was without legal force’, p.313.
7 Reported in the Sunday Express, Threats to Freedom’, 6-4-1947, p.4.
8 Daily Mirror, 11-3-1947, p.1. World’s Press News, 20-3-1947, p.24.
9 World’s Press News, 3-4-1947, p.3.
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Mail, it could only be assumed that there was some basis to his charges. An 
investigation was announced immediately and rumbled on till the end of the year. But 
the press claimed that the Government ‘pose that they have a monopoly both of 
political righteousness and of economic know-how’ had been severely tarnished.10
By the spring of 1947, therefore, Ministers were conscious of the failures in 
Government communication but disenchanted with the press as a means of 
representation. As a result they explored alternatives. They looked to other media 
such as BBC radio, feature films and advertising (their attempts to use these are 
explored in greater detail in later chapters). Though the Government had used many 
of these already, it used them more extensively and effectively through new bodies 
like the Economic Information Unit. When it used the press it tried to reduce its 
mediating influence. For example, with the Reports to the Nation which began in 
October, the EIU booked space in newspapers and filled it with information as and 
how it wanted. Departments also tried to go directly to the worker, bypassing the 
Press entirely, via industry journals like ROF News (for the Royal Ordnance 
factories) the magazine Coal (for the miners), and Target for industrial managers.11
There were already signs, however, that the Government would find direct 
communication with the people difficult. In March it published its much touted 
Economic Survey, both as a White Paper and in a ‘popular version’. This latter 
version was supposed to raise awareness amongst a wider audience of Britain’s dire 
economic circumstances and the responsibilities of the public. But a different title 
(The Battle for Output’), a different cover, and five new charts did not, as The Times
10 The Economist, 15-2-1947, op.cit., p.267.
11 The first issue of the monthly periodical ‘Coal’ came out 1-5-1947. Its target circulation was 75,000 
rising to 150,000. The fortnightly journal ROF News was being planned at the same time (Newspaper 
World and Advertising Review, 5-4-1947, p.6, and 10-5-47, p. 150).
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pointed out, constitute popularisation.12 By comparison the Picture Post published a 
straightforward, visual exposition of the survey in April, setting out its key points and 
its implications for the population. Its clarity demonstrated that the Government still 
had a lot to learn in terms of popular communication.13
The Government Belittles the Press and Undermines its Ability to Communicate with 
the People
At the same time that the Government increased its means of communicating 
directly with the people it reduced the capacity of the newspapers to do the same. 
Over the course of 1947 it took a whole range of actions which, if looked at 
separately, were clumsily authoritarian. When looked at cumulatively, they suggest 
the Government was flexing its muscles at the newspapers and undermining their 
role as the primary means of political communication.
In outline, over the course of the year the Government reduced the press’s paper 
ration and pegged each newspaper’s circulation. It introduced new economic and 
distribution controls that gave it increased executive power over the press’s means 
of production. It went on to threaten to make some papers risibly small (two pages). 
Where possible it avoided the press altogether or formalised its relationship with 
them to constrain mediation (with the lobby correspondents, for example). And the 
whole time it was using rhetoric that seemed calculated to demean newspapers in 
the eyes of their readers and so make them less credible as tools of political 
communication. Each of these actions is examined in more detail below.
Since September 1946 some of the wartime controls on newsprint rationing had 
been relaxed. Penny papers had been allowed to increase to five pages per day,
12 The Times, 5-3-1947.
13 Picture Post, ‘Special Issue on the Crisis. Where Stands Britain?’, 19-4-1947.
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others by a comparable amount, and the basis of rationing had been changed to 
tonnage rather than circulation (so papers could sell as many copies as they liked, 
provided they did not exceed their ration). According to Lord Layton this had an 
immediate impact on political reporting. By his calculations The Daily Mail and Daily 
Express increased the space devoted to parliamentary reports by two and a half 
times.14
However, as the dollar drain quickened in June 1947 the Government scoured the 
country’s imports to see what it could cut.15 It says quite a bit about its current 
attitude to newspapers but not much for its commitment to freedom of the press that 
it did not give a second thought to reducing newsprint, despite its marginal dollar 
impact and despite the recent long term deals the Newsprint Supply Company had 
completed with Canadian suppliers. The Cabinet discussions were dominated, 
instead, by the degree to which food imports would be reduced. In contrast, the 
discussions about paper were fleeting, consisting of one sentence in the minutes; 
‘the cut proposed for raw materials was very small but it would involve a return to a 
four-page newspaper’.16
The announcement to the Commons was similarly unapologetic. “Some restriction(s) 
of supplies of newsprint is inevitable’ Hugh Dalton said, ‘which will render it 
necessary to return temporarily to a four page paper”.17 He gave no indication that
14 Minutes of Evidence, Royal Commission on the Press (ME-RCP), Lord Layton, Day 24 (4-3-48), 
q.8116, Cmd.7409.
15 As a result of the Government’s commitment to the US to return sterling to convertibility on 15-7- 
1947. For a dramatic account of the parlous state of the economy in the summer of 1947 see 
Hennessy, Never Again, pp.299-305.
16 Cabinet Conclusions, CM(47)52, 5-6-1947, Chancellor, CAB 128/10. They returned to paper very 
briefly in the Cabinet discussion of 24-6-1947, only to say ‘It was urged by Ministers that, while some 
cuts, eg. those in paper, tobacco, and films, could be made without serious disadvantage, there was a 
danger that others, and particularly the proposed cut in food imports, would have an adverse effect on 
morale, and so on production’ CM(47)56, CAB 128/10.
17 Hugh Dalton, Hansard, 30-6-1947, Vol.439, Col.961.
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this was a difficult decision to make, or of how long the reduction would last.18 In the 
debate following the announcement the Government also managed to give the 
impression that the cut was a deliberate punitive gesture. As The Economist 
commented, Ministers seemed ‘rather to confirm than to remove the impression that 
the cut was intended to express displeasure at the use made by the daily 
newspapers of their occasional extra pages’.19
Then, just over two months later, after the currency debacle of July and August, 
there were even rumours that the Government might have to shrink the papers even 
more, to two pages. The newspapers were stunned. World’s Press News said that 
this ‘would make a mock of the Government’s professed desire to maintain a free 
press and the democratic way of life’.20 Though this did not happen, the threat hung 
over the press for the following nine months.21
In September the Government introduced the ‘Control of Engagement Order’ that 
gave it increased executive power over industry’s means of production. This was 
Cripps’ plan for taking control of the economic debacle. From now on the 
Government would direct labour and would issue licenses for the use of raw 
materials. Any firm which refused to cooperate would have its license revoked. In 
Parliament Clement Davies immediately saw the possible dangers to the freedom of 
the press and urged the Government to give assurances that it would not use its 
increased powers to close newspapers or to prevent them printing under the guise of
18 The Chancellor met with the Newsprint Supply Company on the 7th July and said the cut would last 
six months. It ended up lasting much longer.
19 The Economist, ‘What’s Wrong with the Press’, 26-7-1947.
20 World’s Press News, Editorial, 4-9-1947, p.8.
21 Until Harold Wilson, newly installed at the Board of Trade, told newspapers in May 1948 that they 
could expect to receive more paper, not less, in 1949.
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economic measures.22 Though the Government gave these assurances its behaviour 
suggested otherwise (for example with the journal Action which will be described 
below).
Despite the decrease in newspaper size the Government still expected significant 
advertising space in what was left. Indeed the Economic Information Unit launched 
the ‘Report to the Nation’ campaign on the 12th October, which was ‘the largest 
space allowed to any one advertiser by newspapers for some years’.23 Some 
newspapers initially refused to give this space to the Government, despite the 
wartime agreement which still existed. But under pressure they eventually gave 
way.24 This seemed particularly unfair when a few weeks later Hugh Dalton 
announced in his budget that in future only half of all commercial firms’ advertising 
expenses would be deductible from their profit and loss account. The Chancellor 
also could not resist an ideological dig, saying, “in these days much of the 
advertising is a serious waste of money, of labour and of material’’.25 This measure 
would directly impact the newspaper revenues and might, MPs argued, cause the 
closure of some of the smaller, provincial papers whose independence the 
Government said it so jealously guarded.
Morrison, Cripps, Bevan and Shinwell maintained this hostility towards the press by 
regularly attacking it in speeches. In September Bevan and Cripps offered the
22 Clement Davies sought to insert an additional sentence to the Bill reading; “Provided that nothing in 
this Act shall be held to authorise the suppression or suspension of any newspaper, periodical, book, or 
other publication”. Parliamentary Debates, Supplies and Services (Transitional Powers) Bill, 11-8-1947, 
Vol.441, Col.2093.
23 ‘Report to the Nation Campaign Begins Sunday’, World’s Press News, 9-10-1947, p.30.
24 ‘Government’s Eleven-Inch Doubles: Press Co-operates’, World’s Press News, 16-10-1947, p.22.
25 Hugh Dalton, Budget Proposals, Hansard, 12-11-1947, Vol.444, Col.401. Stafford Cripps, who took 
over as Chancellor after Dalton’s resignation, postponed the new policy after lobbying by advertising 
firms. A special committee appointed to examine the tax eventually proposed a voluntary scheme rather 
than a compulsory P&L tax .
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unwanted advice to newspapers that they could easily make room for more news by 
cutting reports of certain court cases and stopping serial stories.26 On October 19th 
Emmanuel Shinwell called the Mail and the Express ‘scurrilous rags’.27 The next 
month, on the 23rd, Bevan said that Britain had the ‘most reactionary press in the 
world’.28 It is not surprising then that World’s Press News felt ‘there is at the present 
time a very definite campaign afoot seeking to belittle and denigrate the influence of 
the press’.29
The year ended sourly too. Garry Allighan, whose bribery allegations had been 
investigated by the Privileges Committee, admitted to being paid by the Evening 
Standard through a fictitious company (Transatlantic Press Agency’) to leak 
information about the Parliamentary Labour Party.30 Evelyn Walkden confessed to 
similar charges. As a result, Morrison told the Commons in October that he not only 
wanted any journalist who tried to bribe an MP for confidential information to be 
barred from the House, but for every journalist in their group to be barred as well.31 
Scarcely a week after he said this, Hugh Dalton had to resign after carelessly leaking 
information about the budget to a Lobby correspondent immediately before the 
debate. The behaviour of journalists was strongly condemned, and, though 
Morrison’s intended punishment did not pass the House, he was able to draw up 
written rules to regulate the Government’s future relationship with the Lobby.32
26 ‘Newsprint Cut Menace to Free Press’, World's Press News, 2-10-1947, p.4.
27 The Stafford Fiasco’, World’s Press News, 23-10-1947, p.4.
28 ‘Bevan Attacks Press: Morrison Wants Bigger Papers’, World’s Press News, 27-11-1947, p.4.
29 Editorial, World’s Press News, 11-12-1947, p.8.
30 ‘Privileges Report -  Committee says ‘No Evidence to Justify Allighan Charges”, World’s Press News, 
31-7-1947, p.3.
31 Herbert Morrison, Parliamentary Debates, ‘Confidential Information (Disclosure)’, 30-10-1947, 
Vol.443, Col. 1228.
32 See Jeremy Tunstall, The Westminster Lobby Correspondents (1970), p.48.
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The Press becomes Increasingly Anxious as to the Government’s Intentions
The press were understandably anxious about the actions of the Government. They 
were worried because not only did the actions themselves compromise the ability of 
newspapers to communicate, they were taken so unapologetically as to suggest that 
the Government no longer respected the press as the primary means of political 
communication and therefore no longer thought it needed careful protection. Though 
the Government frequently said that it was reacting to economic imperatives and 
would not use its powers to restrict freedom of the press, its behaviour suggested 
otherwise. A good example of this was its attempted suppression of the fascist 
newspaper ‘Action'.
Action was the journal of the British Union of Fascists. Though it had been published 
throughout the 1930s it temporarily stopped printing in May 1940 because most of its 
contributors were in prison. At the beginning of 1947 it applied to start printing 
again.33 Cabinet examined the application on 12th February 1947. Worried about the 
political difficulties that might accompany the resumption of the journal they 
discussed whether it might not ‘be possible to justify the withholding of facilities to 
prevent publication’.34 They asked the Home Secretary, Chuter Ede, and the Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Jowitt, to look into it.
Ede, who put his memorandum before Cabinet in May, could not see how, short of 
new legislation, the Government could justify suppressing the journal, unpleasant 
though they might find its politics.35 This was not the answer the Cabinet had been 
looking for. It was, in the delicate wording of the Cabinet minutes, ‘reluctant to accept
33 From memorandum by Stafford Cripps, on the paper of the British Union of Fascists, CP(47)54, 7-2- 
1947 CAB 129/17.
34 Cabinet Conclusions, CM(47)21, Paper for Fascist Periodical, 13-2-1947, CAB 128/9.
35 Cabinet Papers, CP(47)135, ‘Supply of Paper for Action, Chuter Ede, 22-4-1947, CAB 129/18.
137
Chapter 3
the conclusion that nothing could be done’. ‘A further attempt should be made’ 
Ministers thought, ‘to find means of preventing the publication of this periodical’. 
Barring all other options, they said, could they not just ‘refuse [its] allocation of 
paper’?36
Stafford Cripps looked into it and, in July, thought he had found a way to “refuse to 
license the delivery of any paper for the publication of Action” through the Paper 
Control Orders. However, this was not foolproof Cripps said, because it may still be 
possible for them to secure paper through other means.37 Another possible answer 
was to amend the paper Orders to ‘make it an offence to publish any periodical 
unless it had been published before 16 August 1940 and in the month of May 1947’. 
This slightly absurd suggestion was rejected since it would undoubtedly affect other 
periodicals which were not politically objectionable. Cabinet had no wish to see 
Action printed but left the issue unresolved.
At almost exactly the same time that Cripps was searching for ways in which to 
prevent Action from appearing by denying it paper he was defending the new round 
of paper cuts to the House of Commons. The cuts were, he explained, only being 
made out of financial necessity. “I hope” he said, “that [...] the House will realise that 
this is not an attempt to discriminate against anybody”.38 Action could justifiably have 
thought otherwise.
Lacking any clear Cabinet direction as to how to proceed Cripps, and his successor 
Harold Wilson, chose to ignore all correspondence from the periodical between July 
1947 and March 1948, therefore not allowing it to acquire a paper license. In March
36 Cabinet Conclusions, CM(47)47, Paper for Fascist Periodical, 15-5-1947, CAB 128/9.
37 Cabinet Conclusions, CM(47)64, Paper for Fascist Periodical, 24-7-1947, CAB 128/10.
38 Stafford Cripps, Parliamentary Debates, 17-7-1947, Vol.440, Col.690.
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1948 circumstances compelled them to review the situation again. The journal, now 
re-titled ‘Union’, had started printing, having gathered together enough paper for 
which a license was not required. In its first issue it accused the Government of 
withholding a license and restricting the freedom of the press. The Cabinet denied 
that it had prevented the paper’s appearance and said they “would not use paper 
control as a method of censorship”.39 Clearly this was not true. Although the 
reticence amongst a Labour Cabinet to allow the publication of a fascist journal may 
have been understandable, it does not excuse the fact that they attempted to use 
their control of paper to suppress a periodical that was legally allowed to resume 
printing.
Therefore Labour’s actions during the course of 1947 strongly suggested it was 
moving towards a different type of relationship with the press. It looked as though 
Labour was creating an environment in which the press was so ill-thought of by the 
public, so limited in its ability to communicate (due to its size), and so circumscribed 
by the executive powers of the Government, that it would be possible to introduce 
significant changes to the way in which it was managed and controlled. It had also 
appointed a Royal Commission expressly to inquire into these means of 
management and control.
SECTION 2: The Inquiry into the Press
What Was The Roval Commission Supposed To Do?
The Royal Commission was asked to examine the influence of the press barons and 
of commercial pressure on newspapers. The motion before the House read:
39 Cabinet Conclusions, CM(48)24, Paper for Fascist Periodical, 22-3-1948, CAB 128/12.
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‘That, having regard to the increasing public concern at the growth of 
monopolistic tendencies in the control of the Press, and with the object of 
furthering the free expression of opinion through the press and the greatest 
practicable accuracy in the presentation of news, the House considers that a 
Royal Commission should be appointed to inquire into the control, 
management and ownership of the Press’
The attitude of the Government is palpable within this motion. It believed there was a 
serious problem in the ‘control, management and ownership of the Press’. The 
motion cites ‘increasing public concern’ -  although what evidence there was of this is 
unclear, and states that there were ‘monopolistic tendencies’ -  a term vague enough 
to allow for considerable interpretation. This then elides into the ‘object of furthering 
of free expression of opinion... and the greatest practicable accuracy in the 
presentation of news’, suggesting a causal link between monopolistic tendencies and 
constraints on opinion or inaccuracy in newspapers.
Senior Labour Ministers were even clearer about their opinion during the debate on 
the Commission in October 1946. Patrick Gordon Walker claimed that ‘the standards 
of journalism are slipping to the point at which the freedom of the press is 
endangered’.40 Morrison asserted that ‘Directives come from the back of Gray’s Inn 
Road, in London, to the provincial newspapers, instructing each of the editors on 
what lines the leading article is to be the next day’ 41
40 Gordon Walker, Parliamentary Debates, Press (Ownership and Control), 29-10-1946, Vol.428, 
Col.484.
41 Herbert Morrison, Parliamentary Debates, Press, 29-10-1946, Vol. 428, Col.558.
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But, as Cripps’ had asked Morrison in July, what was the Commission supposed to 
achieve? Morrison responded to Cripps’ by outlining four possible goals.42 To begin 
with it should rectify many current abuses within the press simply by exposing them 
to public scrutiny. The continued threat of scrutiny, either by future commissions, a 
council on the press, or by the standards set by a press institute would then ‘be a 
very potent weapon for keeping the press in order’ 43 Secondly, the Commission 
would write an ‘authoritative survey’ of the press which could then be used for ‘laying 
general principles which should govern the conduct and management of the press’.44 
Researching and writing this survey would also educate the public about the 
workings of the newspapers to prevent people being too credulous of them in the 
future. Third, it was hoped that a Commission could work out some way in which to 
protect the public sphere. There was a general anxiety that the public sphere was 
being privatised by media owners and commercial interests, to the detriment of 
society and democracy. Therefore, given its ‘quasi-constitutional position’ Morrison 
felt that ‘a general review of the place which the Press should occupy in a 
democratic community’ was long overdue.45 Finally, the Commission’s supporters 
thought it might promote accuracy and good conduct by pressing for the formation of 
a central organisation (such as the National Union of Journalists).
Patrick Gordon Walker, Morrison’s staunch supporter and soon to become his PPS, 
went so far as to suggest that the Commission should not even be required to make
42 First in CP(46)298 in July 1946, CAB 129/11. Then in CP(46)360 in October, and finally in 
CP(46)379, again in October, CAB 129/13.
43 Gordon Walker note to Morrison, 8-10-1946, CAB 124/1070.
44 Morrison to Cabinet on 30-7-1946, CAB 128/6, and in CP(46)298, CAB 129/11. He referred back to 
the PEP report, saying it had given ‘a fair idea of the ground to be covered’ but was now not an 
adequate tool for action.
45 CP(46)360, ‘Inquiry into the Press’, Morrison, 27-9-46, CAB 129/13. Discussed in Cabinet on 3-10- 
1946 (CM(46)84, CAB 128/6).
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recommendations. The survey, he thought, would be enough to resolve the problems 
and make it apparent what the Government should do.46
These objectives were still distinctly vague. This vagueness could be interpreted to 
mean that the Royal Commission was being given a free hand to make its own 
judgments. But the leading terms of reference belie this. It seems more likely that 
they were supposed to give the Government carte blanche. If the Commission 
surveyed the press, confirmed the allegations, and devised some workable 
alternatives of organising the press, this would justify and rationalise Government 
action to suppress the malign influences and protect the public sphere.
Certain contemporary newspapers and observers thought that this may involve 
nationalisation. For example the Twilight of Freedom’ editorials in the Daily 
Telegraph described above. This was always unlikely given the history of the press 
in Britain. But there were other significant, if less radical, steps considered. Some of 
these are contained in the initial proposals discussed by the Royal Commission and 
forwarded to their interviewees. They included: licensing of news groups, a levy to 
fund experimental publications, the compulsory inclusion of alternative views in each 
newspaper, or a public corporation newspaper47 It is far too easy to dismiss these 
proposals with hindsight since these and others were dismissed by contemporary 
newspapers and eventually by the Royal Commission as well. They were all, 
however, workable suggestions.
For example, the licensing of news groups was an option which was promoted by 
many contemporaries. Kingsley Martin was the most eloquent advocate of this
46 Gordon Walker to Morrison, 8-10-1946, the Royal Commission ‘should not be obliged to make 
recommendations', CAB 124/1070.
47 Each of these proposals was either raised by contemporaries and considered by the Commission 
and/or included in the questionnaire they sent out to all the news groups. See Questionnaire NC1.
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approach. He outlined it in his book, The Press the Public Wants (1947) and in 
contemporary public lectures.48 If individuals were not responsible enough to run 
newspapers, he argued, and if newspapers were becoming commercial concerns 
which did not “seek to fulfil the function of systematic truth seeking which the early 
democrats accorded them" then perhaps each paper should be transferred to a 
public group -  political or social -  which could be licensed to run it.49 ‘I do not see 
that the cause of freedom’ Martin wrote, ‘need in any way be damaged by insisting 
that all newspapers should be “public concerns” run by responsible and independent 
groups, and not by irresponsible individuals’.50 Something similar had, he said, 
already been tried in Czechoslovakia and was working. ‘In May 1945, a decree was 
issued by the Czechoslovak Government which made it illegal for any individual to 
own a newspaper’.51
A second option considered was ‘the compulsory publication in every newspaper of 
a column of comment by an outside critic or expert’ to ensure some degree of 
political balance. Most newspapers protested against this as a severe infringement 
of editorial freedom. ‘No,’ the Daily Mirror Group said, ‘compulsion prevents 
freedom’.52 But, given the nature of the Government’s regulation of news and 
political coverage in commercial broadcasting just a few years later, there is no 
reason to believe that such a proposal was entirely incompatible with newspapers. 
The Independent Television Authority, when set up by the Government in 1954 to
48 Kingsley Martin, The Press the Public Wants (1947), Truth and the Public’, Conway Memorial 
Lecture, Conway Hall, 17-6-1945 (printed 1945).
49 Kingsley Martin, Truth and the Public’, op.cit.
50 Kingsley Martin, The Press the Public Wants, p.122.
51 Ibid. p. 107.
52 Memoranda of Evidence Submitted to the Royal Commission (RCP Memoranda), Replies to 
Questionnaire NC1, Daily Mirror Newspapers & Sunday Pictorial Newspapers, (20), response to 
q.32(9).
143
Chapter 3
oversee commercial television services, had to make sure that its programmes were 
impartial, balanced and accurate. The Television Bill agreed to allow the new 
services only if the programmes broadcast by the Authority complied with the 
following requirements: ‘that the programmes maintain a proper balance in their 
subject-matter and a high general standard of quality’, 'that any news given in the 
programmes (in whatever form) is presented with due accuracy and impartiality’, and 
that for politics, ‘no matter designed to serve the interests of any political party is 
included in the programmes’ (unless the programme include discussions or debates 
which are ‘properly balanced’).53
A third option, raising a levy to fund experimental publications, was derided by 
newspapers as a ridiculous proposal. Why should existing newspapers be asked to 
pay for new ones, the Daily Mirror group asked.54 ‘No other industry has been more 
fertile of new ideas, more ready to experiment, or prompter to apply the lessons of 
experience’ Kemsley newspapers argued.55 ‘Who is to decide what experimental 
publications? This would be dangerous and undesirable’ the Manchester Guardian 
said.56 However, again there is a valid comparison between newspapers and 
broadcasting which suggests the proposal was not quite so ridiculous as they made 
out. When the fourth national television channel was established by the Broadcasting 
Act of 1980, the original provisions of the license specified that the channel had “to 
encourage innovation and experiment in the form and content of programmes”.57 
Part of this obligation included “catering for the tastes and outlook” of specific
53 Television Bill, No.76, Parliamentary Papers 1953-54, Volume III, p.463, 4-3-1954, Clause 3 (1)c, d,
& h.
54 RCP Memoranda, Replies to NC1, Daily Mirror Newspapers and Sunday Pictorial Newspapers 
(1920) Ltd. (20), q.32(6).
55 RCP Memoranda, Replies to NC1, Kemsley Newspapers (44).
56 RCP Memoranda, Replies to NC1, Manchester Guardian and Evening News. (54).
57 Broadcasting Bill, 5-2-1980, Bill 139, Parliamentary Papers 1979-80, Vol. 4, Part II, Clause 3(1 )c.
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minority groups which were underserved or not served elsewhere.58 If it was not 
beyond the realms of Government, even in the 1980s, to set up and help fund 
experimental media, neither was it in the 1940s.
A fourth concept, the ‘publication by a body independent of the Government of a 
paper devoted to the objective statement of news and opinion, and possibly of 
controversial comment supplied or reprinted from the remaining national dailies’ 
amused some newspapers. Berrow’s Provincial Group, for example, thought that ‘If it 
attained true objectivity it would qualify for the title of Celestial Times. Its staff would 
certainly have to be God-like’.59 While the Manchester Guardian thought that if it 
were too good it ‘might kill The Times'.60 But it had been none other than Wilson 
Harris who championed the idea in his 1943 book The Daily Press. And, the 
Government were already publishing a range of their own newspapers for specific 
industries so why not a national one as well? Again there is a more recent 
comparison which suggests the concept was not so absurd. In 1997 the BBC started 
to publish a text based version of its news service on the internet, updated regularly. 
This was, to all intents and purposes, a public corporation newspaper.
The structural differences between broadcasting and the press, especially in terms of 
content regulation, later became accepted norms. At this point, however, prior to the 
launch of commercial television and radio, no such norms existed. Therefore while 
ideas such as Kingsley Martin’s for ‘lots of BBC’s’ to replace the contemporary 
ownership structures of the press may seem unfeasible in retrospect, they were 
much less so in the environment of the late 1940s.
58 Ibid. Clause 4(1 )d.
59 RCP Memoranda, Replies to NC1, Berrow’s Newspapers (3).
60 RCP Memoranda, Replies to NC1, Manchester Guardian and Evening News (54).
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Morrison, as the head of Government Information policy and the Government’s 
‘socialisation’ programme, was well placed to think about alternative means of 
organisation and ownership for the press.61 He outlined, in the Labour Encyclopaedia 
of 1948, two criteria that qualified an industry for Government intervention.62 The first 
qualification was that the industry ‘provides a common service for industry generally 
or is basic in character’. The press was not basic in character but it did provide a 
‘common service’, indeed it was ‘quasi-constitutional’ in Morrison’s words. The 
second qualification was that ‘it is a monopoly, or that owing to its nature or to the 
muddle into which private ownership has brought it, the public interest can best be 
served by its becoming a monopoly’. This second criteria would seem to apply 
directly to the status of newspapers when the Royal Commission was appointed. 
The terms of reference even cited ‘monopolistic tendencies’. Therefore, if Morrison 
was following his own rules, Government intervention was warranted.
Moreover, the Royal Commission found, through its investigations, ample 
confirmation that the press was not properly informing the population. ‘In our 
opinion’, the Commissioners wrote in their report, ‘the newspapers, with few 
exceptions, fail to supply the electorate with adequate materials for sound political 
judgment’.63 The popular papers in particular, did not distinguish between what was 
‘intrinsically important’ from what would simply entertain.64 Moreover, the 
Commission was able to find evidence that showed that ‘the political factor in the
61 Morrison used the word 'socialisation' rather than nationalisation since he thought that the latter was 
politically loaded and many of his concepts of Government intervention involved public but not 
Government control.
62 Described in detail in The Economist, lead article, ‘State and Public', 18-9-1948.
63 Report of the Royal Commission on the Press, Cmd.7700, p.154 (paragraph 572).
64 Cmd.7700, p.131 (para.483).
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selection and presentation of news is apparent in all the national papers’.65 Therefore 
it had both the opportunity and the encouragement to recommend significant 
changes to the ‘control, management and ownership of the Press’ and to justify 
Government intervention.
Why Did The Roval Commission End Up Recommending The Exact Opposite?
Despite being set up by the Government to confirm its suspicions about the malign 
effect of press barons and the corrupting influence of commerce and therefore justify 
positive action, the Royal Commission ended up doing the exact opposite. Not only 
did it decide against recommending radical changes to the industry, when the 
Commissioners eventually issued their report they had become extremely sceptical 
about the benefits of any positive action by the Government. They came down 
heavily on the side of maintaining free market mechanisms. ‘In our view’ they said, 
‘free enterprise in the production of newspapers is a prerequisite of a free press’.66
They went even further than recommending against restrictive legislation (for 
example, to limit ownership) and recommended against positive interference as well. 
Of the idea that the Government subsidise the capital costs of printing to encourage 
emergent voices the Commission said, ‘We do not think the taxpayer should be 
asked... to bear part of the cost of starting new enterprises over which he has no 
control’.67 It did not recommend the publication of a ‘public corporation newspaper’ 
along the lines of a BBC Times. Neither did it propose any legal requirements to print 
certain information since it said this ‘in the long run dams the free flow of information
65 Cmd.7700, p.109 (para.394).
66 Cmd.7700, p.155-156 (para.578).
67 Cmd.7700, p.160 (para.597).
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and discussion and undermines the independence’ of the press.68 Virtually their only 
significant recommendation was the establishment of a General Council on the 
Press, made up of members of the press (plus one-fifth lay members -  and even 
their inclusion caused a rift within the Commission).
There are five reasons why the Royal Commission came to conclusions so opposite 
to those for which it was called. Each of these is examined below. The Commission 
is important because its failure to come up with any means to regulate the press or 
protect the public sphere discouraged the Government from taking action (there 
were also other factors acting on the Government which are outlined later). But even 
more so because its investigations, despite being directed towards the influence of 
owners and of commerce, led the Commissioners to question the powers of the 
Government over the press.
Reasons (1): An Untimely Moment to Call a Roval Commission
For two very pragmatic reasons, this was an unfortunate time to appoint a 
Commission on the press. First, because many of the influences that had motivated 
the appointment, and had their roots in the developments of the 1930s, were 
diminished or reversed in 1947. Second, because as a result of newsprint rationing 
the newspapers could not be made responsible for some of the accusations and 
assertions aimed at them.
The peculiar economic circumstances of the newspaper industry in the late 1940s 
have been described in the previous chapter. Essentially, the papers were insulated 
from many of the competitive demands that characterized the pre-war period by low 
costs and virtually guaranteed sales. They were free to include what they wanted
68 Cmd.7700, p.165 (para.617).
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without much to fear from substantial drops in circulation, or due to pressure from 
advertisers. In such an environment it would be extremely difficult for the 
Commission to prove that commercial influences were unduly affecting editorial 
judgment.
Similarly, it would be difficult to prove that the newspapers were deliberately 
suppressing stories or viewpoints when due to paper rationing, the papers were 
limited to very few, rather flimsy, pages. Despite their efforts to cram in as much as 
possible they inevitably had to reduce the breadth and depth of their coverage, and 
alter the editorial style to make it less verbose and more fact rich. They could, 
therefore, justifiably claim that any exclusions from their papers were as a result of 
newsprint shortages, and not made with any harmful intent.69 This situation was 
made worse, and the Government’s case weakened, by the reduction of newsprint 
that came into effect on July 20th 1947.
In the miniaturised newspapers of 1947 it would be hard, if not impossible, for the 
Commission to pinpoint examples of distortion as a result of commercial influence, or 
misrepresentation due to politically motivated interference.
Reasons (2): Not a Strong or Experienced Roval Commission
The Commission itself was neither strong enough, nor experienced enough, to 
recommend major changes to the Press in Britain. This was because Morrison 
appeared intent on appointing members without any direct experience of the 
newspaper industry. He instructed John Pimlott that ‘newspaper proprietors and 
active full time professional journalists (although I am not quite certain about the
69 Lord Layton told the Commission that The British public is definitely becoming an ill-informed public’ 
as a consequence of paper rationing. ME-RCP, memorandum by Newsprint Supply Company, Day 24 
(4-3-48), Cmd.7409 [his italics].
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latter) should be excluded but, subject to this, knowledge of Fleet Street may be an 
advantage’.70
It is unclear why Morrison adopted this approach although he might have been trying 
to avoid anyone with any sympathy towards the Press. This would also explain why 
he was so keen to appoint a judge to chair the Commission.71 But whether Morrison 
wanted objective observers or simply jurors to indict the press, he found it very 
difficult to find people who fulfilled his criteria.
The Cabinet vetoed the idea of a judge as chair.72 It would, the Lord Chancellor said, 
make it too much like a trial. An academic was sought as an alternative. But few 
were keen to accept the post.73 Neither were commission members easy to attract. 
In all, the Government considered at least 17 different chairs and 88 different 
members.74 By January 1947, six months after Morrison had begun writing down 
potential commission members, he had yet to even find a chair.
At this point the Lord President was taken ill and Francis Williams, from the Prime 
Minister’s office, took over. Williams had already expressed his hostility to Morrison’s 
choices. He was appalled by the current members’ lack of ‘practical journalism and 
standing in the profession’ and wrote to Attlee that he was ‘not very happy about the 
names suggested’.75 But by January it was too late to reverse Morrison’s invitations
70 Preparation for memorandum CP(46)379, Morrison, 9-10-1946, CAB 124/1070.
71 A judge was first suggested by Morrison in CP(46)360, 27-9-1946, CAB 129/13.
72 ‘In view of objections to inviting a judge to preside over the enquiry, we thought it would be wise to 
abandon the idea of a having a judge for this purpose’ CP(46)379, ‘Inquiry into the Press', Morrison, 14- 
10-1946, CAB 129/13.
73 Thomas Johnston, Sir Hector Hetherington and Sir Philip Morris all rejected invitations from Morrison. 
Johnston to Morrison, 9-11-1946; Hetherington to Morrison 8-12-1946, CAB 124/1071. Morris to 
Morrison, 11-1-1946, CAB 124/1072.
74 Calculated by adding up all the suggested names from the files of the Lord President and the Prime 
Minister (CAB 124/1070-1071, PREM 5/249).
75 Williams to Attlee, 16-10-1946, PREM 5/249.
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and instead Williams decided to add a number of names of his own.76 This increased 
the experience of the commission but made it large and unwieldy.
Of the Commission’s eventual seventeen members only two had extensive 
knowledge of the Press; RCK Ensor (‘Scrutator’ in The Sunday Times) and George 
Waters (editor of The Scotsman from 1922-44). The others included lawyers, 
accountants, and trade unionists.77 Opposition MPs were not impressed. ‘Who are 
they?’ they shouted when the Commissioners’ names were announced in the 
Commons.78 The Commission’s weaknesses were shown both in its limited ability to 
conceive of alternative means of press organisation and in its overly deferential 
cross-examination of major figures like the press barons or the Government.
Reasons (3): Poor Preparations for an Investigation
Some of these weaknesses were apparent in the Commission’s preparations for an 
inquiry. The Commissioners were not clear on their objectives and this affected the 
way in which they approached their investigations.
They started by sending out written questionnaires to all those covered by the terms 
of reference.79 These were to be followed up with extensive interviews. The 
questions within these questionnaires illustrate how unsure the Commission was of 
its purpose. Some of them were astonishingly academic and went back to first 
principles (for example, ‘In what does the freedom of the press consist?’ and ‘What is 
the proper function of a newspaper?’). Others were accusatory and almost
76 Williams to Attlee, 17-2-1947, PREM 5/249. Williams wrote that he spoke to the Lord President who 
recognised that there were weaknesses of the current list and was willing to agree changes.
77 For full list of members see Appendix A.
78 Reported in The Times, 27-3-1947.
79 The Royal Commission first sent out a questionnaire with 32 questions directed to the editors of all 
the newspaper and periodical publishers in Britain (NC1). They sent slightly different questionnaires to 
proprietors, advertisers (B1) and advertising agents (B2).
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predetermined to lead to defensive answers (for example, ‘How far are inaccuracy 
and distortion due to deliberate sensationalism either in the choice or in the 
presentation of material?’). And though most of them began as open questions they 
then became very leading (for example, ‘What do you regard as a reasonable 
standard of accuracy? Does it include not merely the correctness of facts stated but 
also the statement of all relevant facts?’). This made it apparent, to the recipient, 
what they were ‘supposed’ to answer. Altogether they added up to a slightly 
incoherent mishmash, an agenda which, while interesting, was not very focused and 
not structured to enable direct action.80
But even more damaging than the Commission’s confused agenda was the lack of 
preparation by the key prosecution witness, the NUJ. Despite having been confident, 
ever since it first discussed the idea of an investigation at its annual conference in 
1943, that it could prove its allegations about the malign influence of proprietors and 
of commercialisation, the NUJ failed to produce any damning evidence.
Clement Bundock, the General Secretary of the Union, had written and spoken 
regularly about this destructive influence. In January 1945, for example, he referred 
to ‘the instructions sent out from the headquarters of a group to the editors of a long 
chain of newspapers throughout the country telling them whose speeches were not 
to be reported at all, whose were to be given a good show, whose speeches were to 
be treated on their news value, and what the leading articles were to be about’.81
And yet the NUJ did not even start collecting material evidence of this until after the 
appointment of a Commission in October 1946. Gordon Walker was shocked when
80 The questionnaire was so disordered that Odhams Press (owner of Daily Herald, News Review, 
Illustrated, The People, and John Bull) re-ordered them under its own headings (RCP Memoranda, 
No.63).
81 Clement Bundock in The Journalist, January 1945.
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he went to an NUJ committee meeting in early November and saw how little the 
union had done. ‘I am rather disturbed by the lack of preparation of the NUJ’ he 
wrote to Morrison.82 The Union even resorted to writing to its members requesting 
information. This was quickly exposed by the Evening Standard.83
As a consequence, the NUJ’s eventual submission was weak and inconclusive. 
Instead of hard evidence from journalists about blacklists or directives it provided 
analysis of newspaper coverage (something the Commission were planning to do 
themselves) and ominous warnings (There is inherent in those chain newspapers a 
public danger’).84
Without substantial evidence from the most important plaintiff and armed with an 
eclectic and confused agenda, the Commission was going to find it very hard to 
collate irrefutable proof of wrong-doing that would warrant Government action.
Reasons (4): Lack of Sufficient Evidence of Dangers of Monopoly
When it came to the terms of reference themselves the Commission found that the 
situation was more complex than the NUJ and Labour MPs had suggested, and that 
the value laden charges were not supported by sufficient evidence. As a result the 
Commission felt unable to recommend significant positive action.
Examining whether the number of newspapers was shrinking and whether ownership 
was becoming more concentrated the Commission found that though this was true, it 
was neither consistent nor did it necessarily prefigure a ‘tendency towards 
monopoly’. For example, though the number of newspapers had shrunk from 169 in
82 Gordon Walker note to Morrison, 14-11-1946, CAB 124/1071.
83 Evening Standard, The Londoner’s Diary’, 13-12-1946, p.4.
84 Evidence of the NUJ submitted to the Royal Commission by J.E. Jay (President) and Clement 
Bundock (General Secretary), 3-6-1947.
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1921 to 128 in 1948, the highpoint of consolidation was 1929, since which time some 
holdings had broken apart.85
Moreover, some local papers disputed the idea that their independence had been 
reduced as a result of being members of a newspaper ‘chain’. As Berrow’s 
newspapers, the publisher of a small range of local newspapers around Worcester 
told the Commission that ‘small ownership is no guarantee of higher principles’.86
The Commission also became sceptical about the degree to which individual 
proprietors had an irresponsible influence on their newspapers. First, because the 
NUJ was unable to produced any material evidence of the infamous ‘directives’ 
(despite Beaverbrook having once given out 147 in a single day87). And second, 
because some of the Commissioners did not believe an individual could direct 
something as complex and multifaceted as a newspaper via a series of short 
instructions. They sympathised with Kemsley’s complaint that The notion that I sit at 
my desk... giving daily direction as to what features or leading articles are to appear 
in the respective papers is too fantastic to be entertained by any serious person”.88
Regarding the broader question of whether newspaper ownership was having a 
material effect on the free expression of views the Commission found that it was. 
The influence was more likely to be indirect than direct but, in the case of many 
newspapers, it was freely admitted. Lord Kemsley said he had no need to issue 
directives or dictate policy on the Sunday Times because he had employed men ‘of
85 Cmd.7700, p.61 (para.217). Lord Rothermere sold off his controlling interest in the Daily Mirror and 
Sunday Pictorial in 1931. Lords Kemsley, Camrose and lllife divided their news empire in 1937.
86 RCP Memoranda, Replies to NC1, Berrow’s Newspapers (3).
87 Curran & Seaton, Power without Responsibility (1997), p.45.
88 ME-RCP, memorandum submitted by Viscount Kemsley, Day 36 (27-5-48), p.3, Cmd.7503.
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sterling character and fine qualities, and men with similar ideas to my own’.89 The 
Commission’s own analysis corroborated this, showing that the political views within 
most papers were relatively consistent, and consistently partisan. The coverage of 
the Gravesend by-election, like that of coal nationalisation and of bread rationing, for 
example, was found to be biased and characterised by ‘a complete absence of 
objectivity’.90
But the Commission found it difficult to indict the newspapers since they were under 
no obligation to be impartial. As long as there was a broad spectrum of views 
expressed across the range of newspapers then the individual partisanship of one 
was not, the commissioners believed, problematic. If ‘divergent opinions are of any 
importance’, the Committee concluded, ‘their existence will be news and will be 
reported as such in the newspapers’.91 The Commissioners assumed any absence 
of views would eventually be solved by the market. This seems a remarkably 
complacent judgment from a Commission set up partly to see that such views were 
nurtured and promoted. Moreover, the Commission did no primary research with the 
public to ask if they felt the full range of views were expressed.
Reasons (5): Lack of Sufficient Evidence of Damaging Commercial Influence
On the question of the distorting influence of advertising and commercialisation, 
again the Commission chose to take issue with the charges laid down in the 
Commons motion. In its conclusions it argued the direct influence of advertisers was 
negligible and, as regards indirect influence, ‘of the various possible sources of
89 ME-RCP, Lord Kemsley, Day 36 (27-5-48), q.12,009, Cmd.7503.
90 Cmd.7700, p.118 (para.432). Quote applied specifically to by-election but consistent with report's 
comments on other cases.
91 Cmd.7700, p.88 (para.312).
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income, the sale of their space to advertisers seems to us to be one of the least 
harmful’.92
This was despite having heard evidence to the contrary. It was well documented, for 
example, that all the popular press had resorted to non-journalistic methods to boost 
circulation in the 1930s. A respected advertising agency, the London Press 
Exchange, acknowledged that it had colluded with newspapers in the late 1930s to 
maintain optimism artificially: ‘Before the war the vast majority of papers considered, 
as we did, that it was in the public interest to stimulate the buying of quality goods at 
reasonable prices, and therefore they took active steps, sometimes of their own 
accord, sometimes in cooperation with the advertising agents, to produce a frame of 
mind in the public most likely to achieve this result’.93 And the Commission also 
heard evidence that papers would add supplements to increase advertising revenues 
(particularly on gardening, fashion or books).
However, the situation in 1947 was very different to that of a decade earlier. Due to 
the enormous drop in advertising space available there was a queue of potential 
advertisers for every vacant newspaper position. The balance of power, which might 
have favoured the advertiser in the 1930s, had shifted to each individual newspaper. 
As the President of the NUJ told the Commission, ‘the advertisers are begging for 
space rather than exercising pressure, as was undoubtedly the case before the 
war’.94 And, whilst paper was rationed there was no opportunity to print supplements 
or substitute genuine news for promotional material.
92 Cmd.7700, p.143 (para.528).
93 RCP Memoranda, Replies to Questionnaire B2 (Advertising Agents), London Press Exchange.
94 ME-RCP, NUJ, J.E. Jay, Day 1 (16-7-47), q.129, Cmd.7317.
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In addition, if the Commission were to accept that a major advertiser could have a 
detrimental influence on the content of a paper, then, in 1947, it would have to 
censure the Government. ‘If any advertiser could, through sheer weight of 
expenditure, hope to influence the editorial policy of the newspapers,’ the Advertising 
Association wrote ‘that advertiser must now be the Government itself.95 Government 
advertising, the Association pointed out, was running at around £3 million per year. 
This was significantly higher than any commercial body. The largest proportion of 
this expenditure went on the press. Furthermore, the Government could secure more 
space in the newspapers than any other body, thanks to an agreement it had made 
during the war which Morrison had been able to prolong.96
New Allegations: the Influence of the Government on the Press
It was not in the original terms of reference of the Commission to examine the role of 
Government influence on the press. But, to the surprise of the Commission many of 
the respondents, in interview and in writing, complained vigorously about the actual 
or possible threat of the Government Information Services.97 This was despite the 
fact that, as the Guild of Newspaper Editors crossly reminded the Commission, they 
had “omitted to ask us what are the responsibilities of public authorities to the 
press”.98
95 RCP Memoranda, written evidence of Advertising Association.
96 On 18th July 1947 Morrison met with the advertising managers of the daily and Sunday newspapers 
at 11 Downing Street and appealed to them to maintain the amount of space they gave to the 
Government advertisements, in proportion to the newspaper page reduction, INF 12/13.
97 The Commission told the Government that ‘twenty-seven organisations have referred in their written 
evidence either to PROs or in general terms to the Government information services'. Attachment to 
letter from J.J. Nunn to D.J. Wardley at the Treasury, requesting representatives for interview, 16-3- 
1948, CAB 124/1073.
98 ME-RCP, Guild of Newspaper Editors, Day 4 (16-10-47), q.1061, Cmd.7322.
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The criticism fell into three main areas: obstruction, inherent bias, and 
monopolisation of information. In other words, each of the accusations which had 
been levelled at the press were now being levelled at the Government.
In addition to the central Government obstruction already described, there were 
further obstacles at a local level. According to the Local Authorities Act of 1908 all 
local councils were required to let the press into their meetings." There was, 
however, a loophole. If the council said they were meeting ‘in committee’ they could 
legitimately exclude journalists. By 1947, by the calculations of the Guild of 
Newspaper Editors, 867 local authorities were not allowing reporters into their 
meetings as against 130 which were.100 Even when journalists were given minutes of 
the meetings, they were sometimes threatened that “If you publish anything which 
we say should not be published in relation to particular minutes, then no minutes will 
be sent to you again”.101
Bias in departmental public relations departments was, many newspapers claimed, 
“inherent within the situation itself.102 It was inevitable, the Institute of Journalists 
said, that “the natural ambition of official bodies, national and local, [was] to have 
their virtues and accomplishments publicised”.103 Stephen Tallents, the original 
Public Relations Officer (PRO) and now President of the Institute of Public Relations, 
acknowledged that as a PRO “you are concerned, of course, to put over the point of
"ibid. q.1007.
100 ME-RCP, Guild of Newspaper Editors, Day 4 (16-10-47), q.997, Cmd.7322. Based on results of a 
questionnaire survey the Guild sent out to all local newspapers and journals.
101 Ibid.
102 ME-RCP, Daily News, Robin Cruikshank, Day 24 (4-3-48), q.8218, Cmd.7409.
103 ME-RCP, Institute of Journalists, quoted from submitted evidence, A.T. Penman, Day 6 (30-10-47) 
q.1725, Cmd.7328.
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view of your department; that is what you are there for”.104 In practise, A.L. Cranfield, 
editor of The Star, told the Commission that this meant he received a couple of calls 
a week from PROs informing him that something in his newspaper was wrong, 
although, as he protested, it is only “not right from their point of view”.105
The most serious of the accusations was the third, that the Government had a 
monopoly of information and could retain or release this as it saw fit. Though many 
newspapers believed that the Government did its best to pass on information, they 
were aware that it could misuse its power. Geoffrey Crowther of the Economist gave 
a good example of this. Prior to making sterling convertible on July 15th 1947 the 
Treasury told all the papers that this would not be costly for the country and provided 
figures to back up this claim. Many newspapers took the Government at its word and 
used its analysis. As a result, when convertibility sparked off a massive run on the 
pound, the press was seen to have been ‘unanimously ill-informed or unanimously 
wrong in its judgment’.106 The danger was even more acute in areas like foreign 
affairs when the press regularly relied on the Government as its sole source of 
information. Tribune called this ‘Gleichschaltung’ (establishment of absolute 
conformity) and thought its effect all the more damaging since, because the papers 
were not allowed to quote their source, they had to rewrite the stories in their own 
words.107 This made them the equivalent of Government sponsored news.
An offshoot of this monopolisation was the Government’s use of hand-outs. A 
hangover from the war, a hand-out would normally be either a transcript of a
104 ME-RCP, Sir Stephen Tallents, Day 25 (17-3-48), q.8341, Cmd.7415.
105 ME-RCP, A.L Cranfield, Daily News Ltd., Day 24 (4-3-48), q.8218, Cmd.7409.
106 RCP Memoranda, Replies to NC1, The Economist, Geoffrey Crowther (27).
107 RCP Memoranda, Replies to NC1, Tribune Publications (83). Gleischaltung was specifically related 
to the Nazification process of alignment or coordination within Germany in the 1930s.
159
Chapter 3
ministerial speech or a summary of an official document. Newspapers could use 
them but not refer to them. The sources of these hand-outs must not be quoted,’ the 
Northcliffe Newspapers group told the Commission, ‘in other words it must not 
appear to be official or semi official’.108 Editors could be forgiven for seeing a parallel 
between hand-outs and proprietorial directives. Moreover, the hand-outs could 
sometimes be wrong or misleading. Emmanuel Shinwell was due to give a speech at 
a rally in Edinburgh on 5th May 1947 to mark the introduction of the miners’ five day 
week. A text of the speech was distributed to the press an hour before it was given. 
Unfortunately, it did not match the actual speech made.109 On another occasion in 
October 1947 the Board of Trade released the newly signed General Tariff 
Agreement late in the day. Since the document weighed over 8lbs there was not time 
to read it before going to print. As a result all the papers relied on the 4 page 
summary written by the PRO.110
The press was partly defending itself from Government attack by raising these 
concerns, but there was also genuine anxiety amongst many of them that they were 
being systematically blocked from finding information or were being given skewed 
information. This represented a significant threat for contemporary and future 
reporting; as the Institute of Journalists wrote in its evidence, “If the road to the public 
relations section is the only one left to enquiring journalists, and the newspapers 
have to take their news solely from hand-outs, a condition approximating to official 
censorship of official news will have been established’.111
108 ME-RCP, Northcliffe Newspapers Group, Day 17 (21-1-48), q.5442, Cmd.7373.
109 NUJ to J.J. Nunn (Royal Commission), 11-7-1947, HO 251/154.
110 Examples cited in letter from Sir Thomas Balogh to Sir David Ross, 3-12-1947, HO 251/155.
111 RCP Memoranda, submitted by the Institute of Journalists.
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The Commission Considers Extending its Terms of Reference
Before Christmas 1947 the Royal Commission members reflected on their position 
and discussed whether they should issue an interim report. In general they were 
disappointed with the quality of evidence against the press (‘astonishingly confused, 
thin and ill-supported’ said Sir Geoffrey Vickers) and had trouble sustaining the 
claims about monopolistic tendencies.112 They were not keen on the sensationalism 
of the popular press but this, members like Ensor thought, was a case of 'giving the 
people what they want’ rather than through any conscious attempt to distort facts.113 
It was difficult, GM Young argued, to find a direct link between the nature of 
newspaper ownership or commercial control and restrictions on accuracy of 
information or freedom of opinion.114
However, they had been affected by the significant criticism of the Government’s 
information services and some of the members of the Commission voiced their 
concerns about other damaging influences of the Government. Actions such as 
Hugh Dalton’s November tax on advertisers, would do ‘more harm than good’ they 
thought.115 And more important still, the Government’s strict rationing of newsprint 
created such unnatural conditions that it made it impossible for the Commission to 
judge the situation fairly and recommend serious changes. G.M. Young compared 
the Commission’s job with ‘trying to prescribe a healthy regimen for the inmates of a
112 Sir Geoffrey Vickers, memorandum on interim report to Sir David Ross, 8-12-1947, HO 251/216.
113 RCK Ensor, memorandum (Paper 89), 5-1-1948, HO 251/216.
114 GM Young, memorandum (Paper 115), 14-2-1948, HO 251/216.
115 Ibid.
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concentration camp, not knowing when, or by what stages, they will be 
discharged’.116
The members thought they could not recommend significant Government 
intervention given their findings to date and their concerns about Government 
behaviour. These concerns also, they thought, reflected the prevailing mood in which 
‘feelings against any kind of Government control over, or interference with, the Press 
is so strong that Parliament, I am sure, would not entertain a measure for the better 
regulation of the Press unless the need was demonstrated beyond all doubt’.117
They considered extending their inquiry to include other influences on the press, 
particularly that of the Government itself. But this would force them to veer outside 
the original terms of reference. The Commission had been asked to inquire into ‘the 
presentation of news’ with the object of furthering ‘the free expression of opinion’ as 
affected by the current ‘control, management and ownership’ of the press. It was not 
expected to investigate the Government as well. Despite discussion, by March 1948 
the members were split on what they should do.118
As chair, Sir David Ross decided. We ‘should limit the inquiries to matters plainly 
directed’ by the questions within the terms of reference, he said. ‘Matters external to 
the press such as the influence of PROs would be considered only insofar as they 
were put forward by the press as alternative explanations of shortcomings which 
seemed to arise from causes inside the press’.119 In other words, they would ask the 
Government to be interviewed in respect of the original terms of reference, but not
116 GM Young, memorandum to the Policy Committee of the Royal Commission, December 1947, HO 
251/213.
117 GM Young, memorandum (Paper 115), 14-2-1948, HO 251/216.
118 There are two main schools of thought among members' Sir David Ross wrote to Commission 
members, 12-3-1948, HO 251/216.
119 Ibid.
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with a view to extending the inquiry to a wholesale review of the influence of the 
Government.
The Government is Called to the Roval Commission
Therefore the secretary of the Commission, J.J. Nunn, wrote to the Treasury on 16th 
March 1948 and requested that the Government come for interview.120 The letter 
was deferential and apologetic and made it clear that the Commission had little 
choice. Attached to the letter was a summary of the criticisms, obligingly laid out so 
the Government could respond.
The letter generated a minor panic within Whitehall. The Treasury tried to push the 
issue onto the COI.121 But Robert Fraser felt it was not his responsibility because the 
departments dealt directly with the Press and the Commission referred explicitly to 
the public relations officers who were based in each department.122 So he suggested 
Philip Jordan take charge and work directly with top PROs to handle it. Though Philip 
Jordan was willing to take it on, the suggested PROs were not. Thomas Fife Clarke 
and Matthew Crosse, from the Ministries of Health and of Fuel and Power, refused to 
go in front of the commission. It is likely they feared that the ignominy heaped on the 
information services and on PROs by the press, would fall on whichever poor soul 
chose to take the brunt of the criticism. Scrabbling around for other names the 
Government eventually chose James Crombie (Treasury), Michael Balfour (Board of 
Trade), J.E. Holroyd (Board of Trade), and W.M. Ballantine (Scottish Office) to 
accompany Jordan.
120 JJ Nunn to Wardley (Treasury), 16-3-1948, CAB 124/1073.
121 James Crombie (Treasury) to Robert Fraser (COI), 23-2-1948, CAB 124/1073.
122 Note from Fraser to David Stephens (LP’s Office), 31-3-1948, CAB 124/1073.
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The officials were still keen to make sure they were not sacrificial lambs. They 
insisted that, if they were to stand in front of a Royal Commission, they would only 
act as spokesmen for a Government statement, prepared and submitted before their 
interview.123 Philip Jordan was made head of a sub-committee to draft this document 
and to prepare for the interview. All this would, however, take time, and so the 
Government told the Commission they would not be ready for the proposed interview 
date on the 1st April. They eventually met on the 26th May.
In the meantime Jordan met with Morrison and quickly prepared a draft which was 
scrutinized by the official information services committee, the ministerial information 
services committee, the Lord President’s office, and the Prime Minister.124 At the 
same time Boon and Gore from the Lord President’s office started collecting 
evidence of the activities of the PROs from each department (press conferences 
held, hand-outs distributed, facilities visits, and press inquiries handled).
The Ministers and civil servants went over the Jordan document very carefully, 
editing it, making sure there were no lines that could be used against the 
Government. The idea was to make the statement as positive as possible and 
convince the Commission that the ‘information sections were of equal importance as, 
for example, the accounts department and the typing pool, in the functioning of the 
Departmental machine’.125
123 Note from Stephens to Morrison about Home Information Services Meeting, 2-4-1948: “At this 
morning’s meeting there was strong support for the view that the first and most essential task was not 
so much the selection and briefing of suitable witnesses as the preparation of a government statement 
which would describe the work of the Departmental information services in their relations with the press 
and would also constitute the brief to which the selected witnesses would speak", CAB 124/1073.
124 The IH(O) committee initially discussed the request of the Royal Commission and the response on 
2nd April 1948. The Ministerial committee discussed the request and a draft response (attached to Lord 
President’s memorandum) on 14th April. Note from David Stephens to Morrison, 20-4-1948, says that 
’Mr. Jordan is getting the PM’s approval concurrently’, CAB 124/1073.
125 Point raised at IS(48)4 when they discussed Jordan’s memo, 14-4-48, CAB 124/1073.
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Many of them had changes and adaptations to make. For example in paragraph 7, 
which read:
The Information Division of a department has no view separate from that of 
the department as a whole. It is merely a section of the department 
discharging, as do all other sections, a specialist function for its minister. The 
facts it gives are provided by the department; and in presenting and 
explaining them, it is expressing its department’s well-considered view of 
their significance’
Patrick Gordon Walker did not like this at all, ‘it might well be taken out of context 
and quoted against us as showing that facts are twisted and presented in a way that 
we like’.126 He therefore removed provocative words like ‘present’ and ‘explain’ and 
‘significance’. It ended up as, The information division of a department has no view 
separate from that of the department as a whole. It is merely a section of the 
department discharging, as do all other sections, a specialist function’. The irony that 
Gordon Walker and others were presenting a statement in the way that they liked 
was not commented on.
The eventual document which emerged had many fewer contentious words than 
Jordan’s -  no use of the word specialists, or indication that people were sifting the 
significant from the insignificant. Only that they were making the dissemination of 
information more efficient and less chaotic. It was sent, together with appendix giving 
examples of how the PROs worked (answers to phone queries, a diary of press 
conferences) to the Commission at the end of April.127 Between then and the 26th 
May when the interview took place, Jordan and the other representatives continued
126 Gordon Walker to Morrison, 22-4-1948, CAB 124/1073.
127 J.I.C. Crombie wrote to J.J. Nunn, LO.215/06, 23-4-1948, telling her that the Commission would 
receive the Government response ‘in the next day or so’, CAB 124/1073.
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to receive instructions as to how they should react to the questions and what they 
should say.128
They should not have been so worried. Considering the range of criticisms levelled 
against the Government their interview with the Commission was very brief and 
certainly not testing. Altogether the Commissioners asked 130 questions. This 
compared to the 598 they asked Lord Kemsley and his deputy chairman the 
following day.129 The Commission voiced the main complaints of some of the papers 
but little more. At one point Sir David Ross even apologised that the questioning was 
so negative, “We seem to be making nothing but complaints, although, of course, 
you will understand we are not making them ourselves, we are investigating 
them”.130
The official spokesmen accepted that there had been developments in Government 
communication but disputed the press’s interpretation of their effects. There had 
been a growth in staff numbers which was fully documented.131 There were more 
formal mechanisms for dealing with the press which meant that most inquiries were 
directed to a central source, contact was channelled through this same source, and 
access to others within that Government department had to be arranged through that 
source. But, though the press saw these sources and the mechanisms surrounding 
them as barriers to information and as prisms through which information could be 
shaped, the Government saw them simply as more effective means of accumulating
128 The official information services committee, IH(0)(48)5th, 30-4-1948, talked about what they thought 
the Commission might ask (for example, about scoops and about attribution of sources). The Ministerial 
committee then discussed the issues further at its next meeting; 18(48)3^, 11-5-1948, CAB 124/1073.
129 ME-RCP, Government, Day 35 (26-5-48), questions 11,700 to 11,830, Cmd.7500. Interview with 
Viscount Kemsley and Lionel Berry Day 36 (27-5-48), questions 11,831 to 12,429, Cmd.7503.
130 Ibid., q.11,744, Cmd.7500.
131 Ibid. “There has been a very great development of that over the last twenty years; there was a very 
rapid development between the years 1939 and 1944; the year 1944-45 represented the peak year”,
JIC Crombie, q.11,818, Cmd.7500.
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and distributing information in a timely manner. Holroyd replied at length to Sir 
George Waters, for example, about how, over time, each press office could add to its 
store of information available to the media and then make it easily accessible 
whenever it was required.
Waters tried to pursue this line of questioning by referring to specific complaints 
raised by newspapers. He talked, for example, about the papers of South Wales who 
told the Commission they found it “much more difficult to get information with regard 
to mines than it was before”.132 Crombie’s response was to shift the blame, “Of 
course the Coal Board are not Government departments, as you realise sir”. But this 
was Water’s point. The growth of Government, whether through nationalisation or 
bureaucratisation, had seriously reduced the accessibility of information. “More 
channels are opened than are being closed” Crombie countered.133
The spokesman had been well briefed and were well prepared. They stuck to a 
positive message about the information services. They did not answer questions 
which might have political repercussions or that required them to offer judgment. 
There were not many of these but Reverend Aubrey asked one towards the end of 
the interview. “Do you feel” he asked, “from your experience of this work, that the 
public is so much more fully informed and the press is so much helped that the 
expenditure is entirely justified?”. “This is very difficult for me to answer” Crombie 
replied, “I really think it is for Ministers to give an answer to that question”.134
132 Ibid. q.11,806.
133 Ibid. q.11,799.
134 Ibid. q.11,820.
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The Commission remained true to the instructions of Sir David Ross. At no point in 
the interview did it seek to critique the Government for its behaviour or search for 
specific ways to regulate it.135
SECTION 3: The Impact of Circumstances on the Review
International Developments Cast a Shadow over Government Control
The Government’s autocratic behaviour towards the press over the course of 1947 
might have appeared less ominous to the newspapers had it not been for the very 
real constraints being placed on press freedom elsewhere in the world. During the 
period when the Labour Government was berating the papers, increasing its 
executive powers over them, and considering alternative means of organising the 
press, the governments within the emerging Soviet bloc and many elsewhere in the 
world were all enhancing their control of the media.136
In Hungary, for example, the acting Minister of Information, Mihalyfi, announced in 
June 1947 that all journalists would, from that point on, be liable for punishment, 
including the death sentence, for publishing ‘reports which would harm the reputation 
at home or abroad of the Hungarian Republic’.137 In October, following a secret 
conference of the Soviet Union and its East European neighbours in Warsaw, a 
Communist information office was to be opened in Belgrade, the centre of a newly 
established Cominform. And even in pre-Communist China, the Government 
extended its control of the press at the end of January 1948, to the extent that the
135 The Commission did ask if there was a ‘more definite code’ being drawn up for PROs. Jordan 
bristled and replied that the ‘rules that govern the conduct of civil servants apply to CIOs just as much’. 
This was not entirely true since most PROs were not yet civil servants. The Commission continued 
briefly with this line of enquiry then dropped it. Ibid. q.11,757, Cmd.7500.
136 Outside the Soviet Union this included Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, France, Chile, Argentina, 
Guatemala, China and India. According to The Times, January-March 1948.
137 ‘Press Threat in Hungary’, The Observer, 29-6-1947, p.1.
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Times wrote, ‘a censorship under that name may not exist, but Chinese newspapers 
which do not conform with Kuomintang views or directives are either deprived of 
newsprint or suppressed’.138
But it was the developing situation in Czechoslovakia in early 1948 which had the 
most damaging impact on perceptions of the role of Government on the organisation 
of the press. Czechoslovakia had been seen by many in Britain as a successful 
marriage of Socialism and freedom. In particular its organisation of the press was 
held up by many witnesses of the Royal Commission as a model which should be 
emulated. ‘We have heard a great deal about Czechoslovakia and its press’, one of 
the Commissioners, GM Young, said.139 Kingsley Martin espoused the system of 
licensing, outlined above, in his interview and his book The Press the Public Wants. 
The NUJ lauded the single national union which contained all Czech journalists and 
by whose rules they were all held responsible.
Then, on February 25th 1947, the Czech president, Edouard Benes, appointed a new 
Communist dominated government. Immediately afterwards action groups started 
expelling journalists from the national journalists’ association. Since all journalists 
were members and the Government held the licenses of all the news groups it was 
quite straightforward to exclude dissident voices. Shortly afterwards it went further 
and threw all foreign journalists out of the country as well.
This came as a profound shock in Britain. Many immediately made direct 
comparisons with Western left-wing Governments and saw developments in 
Czechoslovakia as a warning. ‘What is a Czechoslovak internal crisis has its
138 Reported in The Times, 30-1-1948, p.3.
139 GM Young Memorandum (Paper 115), 14-2-1948, ‘On the Possibility of an Interim Report and 
Discussion of Progress’, HO 251/216.
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implications and its lessons for all western countries’ said a Times editorial.140 In a 
similar vein the Sunday Times{ wrote, ‘Here too the grim example of Czechoslovakia 
has lessons for us which we disregard at our peril’. Lord Kemsley’s paper went 
further and said that Socialism was ‘a bridge of appeasement, over which the 
invading forces pass, openly or in disguise, to compel the capitulation of 
democracy’.141
Though most other commentators were not as pejorative as the Sunday Times, they 
did believe that Labour now had a choice. They could choose Socialism first and 
democracy second or democracy first and Socialism second. ‘On one side lies the 
territory where power is held in trust for the people, who are free to criticise the 
Government and to change it. On the other lies the territory where the power is held 
by a party which allows no rivals and tolerates no criticism of its infallible creed’.142 
Labour recognised that it had to define its position and distinguish itself from East 
European Socialism. On March 3rd the National Executive Committee released a 
statement to do just this: The issues before us’ it said, ‘no longer permit of any 
prevarication. Socialism is meaningless without democracy. Democracy cannot live 
without freedom of speech, press, and organisation’.143
This statement expressed a serious shift in the perceptions of Labour in Britain. ‘A 
great change has come over the party since the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia’ 
the Observer said.144 Opinion had hardened against the Soviet Union and 
Communists, and there was a heightened awareness of the values of freedom of
140 The Times, 25-2-1948, p.5.
141 The Sunday Times, Editorial Comment, 29-2-1948.
142 The Observer, Editorial, 7-3-1948.
143 Statement printed in The Times, 3-3-1948, p.4.
144 The Observer, Editorial, 7-3-1948.
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speech and freedom of the press. As a direct result of the coup, some of the 
alternative models of press organisation had been thoroughly discredited. The Czech 
method of licensing specific ‘responsible’ groups to run newspapers, for example, 
was no longer tenable. Neither was the idea of enforcing a journalistic closed shop.
These suggestions became even more unfeasible since, from February 9th 1948, the 
transcripts of the Commission interviews were released. The impact of events 
leading to Communist domination of Czechoslovakia has particular interest for the 
British press’ Newspaper World commented, ‘as the Czech press organisation has 
been quoted in Left-wing circles in this country as a possible model for ensuring 
press freedom’.145
The coup also had a pronounced effect on some of the members of the Royal 
Commission. Sir George Waters, the most experienced member of the group, made 
a speech in Scotland in June 1948 in which he said he was worried about many left 
wingers’ praise of the Czech press system and warned his audience that the 
freedom of the British press from Government was not necessarily assured.146 
R.C.K. Ensor, the only member of the Commission who still worked for a newspaper, 
wrote that ‘the one good thing about the affair is the extent to which it has opened 
men’s eyes’. 'Journalists [in Czechoslovakia]’, he wrote, ‘are particularly easy for 
totalitarians to deal with, owing to the post-war Czech law which made journalism a 
closed profession’.147
At the same time that the Czech Government was imposing severe controls on its 
press a five week international conference on Freedom of Information and the Press
145 Newspaper World and Advertising Review, 'Czech Crisis -  Editors Deprived of Livelihood and 
Newspapers Suspended’, 6-3-1948, p.240.
146 "Freedom of Press Not Assured’ says Sir George Waters’, World’s Press News, 17-6-1948, p.3.
147 Ensor writing as 'Scrutator' in the The Sunday Times, 29-2-1948 and 7-3-1948.
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opened in Geneva. One of the primary concerns of the conference was how to 
protect the freedom of the press against the growth of Government control. 
Discussion quickly polarised into two camps -  East and West. The Soviet delegate, 
Bogolomov, accused the ‘reactionary’ press of Britain and America of fomenting an 
atmosphere of hostility and mistrust. The ‘purer press’ of the Soviet Union had 
shifted from being ‘"mere disseminators of news" into instruments for the education 
and enlightenment of the people’.148
Hector McNeil, the British delegate, roundly condemned the ‘dictated thinking’ of the 
USSR and its satellite states. He held the British press up as an archetype of a 
democracy and independence. 'A supine press is a bad press’ he said, and claimed 
that, There is within the British press endless opportunity for the expression of 
different views’.149 He also submitted a resolution on behalf of the British 
Government on freedom of the press which included a clause stating that each 
national press should have the ‘freedom to impart and receive information and 
opinions without Governmental interference’.
With statements like these the discrepancy between Labour’s rhetoric abroad and its 
behaviour at home became very apparent. 'Was this really a speech by a member of 
the British Government?’ World’s Press News asked after McNeil’s address, 
‘because if so there must be two Government voices, one for abroad which tells the 
world what a fine democratic and independent press we have in Britain, and the 
other for home consumption’.150 It was not true, for example, that there was endless 
opportunity for different views when they all had to be fit within four pages. Neither 
was it true that the British Government had refrained from interfering with the press
148 Reported in the The Times, 31-3-1948, p.4.
149 Hector McNeil, speaking on 29th March, reported in The Times, 30-3-1948.
150 World's Press News, ‘Templar’, 8-4-1948.
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throughout 1947. ‘Such resolutions’ therefore, ‘are mere lip service unless 
accompanied by practical evidence of concern for a properly functioning press’ as 
The Times pointed out on 24th May.
It was becoming much harder for the Government to ignore the parallels between its 
actions towards the press and those of Socialist or Communist Governments abroad. 
It was no longer plausible for them to argue that they were promoting a free press at 
the same time that they were curtailing supplies of newsprint, limiting circulations, 
increasing costs, and penalising advertisers. The Americans were so concerned at 
the threat to democracy this represented that, at the beginning of May 1948, they 
offered to allocate $22 million in the first years’ Marshall Aid in order to buy additional 
newsprint.151 When the Government rejected the offer the reaction of even the most 
neutral newspapers showed that the contradictions between Labour’s assurances 
and their policies were becoming politically unsustainable. ‘Newsprint cannot be 
treated on this side of the iron curtain as just another material commodity’ The Times 
wrote.152 ‘We are finding it increasingly difficult’ World’s Press News said, ‘to draw a 
real distinction between the objectives of the Communists of Czechoslovakia and the 
British Government of today in relation to the Press’.153
Direct Government Communication No Longer an Alternative due to Political and 
Economic Constraints
But in addition to the international developments that were making increased 
Government control of the press politically unacceptable, there were domestic
151 This offer emerged from material published in the US, not in Britain and was raised in the short 
debate on the loan in the House of Commons on the evening of Monday, 3-5-1948. This was reported 
in The Times the following day.
152 The Times, 6-5-1948.
153 World’s Press News, Editorial, 27-5-1948.
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pressures that were making the alternative -  mass Government communication -  
politically and economically impractical, and pushing Labour towards some sort of 
compromise with the newspapers.
Politically, there had been mounting criticism of the Government Information 
Services, particularly at the end of 1947 and beginning of 1948 (described in Chapter 
One). Economically, expenditure on Government communication was only slightly 
below its wartime peak and, in March and April, MPs were expressing serious 
unease. ‘Disquiet over the Government’s information service is not confined to 
Conservative circles’ the Observer wrote, ‘Many of the Government’s own supporters 
realise that there is something very seriously wrong’.154 This unease was vented in 
the Supply debate in May, after which both Cripps and Morrison insisted that cuts be 
made. Budget cuts in information services were symptomatic of a broader range of 
spending cuts across Government departments and indicated that the Government 
simply could not afford to produce all its own information via films, publications and 
advertising. It would have to rely on the existing channels, primarily the press.
The centralisation of the authoritarian state in Eastern Europe also coincided with 
increasing political uncertainty amongst some ministers as to further growth in the 
role of the state in private industry. Morrison led this uncertainty and, at the Labour 
Party conference in Scarborough in May, suggested it was time to slow the pace of 
nationalisation and focus on securing the gains reached so far. ‘Whilst in the next 
programme it will be right’ he told delegates, ‘to give proper consideration to further 
propositions for public ownership, do not ignore the need, not merely for considering 
further public ownership but for allowing Ministers adequate time to consolidate, to
154 The Observer, 9-5-1948, p.5.
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develop, to make efficient or more efficient the industries which have been socialised 
in the present Parliament’.155
Morrison felt Labour needed to draw a distinction between socialisation in Britain and 
the restriction of freedom by state intervention within other socialist republics. The 
transparent reduction of the freedom of the press in the Soviet bloc and elsewhere 
gave a sinister hue to paper rationing and other Government controls. Moreover, the 
practical need for budget cuts made it unfeasible for the Government to keep 
spending on the production of its own information. Combined, these two 
developments made it politically and economically untenable for the Government to 
justify a reorganisation of the press to fit within a Socialist state or to push 
Government intervention in newspapers any further.
The Royal Commission’s own shift in focus, from the effects of monopoly ownership 
and commercialisation which it was asked to investigate, to the dangers of 
Government control and intervention was, therefore, illustrative of a comparable 
political shift within Britain. Their interview with the Government witnesses in May 
1948 was demonstrative of wider anxieties as to the intentions of the Government 
towards the press and of the ever-expanding role of the State in general.
Morrison’s recognition of the limitations of the role of the State at the Scarborough 
conference coincided with his disillusionment in the Royal Commission. Once it 
became clear that the Commission would neither come up with alternative means of 
organising the press nor justify further Government newspaper management he 
gave up on it as a vehicle for radical change. ‘We are credibly informed’ World’s 
Press News reported on May 27th, ‘that only a few days ago Herbert Morrison
155 Herbert Morrison, speech to the Labour Conference, Monday afternoon session, 17-5-1948, from the 
Report of the Conference (Transport House, London, 1948).
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roundly and angrily turned upon a group of left-wing journalists to condemn them 
severely for having induced the Government up the garden path in the appointment 
of that Commission’.
The Government and the Press Agree to Disagree
Neither Morrison nor many within the Government were yet reconciled to working 
closely with the press. Ministers continued to denigrate it when given the opportunity. 
Before the 1948 Labour conference Nye Bevan famously called it ‘the most 
prostituted press in the world’. But they began to recognise that it would be 
impossible to bypass the newspapers entirely and that they were not going to be 
given the license to institute significant reforms. They therefore began to look for 
acceptable means of engagement. Generally this meant seeking to influence the 
press by informal persuasion and direction rather than formal controls.
In 1948 Labour ministers therefore began to tone down their comments and even to 
defend the British press. In May the Solicitor-General, Sir Frank Soskice, defended 
the newspapers’ role as the public’s watchdog, and its willingness to criticise the 
Government to prevent any abuse of power.156 In June Morgan Phillips, chairman of 
the Labour party, told the International Journalists’ Club that Labour did not want 
State control of the press.157
Even Bevan was forced to subdue his language. He sat virtually silent in the House 
while, during an adjournment debate at the end of July 1948, the Opposition tried to 
push him to appear before the Commission and justify his accusations against the 
‘prostituted’ newspapers. The Home Secretary defended Bevan and said the Prime
156 ‘Soskice on Press Role Under Nationalisation’, World’s Press News, 6-5-1948, p.3.
157 ‘Morgan Phillips Says -  Labour Does Not Want State Press Control’, World’s Press News, 3-6-1948,
p.18.
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Minister had stopped the Minister of Health appearing on constitutional grounds.158 In 
the words of The Economist, ‘Having attacked a body whose case is at present sub 
judice, he [Bevan] was so hopelessly in the wrong that, for once, he had to rely upon 
others to conduct his defense’.159
Labour’s anger at the press was also mollified by the results of the US election of 
1948 which suggested that newspapers had little genuine political influence. Harry 
Truman had beaten his Republican opponent Thomas Dewey despite the 
overwhelming support Dewey received from the American papers. Morrison was 
particularly heartened by this. Speaking in Fife in November he said that “the US has 
had an even more dramatic indication that the prognostications of the press of the 
Right are unreliable, and that newspaper circulations are no guarantee that their 
readers agree with them or vote in the way they urge”.160
The shift towards working informally from within was perfectly characterized by 
Morrison in a speech he made in London on 16th November 1948. “I am a friend and 
protector of the press as a great institution” he told his audience, “If I am a critic of 
the press it is because I feel I am part of the family”.161 This mixture of protector and 
critic began to characterise the new relationship. Hartley Shawcross told an 
American audience in July 1949 that “we have in Britain an active and vigorous 
Press, which cannot be bullied or bought, and is vigilant in protecting the rights and
158 Chuter Ede, Parliamentary Debates, 29-7-1948, Vol.454, Col.884.
159 The Economist, ‘Shorter Notes’, 31-7-1948, p.179.
160 Herbert Morrison, speech at Fife, reported in World's Press News, 25-11-1948, p.9.
161 Manchester Guardian, ‘Friend and Protector of the Press’, 17-11-1948, p.6.
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liberties of the subject’, while in November Cripps accused the Press of setting out 
deliberately ‘to mislead and confuse the people of this country’.162
The press were similarly conscious of the shift away from institutional reform, but 
equally aware that the two estates had simply agreed to maintain a mutual distrust. 
AJ Cummings, the author of the influential ‘Spotlight’ column in the News Chronicle 
told the Manchester Reform Club in October 1949 that ‘it had been a tough fight to 
keep the British press free, and the fight was by no means over. Perhaps it never 
would be over’. Though the ‘Shinwells and the Bevans were “maintaining a pulsating 
silence" Cummings said, ‘it was a pause in a battle that was never won’.163
Conclusion
Between 1946 and 1949 the Government’s efforts to promote democratic 
communication, and its attempts to make the press do the same, had a number of 
important consequences for relations between the Government and the press in 
Britain. The first was the confirmation of a perpetual distrust between the two estates 
that exists to this day. Neither the Government nor the press was satisfied with the 
conclusion of their confrontation and as a result, they pursued their own ends without 
any clear resolution of the difficulties.
The Government had to accept that that it could not force the press to be 
‘responsible’ (its interpretation of responsible, of course). However, it still believed 
that the political education of the public was critical to the health of the democracy. 
Therefore, it not only had to adopt some of the responsibility for that education itself,
162 Hartley Shawcross, speaking in Oklahoma, 28-6-1949, reported in the Spectator, 1-7-1949, p.4, 
‘Verdict on the Press'. Sir Stafford Cripps, speaking to East Bristol constituents, reported in Manchester 
Guardian, 21-11-1949, p.5, 'Chancellor denounces Tory “Gloom-Makers" -  Hopeful Signs in Economic 
Crisis -  Press Accused of Setting Out to Mislead People’.
163 Manchester Guardian, ‘Press Freedom -  “Fight by No Means Over”’, 22-10-1949, p.3.
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but felt it was justified in influencing the press with the means at its disposal. JIC 
Crombie argued as much to the Royal Commission in 1948; “If you have set up the 
[information] Division” he said, “it is natural that the contacts with the outside press 
should be canalised through that Division”.164
The press interpreted the Government’s new information services and its clumsy use 
of its executive powers (paper control, licensing etc.) as methods of managing and 
censoring news. Many editors and journalists made this clear in their responses to 
the questionnaire of the Royal Commission. In these they said they believed the 
Government now had significantly more control over information than before the war. 
Few of them cited instances in which this control had been misused, but almost all of 
them emphasised that it had the potential to be. Therefore they sought to preserve 
their independence from Government influence, a goal not necessarily incompatible 
with, but certainly not complementary to, the Government’s attempts to encourage 
responsibility.
Indeed, this seems to have had a further detrimental effect. From the inception of the 
Government information services many members of the press became suspicious of 
the nature of Government news sources and the way in which news was released. 
As a result they began to focus disproportionately on the process by which 
information was communicated rather than on the information itself. The failure of the 
Commission to question the Government fully or to recommend regulation of the new 
services helped ensure that this suspicion persisted.
The press’ triumphalism, borne out of the its perceived ‘acquittal’ by the Royal 
Commission, was also unhelpful. It fostered the impression that the press had 
escaped regulation by the Government which would necessarily have restricted its
164 ME-RCP, Government, Day 35 (26-5-48), q. 11,727, Cmd.7500.
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freedom. And yet the newspapers had consciously and successfully framed the 
debate about their role according to liberal ideas of nineteenth century press 
freedom. This obscured the original purpose of the inquiry, to check the growth of 
monopolistic tendencies in the control of the press and constrain the influence of 
proprietors, and prevented any realistic consideration of an extension to the 
definition of ‘freedom of the press’.
This raises another major consequence of the Governments’ confrontation with the 
press in the late 1940s. Once it had tried and essentially failed to convict the press of 
its allegations, it made it difficult for it to re-play the same debate in the future. And 
since a chief cause of its failure to find sufficient grounds for action was the atypical 
nature of the period (severe scarcity of paper, dire economic situation and the rise of 
political authoritarianism abroad), one must assume that had the Government 
conducted the debate at a different time it may well have had a very different result. 
Had the Government explored the same issues in the 1930s, for example, when 
commercial influence was more blatant and proprietorial political aspirations clearer, 
it would almost certainly have come to very different conclusions. Similarly if it had 
done the same after paper rationing ended. By conducting the inquiry at such an 
atypical time, the Government was not only unable to find enough evidence to justify 
action, it also compromised the ability of future administrations to ask the same 
questions. For example, it was subsequently more difficult to claim that owning a 
chain of newspapers reduced the independence of individual newspapers in that 
chain. Similarly, it was harder to suggest that any specific proprietor could dictate the 
political policy of his newspapers.
As a third consequence of the experience of 1946-9 the Government learnt that 
there were serious problems associated with trying to regulate an established
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channel of communication. However, this was not true of new channels of 
communication. So, in 1954, when the Conservatives finally authorized the formation 
of commercial television services, they made sure that its political responsibilities 
were included in the requirements of the license. This stipulated that ‘due impartiality 
is preserved on the part of the persons providing the programmes as respects 
matters of political or industrial controversy or relating to current public policy’.165 It 
would therefore be impossible for a Beaverbrook or a Kemsley to run a commercial 
television service according to their own political perspectives without risking losing 
their license.
Therefore before the end of this Labour administration the parameters of the 
relationship between the state and the press had been reaffirmed. The Government 
had been prevented from defining the limits of commercial and proprietorial influence 
and therefore felt justified in using the means at its disposal to manage the 
communication of its information through the papers. By the time the Royal 
Commission reported, the formal and informal mechanisms by which the 
Government related with the press had been established: the Central Office of 
Information, the news distribution unit, official civil service grades for public relations 
officers within each department, written lobby rules, enhanced connections with the 
BBC, and a growing understanding of the process of communication. By contrast, 
the press had preserved its freedom to assert its political bias and felt it unnecessary 
to institute any major reforms. Overall both estates had achieved an unhappy 
compromise based on mutual distrust. Over time, this mutual distrust would have a 
corrosive effect on both of them and eventually spread to the people. Although, as
165 Television Bill, No. 76, Parliamentary Papers 1953-54, Volume III, p.463, 4-3-1954, Clause 3(1)g.
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A.J. Cummings said, such inbuilt conflict could be seen as much healthier to the 
preservation of democracy than collusion.
Epilogue: The Report of the Commission and its Implications
When the Commission finally released its report, in June 1949, the debate had 
reached stasis. The report tried to fulfil Morrison’s criteria by criticising the popular 
press for its sensationalism and overly emotive political bias. But by balancing this 
with statements like ‘the British press is inferior to none in the world’ it ensured that 
the latter rather than the former made the headlines. Its dismissal of any intervention 
by Government was understandably seen as a victory for the press and celebrated 
as such. The Press is Vindicated’ the headline on the front page of the Daily 
Express read.166
Conversely, Morrison highlighted the report’s criticisms of specific press coverage 
and quoted the report’s warning that some of the journalism in the popular papers 
was leading to a ‘further weakening of the foundations of intelligent judgment in 
public affairs’.167 The Lord President’s expectation that the report would shine a 
spotlight on the seamier side of newspaper production was dashed because the 
newspapers had no intention of advertising their own faults. But the Government 
also escaped substantial criticism as the Commission did not think ‘that up to now 
any harmful influence is being exerted on the press through the medium of the 
Government information services’.168 If anyone had hoped the Commission would 
suggest preventative measures to protect the freedom of the press from the 
combined influences of owners, Government or commercial pressures in the future,
166 Daily Express, 30-6-1949, front page.
167 Report of the Royal Commission on the Press, Cmd.7700, p.151 (para.559).
168 Cmd.7700, p.147.
182
Chapter 3
they would have been disappointed. The main recommendation, for a General 
Council of the Press, was accepted by the Government but delayed and diluted by 
the press, eventually being set up in 1953.
The original promoters of the Commission argued that just by its appointment it had 
served its purpose. Ernest Jay of the NUJ said that the ‘existence of Royal 
Commission has already had a salutary effect’.169 It was true that Lord Kemsley had 
introduced a training plan for journalists, the Institute of Journalists had tried to 
create a ‘code of honour’ for the press, and John Gordon, the new President of the 
Institute and editor of the Sunday Express, called on his sub-editors to raise 
standards of accuracy.170 But these were relatively minor developments given the 
initial hopes of the Government and the NUJ.
169 World’s Press News, 8-7-1948, p.18.
170 This seriously backfired. All Gordon's sub-editors resigned en masse and Gordon had to apologise 
for his criticisms before they would return to work (World’s Press News, 22-1-1948).
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Chapter 4: The Government and the BBC
The previous two chapters sought to show how the Attlee Government became 
disillusioned with British newspapers and considered alternative means by which 
to structure the press as well as seeking other ways by which to communicate 
with the people. This chapter will examine the relationship of the Government 
with another media, broadcasting. This offers a fascinating contrast since it was 
structured in a very different way. It was controlled entirely by a licence-fee 
funded monopolistic Corporation, the BBC. It is a particularly apt comparison 
since one of the proposals for restructuring the press was that it be made up of 
‘lots of BBCs’.1 This chapter will try to illustrate some of the problems inherent in 
a system structured in such a way, where the State has extensive connections 
with, and potential control over, the main channels of mass communication.
The extent of research on the BBC immediately after the war is still quite limited. 
The most significant secondary source remains the fourth volume of Asa Brigg’s 
official history of the Corporation. Historians have tended to focus on the BBC 
during the war, or jump to the advent of television and the introduction of 
commercial competition. This is unfortunate since, as this chapter will try to 
argue, the direction of post-war broadcasting could have been distinctly different 
without the influence of the Attlee administrations.
Labour and the BBC shared similarly idealistic aspirations after the war. Both 
were convinced they could help to increase the sum of human happiness. The 
Government hoped to do this by supporting everyone through domestic welfare 
and increased opportunities, the BBC by making the highest standards of culture, 
education and information universally available. Both of them wanted to promote 
and sustain a politically informed and participatory democracy.
1 RCP Minutes, Kingsley Martin, Day 10 (27-11-47), q.3222, Cmd.7369.
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Both also believed that it was possible to inform the public truthfully, and in a 
balanced, impartial way. A broadcaster could, they both believed, report 
objectively and independently without favour to the Government, to the 
opposition, to pressure groups or to commercial interests. These shared aims 
and aspirations encouraged the Government to believe the BBC was a model 
communicator -  in stark contrast to the ‘instruments of political warfare’, the 
newspapers.2
However, as the wartime coalition quickly receded and the differing agendas of 
the Government and the BBC became apparent, it became more and more 
difficult to distinguish between partiality and impartiality. The Government’s 
conviction that it could remain national and not party political was not borne out 
by its frequent radio pep talks. The access that the Government enjoyed to the 
airwaves and to the Corporation began to compromise the BBC’s aspirations to 
independence. And the BBC’s determination to remain non-controversial began 
to suggest a degree of consensus that no longer existed.
Labour appeared unable to recognise that the monopoly inherently favoured the 
incumbent Government and promoted the status quo. Its increasingly desperate 
attempts to stress its own impartiality simply emphasised its own inability to 
realise that this was not possible. The degree of control and support it enjoyed 
did, however, become apparent to the Opposition. This led some Conservatives, 
previously convinced of the merits of the current system, to question the 
monopoly and to reconsider the structure of broadcasting in Britain.
This chapter is split into five sections. The first section will argue that, at the end 
of the war, the values and attitudes of the Government and the BBC seemed 
remarkably similar. This apparent unity of purpose led the Government to believe 
it should maintain the status quo.
2 Peter Hennessy, Never Again (1993), p.327.
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The second section will describe how the BBC sought to distance itself from the 
Government but failed. There were too many formal and informal links for the 
BBC to shed quickly. And, though the BBC wanted to assert its autonomy from 
Government, the Government did not want to lose its connections with the BBC.
The third section will examine how the Government’s use of the BBC to its own 
advantage triggered loud calls for an enquiry. Many people were concerned 
about the continued links between the state and the monopoly broadcaster and 
wanted these links opened to public scrutiny.
The Government’s refusal to hold an immediate enquiry and its subsequent 
behaviour towards the BBC is examined in the fourth section. This shows that 
Labour was unable to see how its conviction that it could remain impartial and 
continue to work closely with the BBC compromised the position of the 
Corporation.
The fifth and final section looks at the repercussions of continued Government 
control on other broadcasting voices. It shows how broadcasting was restricted to 
the political mainstream to the almost total exclusion of outsiders.
In the end this chapter will show that the Government managed to undermine the 
image of the BBC as a model communicator to such an extent that it could 
neither act as an archetype for other industries nor maintain its monopoly in 
broadcasting.
SECTION 1: Government -  BBC Consensus at the War’s End
Shared Values
During the Second World War the Coalition and the BBC worked very closely 
towards a single shared goal -  victory. The Government did not have to impose
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this goal on the BBC: it was a goal shared by the people and the nation.3 Early on 
in the conflict the Government had sought to direct the Corporation but quickly 
found that it was a much more effective instrument of communication and 
propaganda if it was given responsibility for controlling and censoring itself. 
Therefore the Government gave it a degree of independence not enjoyed by the 
broadcasters of other nations. As a result, ‘Over the course of the war the BBC 
developed from an instrument of official propaganda into a participant in its own 
right in the propaganda process. It demonstrated a growing self-confidence, and 
a growing sense of its role in national debate’.4
Beneath the overarching pursuit of victory the shared objectives of the 
Government and the people shifted over the course of the war. There was a 
move towards state planning and increased equality. This move was entirely 
understandable given the necessity for wartime planning, the shared privations of 
war and the enforced egalitarianism of rationing. It was further induced by the 
ambitions of the 1942 Beveridge report and by the perceived failure of the 
laissez-faire policies of the 1930s. It led, in Paul Addison’s words, to a left leaning 
‘Whitehall consensus’ within Government by the end of the war.5
This new consensus was reflected by the BBC. This can be seen in its growing 
willingness to broadcast discussions about national reconstruction, planning, 
education and employment. The 1943 programme 'The World We Want’, for 
example, examined the purpose of the state and the costs and benefits of a 
planned society.6 In particular it looked at planning within a democracy and how 
Britain could achieve ‘freedom from fear’ and 'freedom from want’. The following
3 For more about the wartime shared goals see Sian Nicholas, The Echo of War (1996),
Introduction.
4 Nicholas, Echo of War, p.6
5 Paul Addison, The Road to 1945 (1994 Edition), p.281.
6 Miss Benzie to Vincent Alford, 25-10-43, Talks: Reconstruction (The World We Want), R51/448/2, 
BBC-WAC.
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year ‘Jobs for All’ looked at the means of achieving full employment in Britain 
(building on Rab Butler’s White Paper on employment). David Smith has 
analysed these and other programmes and used them to show how much the 
BBC changed during the war and how by 1945 it exemplified this new 
consensus.7
But though the BBC had changed significantly during the war it already embodied 
the values of the new consensus long before 1939. As Herbert Morrison pointed 
out in the debate on broadcasting in 1946, the BBC was one of the first examples 
of state planning and nationalisation in Britain. Morrison even modelled his 
London Passenger Transport Board on the BBC when he served as Minister of 
Transport in 1931.8 It was, he said, “an outstanding achievement in socialisation’ 
and, more remarkably, ‘a socialised institution for which the nation has to thank 
successive Conservative Governments”.9 This was particularly true of its 
underlying rationale, which was to safeguard broadcasting in the national 
interest. Such a rationale closely resembled Labour’s argument for nationalising 
the ‘commanding heights’ of the British economy. It was also true of the structure 
of the organisation; a national monopoly intended for universal benefit, paid for 
by a direct tax, with an independent Chairman and Board of Governors 
overseeing the executive.
And this was not the only way in which the ideals of Attlee’s 1945 Government 
overlapped with the inherent values of the BBC. In education, both Labour and 
the BBC were committed to universal access and equal opportunities. As well as 
being a core obligation within its original 1926 licence, Asa Briggs notes that The
7 David Smith, ‘Politics through the Microphone: BBC Radio and the ‘New Jerusalem’ 1940-45’,
PhD, University of London, 1999, Ch.4.
8 “I should therefore prefer to contemplate the establishment of a body more on the lines of the 
Central Electricity Board, or the British Broadcasting Corporation, with a somewhat similar 
relationship to the Minister of Transport and Parliament’ Morrison to Cabinet, CP(29)251, 20-9- 
1929, cited in Donoughue and Jones, Morrison (2001), p.141.
9 Herbert Morrison, Parliamentary Debates, Broadcasting, Vol.425, Col.1078, 16-7-1946.
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BBC always made much of its “educational” role in a democracy’.10 But more 
than that, on an institutional and on a personal level both Labour and the BBC 
believed in the capacity of individuals to raise themselves up through education 
and both were firmly committed to helping them do that. 14 members of the 
Government, including Attlee and Dalton, had been Workers’ Educational 
Association tutors or executives.11 William Haley, the Director General of the BBC 
from 1944-52, had left school at 15 and, through hard work and compulsive 
reading, rose from being a copytaker to being Director General (DG) and later 
Editor of The T/'mes.12 Once he became DG, Haley believed it was the job of the 
BBC to bring education ‘to much greater numbers of people than have ever been 
served before’.13
Even in entertainment the BBC and Labour found themselves in agreement. Both 
had a benignly universalist view which suggested that the BBC could and should 
provide something that everyone could enjoy. Both believed this would be 
satisfied by three new national BBC stations. In the words of an editorial in The 
Listener in July 1945, ‘If the horrid but convenient terms can be permitted, high 
brows, low brows and middle brows will each have a programme to themselves -  
thereby, one hopes, decreasing mutual jealousies and increasing the general 
stock of human happiness’.14 Neither the Government nor the BBC could see 
why anyone could want for any more than this. When Patrick Gordon Walker 
asked Morrison why he would not allow an additional commercial station to 
broadcast, even under the control of the BBC, Morrison replied that he doubted
10 Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume IV  (1995Edition), p.562.
11 Jonathan Rose, The Intellectual life of the British Working Classes (2002), p.292.
12 Lord Simon, The BBC from Within (1953), p.56. Peter Hennessy, Never Again (1993), p.177.
13 William Haley, ‘Cultural Forces in British Life Today’, British Institute of Adult Education, 20/21-9- 
1946 HALY 16/52, CAC.
14 The Listener, Editorial ‘New Programmes’, 26-7-1945, p.92.
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whether there ‘is really a very strong demand in Britain for this sort of 
programme’.15
Morrison also had an instinctive dislike for commercial programming. His well 
quoted comment in the House in July 1946 gives a good flavour of this: 
“Personally, I find it repugnant to hear, as I have heard [in the US] a programme 
of beautifully sung children’s hymns punctuated by an oily voice urging me to buy 
somebody’s pills”.16 The BBC shared Morrison’s dislike and his belief in 
‘Gresham’s Law’ that in commercial broadcasting The good, in the long run, will 
inescapably be driven out by the bad’. As evidence of the law the BBC cited the 
Press. The truth of this’ it claimed, ‘can be seen by comparing those national 
newspapers which have circulations of over 4 millions with those whose 
circulations are counted in hundred thousands’.17
Therefore in July 1945, when Labour was elected to office, the BBC and the 
Government already had a great deal in common. Labour inherited a Corporation 
whose underlying values mirrored their own and whose structure reflected their 
ideal of a socialised industry. The BBC’s Reithian attitudes towards education, 
entertainment and commerce were shared by many Labour politicians. Its 
programming had shifted leftwards over the course of the war towards a 
Whitehall consensus. Even more importantly though, they both had similarly 
idealistic attitudes towards political communication.
Shared Attitudes toward Political Communication
The Government believed that, for democracy to be sustainable, the people 
needed to be politically informed. As noted in previous chapters, Labour’s vision
15 Morrison to Gordon Walker, 25-6-1946, CAB 124/411.
16 Herbert Morrison, Parliamentary Debates, Broadcasting, Vol.425, Col.1089, 16-7-1946.
17 BBC evidence to the Beveridge Committee, cited in Beveridge Report 1950, Cmd.8116, 
para. 163. Morrison’s belief in Gresham’s Law also appeared to contradict his assertion that there 
was no demand for commercial programmes.
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was of the administration and the electorate reasoning out the Government 
programme together.
The BBC strongly believed it had an important role to play in keeping the people 
politically informed. It saw its duty as ‘to ensure that the idea of the British nation 
as an informed democracy shall not merely be an ideal but a reality’.18 This was 
particularly true of the DG, William Haley, who ‘wrote about the ideals of public 
service broadcasting more eloquently and persuasively that it had ever been 
done before’.19
But both the Government and the BBC thought it was the BBC’s job to act as a 
channel for political broadcasting, not to have a voice of its own. As Haley put it in 
1947, ‘the BBC has principles rather than policies, and that while we should 
supply all the ingredients for the informing -  and thereby the forming -  of public 
opinion, the actual catalyst should always be outside ourselves. Our task in 
relation to public opinion is to transmit, not to transmute’.20 This was one of the 
primary distinctions between the BBC and the newspapers, as Morrison, 
speaking in the Commons in 1946, said; “It is important to remember that the 
prohibition that the BBC is not allowed to have opinions, or to express them on 
air, distinguishes it very much in character from the newspaper Press”.21
The BBC always had to remain strictly impartial. The BBC ‘can conceive that its 
highest duty is to the disinterested search for Truth. This is a stern concept. 
Absolute impartiality in all matters of controversy must be its golden rule’.22 When 
the BBC broadcast on political issues, therefore, it had to ensure not only that the
18 BBC Memorandum, ‘General Survey of the Broadcasting Service’, Cmd.8117,1951, p.5, 
para. 12. Cited in Asa Briggs, Volume IV (1995), p.562.
19 Lord Simon, The BBC from Within (1953), p.56.
20 Haley diaries (reference to speech), 16-3-1947, HALY 13-34, CAC.
21 Herbert Morrison, Parliamentary Debates, Broadcasting, Vol.425, Col.1079,16-7-1946.
22 William Haley broadcast, The Place of Broadcasting’ (Third Programme), November 1947 (25th 
Anniversary), HALY 16-52, CAC.
191
Chapter 4
views expressed were balanced, but that the voice of the broadcaster itself 
remained absent. Otherwise - contemporary politicians were concerned - the 
broadcaster might begin to undermine the position of Parliament by usurping its 
role as the national debating chamber.
It was this commitment to impartiality that made the post-war BBC, like the post­
war Labour Government, determined to deal in ‘facts’. The BBC even started a 
programme on the Home Service in 1945 called ‘Facts First’. Each week this 15 
(then 10) minute show was supposed to give a ‘Picture Post level audience’ a 
brief sketch of the background on current, topical issues.23 At its heart should be 
dry facts, without too much illustration or description. As the BBC’s Vincent Alford 
said, The ‘pictorial’ or the ‘topographical’ should only be introduced when it is 
relevant to the elucidation of the subject of the talk, and then sparingly’.24
The commitment also turned the BBC into a sort of political accountant. It began 
to count the appearances of every politician at the microphone and record their 
political allegiance and the time they spent there.25 That way it could not only try 
to maintain an exact political balance but could also prove to its detractors that it 
was maintaining that balance.
However, the war had demonstrated that the BBC need not simply be a common 
carrier like the national grid but could be much more politically constructive. 
Rather than simply transmit, it could actively promote the objectives of the state. 
As well as passing on information, it could raise morale, encourage a sense of 
shared citizenship, direct people towards specific goals, and provide rationales 
for Government action. It was not a passive participant in the war but played an
23 Mrs. Goldie to Miss Quigley, 'Suggestions for Autumn Programmes: “Facts First”’, 1-8-1945, 
R51/158 BBC-WAC.
24 Vincent Alford (Acting Asst Director of Talks) to David Bryson, 4-1-1946, 'Facts First’, R51/158, 
BBC-WAC.
25 See BBC files on ‘Political Broadcasting, Lists of Broadcasts by MPs’, File 1 1943-46, File 2a 
1947-48, File 2b 1949-50 etc. R51/414. Also in Ministerial Broadcasts. BBC-WAC.
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active role in winning it. The BBC was aware of this change. As David Smith has 
noted, its ‘wartime experience helped to transform not only how the Corporation 
saw itself but how it saw its role in the national life and the audience it served’.26 
The Government was also aware of the change. Herbert Butcher MP said to the 
Commons in 1946, over the last six years the BBC “secured a consciousness of 
its strength and of the part which it played in the winning of the war".27
Not only were the Government and the Corporation conscious of this new role, 
neither of them wanted to relinquish it. Both now believed that the BBC had a 
critical part to play in actively sustaining democracy. It should, for example, 
‘encourage public interest in the working of Parliament’ by broadcasting a nightly 
programme on discussions in the House.28 The microphone could properly be 
used, Haley said, ‘to inculcate citizenship, to [motivate people to] pay proper 
attention to public affairs, to encourage tolerant discussion’.29 Far from being 
simply a channel, the BBC should now help to ensure that ‘that an informed 
Democracy shall function’.30 This meant that at the close of the war there was a 
tension between two concepts of the BBC’s role -  the constructive, independent 
voice or the more submissive, silent partner.
However, in 1945 neither the Government nor the BBC saw a discrepancy 
between the two political roles. Both, they thought, were compatible. Preparing 
for the July election Haley therefore believed the BBC could both adequately 
inform the public and remain an impartial channel. To do this the Corporation 
arranged 24 party political broadcasts of 20 and 30 minutes each -  split between
26 David Smith, op.cit., p. 13.
27 Herbert Butcher, Parliamentary Debates, Broadcasting, 16-7-1946, Vol.425, Col.1168.
28 ‘Cabinet, Draft Report of the Committee on Broadcasting’. Paragraph 22, in CAB 124/400. The 
BBC had already started broadcasting a nightly summary of proceedings in Parliament in 1945 
which then became an obligation within the subsequent BBC Licence.
29 Haley broadcast, The Place of Broadcasting’ op.cit., HALY 16-52, CAC.
30 Ibid.
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the Parties. In each of these a spokesman, nominated by the Party, would speak, 
in monologue, directly to the nation.31 At the same time, as soon as Parliament 
was dissolved, for the 38 days prior to the election, all discussion of politics 
outside the Party broadcasts was precluded -  this included any mention of 
politics on comedy or drama shows. Haley was very proud of the result, as he 
reflected in a memorandum to Morrison the following year, This may truthfully be 
claimed as complete 100 per cent democratic handling of broadcasting’ he 
wrote.32
The BBC had, however, not solved the dilemma but simply avoided it. By 
abdicating all responsibility for political communication (bar helping to determine 
the quota of politicians and giving them access to the microphone) it assumed an 
almost entirely passive role. This set an important precedent for the incoming 
Labour administration. It suggested that the Government (sometimes together 
with the opposition) and not the BBC, could and should control political 
broadcasting and should tell the BBC what to do. And so throughout Labour’s 
period of office, despite their closely corresponding attitudes to political 
communication, the Government treated the BBC like a political novice. Given the 
BBC’s increased self-confidence this was bound to generate friction.
Government Keen to Maintain the Broadcasting Status Quo
Given the degree of shared attitudes and values of the BBC and the 
Government, and the exalted reputation of the broadcaster at the close of the 
war, it is not at all surprising that in 1945 Morrison believed the BBC charter 
should be renewed. Indeed he had so few doubts about this that he pressed for it
31 These proved remarkably popular with the electorate. The listenership to each broadcast was, 
according to Haley, between 12.5m to 15m. Haley Diaries, HALY 13-35, 29-7-1945, CAC.
32 Haley brief to Morrison prior to debate on Broadcasting White Paper, 8-7-1946, CAB 124/25.
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to be renewed without an enquiry, unlike on the previous two occasions.33 He had 
made this decision based on the deliberations of his own Broadcasting committee 
and its predecessor, the Coalition Committee on Broadcasting.
Shortly after Labour took office Morrison chaired a Labour Broadcasting 
committee to discuss the future of broadcasting policy. It met three times in total, 
in August, September and October 1945.34 It was building on the work done by 
the Coalition Committee on Broadcasting which had met 8 times between May 
1944 and April 1945.35
The Coalition Committee on broadcasting had considered the issue of an enquiry 
and been unable to reach a consensus. Brendan Bracken was the source of 
disagreement. Bracken was the one member of the Committee who believed 
there should be an inquiry into the BBC, along the lines of the Ullswater 
Committee of 1935-36, before the Charter was renewed.36 Therefore though the 
Coalition Committee wrote a report before the Caretaker Government took over 
in May, it remained unsigned.
Morrison’s Committee had much less trouble coming to an agreement. Prior to 
the first meeting on 29th August, Martin Flett, Morrison’s Assistant Secretary, 
outlined what he saw as the arguments for and against an enquiry and concluded 
that ‘On the whole I think you will feel that the arguments against a public enquiry 
outweigh the arguments in favour’. Broadcasting was, Flett suggested, now too 
‘closely bound up with politics’. An enquiry would cover the same ground as had 
been covered before and the technicalities had been already been sanctioned by 
an acknowledged expert. Moreover, since the taxpayer was now forced to pay for
33 The Crawford Committee in 1925 (Cmd.2599) and the Ullswater committee in 1936 (Cmd.5091).
34 Broadcasting Policy meetings, GEN 81, 29-8-45, 12-9-45,10-10-45, CAB 78/37.
35 Coalition Committee on Broadcasting; detailed in note from Martin Flett to Morrison 26-6-1946, 
CAB 124/25.
36 Flett to Morrison, Memorandum, 27-8-1945, CAB 124/399.
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part of the BBC, it was the Government’s responsibility to make a decision, not 
the responsibility of a public inquiry.37
This reflected Morrison’s perspective and the other ministers on the Committee -  
E.J. Williams (Minister of Information), Lord Listowel (Postmaster General) and 
Philip Noel-Baker (Minister of State) -  raised no objections.38 They continued 
meeting to talk about the scarcity of broadcast wavelengths and to discuss when 
television should start up again after its wartime suspension. Their report, 
CP(45)293, was completed on 20th November. In its essentials it was the 
unsigned Coalition Committee’s report with some minor amendments. It went 
before Cabinet on Monday 17th December 1945.
The Cabinet minutes suggest that the paper sailed through Cabinet with almost 
no debate. The Lord President and his colleagues, the minutes note, ‘were 
satisfied that there need not be any enquiry by an independent committee, on the 
lines of the Ullswater committee, before the charter of the BBC was renewed and 
that the BBC should continue to be the sole authority licensed to broadcast in the 
UK for the further period of 10 years from 1 January 1947, covered by the new 
charter’.39
At the end of the same week Sir Eric Bamford, acting Director General of the 
Ministry of Information and present at the meeting, called William Haley to tell him 
the Broadcasting Report had made it through Cabinet. The Licence Fee would be 
doubled, from 10s to £1, just as the BBC wanted, the Third Programme could go 
ahead as planned, and BBC broadcasting to Europe would continue. Also, there
37 ibid.
38 Broadcasting Committee Meeting minutes, GEN 81/1, 29-8-1945, The opinion of the meeting 
was that there was no need for a public enquiry on the present occasion’, CAB 78/37.
39 Cabinet Minutes, CM(45)63, 17-12-1945, CAB 128/2.
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would be no inquiry into the BBC.40 The Government and the BBC were both 
happy with the situation as it stood. So happy indeed that Haley was given a 
knighthood in the New Years Honours list for 1946.
This cosy mutual appreciation would not last. Indeed since the end of the war the 
BBC had been conscious that it needed to detach itself from the Government and 
dissociate itself from some of the overlapping values.
SECTION 2: Unsuccessful Separation of the Government and BBC after the 
War
The BBC Seeks to Establish Some Distance from Government
At the end of the war the Director General was eager to establish some distance 
between the BBC and the Government. They had grown very close over the 
previous six years and Haley believed it was important to assert the BBC’s 
independence. He therefore sought greater financial, editorial and political 
autonomy.
The BBC’s financial independence had been suspended for the war. Rather than 
being funded predominantly by the Licence Fee as it had been since its 
inception, during the war the BBC’s money came directly from the Treasury under 
grants-in-aid. Not only did removal of the Licence Fee ceiling mean that 
expenditure increased significantly, but that the BBC grew quite used to having 
the Treasury as its paymaster. According to Maurice Gorham, editor of the Radio 
Times during the war and head of the Light Programme immediately after it, 
‘during the war broadcasting was a national service and it was not difficult to go 
to the Treasury and get more money for staff, studios and equipment... People 
had got used to the feeling that if new things were needed the money could
40 Call noted in Haley's diaries, 23-12-1945: ‘I asked him [Bamford] if there was to be a Charter 
inquiry. He said not but the Govt, would probably issue their findings as a White Paper’, HALY 13- 
35, CAC.
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always be found’.41 As a result the Corporation’s expenditure rose by 150% in 
seven years from £2,675,000 in 1938 to £6,700,000 in 1945 42
Haley was determined to renew the BBC’s financial independence. But, given the 
increase in the Corporation’s size, and the investment required in developing the 
new services and television, this meant a major increase in the Licence Fee. 
Haley suggested doubling it. The Labour Government agreed. Since the number 
of Licence holders surpassed 10 million early in 1946 the BBC would now receive 
yet another increase in income to add to that which it had enjoyed over the 
course of the war. The rise took effect from June 1946 but it was not until 1947 
that the BBC gained full control of its finances once again.43
The BBC’s enhanced reputation after the war was mainly the result of the 
perceived accuracy and impartiality of its news. Its authority was such that by 
1945 ‘“I haven’t heard it on the BBC” was sufficient justification for popular 
disbelief.44 This reputation was nurtured and protected during the war by 
separating the BBC’s news services from other departments. After the war Haley 
decided to perpetuate this separation. Looking back on it he described how he 
“isolated the News Division from the rest of the Corporation, and made the news 
itself immune from the Programme Heads. Fixed slots, the lengths and timings of 
which were decided by the Director-General, were imposed on each programme. 
They could not be varied. What went into them was the News Division’s 
responsibility alone. No programme head was allowed to concern himself with the
41 Maurice Gorham, Sound and Fury, 21 Years at the BBC (1948), p.189.
42 Lochhead to Crossley, in response to question in the House of Commons, 6-2-1946, CAB 
124/401.
43 And even then only for domestic services. BBC Overseas Services were to continue to be funded 
by a grant-in-aid. Haley note to Board of Governors (BoG), 31-12-1947, Ga2/48, BoG Papers,
R1/84/6, BBC-WAC.
44 William Haley, The Public Influence of Broadcasting and the Press, Clayton Memorial Lectures, 
XCV (1953-54), No.2, p.3, HALY 16/52, BBC-WAC.
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news audience’s figures, or their effect on his programme’.45 Haley hoped in this 
way he could sustain both the perceived and the actual impartiality of the BBC.
Haley also wanted to clarify the BBC’s position on post-war Party political 
broadcasting and make it more transparent. Political broadcasting had always 
been an issue at the BBC. After granting its first Licence in 1927 the Government 
stipulated that the BBC could not engage in any controversy nor could it express 
any political opinions of its own.46 In 1928 this stipulation was relaxed so that the 
BBC could broadcast controversy, as long as it remained balanced and 
impartial.47 However, throughout the 1930s the Corporation was unable to find 
agreement amongst political parties as to the nature of these broadcasts and 
remained politically very restrained as a result.48 Party political broadcasting was 
suspended during the war.
In the weeks after Labour took office Sir Allan Powell (then Chairman of the BBC) 
and Haley began talks with the Government to restart Party political broadcasting 
within clearly articulated parameters. Haley soon became aware that this would 
not be straightforward. Labour did not want to give up their current advantageous 
position. ‘We are now talking to Arthur Greenwood [Lord Privy Seal] about 
political broadcasting’ Haley wrote in his diary in November, The Labour Govt.
45 Haley speech at Columbia University; ‘Broadcasting, Government & Freedom of the Press’,
1971, HALY 16-54, CAC.
46 The Postmaster General, acting under the authority of clause 4(iii) of the 1927 Licence (which 
stated the Postmaster General may from time to time... require the Corp to refrain from sending out 
broadcasts) ‘informed the BBC on 11th January 1927 that he required the BBC to refrain from 
broadcasting the following matter:- “(a) statements expressing the opinion of the Corporation on 
matters of public policy; and (b) speeches or lectures containing statements on topics of political, 
religious or industrial controversy."’, MOI memorandum, 27-8-1945, CAB 124/408.
47 ‘In January 1928 the BBC made a formal application to the Postmaster General for a relaxation in 
these restrictions. The Corporation [said that]... the power, if granted, would not be misused. No 
partisanship would be shown and any new controversial matter would be introduced gradually and 
experimentally. There would be no expression of views contrary to the interests of the State’. The 
rules were relaxed shortly after, MOI Memorandum, IH(46)8, 25-6-1946, CAB 124/408.
48 The history of political broadcasting before the war was decidedly chequered’, Herbert Morrison, 
(IH(46), 22nd June 1946), CAB 124/408. See also 14 page MOI memorandum on the history of 
political broadcasting 27-8-1945 (CAB 124/408) and ‘Reith and the Denial of Politics’, in Curran & 
Seaton, Power without Responsibility (1997).
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have authoritarian leanings in this’.49 Haley tried to overcome these leanings by 
capturing the BBC’s proposals within an Aide-Memoire. This was discussed at 
length in the penultimate Cabinet before Christmas. But the Cabinet were 
concerned that written rules made the government too weak and instead felt 
‘these matters should continue to be governed by understandings as to the 
normal practice”.50 Greenwood explained to Haley on 23rd January that such rules 
could as easily be written down as could “conduct befitting an officer and a 
gentleman”.51 The issue therefore remained temporarily unresolved and the other 
political parties without ready access to the microphone.
Haley was more successful at rebutting clumsy efforts by the Government to 
interfere with specific BBC programming. After a World Affairs talk by the 
historian A.J.P. Taylor in September 1945 which Ernest Bevin found 
objectionable it was suggested that the BBC submit all scripts dealing with 
overseas matters to the Foreign Office.52 Haley refused. In October, after the 
dockworkers went on an unofficial strike, George Isaacs, Minister for Labour and 
National Service, wanted the union leader, Donovan, to broadcast a ‘factual 
statement’ on the BBC. Haley blocked Isaacs, telling him that if Donovan 
broadcast they would have to let the strikers broadcast as well. Attlee then called 
Haley directly to question this ‘extraordinary argument’.53 But the DG held firm 
and was backed by the Chairman and Governors.54
Therefore Haley was trying, after July 1945, to assert the BBC’s independence 
from Government; in its news output, in its financing, and in its political
49 Haley diaries, 10-11-1945, HALY 13-35, CAC.
50 Cabinet Conclusions, CM(45)64, 20-12-1945, CAB 128/2.
51 Meeting recorded in BoG minutes, 24-1-1946, Min.19, R1/14/1, BBC-WAC, and in Haley diaries, 
3-2-1946. Haley commented that 'this is delightful from a Labour Government’, HALY 13-35.
52 Haley diaries, 30-9-1945, HALY 13-35, and in separate diary entry 30-9-1945, HALY 13-5, and 
reference in BoG Minutes, 4-10-1945, R1/13/1, BBC-WAC.
53 Haley diaries, 15-10-1945, HALY 13-35.
54 BoG Minutes, Minute 229, 18-10-1945, R/1/13/1, BBC-WAC.
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broadcasting. However, the provocativeness of this assertiveness should not be 
exaggerated. The BBC did not challenge the Government openly, neither did it 
introduce a raft of new political discussion programmes. In fact, it seemed to play 
down domestic politics in the period after the war. Asa Briggs has argued that this 
was ‘through fear of broadcasting being used for propaganda purposes’ although 
it seems odd that an organisation trying to assert its independence from 
Government should do so by avoiding politics.55 The newspapers, for example, 
took the opposite approach and celebrated their peacetime freedom with much 
greater discussion and criticism. Moreover, there were many aspects of the BBC 
where the wartime closeness persisted, and this closeness compromised the 
Corporation’s aspirations to independence.
The BBC Remains “Enmeshed in Government"56
Given the depth and length of the wartime relationship between the Government 
and the BBC the legacy was bound to extend into peacetime. There were too 
many official, unofficial, attitudinal, and habitual connections to shed quickly. 
However, whilst the BBC was conscious of many of these connections and keen 
to let them go, the Government was both less conscious and much less keen. 
This was true of both the formal and the informal connections.
“Nominally, the Government’s powers of dictation over the Corporation are... 
absolute”, Morrison told the House in 1946, “In practice, there is a clear 
understanding that the Government will not use their powers as long as the 
Corporation does not misconduct itself.57 The Government had always held de 
jure powers over the BBC via its constitution but, as Morrison said, rarely used
55 Asa Briggs, Volume IV (1995), p.564.
56 Haley diaries, 30-9-1945, The revelation one gets of being enmeshed in Government is to see 
how many things that ought to be done remain undone simply for lack of decisions’, HALY 13-5, 
CAC.
57 Herbert Morrison, Parliamentary Debates, Broadcasting, 16-7-1946, Vol.425, Col.1079.
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them. During the war it increased its powers and influence significantly. At the 
end of the war, instead of giving all of these new powers back, it formalised some 
of them.
Given the power of radio at this time this is not surprising. The BBC’s monopoly 
of broadcasting combined with the popularity of the wireless gave the 
broadcaster a direct channel into four out of every five households in the 
country.58 It was a very valuable and influential channel, as the wartime Coalition 
had found. It could be used for announcements, for appeals, for campaigns and 
for Ministerial broadcasts. During the war there was rarely a day when a listener 
would not be treated to an abundance of Government information.
Government announcements continued after the war but slowly wound down. In 
November 1945 there were still many public service broadcasts for the home 
listener. Martin Flett’s research identified ’77 informative talks given in the course 
of one month chosen at random’ including The Small Farm -  Labour Problems’, 
resettlement information and citizens advice.59 The official announcements period 
on Mondays, Fridays and Saturdays disappeared, first to be replaced by a more 
flexible arrangement each weekday, and then to be reduced to a single slot on a 
Tuesday from December 1945.60
Ministerial broadcasting was, however, too useful for the Government to let go. 
During the war the procedure was that any minister could approach the Ministry 
of Information and request time to broadcast on air. He or she would then be 
given a slot of up to 15 minutes to broadcast live to the nation, in monologue not
58 According to Lord Listowel, House of Lords Debates, 26-6-1946 (reported in The Times, 27-6- 
1946, p.8). The number of households paying a BBC Radio Licence Fee passed 10 million in 
January 1946. See BBC Programme Policy Meeting minutes, 29-1-1946, R34/615/4, and Radio 
Times 24-2-1946.
59 ‘List B’, ‘Public Service broadcasts for Home listeners’ November 1945. Research provided to 
Martin Flett by the BBC for the July debate, 8-7-1946, CAB 124/25.
60 Correspondence between BBC and MOI, June to December 1945. The MOI was not happy to 
give up the slots as seen from MOI telephone call to Tony Rendall, 18-12-1945, R28/84/3, BBC- 
WAC.
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dialogue. Once in office Labour did not ask the BBC if it could maintain this 
privilege; it notified the Corporation that the practise of wartime Ministerial access 
would continue. ‘Dear Haley’, Sir Eric Bamford wrote to the Director General in 
mid August 1945, ‘You may wish to know that Mr. Attlee has reaffirmed the 
procedure with regard to Ministerial broadcasting which was laid down by the 
Coalition Government’.61
Morrison was not unconscious of the importance of Ministerial access. When, at 
the end of September, Martin Flett wrote a memorandum to Morrison about home 
broadcasting which suggested there was general agreement that Government 
control should revert to the pre-war position, Morrison wrote in the margin, ‘Yes, 
but it may include requirements as to Ministerial or official broadcasts’.62 This led 
to a follow up note in which Flett made certain that the BBC were still bound to 
“send out any matter which any government department may require to be 
broadcast”. ‘I think that these terms are sufficiently wide enough to enable the 
Government to arrange for any Ministerial or official broadcasts it wishes’, Flett 
wrote.63
The post-war process for Ministerial broadcasting was then formalised in Cabinet 
Paper CP(46)199. Ministers simply had to inform the Postmaster General of the 
subject of their broadcast, the proposed length and the desired date. The 
Postmaster General would then contact the Prime Minister who would sign off the 
broadcast. Though the P.M. could turn down the broadcast John Pimlott, 
Morrison’s Personal Secretary, told the Lord President that ‘the number of times
61 E Bamford to Haley, 18-8-1945, R34/534/5, BBC-WAC. Procedure outlined in Cabinet Papers, 
CP(45)100, 8-8-1945, CAB 66/67.
62 Margin, Flett to Morrison, ‘Ministerial Control of Broadcasting’, 26-9-1945, CAB 124/400.
63 Flett to JAR Pimlott, 1-10-1945, CAB 124/400.
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on which he has declined to agree to a broadcast is small’.64 The Postmaster 
General would then contact the BBC and schedule it in.
The Government also maintained a formal connection with a large part of the 
BBC after the war, the BBC Overseas Services. These had expanded 
enormously after 1939.65 During the course of 1944 there were many discussions 
as to whether they should be maintained and if they were, whether they should 
become independent after the war or remain within Government. In 1945 Attlee 
decided they should be kept. They could not, however, be given back entirely to 
the BBC. The Government believed they were too important a political instrument 
for that. Instead, they would sit in an uncomfortable middle ground, ostensibly 
free to determine their own programming, but always in ‘close consultation’ with 
the Foreign Office and always in pursuit of the national interest.66
In addition to these formal connections many of the unofficial links between the 
Government and the BBC still existed. Over the course of the war departmental 
officials had become very familiar with programme heads and programme 
makers at the BBC, sometimes going as far as ‘writing or re-writing their scripts 
and rehearsing them’.67 Some BBC personnel had also worked directly for the 
Government during the war. Mary Adams, post war head of BBC television talks, 
was Director of Home Intelligence at the Ministry of Information from 1939-41. 
A.P. Ryan, Editor of BBC News after the war, was seconded to the MOI to be 
“Adviser to the BBC on Home Affairs”. His task, according to his Times obituary,
64 Pimlott to Morrison, 19-12-1946, CAB 124/33.
65 Between 1939 and 1948 the number of live hours broadcast by the BBC overseas services each 
week rose from 99 to 481. Over the same period the number of staff rose from 323 to 4,161, 
G69/48, R1/84/3, BBC-WAC.
66 See Asa Briggs, Volume IV  (1995), ‘Overseas Broadcasting’, pp.125-147.
67 Sian Nicholas, regarding ‘Kitchen Front’ 1942, Echo of War, p.79.
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‘was to put the Government’s point of view to the BBC on domestic matters’.68 Or 
to keep a careful watch on the broadcaster.
The closeness of personal and departmental relationships extended to 
information sharing. From late 1945 through 1946 the Government and the BBC 
cooperated closely on the preparations and packaging of the broadcasting White 
Paper and subsequent BBC Charter. As noted above, for example, Bamford was 
happy to contact Haley shortly after he knew the outcome of the Cabinet meeting 
on the BBC White Paper in December 1945 -  even though Parliament would not 
know of the Government’s intentions until late January 1946 and after.69 The BBC 
then worked collaboratively (and secretly) with the Government to prepare the 
White Paper on broadcasting throughout the first half of 1946.70 When, prior to 
the Broadcasting debate in July, pressure began to build for an inquiry into the 
BBC, Morrison even asked Haley for information about the BBC’s reorganisation 
that he could use to argue against an inquiry. At this stage Haley ‘pointed out to 
Abbott [at the Post Office] the BBC would have to be circumspect in such a 
matter. It cannot be put in the position of seeming not to want an inquiry’.71
As important as the formal and informal connections with Government was the 
profound psychological legacy of the war years on the BBC. As a result of its self­
censorship and its increased stature the BBC felt an overwhelming sense of 
responsibility which naturally encouraged conservatism. For example, Maurice 
Gorham, head of the Light Programme, asked in a Coordinating Committee 
meeting in August 1945 whether there were any limitations on the use of MPs in 
entertainment programmes. He was told that they ‘should not be allowed to
68 AP Ryan, obituary, The Times, 3-7-1972.
69 E.J. Williams told Parliament the Licence Fee would double on 22-1-1946 (Vol.418, Col.34).
Attlee told Janner there would be no inquiry into the BBC on 19-2-1946 (Vol.419, Col.952-953).
70 Flett and Bamford visited Haley on 14-2-1946 about working more collaboratively and worked 
with the Corporation from then until the broadcasting debate in July. See Flett to Morrison, 20-2- 
1946, and subsequent memoranda in CAB 124/402.
71 Haley diaries, 25-6-1946, HALY 13-35, CAC.
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broadcast in a context which might be derogatory to their dignity’ and that this 
was ‘Of the greatest importance, MPs must be protected agst [sic] themselves. 
They are not always good judges in such matters’.72
Associated with this sense of conservatism was a sense of passivity that came 
from the wartime reversal of initiative. The Government had led so many 
campaigns and required so much help from the Corporation in communicating 
information that the BBC became used to receiving news rather than retrieving it. 
This was highlighted by a BBC memorandum reviewing liaison with Government 
departments in mid-1946: ‘Before 1939 contact with Government departments 
was made on the initiative of the Corporation when it required guidance. During 
the war numerous regulations, eg. rationing of food, brought about a complete 
change in relations’.73
The persistent formal and informal closeness between the Government and the 
BBC enhanced the inhibiting sense of responsibility and passivity within the 
Corporation. It made it difficult to shake the feeling that the BBC and the 
Government were working together, sharing information and coordinating 
programme making. Equally, it gave the Government a continuing sense of 
control and assumption of BBC acquiescence. It saw the BBC as its natural ally, 
and encouraged it to treat the Corporation as a subordinate. For example when 
RA Rendall, controller of talks, spoke to John Strachey’s office about the nature 
of the Minister of Food’s proposed broadcast in July 1946 the office ‘suggested it 
was not for us to cross question the Minister, and although I [Rendall] pointed out 
that the Corporation had a great responsibility in these matters, it was clear that
72 Policy, Coordinating Committee Meeting Minutes, 8-8-1945, Minute 136, ‘Broadcasts by MPs’, 
R34/320/1, BBC-WAC. The second comment is scribbled by Haley beside the first (his underlining).
73 ‘Liaison with Government Departments’ (unsigned), 1946, R51/205/4, BBC-WAC.
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he did not think it was our job to do anything but say yes, or his to do anything 
but get us to say it as quickly as possible’.74
This relationship inherently tended to favour the Government (it was invariably 
given the benefit of doubt, was normally used as first source for information and 
questions, and was consulted regarding scripts which might offend). This was 
important because, as time went on the closeness not only encouraged a sense 
of partiality, it compromised the BBC’s independence. This is shown by a News 
Chronicle poll conducted in June 1946 that asked, ‘Which do you think the BBC 
most resembles, an independent concern like a newspaper, or a Government 
controlled body like the Ministry of information?' 37% answered that it resembled 
an independent concern, 52% answered that it was like a Government controlled 
body.75
SECTION 3: Continuation of Government-BBC Relationship Prompts Calls 
for an Enquiry
Free Access to Microphone leads to Monopolisation and Partiality
The advantages to the Government of the connections with the BBC became 
apparent as 1945 wore on. Ministers used their right of access to the microphone 
liberally. From 14th August to end of December, there were 15 Ministerial 
broadcasts (this does not include ministerial appearances on the news or on 
other BBC programming -  just direct broadcasts to the nation). They included 
informational talks by George Isaacs about demobilization, appeals from Sir 
Stafford Cripps for the Workers Educational Association, and Aneurin Bevan 
explaining Government policy on nurses.76
74 Record of Telephone Conversation, 3/4-7-1946, RA Rendall (Controller, Talks) with Sir 
Drummond Shiels re Strachey desire to broadcast on bread rationing on Sunday July 21st, 
R34/534/5, BBC-WAC.
75 'What Listeners think of the BBC’, News Chronicle poll, 25-6-1946, p.2.
76 'Ministerial Broadcasts’, R34/553/2, BBC-WAC.
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Though some of the broadcasts may have seemed innocuous, there were a 
number of difficulties with them. First, there was an implicit assumption that 
everyone in Britain was still striving towards the same goals. In some cases this 
was probably true. Attlee, for example, spoke in September about trying to 
establish stable democratic Governments abroad: “Our sole endeavour is to 
enable the will of the people to prevail, and to assist in the establishment 
everywhere of Governments resting on popular consent. It is a difficult and 
perhaps a thankless task, but we have to perform it”.77 But opinions, even on 
foreign affairs, were no longer as uniform as they were during the war, as 
witnessed by the controversial A.J.P. Taylor talk in September. The Government 
did not seem to recognise this and, in November, asked Haley for the right ‘on 
certain occasions’ to broadcast on foreign affairs without prompting any right of 
reply. The Director General was concerned that this would be unrepresentative. 
They [the Government] plead’ he wrote in his diary, ‘there will be some isolated 
emergencies when it will be necessary to speak as a united people, so that other 
countries, such as Russia, may be impressed. But what if we are not a united 
people?’.78
The issue of unity was even more apparent with broadcasts on domestic issues. 
It was very hard, despite their efforts, for the Government not to sound partisan. It 
was only natural that, in making an appeal a Minister should seek to justify his or 
her policy and outline its goals. Therefore Nye Bevan, speaking about the need 
for nurses in November 1945, explained that the new Government nursing 
charters “are intended to establish the nursing profession on a much more 
satisfactory basis and to provide for conditions of work, and for salaries which will 
meet the highest status of the profession. The government intends that nurses
77 PM’s broadcast There is much to be Done’, 3-9-1945, printed in The Listener, 6-9-1945.
78 Haley diaries (his underlining), 10-11-1945, HALY 13-35 CAC.
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shall have a square deal”.79 It was also understandable that, when a Minister 
was broadcasting bad news, he or she should try to explain what happened and 
put it in context. This context would naturally emphasise the good intentions 
behind Government policy and highlight the influence of factors outside of the 
Government’s control which undermined those intentions. John Strachey, for 
example, broadcasting about bread rationing in June 1946, told listeners that ‘It is 
the destruction, and even more the disorganisation that is the inevitable aftermath 
of the war’ which forced the policy on the Government.80
The Ullswater committee had made a note of some of the dangers of excessive 
Ministerial statements back in 1936. Though it recognised that it was ‘inevitable 
that more prominence is given to the leaders of the political parties in power than 
to the Opposition’ it warned that These [statements] necessarily have some 
political flavour and tend naturally to stress the beneficence of Government 
activities’.81 Attlee, a vocal member of the Ullswater Committee, went even 
further and told the BBC it should ‘exercise great care in deciding the occasions 
which in the interests of the country call for a ministerial statement to be made, 
for there have been instances where broadcasts, professedly based on the need 
of giving information to the general public, were in fact merely partisan 
speeches’.82 Though Attlee was referring to broadcasts made on the BBC in 1931 
he could reasonably have made them about broadcasts by Ministers in his own 
Government.
By February 1946 the Director General was becoming frustrated by the number 
of Ministers who wanted to broadcast. ‘Ministers who wish to broadcast are
79 Home Service, 11-11-1945, 9.15pm, printed in The Listener, 15-11-1945, p.549.
80 Strachey, Home Service, 16-6-1946, 9.15pm, printed in The Listener, 20-6-1946, p.801.
81 Ullswater Committee Report, Cmd.5091, February 1936, paragraph 89, p.28.
82 ‘Reservations by Mr. Attlee’, Ullswater Committee Report, Cmd.5091, February 1936, p.50.
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becoming a nuisance’ he wrote in his diary on February 9th.83 Since the beginning 
of the year Pethick-Lawrence, Ben Smith and Emmanuel Shinwell had already 
spoken on air.84 There would be a further 18 Labour broadcasts before the end of 
June, almost the equivalent of one a week. By May the BBC Programme Policy 
committee noted the ‘Recent unsatisfactory handling of ministerial broadcasts on 
the Government side’.85 It did not help that there were virtually no broadcasts by 
the Opposition (since ‘political broadcasting’ had not been re-established). In its 
first year of office the Government broadcast 38 times compared to the 
Opposition twice (both Opposition broadcasts were by the shadow Chancellor, 
John Anderson, about the budget).86 This monopoly of the airwaves could not 
help but have a naturally beneficent effect on listeners’ perceptions of 
Government policies.
BBC Self-Censorship and the Impression of Consensus
This positive impression was further enhanced after 1945 by the prohibition of 
any debate about issues under discussion in the House. For this prohibition the 
BBC had itself to blame. Shortly before the White Paper on Education was to be 
debated in July 1943 ‘Rab’ Butler asked the BBC if he could make a broadcast 
about education. Anxious that this type of broadcast might constitute competition 
with Parliamentary debate, the BBC drafted a resolution the following year which 
precluded discussion of a topic on radio that was the subject of legislation in the 
House.87 This draconian ruling, if taken literally, would have meant the BBC could 
broadcast about almost no current ongoing political issues. Though they did not
83 Haley diaries, 9-2-1946, HALY 13-35, CAC.
84 Pethick-Lawrence on the 1st January, Ben Smith on the 5th February and Shinwell on the 9th 
February itself, R34/553/2, BBC-WAC.
85 ‘Extract from Minutes of Programme Policy meeting’, 21-5-1946, R51/205/4, BBC-WAC. Haley 
proposed that he go and speak to the Post Office ‘as [a] first step towards [a] proper working 
arrangement’.
86 Full list of Ministerial broadcasts for 1945-46 in R34/553/2, BBC-WAC.
87 Note by DG, 6-5-1948 to BoG, G41/48, ‘Broadcast on Matters before Parliament’, BoG Papers, 
R1/84/2, BBC-WAC.
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adhere to it to the letter, the BBC did abide by the ruling’s broad intention. 
Coupled with its reluctance to broadcast controversy this meant programming on 
the post-war BBC inevitably played down argument and encouraged an 
impression of consensus.88
The BBC’s treatment of food and bread rationing provides a good example of 
this. As outlined in the previous chapters, bread rationing became a highly 
political issue in the first half of 1946. From February to July there was rarely a 
week without some coverage of bread in the newspapers. And yet there was not 
one BBC discussion programme on the topic during this time.89 Specific items 
were covered in news broadcasts but not in discussion programmes. At the same 
time there were six long statements on food and bread made by Government 
Ministers -  Ben Smith, Edith Summerskill, Tom Williams (three broadcasts) and 
John Strachey.90 There were also other talks (as opposed to discussions) on the 
world food shortage -  by Arthur Salter and D.G. Bridson.91 The last, on the 
UNRRA, The Battle Against Starvation and Want in Europe’ was broadcast at 
9.30pm on Sunday 30th June, immediately after Herbert Morrison’s production 
talk.
A listener would therefore come away from the BBC with the impression that 
there was a terrible shortage of bread worldwide, that the Government was doing 
all it could to alleviate the world food crisis, and that people within Britain would
88 This became formalised in Clause 6(iv) of the Aide Memoire on political broadcasting in 1947 
and, in 1948, was expanded to explain that this meant the BBC could not have discussions on any 
issues for a period of a fortnight before they are debated in either House, nor could MPs be 
involved in discussions on subjects regarding ongoing legislation. See Briggs, Volume IV, pp.582-3.
89 From analysis of the Radio Times 1945-46 and The Listener 1945-46.
90 Ben Smith (5.2.46 on world food shortage), Tom Williams (22.2.46 food production), Edith 
Summerskill (10.3.46 on food shortages), Tom Williams (27.3.46 -  Battle for Food - Women’s Land 
Army), Tom Williams (30.5.46, wheat off farms quick), John Strachey (16.6.46 review of food), from 
R34/553/2, BBC-WAC.
91 Arthur Salter, The Shadow of World Famine', Home Service, printed in The Listener 11-4-1946 
(p.453), Maurice Webb also wrote an article for The Listener on ‘Hunger in Europe’, 30-5-1946 (not 
clear if broadcast first, p.709), DG Bridson, 'UNRRA -  The battle against starvation and want in 
Europe', Home Service, 30-6-1946, 9.30pm, Radio Times June 30 -July 6th.
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have to work harder and eat less as a consequence. They would not have heard 
any Ministers being challenged on the statements they were making about food 
and bread, nor would they have heard a spokesperson broadcasting from the 
opposite perspective, against the rationale for rationing.
The BBC was not in a strong position to object. It was avoiding debate on issues 
that were under discussion in the House and it was allowing Ministers to make 
‘non-controversial’ broadcasts as it was obliged to do under Clause 4(2) of the 
BBC Licence. Though the BBC ostensibly had the right to turn down a broadcast, 
it rarely did. It did eventually draw the line, however, at a request by John 
Strachey to broadcast on Sunday 21st July, the evening before bread rationing 
began. Though the Government claimed the broadcast would deal only with 
administrative details, the BBC responded that ‘(a) it is impossible for a Minister 
to speak on bread rationing without being deemed controversial (b) that if purely 
administrative explanation is aimed at an administrator could do just as well’.92 
On this occasion the Government agreed to the BBC’s request not to broadcast.
One reason for this is that Labour’s free use of the microphone had, by this time, 
attracted the attention of the Opposition. The specific catalyst was a broadcast by 
Herbert Morrison on Sunday 30th June 1946 when the Lord President spoke for 
15 minutes under the title ‘Britain Gets Going Again’. Winston Churchill sent a 
letter to the BBC arguing that this talk could not be considered non-controversial 
and merited a response from the Opposition. It is hard not to have sympathy for 
Churchill’s view. Morrison’s broadcast was littered with examples of the 
Government’s successes since the end of the war; “Since June last year we have 
cut down the number of people working for the forces and their supplies by about 
six millions -  that is by about half a million every month... 97 out of every 
hundred now ready for work are employed... the building industry is being
92 Recorded in Haley’s diaries, 4-7-1946, HALY 13-35, CAC.
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doubled in size over eighteen months... How are our exports looking? They are 
reviving wonderfully”.93 He even made an ambitious political claim that if Labour’s 
attempt ‘to combine order with liberty’ was successful, ‘we will have invented 
something as revolutionary as some of the previous social inventions which we 
have given the world, such as our parliamentary system”.94 Morrison, however, 
did not believe he had been partial and would not agree to an opposition reply.95 
As a consequence the Conservatives insisted that the two Parties enter 
discussions about political broadcasting.96
Therefore the Government was using the BBC to its advantage and the BBC was 
favouring the Government by its own self-censorship. The Opposition and the 
press could not fail to notice and to react.
The Growing Pressure for an Enquiry into the BBC
From the end of 1945 until the Broadcasting debate on July 16th there was 
growing pressure on the Government to hold an enquiry into the BBC. Barnett 
Janner MP asked the first question to the Labour Government on 13th December 
and was told by the Prime Minister that the administration were undecided on 
whether there would be an enquiry before the Licence was renewed.97 On 24th 
January 1946 the Daily Mirror said it felt it was ‘quid pro quo’ that if the licence 
fee payer was to be required to double the amount he or she paid, the BBC 
should be required to explain why.98 Janner asked again about an enquiry on
93 ‘Britain Gets Going Again’, Morrison, Home Service, 9.15pm, 30-6-1946. Transcript in The 
Listener, 4-7-1946.
94 Ibid.
95 Cabinet Paper, CP(46)255, 2-7-1946, Morrison believed the broadcast ‘could hardly have been 
less controversial in either matter or manner’ CAB 129/11.
96 Churchill had already started informal discussions about political broadcasting (e.g. meeting of 
18-3-46 in LP’s office) -  but the Morrison broadcast forced the issue, CAB 124/408.
97 Barnett Janner, Parliamentary Debates, 13-12-1945, Vol.417, Col.606-7.
98 Daily Mirror, The BBC’s Quid Pro Quo’, Editorial, 24-1-1946.
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January 29th and on February 19th. "  It was not until this third occasion that Attlee 
told him there would not be an inquiry. This rejection sparked further debate in 
the Press. In April The Times in a leader column and a serving BBC Governor, 
Arthur Mann, in a letter to The Times, both called for an enquiry.100
The pressure coalesced in a motion put forward by Winston Churchill in June. 
Brendan Bracken was almost certainly the driving force behind this motion. 
Bracken had, as noted above, been the only proponent of an enquiry whilst on 
the Coalition Broadcasting Committee. He was one of the main signatories of a 
note sent to Churchill by James Stuart on 5th June 1946 asking the leader of the 
Opposition to lead the charge for an investigation: ‘A Motion has been drafted by 
Messrs Bracken, Crookshank and WS Morrison’ Stuart wrote, ‘which has been 
approved by the Committee of Chairman and which reads as follows: - To move 
that the question of the renewal, with or without amendment, of the Charter of the 
BBC be referred to a Joint Select Committee of both Houses’.101 Churchill agreed 
to head the list and tabled the motion on 20th June.
By this time there was virtual unanimity amongst the opposition, the press and 
interested outsiders, of the need for an enquiry. The extent of support can be 
seen in the debate about the issue in the Lords on 26th June when Lord Listowel, 
the Post Master General, had to defend the Government’s decision not to have 
an enquiry almost single handed.102 And, to an even greater degree, it can be 
seen in the editorials of the press and periodicals. ‘It is almost impossible to find a 
single person who, on due consideration of the question, fails to see the need for 
a full and public discussion of the working of British broadcasting’ The Spectator
99 Barnett Janner, Parliamentary Debates, 29-1-1946, Vol.418, Col.693-4. And, 19-2-1946, Vol.419, 
Col.952-953.
100 The Times, leader article, ‘BBC Prospects’, 8-4-1946, p.5. ‘BBC News Policy’, letter from Arthur 
Mann, also p.5.
101 James Stuart to leader of the Opposition, 5-6-1946, in Churchill 2/5, Correspondence A-C, 
Churchill Papers, CAC.
102 Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 26-6-1946, Vol.141, Col.1173-1218.
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wrote.103 Whilst The Times said 'the public is unquestionably entitled, before the 
Charter is renewed, to the benefit of a thorough survey and adjudication’.104
There were a variety of different motivations driving interested parties to call for 
an enquiry. Some, like The Daily Mirror, were triggered by the rise in the Licence 
Fee. Others, like Arthur Mann, were motivated by political and personal 
reasons.105 Most, however, were motivated by the desire to investigate the 
enormous changes that the BBC had undergone over the course of the war, in 
size, in structure and in purpose. As well as an increase in spending of 150%, the 
BBC now had 11,349 employees against 4,300 in 1939.106 It had two national 
channels, soon to be three, and was broadcasting an overseas propaganda 
service to over twenty countries. There had also been rumours of internal crises 
left unreported during the war (such as that surrounding the departure of Sir 
Frederick Ogilivie, Reith’s successor as Director General until 1942).107
Some of those calling for an enquiry were also concerned that the 'heavy hand of 
Whitehall’ which had controlled the BBC during the war ‘was never quite 
removed’.108 A Times editorial on 22nd June suggested that, over the last 6 years, 
The BBC has entered into fundamentally new relations with the Government’ 
which deserved to be examined.109 On the 29th June The News Chronicle 
wondered ‘What should be the relationships between broadcasting and
103 The Spectator, ‘Scrutiny of the BBC’, 28-6-1946, p.650.
104 The Times, leader article, ‘A BBC Inquiry’, 27-6-1946, p.5c.
105 Arthur Mann argued that news and Parliamentary affairs were not receiving enough airtime. He 
had a history of taking principled stances when editor of the Yorkshire Post in the 1930s and later 
over Suez. See heated correspondence in BoG papers 1946, between G2/46 and G33/46, R1/82/1, 
BBC-WAC
106 BoG Papers 1948. Comparison of numbers of pre-war and present staff, Note by director of 
administration G69/48-1939: 4,300 (total) 1948: 11,349, R1/84/3, BBC-WAC.
107 Ogilvie had been effectively dismissed as DG of the BBC in January 1942 because the 
Governors did not think him capable enough. This was kept secret at the time and subsequently. 
Haley told Morrison prior to the Broadcasting debate after Ogilvie began writing to The Times. See 
Flett to Morrison, ‘Sir Frederick Ogilvie’, 13-7-1946, re Haley note. CAB 124/25.
108 Time and Tide, ‘No BBC Commission -  Why?’, 6-7-1946, p.627.
109 The Times, ‘BBC Select Committee’, 22-6-1946.
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Government?’ and suggested that it was up to an enquiry to find out. Some 
Conservatives were equally anxious to illuminate the tangled relationship of the 
BBC and the Government and protect it from Cabinet Ministers. Brendan Bracken 
told Sir Ian Fraser, an ex-Governor of the BBC, on the 24th June that he had 
tabled the motion, “To strengthen the BBC” and "to ensure its independence 
against Herbert Morrison”.110
When the Government presented its reasons for not having an enquiry in the 
Broadcasting Policy White Paper issued on 2nd July it increased rather than 
removed the speculation.111 The three reasons it gave for not having an enquiry 
were: that the BBC had only been operating in normal (peacetime) conditions for 
less than a year which was not enough time to evaluate its position; that 
technology was moving forward too quickly right now to make a proper 
assessment; and that international agreements on wavelengths had yet to be 
revised.
The Spectator called the White Paper ‘completely unacceptable... in almost 
every respect a thoroughly bad document’.112 The three reasons all seemed 
surprisingly weak. It was the changes wrought by war that the public were 
interested in, said Time and Tide, not the twelve months of peace.113 The 
argument that technology was moving too quickly could have been made at any 
time in the post war period. And in the broadcasting debate Ian Orr-Ewing 
suggested that an enquiry should strengthen the Government’s position when 
negotiating future international agreements on wavelengths.114 The naivete of the
110 Haley diaries, 25-6-1946, HALY 13-35, CAC.
111 Parliamentary Papers, Broadcasting Policy White Paper, Cmd.6852, Vol.XX., 2-7-1946.
112 The Spectator, ‘Bad News About Broadcasting’, 5-7-1946, p.2.
113 Time and Tide, ‘No BBC Commission -  Why?’, 6-7-1946, p.627.
114 Ian Orr-Ewing, Parliamentary Debates, Broadcasting Debate, 16-7-1946, Vol.425, Col.1086. PP 
Eckersley, ex-chief engineer of the BBC, also asserted that there was not a limit on wavelengths,
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Government’s arguments made some people even more suspicious of the 
relationship between the state and the national broadcaster; ‘the White Paper is 
indeed very disquieting’ Time and Tide wrote, ‘It seems to view the monopoly as 
taking its place in the national propaganda machine’.115
There is no evidence to suggest that, despite the significant amount of pressure, 
Morrison ever reconsidered his original decision not to have an immediate 
enquiry. Rather the Government papers indicate that he spent his time preparing 
for the broadcasting debate by collecting additional arguments not to have an 
enquiry. He asked his Assistant Secretary Martin Flett to look over the papers of 
the Coalition Broadcasting Committee to confirm that but for Bracken’s 
contrariness they too would have voted against an enquiry.116 He calculated the 
length of time it took the Government to appoint the Ullswater Committee and 
react to its report.117 And he contacted William Haley and asked for information 
showing how the BBC’s reorganisation would make an enquiry very difficult.118
There are a few probable reasons why Morrison was not affected by the pressure 
for an immediate enquiry. He was conscious that the BBC was in the midst of 
launching new services and restructuring the organisation and that an enquiry 
would make this more difficult. He may well still have been worried about the 
implications of an investigation for the BBC’s new overseas services. This had 
been one of the original reasons against an enquiry which Flett had raised 
immediately before the meeting of the August 1945 Broadcasting committee.119 
But most importantly, Morrison was very happy with the situation as it stood. This
as the Government suggested: ‘there are no real technical limitations whatsoever barring the 
expansion of broadcasting’. Eckersley letter to The Times, 16-7-1946.
115 Time and Tide, Ibid., p.627.
116 Based on note from Flett to Morrison, 21-6-1946, CAB 124/25.
117 Flett to Morrison, 24-6-1946. From appointment to White paper -  fourteen months. The 
committee itself took eight and a half months, CAB 124/25.
118 Haley diaries, 25-6-1946, HALY 13-35, CAC.
119 See above, memorandum from Flett to Morrison, 27-8-1945, CAB 124/399.
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was particularly true because he could make a direct comparison between 
political communication on the BBC and political communication in the 
newspapers. From Morrison’s perspective the BBC was responsible and 
impartial, the newspapers were irresponsible and partisan. If there should be any 
enquiry, Morrison believed, it should be into the Press, not into the BBC.120
Morrison did, however, have to make a concession. Calls for a BBC enquiry had 
spread to his own party and he faced a potentially difficult battle to force the 
Charter through without some sort of compromise. He therefore told the 
Parliamentary Labour Party that he would reduce the length of the Charter to five 
years and promised to hold an enquiry before the end of that date.121
The Government’s intransigence up to this point and its determination to preserve 
the status quo unquestioned caused people to raise fundamental questions about 
the nature of the BBC and about its relationship with Government.122 It increased 
awareness of this relationship going forward and ensured that the Conservatives 
would not give the Government unchallenged access to the microphone again. It 
also led people to question Labour’s commitment to open-ness in other socialised 
industries.123 Morrison had always argued that socialised industries would 
maintain public trust via frequent open enquiries. His refusal to have one into the 
BBC made this claim seem much less credible.
Had the Government recognised people’s concerns and opened the BBC to 
public scrutiny in mid-1946 it might have allayed suspicion about the
120 Morrison made the contrast between broadcasting and the Press explicit during the 
Broadcasting debate when he called for an enquiry into the latter, Parliamentary Debates, 16-7- 
1946, Vol.425, Col.1084.
121 Note from CPM (privy council office) to Morrison re speech to PLP, 12-7-1946, CAB 124/25.
122 During the Commons debate Henderson Stewart, Brendan Bracken, Lady Megan Lloyd George, 
WJ Brown, KWM Pickthorn and Herbert Butcher all questioned the nature of the relationship 
between the BBC and the Government. Hansard, 16-7-1946, Vol.425, Col.1118.
123 Lord Brabazon, 'Is this the way the mines are going to be run -  in a spirit of perpetual self- 
satisfaction?’... Do they really want these organisations kept up to date by inquiry and 
improvement...?’ Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 26-6-1946, Vol.141, Col.1182.
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Corporation’s independence and impartiality. That it did not meant these 
suspicions were encouraged and one of the key arguments in favour of the 
continuation of the monopoly was undermined.
No Change
Morrison’s concession on the BBC enquiry did not represent a shift in Labour’s 
attitude towards broadcasting. The Government remained outwardly unconscious 
of the potential problems associated with its excessive closeness to and control 
of the BBC. It maintained and in some cases increased its formal and informal 
connections. The BBC’s new Charter and Licence perpetuated the key elements 
of Government influence. Ministers continued to use the broadcaster to make 
frequent statements to the nation. Departments remained convinced that the BBC 
should be their ally on Government campaigns and receive most of its 
information from Government sources. The Cabinet began talks with the 
Opposition regarding political broadcasting but did not question its assumption 
that the BBC was incapable of organising political broadcasting on its own. Over 
the course of the next three years each of these would be questioned, by the 
BBC itself, by the Conservative Opposition, and by the press, such that 
eventually, not only would the persistence of Government control seem 
untenable, but so, to some, would the maintenance of the BBC status quo.
SECTION 4: Continued Government Influence Compromises the BBC 1946- 
48
Continued Government Influence: The New Constitution
The BBC Charter that was renewed in December 1946 was essentially 
unchanged by the heated discussions of the summer. It maintained the 
Postmaster General’s power of veto. It perpetuated the right of any department to
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broadcast whatever it liked whenever it liked.124 It made regular coverage of 
Parliament a written BBC obligation125, and it allowed the Postmaster General to 
require the BBC to ‘refrain from sending any broadcast matter (either particular or 
general)’. This requirement could also ‘specify whether or not the Corporation 
may at its discretion announce that the note has been given’.126 In other words, 
the Government could use the microphone whenever it wanted. It could censor 
anything to be broadcast on the BBC. And, it could ask the BBC not to tell 
anyone that the content had been censored. In television the Government’s 
powers were made even broader still.127 Though these clauses were similar to 
those included in the 1936 licence, the reaction of the press and the BBC to their 
renewal illustrates both how far broadcasting had changed over the previous 
decade and highlights contemporary fears about the BBC-Government 
relationship.
Some of the press were appalled at the breadth of powers taken by the 
Government. The Charter contains ‘the foundations for an almost limitless 
censorship’ Time and Tide wrote.128 There is too much at the present time of the 
Government taking powers “which will naturally never be used’” , the magazine 
continued, ’The fact is that under the monopoly’s charter the Government has 
taken powers so unspecified and therefore so wide as to enable it to control 
completely, if it wants, what the listener can hear’.129 The Spectator was of the 
same opinion, writing that To give that authority, without qualification or
124 BBC Licence, Cmd.6975, 29-11-1946, Clause 4(3).
125 Ibid. BBC Licence, Clause 4(2).
126 Ibid. BBC Licence, Clause 4(4).
127 Ibid. BBC Licence, Clause 5, The Corporation shall observe and perform such stipulations 
conditions and restrictions and do such acts and things in relation to the Television Broadcasting 
Stations or the Television Service as from time to time may be prescribed by the Postmaster 
General in writing’.
128 Time and Tide, The BBC Charter’, 14-12-1946, p.1212.
129 Ibid., p.1212.
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reservation, to every Government department in Whitehall or its purlieus is 
altogether excessive’.130
The BBC had been brought in, very late in the process, to make final alterations 
to the draft.131 Haley was able to remove some of the more stringent aspects of 
Government control but was still unhappy with the outcome, especially clauses 
4(3) and 4(4). He and the Governors were particularly bothered by 4(4) which 
specified that the Government could stop the Corporation broadcasting 
something and prevent the Corporation telling anyone it had been stopped. They 
felt the Government should only be allowed that power of veto on issues of 
national security.132
The Governors were anxious enough about it to take legal advice the following 
February. They asked Cyril Radcliffe, the highly respected barrister and later Lord 
of Appeal, whether they could challenge the clause. Radcliffe confirmed their 
fears. He advised them that they had to interpret the word “announce” in the final 
sentence of Clause 4(4) extending “to any communication of the facts addressed 
to the public or intended to reach the public" whether on the radio or by any other 
method of communication.133 To challenge this the BBC would have to wait until 
the renewal of the Charter in five years time. Until then Government power over 
the BBC would remain very much intact.
130 The Spectator, The Government and Broadcasting’, 19-7-1946, p.53. Though written before the 
ratification of the Licence, this article is referring specifically to the proposal that the BBC be 
compelled to broadcast “any pronouncement or other matter which a Department of his Majesty's 
Government may require".
131 Haley told the Board of Governors that he had only a few days in which to suggest amendments 
to the Charter and Licence, BoG Minutes, 27-11-1946, R1/14/1, BBC-WAC.
132 ‘Postmaster-General’s Right of Veto’, G15/47. Note by DG to Governors, 26-2-1947, BoG 
Papers, R1/83/1, BBC-WAC.
133 Cyril Radcliffe to BBC, quoted in G15/47 PMG's right of veto. Note by DG 26-2-47, R1/83/1, 
BBC-WAC.
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Continued Government Influence: Ministerial Broadcasting
Despite the fracas surrounding the Morrison broadcast of June 1946 and 
Strachey’s attempt to broadcast in July, Ministers continued to use the BBC 
microphone freely. Tom Williams, James Griffiths, Stafford Cripps and ten other 
Ministers made radio statements before the end of the year.134 On top of this 
many Labour MPs and Ministers were appearing on BBC discussion 
programmes. Ministers now appeared to assume it was their right to talk to the 
people directly without being challenged, edited or interrupted.
By late 1946 the Conservatives became convinced that Labour voices were being 
significantly over-represented on radio. To prove it Lord Woolton hired a media 
research firm called ‘Watching Briefs’ to monitor the amount of airtime each party 
received on the BBC.135 Basing their analysis on the month of December 1946, 
Watching Briefs counted 32 talks on political subjects by 22 different speakers. 
15 of these speakers were, according to the research, Socialists, 6 were Liberal 
and 11 were independents. None were given by Conservatives.136
Though publicly the BBC disputed the figures recorded by the Conservatives, 
privately it had already recognised there was a problem.137 Prompted by a 
comment in the House by Woodrow Wyatt in November Haley had written to 
Morrison’s Personal Secretary, John Pimlott, to make him aware of the disparity 
between Government and opposition broadcasting. In the note he quoted the 
Ullswater report to the effect that these Ministerial statements “tend naturally to
134 Ministerial Broadcasts, R34/553/2, BBC-WAC.
135 Letter from Lord Woolton to James Stuart, copied to Winston Churchill, 12-11-1946, Churchill 
Correspondence 2/38 (Public and Political: General 1946-51) Political Broadcasting, CAC.
136 Copy of Conservative Central Office Statement; Politics and the BBC. An Analysis of Broadcast 
Talks, Ga1/47, 25-1-1947, R1/83/4, BBC-WAC.
137 The BBC claimed that the Conservative figures only related to the Home Service broadcast from 
London and excluded the appearance of Conservatives on programmes which were less explicitly 
political (like ‘Brains Trust’). BBC statement in The Times, 30-1-1947.
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stress the beneficence of Government activities".138 Pimlott drafted a follow-on 
note to Morrison in December.139 As a consequence, Morrison spoke to Attlee 
about reducing the number of Ministerial broadcasts, and John Pimlott set about 
trying to define impartiality.140
This experience did not, however, lead Morrison to question the Government’s 
dominance of broadcasting. Instead, he was anxious that the imbalance between 
Government and Opposition broadcasting was becoming too noticeable, and that 
the Ministerial broadcast had been over-used as compared to other methods of 
communication.141 His office made sure that Rowan’s draft of the Prime Minister’s 
Cabinet Paper spelled this out. Excessive numbers of Ministerial broadcasts, it 
said, ‘debase their value and reduce their effectiveness’.142 By reducing the 
number of broadcasts and seeking alternatives they could make the remainder 
more powerful. Attlee issued a note to Ministers on the 3rd January to this 
effect.143 As a result, the number of Ministerial broadcasts dropped to nine in the 
first half of 1947 (two of them by Attlee).
However, after the economic crisis in July Morrison sought to increase the 
number again. On the 31st July he told the Home Information Services committee 
that ‘there might with advantage be somewhat more such broadcasts’.144 Though 
this was followed by three in the next four weeks (four including Morrison’s Party 
Political Broadcast), the number then dropped again so that in November the 
Lord President talked to Attlee about having a regular, monthly broadcast about
138 Haley to Pimlott, 19-11-1946, regarding alleged verbal directive, CAB 124/33.
139 Pimlott to Morrison, regarding the number of Ministerial broadcasts and the procedure 
surrounding them, 19-12-1946, CAB 124/33.
140 Morrison to Attlee, 24-12-1946, regarding the number of Ministerial broadcasts and 
recommending the use of alternative means of publicity, CAB 124/33.
141 Ibid.
142 This sentence was specifically added to Rowan’s draft of CP(47)7, 3-1-47, by Morrison’s office, 
see JAR Pimlott to Morrison, 30-12-1946 and Pimlott to Rowan, 1-1-1947, CAB 124/33.
143 Cabinet Paper, CP(47)7, 3-1-1947, 'Ministerial Broadcasting’, CAB 129/16.
144 IH(47)1st, Minutes, Morrison, 31-7-1947, CAB 134/354.
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the economic situation. Attlee thought that these might be given by Stafford 
Cripps but Morrison, concerned in case other Ministers might think this 
disproportionately raised Cripps’ stature, suggested they be given by a range of 
Ministers.145
Morrison was particularly concerned that these broadcasts be perceived to be 
absolutely impartial. This was less to protect the listener from possible Party 
political influence than to make sure that they would not provoke a response from 
the Opposition. Morrison was very explicit about this. The scope and tone of 
these broadcasts would have to be national’ he told Attlee, ‘and it would be 
essential that they should not give rise to opposition replies. If this could not be 
secured then I think the idea should be dropped’.146 Morrison and other Ministers 
remained convinced that a 15 minute monologue given by a Minister could be 
impartial.
Haley found it hard to agree. Reviewing the status of Ministerial Broadcasting for 
the BBC’s Board of Governors at the beginning of 1948 he said that while ‘It is 
true that they were considerably reduced last year... the basic difficulty 
remains’.147 How could the listener tell the difference between factual information 
communicated by a Government Minister from straightforward party political 
propaganda? Regarding Hugh Gaitskell’s recent broadcast on petrol rationing, for 
example, Haley said it was questionable whether it ‘was necessary in the 
interests of carrying on the King’s Government or whether it put the Government 
in a more favourable light’.148 Similarly, how could a review of the economic 
progress made by the Government in 1947, due to be made by Sir Stafford
145 Morrison to Attlee, regarding conversation of the 16th about possible Cripps’ broadcasts, 17-11- 
1947, CAB 124/33.
146 Morrison to Attlee, 25-11-1947, CAB 124/33.
147 Haley to Board of Governors, BoG Papers, G13/48, 29-1-1948, R1/84/1, BBC-WAC.
148 Ibid.
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Cripps in January 1948, fail to be politically partisan?149 On February 17th Haley 
brought up his concerns at a meeting between the BBC and the Government. 
‘Ministerial broadcasts on controversial subjects caused difficulties for the BBC’, 
the Director General said.150 It was hard to distinguish between controversial and 
non controversial subjects, ‘especially when the “facts” of the situation were the 
subject of dispute between parties’. Despite Haley’s concerns, Morrison would 
not agree to stop or even reduce Ministerial broadcasts but said he understood 
the issue and would ‘keep a close watch’.151
The number of Ministerial broadcasts did decline slowly, but there is evidence to 
suggest that Labour never became conscious of the difficulties associated with 
them.152 In January 1949 Philip Noel-Baker wrote to the Prime Minister 
requesting time to broadcast on the Commonwealth because ‘there has been a 
good deal of irresponsible comment in the Press and elsewhere implying that the 
Labour Government is giving the Commonwealth away, or at least letting it break 
up’.153 Though he assured Attlee that the talk would be non-controversial it was 
clear that the Minister was using the BBC as a means to counter unfavourable 
comment in other media. Attlee approved the broadcast.
For Labour Ministers the BBC was a channel through which they could speak 
directly to the people. Unlike the newspapers the BBC was not, they thought, a 
filter but simply a means of access to the homes of their electorate. When they 
were denied access Ministers tended to become quite angry (as with John 
Strachey in July 1946). Equally, when Ministers gave the BBC statements, they
149 Ibid. Cripps eventually had to cancel this broadcast, planned for January 22nd.
150 Minutes of meeting between Government and BBC, 17-2-1948, CAB 124/410.
151 Ibid.
152 There were 31 Labour ministerial broadcasts in 1948 compared with 26 in 1949 and 18 in 1950 
(not including Party Political Broadcasts), R51/414/1 to R51/414/4.
153 Philip Noel-Baker to PM, 28-1-1949, CAB 124/33. Approved by Attlee the next day although 
subsequently cancelled for other reasons, then rearranged for later that year (Noel-Baker to Attlee, 
5.5.49, CRA reply 5.5.49).
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expected them to be read out verbatim. When they were not, they attacked the 
BBC for irresponsibility and misrepresentation. In May 1947 George Isaacs 
accused the BBC of prolonging the dockers’ strike by not reading out his three 
paragraph statement on the news, in full. AP Ryan, Editor of News, responded 
that the BBC had read out two of the paragraphs and had only briefly mentioned 
the first paragraph because it ‘summarised past history’.154 Unmollified, Isaacs 
told the BBC that in future he would make it clear when an important 
announcement should, for policy reasons, be read out in full.155 Despite this 
assumption of compliance, Ministers publicly applauded the idea of BBC 
autonomy, and did not seem to view their actions as a threat to this autonomy.
Continued Government Influence: Economic Campaigns. 1947
The persistent assumption that the BBC would and should be the ally of the 
Government is seen nowhere more clearly than during the economic campaigns 
of 1947. The language used was even reminiscent of the Second World War. 
This was the country’s ‘economic Dunkirk’ and the Government expected the 
BBC to act in the same way as it did in the difficult days of 1940. The BBC did its 
best but was increasingly uncomfortable with the Government’s interference and 
direction.
Herbert Morrison’s office had worked closely with the BBC before 1947 but in that 
year it established a more regular, reciprocal information channel. The 
Government could pass detailed economic reports through this channel and the 
BBC could discuss specific programmes and approaches. This reciprocal 
channel came about as a result of an approach by Francis Williams, acting in his 
role as a member of the Prosperity Campaign Committee.
154 Note by Editor (News) to Board of Governors, 5-5-1947, G36A/47, R1/83/1, BBC-WAC.
155 Isaacs to DG (BBC), contained within papers to Board of Governors, G43/47, 21-5-1947, 
R1/83/2, BBC-WAC.
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On 7th March Francis Williams wrote to the Controller of Talks (RA Rendall), the 
head of the Home Service, (REL Lindsay-Wellington), the Editor of News (AP 
Ryan), the deputy Editor of News (JCS MacGregor), the head of Features (L 
Gilliam) and the head of television (Norman Collins) inviting them to a meeting of 
the Prosperity Committee at 10 Downing Street to talk about the communication 
of the forthcoming Economic White Paper and the campaign to raise 
productivity.156 The Committee was keen that the BBC help explain the White 
Paper to the country and make the crisis and its implications comprehensible to 
the listener. Williams said he wanted to know ‘what plans the BBC has for further 
explanation of the economic state of the nation to its listeners in the way of 
discussions, feature programmes and so on’.157 Williams’ intention was to create 
a “successful chain of persuasion” across various media to increase national 
productivity over the course of 1947.158
The BBC had already begun to play its part in coping with the developing national 
crisis. It had temporarily stopped television broadcasting and the Third 
Programme to save fuel. Haley had offered Attlee access to the microphone to 
make a national appeal. And prior to the meeting at Number 10 it began 
preparing its response and organising a whole series of talks and discussions. In 
doing this the BBC found one of their difficulties was ‘the lack of a central point 
where they could obtain information, ventilate their own ideas, or find out where 
information was to be got; and the lack of a news gathering organisation which 
would supply them with hot news stories on the production front, in specific 
factories'.159
156 Letter from Francis Williams to R.A. Rendall, 7-3-1947, R34/701, BBC-WAC. Williams told 
Rendall, ‘I am also writing to REL Lindsay-Wellington, Mr. AP Ryan, Mr. JCS MacGregor, Mr. L. 
Gilliam [features] and Mr. N. Collins [TV]’.
157 Ibid.
158 AP Ryan letter to DG (BBC) re Production drive, 18-3-1947, R34/701, BBC-WAC.
159 Prosperity Campaign Meeting, minutes, 20-3-1947, CAB 124/909.
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The Lord President’s office thought it could be this source and as a result of the 
meeting Puck Boon became the principal conduit of information between the BBC 
and the Government on the production drive. He began collecting stories from 
departments to give to the BBC and became the central point of contact for 
senior BBC staff. The relationship was evidently fruitful, as Rendall wrote to the 
Ministry of Food in April that ‘the arrangement with the Lord President’s office... 
is proving very useful to some of our programme departments, particularly the 
Features department’.160
Boon was equally pleased with the cooperative arrangement and, on 1st May 
1947, reported back to the committee that the BBC were ‘now giving very 
satisfactory treatment to the Production Drive’.161 In addition to the weekly 
production reports and coverage of Press Conferences, for example, the BBC 
were planning a major new series called ‘Britain’s Crisis’. This was to consist of 
eight talks at 9.15pm each Wednesday on the Home Service, dealing with a 
different economic theme each week. They would be given by Graham Hutton, 
an independent economics expert. Each talk would be followed, on the Thursday, 
by a 45 minute discussion between various experts hosted by George Schuster, 
along the same theme. They were due to start on Wednesday May 7th.
Harman Grisewood, the Assistant Controller of Talks, had spoken to Boon about 
the series. Grisewood even went so far as to ask ‘the [Prosperity Campaign] 
committee to assist him by suggesting names of people to take part in the 
debate, and by giving guidance on the emphasis to be given in the 
programme’.162 The Committee were sent synopses of the talks and, at their 
meeting on the 8th May, discussed them with the BBC producer, G. Steedman.
160 R.A. Rendall letter to Professor Robert Rae, MAF, 16-4-1947, R51/205/5, BBC-WAC.
161 PC(0)C(47)16th, Minutes, The BBC and the Production Drive’, 1-5-1947, CAB 124/910.
162 Ibid.
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They questioned him in some detail. For example John Pimlott asked Steedman 
‘if full justice was done to the treatment of planning in a democracy. The 
discussion in [programme] No. 8 dealt with the administrative details of planning 
and not with the place that planning occupied in a democracy. Mr. Steedman 
explained that Mr Hutton was very much alive to that point, and that it would run 
all the way through the series’.163
Despite this close involvement the BBC was keen to maintain the impression of 
independence. An editorial in The Listener introducing the new series on 8th May 
1947 went out of its way to stress the lack of Government-BBC collaboration. 
The Government has published a White Paper and launched a propaganda 
campaign: ‘We work or want’ with graphs illustrating the production and export 
targets that have been set. Parallel but entirely independent of this -  and here we 
may stress the non-party nature of the programmes -  a new series of broadcasts 
began yesterday under the general title of ‘Britain’s Crisis’.’164 As already 
demonstrated, this was not actually true. Presumably the BBC was self- 
conscious about its connections and felt the series might be compromised if the 
Government’s involvement was revealed.
In addition to ‘Britain’s Crisis’ the BBC broadcast an impressive range of 
programmes to explain Britain’s economic circumstances in 1947. The 
Corporation counted 62 broadcasts on the economic situation for the three 
months between 1st June and 31st August. This included the Home, Light, Third 
and Regional Programmes and everything from Graham Hutton’s talks with the 
follow-up discussions, to educational broadcasts, pieces on Woman’s Hour, 
feature programmes, and Ministerial broadcasts (this list does not include
163 PC(0)C(47)17Ul, Minutes, 8-5-1947, CAB 124/910.
164 The Listener, Editorial, ‘Britain’s Crisis’, 8-5-1947, p.702.
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mentions of the crisis on the news).165 Lindsay Wellington was also planning 
more programming in the autumn, including documentaries on ‘Britain at Work’, 
‘Coal’ and The Tradition of Courage’.166
When the economic situation was made much worse by the July currency crisis 
even this was not enough. The Government put even greater pressure on the 
Corporation to soothe national anxieties and encourage greater economic effort. 
The Chairman and Governors of the BBC were ‘frightfully anxious to live up to 
their responsibilities’.167 Lady Reading, Governor and Deputy Chairman of the 
BBC, wanted the BBC to explain the crisis to ordinary people and tell them ‘what 
they personally could do in the way of food preservation, salvage, and national 
savings’. Her fellow Governor Barbara Ward ‘suggested encouragement and 
enlightenment were needed, particularly on the world food situation, inflation, 
coal and incentives’.168
William Haley, though conscious of the BBC’s ‘responsibilities’, was concerned 
that it might be moving too closely into line with the Government. He felt the 
Board of Governors ‘do not face up to the fact it is predominantly a political crisis’ 
and the BBC must not immediately assume the position of the Government.169 He 
therefore drew up a long memorandum which he gave to the Board and to senior 
BBC staff outlining how he thought the BBC should behave. It split the BBC’s 
responsibilities into the moral, the economic and the political. The BBC should try 
to help morally and economically by discouraging the black market and 
explaining the economic situation to people as best it could. ‘On the political side’,
165 'Broadcasts on the Crisis’, September 1947, R51/55, BBC-WAC.
166 Lindsay Wellington to DG, ‘Autumn Plans Bearing on “The Crisis’”, Features, 17-9-1947, 
R51/55, BBC-WAC.
167 Haley Diaries, 18-9-1947, referring to Governors’ Board Meeting, HALY 13-34, CAC.
168 BoG Minutes, Minute 224, ‘BBC and the National Crisis’, 18-9-1947, R1/15/1, BBC-WAC.
169 Haley Diaries, 15-9-1947, referring to special meeting of Board of Governor’s on 18th 
September, HALY 13-34, CAC.
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however, Haley said that ‘it was important that the BBC should not try to make 
out that there was political unity when in fact the country was divided’. 'It is not 
the BBC’s duty’ he wrote, ‘to win any political battles’.170
The three way split of the BBC’s responsibilities was difficult to maintain in 
practice. Economic issues dominated the political agenda throughout this period 
and the BBC was showing rather a lot of the ‘Dunkirk spirit’. Shortly after 
distributing his memorandum, therefore, Haley found himself telling programme 
makers to be careful about how they used the economic information the 
Government was giving the BBC (prepared by the recently formed Economic 
Information Unit). The Bulletin which was distributed by the EIU, ‘should be used 
as background information and in no sense as a guide as to what Corporation 
should put out’ Haley wrote.171
The Director General also found himself having to police any further 
encroachment of the BBC’s impartiality by the Government. In November, at a 
meeting of the Information Services Committee, Morrison “drew attention to 
recent announcements which had been made over the BBC regarding the cut in 
sugar and the rationing of potatoes’. Morrison was concerned because ‘Both 
these announcements had been couched in extremely bald terms’. Though the 
Lord President ‘recognised that Departments had in all probability provided the 
BBC with explanatory notes’ it seemed they had not been used. Morrison 
therefore ‘thought it would be helpful if Departments which had unpalatable 
announcements to make should, where possible, agree with the BBC the terms 
of a short explanation which would accompany the official announcement’.
170 ‘The BBC and the Crisis’, note by the DG, 30-9-1947, R34/339, BBC-WAC.
171 Extract, Programme Policy Meeting Minutes, Minute 199, 'Economic Bulletin’, 2-12-1947, 
R51/205/5, BBC-WAC.
231
Chapter 4
Morrison ‘also drew attention to the importance of proper timing, bearing in mind 
the political repercussions which such announcements might cause”.172
Haley was not prepared to sanction such an infringement of BBC news’ 
autonomy. All Government announcements should be treated on their news 
merit, he told the Programme Policy meeting on the 18th November. The wording 
of news items in the BBC news bulletins is a Corporation responsibility’ not a 
Government one.173
However, the fact that Haley had to become so involved in protecting the integrity 
of the BBC demonstrates the extent to which, even by 1947, the Government 
assumed the BBC would be its immediate ally and partner. The BBC did not 
make it any easier to define the parameters of the relationship by cooperating 
with the Government and using the Government as its main source of 
information. The editorial in The Listener and Haley’s autumn memorandum show 
how concerned the BBC was about its proximity to the Government. The 
Government showed no such signs of concern. Morrison in particular was 
determined to maintain the closeness and was not worried about the risk of 
partiality. This can be seen even more clearly by the way in which he appointed a 
new BBC Chairman and Board of Governors in 1946 and 1947.
Continued Government Influence: The BBC Chairman and Governors
The manner of the appointment of the BBC Chairman and Governors in 1946 and 
1947 is important as a way of judging the degree to which the Government 
genuinely sought independent and impartial appointees or simply those that were 
perceived to be so. The BBC Governors were the guardians of the BBC’s 
freedom from political and commercial influence. To quote Morrison in the 1946
172 IH(47)2nd, Minutes, Terms and Timing of Government Announcements’, 12-11-1947, CAB 
124/404.
173 Programme Policy Meeting Minutes, min.192, 'Wording of News’, 18-11-1947, R34/615/6, BBC- 
WAC.
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broadcasting debate, The Governors are the BBC’.174 Their integrity was also 
important as a validation of Labour’s other nationalisation plans. The BBC board 
was the model which Labour said it would use when structuring other 
nationalised industries.
In 1946 and 1947 there was plenty of opportunity to demonstrate the proper 
manner in which to appoint BBC Chairmen and Governors. In April 1946 all five 
wartime Governors of the BBC were set to complete their 5 year terms and 
needed replacing. And towards the end of 1946 Morrison decided to ask Sir Allan 
Powell, the BBC wartime Chairman, if he would step down to make way for a new 
candidate.
Morrison had been considering who should succeed the BBC Governors since 
February 1946. He and John Pimlott put together an initial list of 22 names which 
they then discussed with Patrick Gordon Walker and Maurice Webb before 
passing on to the Cabinet Secretary Edward Bridges. This then increased to over 
45 potential candidates from whom Morrison picked five (with a couple of 
alternatives) to recommend to the Prime Minister.175 He also forwarded the list to 
the Post Master General, Lord Listowel. The five first choices were Ernest 
Whitfield (unsuccessful Labour candidate in 1931 & 1935), IJ Hayward 
(prominent trade unionist and Chairman of Education Committee of LCC), 
Barbara Ward (active member of the Labour Party), David Low (well known 
cartoonist with Labour sympathies), and GM Young (historian with Conservative 
sympathies).
Listowel was taken aback by the predominance of left-wingers on Morrison’s list. 
‘I think it would be a serious mistake’ he wrote to Morrison, ‘if four of the new
174 Morrison, Parliamentary Debates, Broadcasting, 16-7-1946, Vol.425, Col. 1080.
175 The list included George Orwell, Note to EE Bridges, 7-3-1946. Herbert Morrison sent his five 
recommendations to the PM on 12-3-1946, and forwarded it to the Post Master General, CAB 
124/413.
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Governors were either members of the Labour Party or familiar to the public as 
exponents of Labour views’.176 Morrison accepted the criticism and Hayward was 
replaced by the non-political Air Marshall Sir Richard Peck, David Low was 
dropped in favour of the Chair of the Women’s Volunteer Service, Lady Reading 
and GM Young was exchanged for the more outwardly Conservative Geoffrey 
Lloyd. Had Lord Listowel not made such a vocal objection to Morrison’s choices 
there is no reason to believe he would have changed them.
When it came to choosing a chairman later in 1946, Morrison was equally keen to 
find a left winger. In October he wrote to Attlee, ‘My own mind has been working 
on the lines of appointing a Chairman whose sympathies are towards the Left -  
though not necessarily violently so’.177 He found his ideal candidate in Lord 
Inman, ‘a sane and reasonably left figure, not too tarred with “party” but making 
no secret of his membership of the Labour Party’.178 Unfortunately, only three 
months after Morrison appointed Lord Inman he was asked to become Lord Privy 
Seal and in April 1947 Morrison had to find another candidate. Once again 
Morrison looked for someone with clear Labour sympathies. He decided on 
another Labour peer, Lord Simon of Wythenshawe.
The appointment of Labour sympathisers as Chairman and Governors of the 
BBC was not, in itself, surprising or necessarily detrimental to the integrity of the 
BBC. However, it does demonstrate the determination of Morrison to maintain the 
closeness of the Government to the BBC and his blindness to the potential 
damage it might do to the BBC’s reputation. This was not lost on outsiders. Lord 
Reith, who had been hoping to be invited to be chairman, told Haley that the
176 Lord Listowel to Morrison, 14-3-1946, CAB 124/413.
177 Morrison to Attlee, 14-10-1946, CAB 124/413. Morrison thought this might be slightly balanced 
by a vice-Chairman who was ‘moderately to the Right or non-political’.
178 ‘E’ (presumably Ellen Wilkinson), Ministry of Education, re Lord Inman to Morrison, 24-10-1946, 
CAB 124/413.
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reason he was not was that, ‘He was not a member of the Labour party [and] He 
was not amenable to the Government’.179
The most determined defender of the BBC’s integrity in the late 1940s was not 
the Board but the Director General. William Haley repeatedly blocked 
Government attempts to encroach upon the independence of the BBC. He 
refused to be influenced even when directly criticised by the Prime Minister. He 
spoke frequently about the need for the BBC to stay aloof from Government. And 
he avoided the regular advances of Herbert Morrison. In May 1947 Haley noted 
in his diary that ‘Morrison had complained I was reserved towards the Govt. He 
had apparently no complaints to make agst my impartiality but he thought I could 
be a bit more forthcoming. This is about the fourth time in the last 18 months 
Morrison has aired this complaint’.180
When Haley remained non-compliant Morrison sought to dilute the power of the 
Director General in favour of the Chairman and Governors. Immediately before 
Lord Simon’s appointment Morrison talked to him about the structure of public 
corporations and the relationship between the Board and the Executive. He told 
Lord Simon that the DG of the BBC was too powerful.181 Morrison would later tell 
Lord Beveridge about the same thing and Beveridge would eventually make this 
dilution of power one of the recommendations of his 1951 broadcasting report.182
179 Haley diaries, 25-5-1947, HALY 13-34, CAC.
180 Haley diaries, 13-5-1947, HALY 13-34, CAC.
181 Haley diaries, 13-5-1947, ‘[Ernest Simon] told me he had been talking to Morrison about his 
possible investigations into how public corporations should be organised as between Board and 
Executive. Morrison had said that the DG of the BBC was too powerful' HALY 13-34, CAC.
182 As well as recommending greater power for the Governors (‘the Governors of the future should 
have as much authority as possible’ Cmd.8116, p.177, paragraph 591), the report suggested the 
Governors take a bigger role in programme policy making -  for example by attending Board of 
Management meetings (paragraphs 581-582).
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SECTION 5: The Consequences of Government Control -  Excluding Other 
Voices
The consequences of the Government’s continued control of broadcasting are 
best illustrated by the way in which it was able to exclude other political and 
commercial voices from the air. It has already been shown how effectively it 
managed to keep the Opposition off the radio for its first 18 months of office. But 
it was also able to control the access of less mainstream political voices, and of 
course commercial ones, even from abroad.
Excluding Non-Mainstream Political Voices
After Morrison’s broadcast of 30th June 1946 Churchill insisted that Labour begin 
discussions about political broadcasting. The two Parties then met on July 30th 
1946, without the BBC, and then on November 5th, with a further discussion after 
the completion of the Aide Memoire on February 28th (the BBC was invited to the 
latter occasions).183 At the first meeting, in the BBC’s absence, Labour and the 
Conservatives decided that Party political broadcasting should be resumed. Each 
Party should be allocated a number of political slots on the radio each year 
according to the number of votes it received at the last election. The Parties could 
choose to use these slots as they wished (including which politicians should be 
allowed to broadcast). In addition, the Government should be allowed to make 
national broadcasts as long as they were absolutely impartial. They gave these 
proposals to the BBC to be discussed at the second meeting on political 
broadcasting on 5th November 1946.
The Chairman at that time, Sir Allan Powell, and William Haley were unhappy 
with the proposals. They suggested that they represented a return to the practice 
of the 1930s when the Party Whips would decide who did and did not broadcast.
183 Minutes to meetings in CAB 124/408.
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This had meant that dissident voices (most notably those of Winston Churchill 
and David Lloyd George) were blocked from appearing on the radio. The initial 
draft of the 1946 Aide Memoire on political broadcasting would have effectively 
formalised this procedure rather than changed it. The BBC Chairman believed 
this would compromise the Corporation’s freedom to safeguard broadcasting in 
the national interest. The BBC must, he argued, be allowed to invite persons of 
public eminence to the microphone if the circumstances required it.
But neither Morrison nor Churchill was keen to change the draft.184 Churchill said 
there were ‘no such eminent men’ outside the mainstream today so it did not 
matter’.185 If there was such a person, Morrison said, the BBC could always 
consult the Parties and gain their agreement. This, Haley replied, rather defeated 
the object. After further discussions they eventually agreed that the BBC could 
invite people of ‘outstanding national eminence’ to the microphone. This definition 
was specifically exalted enough that it would prevent all but very rare invitations, 
and even on those occasions the Parties would have room to object, should they 
choose to.186 This was included in the Aide Memoire on political broadcasting 
which was eventually agreed and signed off on 6th February 1947.
Throughout the November meeting and those subsequent to it Haley was 
conscious that the politicians did not think the BBC was competent to organise 
political broadcasting on its own. On 5th November There was a great deal of talk 
of the responsibility of the political leaders to guide political controversy and the
184 ‘The Chairman and Director-General reported that at the meeting on 5th November they had 
been faced with complete unanimity of view between the two parties’, BoG Minutes, 18-11-1946, 
R1/14/1, BBC-WAC.
185 Haley diaries, 5-11-1946, HALY 13-34. This was despite Churchill’s comment in 1938 that “the 
idea that no public man not nominated by Party Whips should be allowed to speak on the radio is 
not defensible in public policy”. Cited by Haley in BoG Papers, G61/46 Political Broadcasting, 
R1/82/2, BBC-WAC.
186 As Morrison pointed out in a note to Attlee, 16-1-1947, CAB 124/409.
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difficulty of the BBC treading in this field on its own’.187 This attitude was equally 
apparent during an argument over political broadcasting a few months later, in 
August 1947. Clement Attlee had just made a national broadcast regarding the 
currency crisis. The Conservative Chief Whip then contacted the BBC to tell them 
Winston Churchill was keen to reply. Told that Churchill would have to use a 
coupon (one of the Conservative’s 5 political slots) since Attlee’s broadcast was 
‘national’ and not political the Chief Whip complained. An argument ensued 
between the Lord President’s office and the Opposition. ‘At no stage has any 
reference been made to the BBC’ Haley noted in his diary. ‘It is strange how even 
in a row the politicians keep this affair a close c...[illegible]. They would do almost 
anything rather than let the BBC decide the issue -  as it legally can under the 
Aide Memoire’.188
Though outsiders were unaware of the internecine arguments behind the scenes 
at the BBC, they were clearly aware of the end result. Only a small number of 
politicians ever made Party political broadcasts. Those that made broadcasts did 
so on their own terms not those of the BBC. Once again the BBC was seen to be 
abdicating its position in favour of the leaders of the political Parties. Not only 
were other politicians blocked from appearing on air, but so were other non-Party 
political voices. Haley lamented that ‘all the politicians regard their world as a 
closed world. So long as a reply is forthcoming from an official opposition they 
really feel all duty of impartiality has been meet [sic]. It does not occur to them 
there are other forces in the community, such as the Church, which may have a 
right to a say in some matters’.189
187 Haley diaries, 5-11-1946, HALY 13-34, CAC.
188 Haley diaries, 13-8-1947, HALY 13-34, CAC.
189 Haley diaries, 10-11-1945, HALY 13-35, CAC.
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A comparison can be made between this ‘closed world’ of the politicians on air 
and the blacklists of the newspaper owners that caused such a stir during the 
Royal Commission on the Press. Both the owners and the politicians made sure 
their media outlets were exclusive and that those who they did not want to gain 
publicity were prevented from gaining it. An important difference, however, was 
that since Britain had a competitive press there was normally an alternative 
newspaper through which someone could make sure they were heard. No such 
alternative existed in broadcasting.
Excluding Commercial Voices
It had been a consistent policy of the British Government since the early 1930s to 
try to prevent commercial broadcasting to the UK from abroad in order to uphold 
the monopoly at home. The Labour Government continued this policy after 1945 
but with even greater urgency.
The most prominent target of Labour policy was Radio Luxembourg. Radio 
Luxembourg had been broadcasting to Britain since 1933 and had gained quite a 
following before the war. As a commercial station broadcasting music and 
entertainment its programming was quite different from the rather staid BBC 
(especially on Sundays when Lord Reith insisted the BBC desist from all forms of 
entertainment).
During the war Radio Luxembourg was twice taken over. First by the Germans in 
1940 (who used it for propaganda), and then, in 1945, by the American Army 
(who did the same). At the end of the war the commercial station was very keen 
to start broadcasting again. The British Government, however, was determined to 
stop it. Initially, the Foreign Office thought it might be able to take control of the
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station’s transmitters itself and use them to broadcast the BBC overseas service 
to the continent.190
When it became clear this would not be possible and that Radio Luxembourg 
might be able to get back on air the F.O. and the Lord President’s office began 
desperately searching for ways to prevent it. They had already encouraged the 
BBC to counteract the potential revival of Radio Luxembourg by supporting the 
launch of the Light Programme. This was supposed to give listeners an 
alternative to overseas commercial radio and undermine its competitive 
advantage.191 But the Lord President wanted to go further and stop Radio 
Luxembourg broadcasting entirely. In May and June 1946 Morrison tried to alter 
the defence regulations to prevent the channel selling advertising time on air to 
British companies.192 When this did not work he had Flett ask the Treasury if they 
could do the same thing via the Finance Bill. When even this was unsuccessful 
he asked the Board of Trade to introduce exchange controls which would stop 
Luxembourg buying British records.193
Labour justified its concerted campaign against Radio Luxembourg by saying that 
it was committed, like other British Governments before it, to sustaining the 
broadcasting monopoly. It also defended its actions by arguing that it was 
maintaining standards which, it suggested, would inevitably be reduced by a 
commercial broadcaster. But there was another reason why it found Radio 
Luxembourg objectionable. One which was outlined in a memorandum from 
Morrison’s office: ‘it might be said that an additional reason for disliking
190 A summary of their attempts can be found in a Foreign Office memorandum, 'Memorandum on 
Radio Luxembourg’, 6-1-1947, CAB 124/407.
191 Flett to Pimlott, 19-2-1946: The BBC themselves have taken steps to counteract this [the 
popularity of Radio Luxembourg] and in fact one of the main purposes of the new Light Programme 
is to kill any demand for the sort of thing which used to be put out by Radio Luxembourg’, CAB 
124/407.
192 Flett to W.E. Phillips (Treasury), 7-6-1946, CAB 124/407.
193 Board of Trade letter to Flett, telling him that they are going to be unable to block the export of 
records to Radio Luxembourg, 11-7-1946, CAB 124/407.
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programmes like those of Radio Luxembourg is that we have no control over their 
content’.194
This control over content was important not only for maintaining standards but 
also for preventing specific people or organisations from gaining airtime. Puck 
Boon, from the Lord President’s office, discovered in February 1946 that if Radio 
Luxembourg began broadcasting again, There is a probability that two of their 
clients will be THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY and the ROAD HAULAGE 
ASSOCIATION’ [his capitals].195 Three months later Boon confirmed that this was 
the case and that ‘there was talk to the effect that the Iron and Steel Federation 
are being approached to work a program on similar lines’.196 Morrison’s office 
redoubled its efforts to keep the station off the air. In May and June it worked 
directly with the Treasury to try to stop British companies being able to pay Radio 
Luxembourg to advertise.197
The Government was not successful and Radio Luxembourg did eventually begin 
broadcasting again on 1st December 1946. Morrison’s efforts had, however, 
scared off a number of potential advertisers and Morrison himself continued to try 
to bring down the commercial station throughout 1947.198
Labour’s treatment of Radio Luxembourg is interesting for three reasons. It 
suggests that the Government was not aware of the contradictions inherent in its 
actions. Morrison told Patrick Gordon-Walker in June 1946 that he doubted ‘there
194 Preparatory notes for response of Morrison to Parliamentary question from Wilson Harris. 
Unsigned and undated. June 1946, CAB 124/411. See also Harris to Morrison, Parliamentary 
Debates, 10-7-1946, Vol.425, Col.385.
195 PH Boon to Morrison, 13-2-1946, CAB 124/407.
196 PH Boon to Morrison, 22-5-1946, CAB 124/407
197 Morrison to Flett, 12-6-1946, ‘I trust the Treasury can find a suitable amdmt to the DR’s. It is
important. If not try a new clause in the Finance Bill. It is an important evasion and shd not be
tolerated' written on bottom of note from Flett to Christie (Treasury), 7-6-1946, CAB 124/407.
198 Haley to Flett, 12-6-1946 and 20-6-46, informing him that companies were not buying space on 
Radio Luxembourg because they knew the Government was trying to shut it down. Stephens letter 
of 11-11-1947 shows that Morrison’s office were still actively pursuing this course a year after the 
station re-opened, CAB 124/407.
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is really a very strong demand in Britain for this sort of programme’ and yet he 
exerted an awful lot of effort trying to block it.199 It also seems to reveal a 
remarkable lack of self-consciousness. Labour was desperately attempting to 
prevent all foreign broadcasts to the UK while, at the same time, broadcasting the 
BBC Overseas services to over twenty countries around the globe. And, Labour’s 
treatment of Radio Luxembourg demonstrates the Government’s determination to 
retain absolute control of broadcasting to the UK. Their reasons for this were not 
only to maintain standards but also to control who gained access to the 
microphone and for what purpose.
Excluding Communist Voices
As well as actively suppressing commercial voices, in 1948 the Government 
began actively suppressing political ones. It did this when it suspected the BBC 
had been infiltrated by Communists.
On 17th February 1948, Churchill wrote to Morrison about the ‘undue prominence 
being given by the BBC to Communist and near-communist speakers, the 
featuring of Mr. Horner etc.’.200 The following week he brought it up at the political 
broadcasting meeting with the BBC.201 The leader of the Opposition said he 
thought the BBC had within it a nest of ‘Communist vipers’ who were using their 
influence to give Communism a disproportionate amount of coverage on air. Lord 
Woolton presented analysis to back up these claims.202
Given the fear aroused by the Czech coup, the issue was raised in Cabinet on 
the 5th March. At this meeting ‘the suggestion was made, in the course of the 
discussion, that Communist influences might be at work in the BBC’ which the
199 Quoted above. Morrison to Gordon-Walker, 25-6-1946, CAB 124/411.
200 Churchill to Morrison, 17-2-1948, Churchill correspondence, Churchill 2/38, Political 
Broadcasting, CAC.
201 Political Broadcasting meeting, 25-2-1948, CAB 124/31.
202 Research submitted by Woolton to BBC, re excessive broadcasts and publicity for Communists, 
in R34/313/2, BBC-WAC.
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Lord President undertook to look into.203 Due to its sensitivity, the Cabinet 
secretary intentionally did not record this in the Cabinet minutes.204 A small 
Ministerial committee was set up to examine the infiltration of Communists 
westward. Morrison was given responsibility for reporting on Communism in the 
BBC.
Morrison began listening out for signs that Communism was being treated too 
favourably in BBC broadcasts. After a speech by Harry Pollitt received coverage 
on the BBC news on March 21st Morrison sent Stephens, from his private office, 
to the BBC to find out who was responsible. Haley refused to say, telling 
Stephens he would not submit to what he called ‘witch hunting of the worst 
type’.205 He also told Stephens that he was well aware of the danger of BBC 
infiltration and that the BBC had been vetting people according to their political 
affiliations with the help of MI5 for 10 years.206 Undeterred, the Lord President 
then contacted Lord Simon and told him to sack whoever had produced the 
broadcasts.207 Though Lord Simon did not go this far he insisted to Haley that 
from now on the BBC keep a careful record of all references to Communism and 
any airing of Communists on the BBC.
The BBC Governors discussed the issue of Communism on the 4th and 18th 
March and 1st April.208 Acting on Haley’s advice they confirmed that the 
Corporation did not employ people with overt Communist sympathies. If, 
however, there was a Communist already on the staff, they did not think it right to
203 Norman Brook to David Stephens, 22-3-1948, CAB 124/31.
204 Ibid. This, for obvious reasons, was not recorded in the Cabinet minute; but the LP undertook to 
look into the point’, CAB 124/31.
205 Haley diaries, 10-4-1948, HALY 13-34, CAC.
206 Stephens to Morrison, 30-3-1948, Stephens description of his conversation with Haley, CAB 
134/31. Reiterated by Haley in a letter to Churchill, 5-5-1950; ‘No entrant to the BBC for the past 12 
years therefore, has come into the Corporation without check’, R34/313/3, BBC-WAC.
207 Haley diaries, 10-4-1948, HALY 13-34, CAC.
208 BoG Minutes 1948, R1/16/1, BBC-WAC.
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remove them unless their political affiliations were affecting their work. They 
emphasised the need for ‘vigilance’ as well as the need to ‘preserve a proper 
perspective’ about Communism.209
Morrison, however, continued to harry them. In early April he had dinner with 
Lord Simon and Haley and asked them about an invitation which BBC 
Manchester had made to a fascist speaker. Haley explained how it was ‘some 
minor blunder’ but Simon was appalled that such a thing could have happened 
without him knowing about it. After the meal he said to Haley that in future he 
should ‘be told of every communication written or verbal, from any Government 
department that has occupied, or may occupy, the attention of a Minister’.210
Only a few days later the Lord President was in contact with Lord Simon again. 
He now wanted the BBC to appoint someone to watch over BBC staff and act as 
a contact between the broadcaster and the Government. He had a specific 
candidate in mind.211 He asked Lord Simon if the BBC would take him on as an 
advisor. The Chairman rang the Director General and asked him to appoint 
Morrison’s candidate. Haley objected, saying he was unable to see how this 
person would fit in. Though Lord Simon pushed the issue he dropped it after 
Lady Reading also raised serious objections.212 Morrison continued to badger the 
BBC during the summer, at one point going as far as asking for attendance 
records of the Board meetings, before temporarily abating.213
The Government’s behaviour towards the BBC in the spring of 1948 once again 
emphasised the difficulties inherent in a single national broadcaster maintaining
209 BoG Minutes, 1-4-1948, Minute 87, R1/16/1, BBC-WAC.
210 Haley diaries, 12-4-1948, HALY 13-34, CAC.
211 Haley refers briefly in his diaries to the candidate, called ‘Mr. Gater1. Gater does not appear in 
other files relating to this episode. Haley diaries, 14-4-1948, HALY 13-34, CAC.
212 Ibid.
213 'Mr. Morrison continues his antics. He is now demanding a report of the Governors attendances.
I hope they will refuse them. The are independent and he is not their schoolmaster’, Haley diaries, 
17-7-1948, HALY 13-34, CAC.
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its independence. As soon as the Communist scare arose after the Czech coup 
the Government and Opposition began attacking the BBC. The Government 
treated the staff of the Corporation like members of the civil service, calling for 
them to be vetted, policed and even fired if the Government required it. Though 
the experience says quite a bit about Lord Simon’s ‘appalling susceptibility’ it also 
emphasises the willingness of the Government to transgress the boundaries that 
were designed to separate the BBC from the Government.214 Had Haley not been 
so firm in his own defence of the Corporation’s staff it is likely that there would 
have been many more concessions to the Government’s demands.
The Communist issue came up again in 1950 immediately prior to and during the 
Korean War.215 For a second time the Government and the Conservative 
Opposition pressured the BBC and its staff and sought to influence its 
programming.216 Through its actions the Government showed that not only was it 
prepared to limit access to the microphone to itself (with occasional broadcasts 
by leaders of the Opposition), but that it was also willing to use its powers to 
prevent other voices from being heard.
Past its Sell-Bv Date -  The Beveridge Inquiry
The eventual enquiry into the BBC was appointed too late and deliberated for too 
long to have a material effect on the future of the BBC. This was, however, by no 
means apparent when it was appointed in 1949. Its chair, William Beveridge, 
certainly took his position very seriously, collecting copious evidence (including 
640,000 words from the BBC) and conducting exhaustive research (including
214 ‘He [Simon] who should be in a position to be 100% independent is appallingly susceptible', 
Haley diaries, 14-4-1948, HALY 13-34, CAC.
215 On 4th April 1950 the Government and Opposition raised the issue of Communism again after 
receiving a letter from the Listeners’ Association, CAB 124/31.
216 See BBC file on, ‘Policy, Communism, File 3: 1950-51’, R34/313/3, BBC-WAC. During the 
preliminary stages of the rearmament re-education campaign in early 1951 Clem Leslie and others 
were keen to enrol the BBC in promoting anti-communism. See Leslie to Nicholson 25-1-1951, CAB 
124/80.
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sending some of the committee on a field trip to America). His Committee’s 100 
recommendations were contained within a 327 page report complete with 583 
pages of evidence, completed just before Christmas 1950. They were perhaps 
best summarised by the headline in The Spectator, 'BBC for Ever’.217
Beveridge advocated no major changes in British broadcasting. He believed that 
the monopoly was the best way in which to preserve ‘a public service for a social 
purpose’.218 To ensure that the monopoly did not become complacent or 
unresponsive he suggested strengthening the role of the Governors. They should 
be 'completely masters in their own house’ and, in an unfortunate turn of phrase, 
‘agents of democratic control’.219 Internally, the ‘Charter should place them in 
unfettered control of the staff and all its activities’.220 Externally, they should make 
sure that the BBC remained responsive to public opinion. This did not, however, 
mean encouraging programming people liked. ‘Broadcasting should not’ 
recommendation 57 read ‘be governed automatically by regard to what will 
please the listeners’.221
The Committee’s report was at its most conservative when it came to relations 
with the Government. It suggested keeping Clause 5 from the 1946 Charter, 
giving the Government sweeping powers over television.222 It believed that the 
‘friendly arrangement’ by which the BBC arranged Government broadcasts 
should be maintained.223 It even said the Governors should fulfil a ‘Ministerial
217 The Spectator, ‘BBC For Ever1, 19-1-1951, p.67.
218 Report of the Broadcasting Committee 1951, Cmd.8116, para.205.
219 Ibid. Para.554. and title to page 166.
220 Ibid. Para.552.
221 Ibid. Recommendation 57.
222 Ibid. ‘We believe therefore that the Government should retain powers of direction in relation to 
television greater than those possessed by it in the older field of sound broadcasting’, para.342.
223 Ibid. p.8, para.29.
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function’ and compared the BBC to a department.224 Overall the conclusion was 
‘No Revolution at the BBC’.225
But shortly after it was finished the report ‘began to be thought of increasingly as 
only one piece of relevant background material on broadcasting policy and not as 
a set of positive recommendations to be accepted or rejected’.226 The changes it 
suggested, such as greater regionalism and the dilution of the authority of the 
Director General, were intangible enough to disappoint the public and complex 
enough to excite months of inconclusive Parliamentary debate. Moreover, the 
Cabinet were distracted by much larger issues.227
More significant was Selwyn Lloyd’s Minority Report. Lloyd was unable to agree 
with the other members of the Committee and wrote a separate short report 
recommending an end to the BBC’s broadcasting monopoly. His report was taken 
up by a Conservative Broadcasting Policy Committee formed in February 1951. 
This 10 member committee ‘summoned witnesses, including Haley, and looked 
at alternative models of future broadcasting’.228 Though not able to come to a 
unanimous conclusion (Brendan Bracken was one member of the committee), 
they were all agreed that there had to be more competition and diversity. The 
findings of the group were to form the basis of the Conservative government’s 
broadcasting policies after they won the election later that year.
Beveridge himself was understandably dissatisfied with the Government’s 
treatment of his report and the White Paper they wrote in response to it. 
Beveridge did not believe Labour had engaged with the problems of broadcasting 
and did not comprehend the dangers inherent in the relationship between the
224 Ibid. p. 166, para.553.
225 New Statesman and Nation, ‘No Revolution at the BBC’, 20-1-1951, p.54-55.
226 Asa Briggs, Volume IV  (1995), p.362.
227 This was the highpoint of the Korean War, the Cabinet was split due to the impact of the 
rearmament budget on welfare spending, and a number of members of Cabinet were seriously ill.
228 Asa Briggs, Volume IV (1995), p.364.
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Government and the BBC. “My Committee” he said to the House of Lords in July 
1951, “were profoundly impressed by the dangers and disadvantages of 
monopoly in so vital a service as broadcasting. The Government, to judge by 
their White Paper, are not conscious of any dangers at all”.229
Conclusion
From 1945 to 1951 the Labour Government and the BBC remained very close. 
Though the BBC was increasingly uncomfortable with this relationship, there is 
good evidence to suggest that the Government was not. This is not to say that it 
did not recognise and value the idea of the independence and impartiality of the 
BBC, only that it did not see a contradiction between this aspiration to objectivity 
and a collaborative relationship with the Government in power. Their perspective 
can partly be explained as the perpetuation of wartime cooperation, but the 
congruence of views between the Government and the BBC at the close of the 
conflict was even more important.
This prolonged association of the Government and the BBC made many 
contemporaries suspicious. An inquiry, they thought, would clear the air and 
accentuate the autonomy of the Corporation. The Government’s unwillingness to 
agree to an inquiry further fuelled their suspicions and encouraged them to watch 
the Government more closely. Hence the determination of the Conservatives to 
gain access to the microphone to restart political broadcasting, and their analysis 
of Labour airtime.
But the continued willingness of Labour to use the BBC, either for broadcasts, for 
extensive help in Government campaigns, or to seek help via the Board of 
Governors, raised more fundamental questions about the future of the 
Corporation. In May 1947, while the BBC was supporting the Government’s
229 Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 25-7-1951, Vol.172, Col.1260.
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economic education and productivity campaign, Lord Woolton, the Chairman of 
the Conservative Party, spoke about these concerns to John Coatman on his way 
back from dinner in Pembroke College. The following day Coatman told the BBC 
Director General how Woolton had confided that ‘it was touch and go whether the 
Conservative Party would make the destruction of the BBC’s monopoly a plank in 
the new Tory programme’.230
This was because over the course of Labour’s first two years in office the BBC’s 
reputation as an objective communicator had been undermined. The 
characteristics that Labour had used to justify the BBC’s privileged position were 
now seen by some to justify its removal. Its monopoly facilitated Government 
control and ensured only a small coterie of Ministers gained access to the 
microphone. Its independent Board was clearly less than entirely independent. Its 
promotion of the national interest appeared to be a promotion of the Government 
in power.
This was important not simply for the future of the BBC but for the future of the 
newspaper press. It is entirely conceivable that in the summer of 1946 the 
Government envisioned the BBC as a potential model to be applied to the Press. 
Indeed the ‘Czech Press model’, advocated by a number of left wingers to the 
Royal Commission on the Press, had many similarities to the broadcasting 
model. The Czechoslovakian Government granted licences to responsible 
groups, not individuals, to publish newspapers. The licences had to be renewed 
on a regular basis and could be revoked or suspended if the newspaper group 
did not conform to set rules.
To Selywn Lloyd, whose Minority Report eventually had such influence, it was 
this very model that was, by 1949, highly objectionable. It epitomised the idea of 
the Labour socialised industry which Lloyd viewed as paternalistic, centralist, and
230 Haley diaries, 19-5-1947, HALY 13-34, CAC.
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uncompetitive. He strongly objected to the principles expressed in the BBC’s 
evidence to the Beveridge Committee which he summarised as; 'it is the BBC’s 
duty to decide what is good for people to hear or to see, and that the BBC must 
elevate the public taste and constantly be ahead of public opinion and public 
wishes in their programmes’.231
He, like a number of other Conservatives, took issue with Morrison’s defence of 
the BBC as an integral part of the Corporate State. As Selwyn Lloyd’s biographer 
has put it, ‘For the younger Conservatives this sharpened the thrust of the 
argument: it became free enterprise versus centralism; the market economy or 
the planned economy’.232 Lloyd even used the idea of this model transferred to 
the Press as a criticism of the structure of British Broadcasting: ‘It is just as 
though a British Press Corporation were to be set up with a monopoly of 
publishing newspapers, and were to decide what choice of newspapers people 
were to have and what it was good for them to read in them’.233 Therefore 
Labour’s appreciation and praise of the BBC helped to poison the Conservatives 
against it.
After Churchill returned to office in October the Conservatives extended the 
current BBC Charter for six months. This was enough time to reconsider the 
position of the BBC and draft a White Paper which stated that ‘in the expanding 
field of television provision should be made to permit some element of 
competition’.234 This provision was introduced two years later and was enough to 
inaugurate the advent of commercial television and, subsequently, commercial 
radio.
231 Selwyn Lloyd Minority Report, Report of the Broadcasting Committee 1951, Cmd.8116, p.202.
232 DR Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd (1989), p. 142.
233 Minority Report, Cmd.8116, p.202.
234 Cmd.8550, 15-5-1952, quoted in Asa Briggs, Volume /V(1995), p.391.
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Chapter 5: The Government, Films And Newsreels 1945-51
Prologue
In 1945 cinema going was at the peak of its popularity. There were approximately 
1,585 million admissions per year.1 This equates to over thirty million a week, out 
of a population of approximately 49 million. Of those who went to the cinema 40% 
went more than once a week.2 Each time people went to the cinema they would 
see a first feature and a support programme. The support programme would 
normally consist of a newsreel of about seven minutes and either a second 
feature or a short and possibly a cartoon.
The vast majority of those who went to the cinema were working class.3 As such, 
they were less likely to read a newspaper or own a radio.4 Moreover, fewer than 
half a million people owned a television license before the end of 1950 (and the 
BBC did not start making television news before 1948).5 The cinema was, 
therefore, the only source of visual news and information for the vast majority of 
people. It is not surprising, therefore, given the Government’s stated commitment 
to communication, that it should have been interested in film and newsreels.
Introduction
This chapter will examine the Government’s approach to film and newsreels and 
its development over the course of 1945-51. Chapters two and three studied this
1 Perilli, ‘Statistical Survey of the British Cinema Industry’ in Curran and Porter, British Cinema 
History, (1983), p.372, Table 1.
2 Street & Dickinson, Cinema and State: The Film Industry and the Government 1927-84 (1985), 
p.183.
3 ‘it is significant that the working class went to the cinema a great deal more than the members of 
the middle or upper classes’, Pronay and Wenham, The News and the Newsreels (1976), p.7.
4 According to the Wartime Social survey, 1943, cited in James Chapman, The British at War- 
Cinema, State and Propaganda 1939-45 (1998) p.3.
5 The BBC Television Newsreel’, PH Dort (1949) in McKernan (ed.), Yesterday’s News -  The 
British Cinema Newsreel Reader (2002). In 1950 343,882 people had television licences (Perilli, 
op.cit.).
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administration’s experience with the Press and highlighted the problems 
associated with trying to alter an established media within a democracy. Chapter 
four looked at the Government’s experience with the BBC and the difficulties that 
result from working too closely with a publicly funded media within a democracy. 
In this chapter, the Government’s experience of film-making is assessed in order 
to illustrate the problems associated with a democratic state producing its own 
media.
Films represent a particularly good example since this Government made so 
many of them. Between 1945-51 the Attlee Government produced more films for 
home consumption than any British peacetime Government before or since.6 In 
the three years from 1946 to 1949 alone the Central Office of Information made 
433 films.7 Most of these were short films of about 10 minutes in length but it also 
included a number of features (40-50 minute films).
The Government initially believed film could be used simply as a channel through 
which departments could pass information on to the public. By 1947 it realised 
that film was not a neutral channel and could not be used as such. At this point 
the Government could have retreated from its use of the medium but instead 
chose to embrace its powers in order to persuade and condition the people. By 
1949 this too had proved highly problematic and the Government adapted its 
ambitions.
But however many films the Government made, they would never be seen by as 
many people as saw the newsreels. Every programme in every cinema included 
a newsreel. Yet the Government virtually ignored the newsreels for its first two 
years in office. This may seem surprising given their popularity but can be partly
6 See Appendix B, Government Film Production.
7 Answer to Parliamentary Question, Sir T Moore to FS Treasury, Hansard, Written Answers, 25-7- 
1949, Vol.467, Col.93.
252
Chapter 5
explained by the lack of political information contained within them. This does not 
explain, however, why the Government, given its commitment to inform the 
people, failed to take any action to make the newsreels more informative.
There were serious deficiencies in communicating information via contemporary 
newsreels. First, the companies making the newsreels considered their purpose 
to be chiefly entertainment, rather than the communication of information. 
Second, their content was highly controlled by the five commercial newsreel 
companies that produced them. And third, the newsreels had a cavalier approach 
to factual accuracy. This will be illustrated in this chapter.
The chapter will seek to explain why Labour did not take action to resolve these 
deficiencies, and in so doing show that the Government was more concerned 
with altering the behaviour of confrontational media, such as the press, and 
perpetuating that of consensual media, than with creating a more open, 
democratic dialogue.
When, in 1947, the Government recognised the value of the newsreel, it did not 
seek to reform them but use them to its advantage. It started collecting stories 
and passing them on and even producing its own film material for screening. At 
the same time it seriously considered making an official newsreel to run 
alongside those of the commercial companies. This helped lead to a deterioration 
in the relationship between the Government and the newsreels, after which the 
Government became more conscious of their sensibilities and sought to work in 
partnership with them. But even then it sought to use the newsreels only to 
communicate its message rather than to make them more accurate, unbiased or 
independent. The development of this relationship reveals both the Government’s 
growing awareness of the power of visual media and its gradual adoption of 
modern news management techniques.
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Most of the work previously done about Government film-making at this time is 
written from the perspective of the documentary movement. In the writings, for 
example, of Paul Rotha, Elizabeth Sussex, Paul Swann, Jack Ellis, and Albert 
Hogenkamp.8 1945-51 is generally presented as the period of the decline of this 
movement, in which an unimaginative Labour Government failed to understand 
and utilise the value of documentary film. This perspective seems a little one­
sided. It does not take the Government’s position into account, nor does it locate 
the role of film in the Government’s broader information strategy. This chapter will 
not try to reassess the perceptions of the documentary movement but rather 
focus on those of the Government.
Although there has been a considerable amount of work done on newsreels in 
Britain before and during the Second World War, there has been very little written 
about them post-war. This is partly due to the limited source material.
The main sources of reference about newsreels and film-making during this 
period are the copious Government files (particularly those of the films division of 
the COI and the information committees), the films and newsreels themselves 
(those which still remain in the NFTVA, the IWM and online), the minutes of the 
Newsreel Association (NRA), the documents collected by the British Universities 
Film and Video Council, and contemporary trade journals. This chapter is based, 
as much as possible, on all these written and visual sources.
SECTION 1: Films And Newsreels In 1945
The Government’s Relations with Films bv 1945
Between 1939 and 1945 the Government made 726 films to aid in the war effort.9 
Many of these had been made by the Government’s own film production arm, the
8 See bibliography.
9 IH(0)(47)58, Memorandum, ‘COI Films: Production and Distribution', 30-12-1947, CAB 134/356.
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Crown Film Unit. The Coalition had also invested in and facilitated the production 
of a host of feature films, including 49th Parallel, Millions Like Us and Olivier’s 
Henry V. But 1939 was not the first time the British Government had been 
responsible for making movies.
It first became involved in film production during the First World War.10 Much of 
this involvement ceased with the disbanding of the Ministry of Information after 
the war. Some Government departments used film sporadically in the 1920s but 
neither widely nor consistently.11 Even Sir Stephen Tallents, Secretary of the 
newly formed Empire Marketing Board, who in 1926 decided to use film as a 
means of promoting the Empire overseas, saw it as only one of a number of 
methods available.12 But Tallents employed John Grierson who, on the strength 
of his first film, Drifters, created a film unit. Grierson went on to use this unit as 
the basis of a ‘documentary movement’ which then produced a series of films for 
the Government and for industry during the 1930s (first with the Empire 
Marketing Board, then as the General Post Office film unit), including Song of 
Ceylon, Night Mail and North Sea.
Two aspects of the origins of the relationship between the Government and the 
documentary movement are particularly relevant to this chapter. First, the 
movement’s promotion of the use of the documentary by the State as an 
instrument of social education and persuasion. As Grierson wrote in 1942, ‘the 
documentary idea was not basically a film idea at all, and the film treatment it 
inspired only an incidental aspect of it... The idea itself... was a new idea for
10 From two minute ‘advertisement’ films known as ‘film tags’ through factual films and newsreels to 
investment in Hearts of the World, a large scale dramatic film. See Rachel Low, The History of 
British Film 1914-18 (1950), pp.36-37.
11 Some Ministries, such as Health, made sporadic use of some film publicity, for example in 
promoting hygiene, (Paul Swann, The British Documentary Film Movement, 1926-1946 (1989), 
p.52).
12 As John Grierson wrote later, ‘In official records you would find the E.M.B. Film Unit tucked away 
in a long and imposing list of E.M.B. Departments and Sub-Departments, forty-five all told’, in The 
E.M.B. Film Unit’, in Forsyth Hardy (ed.), Grierson on Documentary (1946), p.97.
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public education, its underlying concept that the world was in a phase of drastic 
change affecting every manner of thought and practice, and the public 
comprehension of the nature of that change vital'.13 Soviet propaganda films of 
the 1920s were a strong primary influence on the development of these 
documentaries. Grierson wrote in 1937, ‘the documentary group has learned 
freely from Russian film technique’.14 Second, documentary’s intimate links with 
public relations. The first films were produced in order to market the British 
Empire. Later films in the 1930s were made to promote the Post Office or 
corporations such as Shell, the BBC and the Gas Light & Coke Company. As the 
documentary maker Paul Rotha wrote in 1946, 'Documentary’s main 
accomplishment, therefore, has been made possible only by sponsorship from 
outside the film industry’.15 The twin ideals of persuasion and promotion were 
both important in the use to which the documentary was put after 1945.
Though a good deal has been written about the documentary movement, the 
actual production of such films by the British Government in the 1930s was 
limited.16 It was not until the Second World War that the Government began to 
produce films in earnest, and then it did not restrict itself to documentaries. After 
a slow start, the Ministry of Information started making documentaries and 
feature films to increase morale, promote solidarity and communicate emergency 
information. After producing only 2 films in 1939 the Government made 72 in 
1940 and 160 in 1942.17 Many of these were only ten minutes in length but there
13 John Grierson, The Documentary Idea: 1942' Documentary News Letter 1942, in Grierson on 
Documentary (1946), p.180.
14 John Grierson, The Course of Realism’ (1937), reprinted in Grierson on Documentary (1946), 
p. 140.
15 Paul Rotha, ‘Documentary is Neither Short Nor Long’ (1946) in Rotha on the Film (1958), p.233.
16 The Arts Enquiry report states the documentary movement made over 300 films in the 1930s but 
many of these were non-Government sponsored and of those that were, Swann points out that the 
figure is inflated by the many 'simple and cheap instructional films made by the Post Office’ (op.cit. 
p.68).
17 Robert Fraser to Paymaster General, Evidence for Inquiry, 19-9-1947, CAB 124/1025.
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were also some longer features. The Government also supported the production 
of British films by commercial companies.
There were four ways in which the Government could distribute these films. The 
first was non-theatrical distribution. This involved regional film officers from the 
MOI screening films from mobile projectors to audiences in factories, schools, 
village halls, women’s societies etc.18 In 1946 there were 144 such mobile units.19 
The second was through a Central Film Library and regional film libraries. In 
these the Government held a number of copies of its films which it would lend 
out, free of charge, to local organisations to screen themselves. The third was 
through a theatrical distribution deal with the Cinema Exhibitors Association, 
which represented a large proportion of the cinemas in Britain.20 Through this 
deal, first agreed in 1940, the Government was able to screen a number of its 
short films in the cinema as well as Government trailers or ‘flashes’ -  essentially 
Government advertisements of under one minute in length. After 1943 this was 
fixed at 12 Government short films a year, or one a month, and 25-30 trailers.21 
The fourth and final means of distribution was commercial. The Government 
could, just like a private film distributor, try to secure commercial deals with 
cinemas. Only a limited number of Government films managed to find commercial 
distribution.22 By the end of the war the Government was making, on average, 
more than 10 films a month, or about 20 reels.23
18 See Helen (Lady) Forman (n6e Helen de Mouilpied), The non-theatrical distribution of films by 
the Ministry of Information’ in Pronay and Spring, Propaganda, Politics and Film, 1918-45, pp. 221- 
233.
19 ‘Shown by Request’, Crown Film Unit (CFU), 1946, INF 6/382.
20 The Government was also able to negotiate deals with the cinemas not represented by the CEA 
on a more ad hoc basis.
21 This enables us to have twelve films a year shown in over 3,000 cinemas each [out of a total of 
about 4,700], which is far wider distribution than any normal commercial film could ever get’ 
IH(0)(47)4t Memorandum, ‘Film Distribution: theatrical’, 7-2-1947, CAB 134/356.
22 6 in 1941, 7 in 1942, 12 in 1943 and 10 in 1944, according to IH(0)(47)58, ‘COI Films - 
Production and Distribution’, 30-12-1947, CAB 134/356.
23 Each reel equated to 1,000 feet of film which in turn equated to approximately 10 minutes.
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The Newsreel Set-Up by 1945
In 1945 there were five main newsreel companies in Britain; Pathe News, British 
Movietone News, Universal News, British Paramount News, and Gaumont British 
News. Each of them produced and distributed short news packages to the 4,703 
cinemas, which were then shown as part of a programme. The news packages 
were changed twice a week, on a Monday and a Thursday.
Ostensibly the newsreel industry was entirely commercial and free from 
Government influence, much like the newspapers. But in 1945 the newsreels, like 
the press, still laboured under the constraints imposed during the war. The 
shortage of film stock, for example, had led the Government to ration its use 
through the Board of Trade Economy Film Stock Order, introduced in 1943. This 
stated that if cinemas wished to show newsreels they must sign a ‘supplementary 
contract’ which committed them to a specific newsreel from a specific newsreel 
company. This was supposed to maximise the number of cinemas able to show a 
newsreel.24
Unlike the newspapers, the newsreels also suffered from strictly controlled 
access to sources of news. The rota system, introduced in 1943, stated that only 
one cameraman was allowed access to official events.25 The newsreels would 
decide which of them would send someone, and then share the film. During the 
war this made it less dangerous and less expensive for newsreel companies to 
gain footage, and allowed the Government to control newsreel access. It also 
meant that each of the newsreels screened the same material.
24 For a description of the Order and the supplementary contract see the Arts Enquiry report, The 
Factual Film (1947), p. 137.
25 This began as a ‘royal rota’ after a blackout on Royal news but then 'spread until it became 
routine for any event of security importance. Government departments arranged coverage through 
the Newsreel Association instead of dealing with individual companies’ (‘Newsreel Monopoly -  
Personal Statement by Alf Tunwell, Chief Cameraman, Telenews’, Impact, Spring 1949, pp.24-26).
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Though the newsreels often liked to compare their approach to news to that of 
the popular press, their chief similarity was their pursuit of popularity.26 The 
newsreels did not pursue as political an agenda as the press because they did 
not perceive this as their role. They covered mainly sports, staged events, and 
royalty. When they did mention politics the forcedly cheerful commentary and the 
background martial music militated against argument or complexity. Most political 
events were reported with little other than optimistic cliches and vivid adjectives 
(for example, “There is hope in the air for war-drained taxpayers” Pathe said of 
Dalton’s 1945 budget27). In the 1930s the newsreels had famously satirized 
rather than demonised the Nazis.
The newsreels were also even more blatant than the popular press in their 
relaxed attitude towards accuracy. If they were unable to film actual footage they 
would search for something useable from their film libraries, or, in some cases, 
stage reconstructions. This was well known by contemporaries. Len England 
wrote a number of reports for Mass-Observation in 1940, for example, in which 
he detailed the newsreels’ use of ‘prepared’ footage and reconstructions.28
But there was another aspect which made the newsreel industry distinct from 
newspapers. Since 1937 these five newsreel companies had worked closely 
together to plan and co-ordinate their output. In November of that year they 
formed an association, the Newsreel Association (NRA), to prevent competitive 
bidding for events becoming too expensive.29 From then on they would meet 
regularly to discuss bids for sports events, coverage of royalty, and the
26 ‘The wish to become the Northcliffe of the newsreels was habitually expressed by newsreel 
editors’, Nicholas Pronay, ‘British Newsreels in the 1930s: T (1971), reprinted in McKernan, 
Yesterday’s News.
27 Transcription of Pathe newsreel, Blessing from the Budget, 29-10-1945.
28 The Faking of Newsreels' (FR 16, LE 7.1.40), ‘Newsreel Report’ (FR 22, LE 28.1.40) and ‘Memo 
on Newsreels’ (FR 314, LE 2.8.40), by Len England in McKernan, Yesterday’s News.
29 This is how Alf Tunwell, Telenews, explained the formation of the NRA in his article for Impact 
(Spring 1949).
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newsreels’ approach to political issues.30 As soon as the war broke out the 
Government found the association very useful as a means of coordinating action 
with the newsreel companies and issuing directives. The association grew in 
strength as a consequence.
Expectation Of Change At End Of War
Given that the Government’s involvement with film before the war was limited and 
that film production and distribution was very costly, it might have seemed 
reasonable to expect that the Government might revert to such limited 
involvement at the war’s end. This was certainly the expectation if the 
Conservatives won the election. The documentary makers were particularly 
anxious, as Irmgarde Schemke wrote in 1948, that had the Tories gained power 
'it had been feared that the end of the war might see the end of regular 
government support to the Documentary units’.31
If the Government did continue to make films many people assumed that it would 
reduce its wartime output. A memorandum sent by the MOI to departments in 
February 1945 on the ‘Post War Film Needs of Govt Departments’ told them to 
assume, for example, that at the end of the war the CEA deal (in which 12 
Government short films and 25-30 Government trailers were screened in cinemas 
each year) ‘will probably cease’.32 That, though a few ‘general’ films may continue 
to be made, ‘only comparatively few Government films of exceptional merit which 
are likely to secure extensive paid showing’ would be shown in cinemas. And, 
that the main outlet for Government films would therefore be through non­
theatrical distribution.
30 See Newsreel Association Minutes (NRA), Box 1, Book 1, Minutes 1-659.1.11.37-17.4.1941,
The first meeting of the association is on the 1st November 1937, British Film Institute (BFI).
31 ‘Documentary Today’, Irmgarde Schemke, Sequence, Spring 1948, p.12.
32 MOI, memorandum sent to departments, ‘Post War Film Needs of Government Departments’, 22- 
2-1945, INF 1/947.
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Similarly, it would have seemed natural if the incoming Government had reduced 
its controls over newsreels. The post-war rationing of film stock was liable to 
continue until film stock became readily available, but there seemed little 
justification to continue the rota system, or the use of the NRA as a controlling 
body.
Indeed, given Labour’s commitment to a free press as illustrated in its election 
manifesto and its promise to prohibit ‘anti-social restrictive practices’ it would 
have seemed reasonable to assume that Labour would be unhappy with the 
structure of the newsreels. There was public concern about the Newsreel 
Association’s monopolistic tendencies. The controls exercised by the NRA clearly 
prevented the free expression of opinion. And, the newsreels themselves were 
well known for their lack of accuracy. These were the very reasons Morrison and 
others used to justify its appointment of a commission into the Press in October 
1946 (see Chapter Three). It would therefore seem appropriate that Labour 
launch a parallel inquiry into the newsreels.
The Government Decides to Maintain Film Production & Distribution
Even while the future of the COI remained unclear, between the end of the war 
and early 1946, there was hardly a lull in Government film making. Production 
persisted, and then increased. In 1945-6 there were 143 reels made and in 1946- 
7 148.33 Indeed by February 1947 the COI was having to turn down twice as 
many films as it accepted, demand from departments was so high.34 In addition, 
the Government not only maintained its non-theatrical distribution, it maintained 
its distribution with the CEA (and Rank and ABC), and its option to distribute films 
commercially.
33 COI Annual Report, 1947-48, Cmd.7567, p.22.
34 Robert Fraser to IH(O) meeting, 28-2-1947, CAB 134/356.
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There are four reasons that might explain why the Labour Government decided to 
continue to make these films. The war had shown that films could be a very 
powerful means of communication between the state and the people. Jack 
Beddington, head of the Films Division of the Ministry of Information during the 
war, argued this in a persuasive memorandum he wrote for the continuation of 
Government films in 1944.35 Beddington was one of a number of forceful 
advocates of film making. Their lobbying of the Government offers a second 
reason why Labour decided to continue making films. Particularly influential was 
a survey published by PEP on The Factual Film’ written by a group which 
included documentary makers like Paul Rotha and Basil Wright.36 John Grierson 
later argued that it was the documentary makers who had convinced the 
Government of the need for film. ‘A main point to remember’ he wrote in Sight 
and Sound, ‘is that the Government did not always want films. It was taught by 
the documentary people to want them because the documentary people saw the 
possibility of combining their interest in the medium with the Government’s 
interest in public service’.37 There was also inertia within the industry. Many 
production units had grown up purely on the back of official sponsorship.38 Many 
if not most of these would fold if the Government stopped making films. A fourth 
reason was the latent demand from departments for more films. This was
35 Jack Beddington, ‘Government Film Production and Distribution’. Though unsigned it is referred 
to as ‘Beddington’s report’ later in the file (handwritten note, GR, 30-8-1944), INF 1/947.
36 Arts Enquiry, The Factual Film (1947). Though not published until 1947 this report was written in 
1944. Hogenkamp identifies the members of the committee in Chapter 2 of his thesis, op.cit.
37 ‘Prospect for Documentary -  What is wrong and Why’, John Grierson, Sight and Sound, Vol. 17, 
No.66, Summer 1948.
38 Fraser identified 3 documentary units working before the war as compared to over 40 after it 
(Fraser, Evidence for Inquiry, 19-9-1947, CAB 124/1025).
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demonstrated by the results of a questionnaire sent out to departments by 
Bernard Sendall, the acting head of Films Division, in the spring of 1945.39
But the specific Government reasoning remains unclear. Morrison met the heads 
of the Ministry of Information on 15th October 1945 and was obviously aware of 
the MOI’s film production.40 But in his report on the Government Information 
Services he did not refer to films outside a very general context41 HG Welch, an 
official at the MOI, commented on this lack of clarity in a note to Bernard Sendall 
in October saying that whilst it was still unclear what was going to happen to 
films, it had to be assumed their future was wrapped up in the general question of 
Government Information Services42
It was not that Morrison was unconscious of the nature of film as a means of 
information and propaganda. The use to which the fascist governments had put 
film prior to and during the war was well known and documented. Moreover, 
Morrison was aware of John Grierson’s ideas about the importance of information 
as a progressive force. Morrison received a note from Grierson in late November 
on The Nature and Form of a Government Information Service’.43 The note 
began, ‘A Government Information Service may be, if it is so willed, a powerful 
instrument of national and international progress. Its form will reflect the degree 
of progressive or reactionary will which inspires it’. And it continued in the same 
vein, outlining how an information service should be structured to fulfil this end. 
Sir Stafford Cripps, who also received a copy, was so impressed that he
39 Bernard Sendall to SJ Fletcher, 11-4-1945, ‘Replies received to the questionnaire sent to 
interested departments by the DG show a strong body of opinion in favour of the continuance of 
Government film production and distribution, INF 1/947.
40 Morrison meeting with the MOI heads, 15-10-1945, CAB 124/988.
41 CP(45)316, ‘Government Publicity Services', Annex 1, Lord President, 23-11-1945, CAB 129/5.
42 HG Welch to Sendall, 18-10-1945, Reference F.1183, INF 1/947.
43 The Nature and Form of a Government Information Service', Grierson, 20-11-1945, CAB 
124/988.
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suggested Morrison send the note to the Prime Minister.44 Morrison forwarded it, 
but also advised Attlee that Grierson’s proposed scheme would be difficult to set 
up.45
Morrison was particularly concerned about the executive control of the 
information process in Grierson’s scheme. The Lord President’s plan for the 
process by which films were made was designed to be consistent with the 
Government’s intention to use films simply as a channel through which to pass 
information from the state to the citizen. This process was supposed to be as 
politically neutral as possible. A department would decide it had information 
which would best be communicated through film. It would approach the COI 
Films Division to discuss the idea and then together they would choose a film unit 
from which to commission the work.46 The film unit, presuming it accepted the 
commission, would draw up a treatment which would then be signed off by the 
COI and the department. Once the Treasury had then agreed the funding, the 
unit would produce the film 47
All this suggests that, as with other aspects of information policy, the Labour 
government was committed to communication through film in principle. As an 
editorial in the Documentary News Letter said in spring 1947, That the present 
Government realizes this [the importance of public communication] in theory is 
obvious from the fact that the Central Office of Information exists (the Tories 
might well have dispensed with it)'.48 But it also suggests that it wanted to restrict
44 Cripps to Morrison, 3-12-1945, CAB 124/988.
45 Morrison to Attlee, 5-12-1945, CAB 124/988. In particular, Morrison thought that Parliament 
would sit on it -  see hand written note to Pimlott on Nicholson letter, 4-12-1945.
46 In addition to the official Government film unit, the 'Crown Film Unit’, the COI and departments 
were free to offer their commissions to the independent film companies.
47 For a good description of the process see Philip Mackie's article, ‘Production History of a COI 
Film’, in Documentary News Letter, November-December 1947, Vol.6, No.60, p.157.
48 ‘Information Please’, Documentary News Letter, April-May 1947, Vol.6, No.56.
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its use to the passive transfer of information from state to citizen. Film was simply 
another means by which to facilitate this transfer.
No Inquiry Into the Newsreels
Despite the known monopolistic practices, the prevention of the free expression 
of opinion, and the regular inaccuracies within the newsreels, Ministers did not 
consider launching an inquiry or trying to alter the structure of the newsreel 
industry. Even when the suggestion was made that newsreels might be examined 
as part of the inquiry into the press, Morrison quickly dismissed the idea, 
suggesting that ‘these would take the Commission into the ramifications of the 
film industry’.49
In fact, in its first two years, the Government hardly thought about the newsreels 
at all, even in its review of the MOI and establishment of the COI. The most 
consideration they were given was regarding the establishment of a newsreel 
desk in the COI as a possible outlet for Government information.
This was the suggestion of a films subcommittee, set up in early 1946 to write 
recommendations on how to organise the COI Films Division. In its report the 
committee wrote that, ‘We believe that newsreels and film magazines, both in this 
country and abroad, will continue to provide a most valuable outlet for 
Government information, and we think that full use should be made of these 
media under the COI'.50 It therefore recommended the establishment of a 
newsreel desk and even discussed the qualifications of a possible appointment.51 
Ministers ignored the recommendations.
49 Cabinet Papers, CP(46)298, ‘Inquiry into the Press’, Lord President, 25-7-1946, CAB 129/11.
50 Report of Films Committee to advise on Films Division in COI, February/March 1946, INF 1/948.
51 Films Committee, 9th Meeting, 20-2-1946, INF 1/948.
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There are three key reasons that help to explain why the Labour Government did 
not try to restructure the newsreels after 1945. First, because they were not 
considered agents of political communication. Second, because the Government 
continued to enjoy significant direct and indirect control over the content of the 
newsreels through most of its periods in office. And third, because the newsreels 
were consistently supportive of Government policy, and maintained a remarkable 
degree of accommodating self-censorship throughout this period.
When Labour took office the newsreels were not considered important avenues 
of political communication. Their natural tendency was to avoid sensitive issues.52 
During the war the Government had worked with this tendency and concentrated 
on keeping sensitive news out of the newsreels rather than putting propaganda 
in.53 By 1945 the Government had no expectation that the newsreels would 
'break stories’ or run political exclusives. Neither did newsreels have that 
aspiration.54 Newsreels provided the audience with film footage of stories they 
had already read about in the newspapers or heard on the wireless. The lack of 
interest of Government Ministers in the newsreels is indicated by the almost 
complete absence of comment about them in Cabinet discussions or even 
amongst the members of the Ministerial Information Services Committee 
throughout the first two turbulent years of Labour’s administration.55
52 In the 1930s Pronay writes that The five newsreel Editors met regularly to decide on their 
policies concerning ‘touchy’ subjects and they abided by the agreements’. Nicholas Pronay, ’British 
Newsreels in the 1930s: 2’ (1972), McKernan p.148.
53 Pronay demonstrates this very clearly in The News Media at War1, in Pronay and Spring, op.cit. 
(1982), pp. 173-208.
54 For example, see Hannah Caven on coverage of concentration camps, ‘Horror in our time: 
images of the concentration camps in the British media, 1945’, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and 
Television, Vol.21, No 3, 2001 pp 205-53. The one exception after the war was the editor, Clement 
Cave, tried to take a more serious approach while at Path6 in 1947. The other newsreels did not 
follow suit and Cave was removed as editor of Path§ in June 1948. See Clement Cave, ‘Newsreels 
Must Find a New Policy’, Penguin Film Review, No.7,1948. Reprinted in McKernan, Yesterday’s 
News, pp.227-230.
55 Review of agendas of Cabinet 1945-47 and of Home Information Services (Ministerial) meetings. 
There is one memorandum by Morrison regarding technical advice for Ministerial film interviews, 
distributed to the IH committee in September 1946, (IH(46)9, 25-9-1946, CAB 134/354).
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A second reason why the Government did not seek to reform the newsreels was 
because it continued to maintain the controls over them that had been instituted 
immediately prior to and during the war. It kept the rota system which restricted 
the access of newsreel cameramen to many official events.56 It held onto the 
supplementary contracts which directed how many newsreels should be made 
and where they should go. And, it perpetuated its regular contacts with the 
newsreel companies via the individual departments and the Central Office of 
Information.
With the rota system departments maintained a significant degree of control over 
newsreel coverage. For example, when Morrison was given the freedom of 
Lambeth, the Secretary of the NRA informed the newsreel companies that they 
had been told ‘facilities for filming could be granted to one company only’. There 
was subsequently some discussion, ‘and it was decided to shout [sic] the event 
on rota -  British Movietonews were nominated as the result of a “draw”” .57 For 
the newsreels themselves the system reduced costs but also compromised their 
competitiveness and their freedom to cover the story as they chose. For the 
departments, it meant the ability to dictate what would be filmed and how.
Even so, the newsreels were willing to accept its perpetuation. It was not until 
1948 that the NRA began to lobby to change the system. ‘After discussion’ in an 
NRA meeting of 26th January 1948 ‘it was unanimously agreed that a letter 
should be sent to the ACT [Association of Cine-Technicians] stressing the NRA’s 
ingrained dislike of the rota system, and our resistance to it since its inception’.58 
Yet despite this dislike they let the system continue. Alf Tunwell, a cameraman
56 Limited space was normally cited as the reason for this restriction. Only one cameraman, for 
example, was allowed to film in Number 10. Correspondence with John Turner, Gaumont British 
newsreel cameraman, 20-9-2004.
57 NRA minutes, 29-9-1947, min.2414, ‘Freedom of Lambeth to Rt Hon Herbert Morrison, October 
31st 1947’.BFI
58 NRA minutes, 26-1-1948, min.2487. See also discussions in meeting of 15-1-1948.
267
Chapter 5
for the non-NRA company Telenews, complained in the spring of 1949 that he 
was still blocked from events because he was not on the rota.59
The supplementary contracts also outlasted the war. As explained above these 
legislated that, due to the shortage of film stock, the exhibitors had to subscribe 
to a certain newsreel indefinitely and agree to buy every copy at a fixed price. 
The newsreel would then be shared with other local cinemas (called 
‘crossovers’).60 Though this ensured the income of the newsreel companies it 
also discouraged innovation and investment. It is symptomatic of the inertia of the 
newsreel companies that the NRA discussed the cancellation of the contracts in 
November 1945 but decided not to challenge them.61 The contracts were only 
broken in 1950 when Sidney Bernstein, an independent exhibitor, threatened to 
challenge the controls order in each of his 38 cinemas.62
Further evidence that the newsreels, far from seeking independence from the 
Government, sought to perpetuate their wartime collaboration, comes from their 
formal and informal contacts with departments and the COI after the war. During 
the conflict each of the newsreel companies was assigned to one or more 
Government departments. They were then the sole liaison for that department 
and were the only company with the right of separate approach. Though the NRA 
discussed changing this system after the war they decided not to.63
Similarly, they continued their regular meetings with the MOI and its successor, 
the COI. Every week they would screen the newsreels at the COI offices at
59 Alf Tunwell, ‘Newsreel Monopoly’, Impact, Spring 1949, pp.24-26.
60 For a good, short description of the agreement see memorandum from AG White (BoT), 21-1- 
1948, INF 12/565.
61 NRA minutes, min.2039, 22-11-1945.BFI
62 See Caroline’s Moorehead biography of Bernstein (1984), pp.191-192. For a full examination of 
the supplementary contract system see Enticknap PhD (1999), The Non-Fiction Film in Britain, 
1945-51’, Ch.2.
63 See NRA minutes for: 11-7-45 (min.1938), 24-1-46 (min.2058), 22-7-46 (min.2192), 15-1-48 
(min.2475, discussion of whether to discontinue arrangement), 26.2.48 (min.2505, decision to 
continue as is), 5-8-48 (min.2614).BFI
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Norgeby House on Baker Street.64 Every fortnight they would meet with a COI 
representative to discuss the newsreels.65 The purpose of these meetings was 
indicated at an Economic Information Committee meeting in November 1947; 
The regular meeting of the COI with the newsreel companies would continue to 
serve as the channel for communicating to the companies such stories as depts. 
felt should be covered for policy’.66 The NRA was even willing to supply footage 
to documentary producers for departmental shorts or industrial films on request.67
Therefore the post-war audiences were watching newsreel footage for which 
access had been determined and defined by the Government, where political 
content had almost certainly been discussed with the department concerned, 
where the finished product had been pre-screened at the COI, and which was the 
same across the country.
This raises the third reason why Ministers did not contemplate change. Though 
the newsreels have often been criticised as politically biased, the evidence 
suggests that after 1945 this bias was not Party political but pro-establishment. It 
is true that the newsreels had been willing to work closely with the Conservatives 
in the 1930s, and that Movietone News was part owned by Associated 
Newspapers and produced films on behalf of the Conservative Party.68 However, 
this did not stop the newsreels themselves being supportive of the Labour 
Government in the 1940s. The minutes of the Newsreel Association and the
64 NRA minutes, 24-1-1946, min.2060, decision to maintain MOI meetings and screenings. 
Maintained until 1948. Thereafter moved to own cinemas, NRA minute 2659, 28-10-1948.BFI
65 Though no minutes of the fortnightly meetings have been kept, they are referred to by the EIC in 
1947, e.g., 10-10-1947, Mr. Kitchin talks about ‘the fortnightly newsreel meeting at the COI’, CAB 
134/361.
66 IH(0)(E)(47)14th, Minutes, 14-11-1947, CAB 134/361.
67 NRA minutes, min.2159, ‘Supply of Film for Government Shorts’, 20-5-1946.BFI
68 See Timothy Hollins, The Conservative Party and Film Propaganda Between the Wars’, E.H.R., 
Vol.96, No.379, April 1981, pp.359-369.
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commentary from the newsreels themselves suggest that they believed they were 
pursuing a national consensus, not a political agenda.69
Certainly in the 1945 election the newsreels went so far out of their way to avoid 
accusations of bias that they copied the BBC and offered a fixed amount of 
footage to the respective leaders of the three principal parties.70 Moreover, after 
1945 there was very rarely any direct criticism of the Government. Even attempts 
at ‘balance’ elicited sharp retorts from MPs.71
Generally the newsreels were desperate to emphasise their patriotism and to 
promote the status quo. They repeatedly stressed collective responsibility and 
frowned upon any deviation from the norm. They were strongly against unofficial 
strikes, for example. Reporting from Lowestoft and Yarmouth on the unofficial 
dockers’ strikes of October 1946 the Pathe news commentator said that this was 
‘a picture which ought never to be seen in food hungry Britain... of this year’s 
crop of strikes the vast majority are unofficial, in all of them, the public suffers. 
Again, was it necessary?’.72
They were also supportive of Government campaigns. When the Government 
was exhorting people to 'Work or Want’, a March 1947 Pathe report on the 
economic situation told the audience that “We, the people of Britain, must 
produce more or we shall see our standard of living fall”.73 Similarly, on 
Movietone’s end of year review, the commentator reported that ‘Sir Stafford
69 When they were accused of party political bias, in Tribune in August in 1949, they were grossly 
offended and decided to review their public relations as a consequence. See NRA meeting minutes 
September -  December 1949.
70 Gerald Sanger (Movietonews), Clifford Jeapes (Universal) and Castleton Knight (Gaumont 
British) thought this ‘would avoid any criticism of newsreel bias in political matters’. NRA minutes, 
31-5-1945.
71 Sanger wrote that Movietone was attacked by Jennie Lee in Tribune when it showed a 
‘dissatisfied housewife’ after an interview with Sir Ben Smith on a news item about reduced rations. 
‘Propaganda and the Newsreel’, Sight and Sound, Vol.15, No.59, Autumn 1946, pp.79-80.
72 Transcript of Path§ newsreel, Talking Points. End the Strikes’, 14-10-1946.
73 Transcript of Path6 newsreel, ‘Battle of Britain’, 17-3-1947.
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Cripps came in to mobilize industry and manpower for the mammoth task of 
closing the gap between imports and exports. Can it be done?’ Movietone asked, 
‘Yes it can, by hard work and self-denial’.74
The COI was so pleasantly surprised by the support of the newsreels that in 1947 
it commented that ‘their readiness to be helpful in such matters as the screen 
interviews and in the inclusion of brief contributions to current campaigns has 
been far greater than the Central Office ever expected’.75
That the newsreels’ approach fitted with the Government’s economic campaigns 
was not accidental. Gerald Sanger, editor of Movietone News, writing in Sight 
and Sound in the autumn of 1946, acknowledged and defended the newsreels’ 
support for the Government’s campaigns. He argued that a newsreel would be 
‘neglecting its duty’ if it did not try to explain why Britain was in such a difficult 
economic situation. Moreover, he said, since there was a need for exports and a 
Government production drive was in progress, ‘Were the newsreels wrong to 
support this drive with their pictures and commentary? Are the newsreels wrong 
in dealing with a similar campaign to increase coal output?’.76
There was also a remarkable degree of NRA caution and self-censorship which 
worked in the Government’s favour. Newsreels that strayed outside this 
consensual agenda were admonished by their colleagues within the Association. 
British Movietone News was officially censured for the way in which it had acted 
during the fuel crisis, ‘when the exigencies of the fuel shortage called for urgent 
and complete cooperation’. And, in future, the other members agreed that ‘any
74 Transcript of Movietone newsreel, ‘1947 and After’, 29-12-1947.BFI
75 IH(0)(47)5, Memorandum, ‘Newsreels and official publicity (memo by the COI)’, 19-2-1947, CAB 
134/356.
76 Gerald Sanger, ‘Propaganda and the Newsreel’, op.cit. This is doubly surprising since Sanger 
was the Conservative Party’s principal adviser on film at this time (Hollins, op.cit.).
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action decided upon shall be subject to a majority vote, to which any dissenting 
party and/or parties, shall strictly adhere’.77
With this degree of support and self censorship it is understandable that Labour 
Ministers did not feel it needed to restructure the newsreels. It believed they were 
of limited value as communicators of political information, and that the infrequent 
messages that were communicated were consistent with Government policy. As 
a memorandum to the Home Information Services committee commented in the 
midst of the fuel crisis of February 1947, The Newsreel companies continue to 
be very cooperative in their own conventional and unimaginative way’.78 Indeed 
the dearth of discussion about the newsreels and the lack of attention devoted to 
them (as compared to the other media) indicates that Ministers and officials took 
them for granted and tended to ignore them.
The Government’s neglect of the newsreels indicates that its concern regarding 
the media as a means of political communication with the electorate only 
extended to confrontational media, or -  as will be shown below -  when the 
Government needed the media as a means of pursuing policy. Though 
understandable, it was a reflection of contradictions within Government policy 
given Labour’s stated commitment to ‘factual accuracy’ and the ‘free expression 
of opinion’, and given the importance of the cinema in reaching many people who 
would not be reached by other means of political information.
The Production of ‘Information’ Films Proves Unsustainable
By 1947 it was clear that there were serious problems associated with the 
process of producing neutral Government information films. The first was that, 
without some criteria by which to rank the films, it was very difficult to prioritise
77 NRA minutes, min.2335, vote of censure on British Movietonews, 20-2-1947.BFI
78 IH(0)(47)5, Memorandum, ‘Newsreels and Official Publicity’, 19-2-1947, CAB 134/356.
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one over another. Not only did this make the job of the COI very difficult 
(particularly in negotiating with departments), it meant decision making and film 
making took a long time.79 Sometimes the process would take so long that 
Government policy had moved on before a film was started. The film 
‘International Trade’, for example, commissioned by the Prime Minister’s office in 
1946, was supposed to 'explain and praise multilateral trading’ but had to be 
dropped by the Board of Trade when Britain was forced back onto bilateral 
trading in 1947.80
There was also no underlying plan or strategy (although this was again consistent 
with the production of purely informational films). This meant the COI and the film 
makers lacked purpose and focus.81 John Grierson, once again writing advice to 
the Lord President’s Office, said in August 1947 that They [the documentary 
makers] say they have lost the conception of a total driving plan for the use of the 
documentary film in the urgent service of the nation’.82
Even more important, this neutral process of film making tended to lead to the 
production of tedious films. For example, two of the theatrical monthly releases 
for 1946 and 1947, Getting on with it (Merlin and Films of Fact compilation for 
COI 1946) and Introduction to Aircraft Recognition (CFU for War Office 1947), 
both of which were intended for a general audience. The first film was made up of 
three short film packages, the second titled ‘Photo-Elastic Technique in Industrial 
Research’. The subtitle, ‘The Research Department makes a modification to the
79 Paul Rotha complained in 1947 that ‘there seemed to be no justification for many of the 
cancellations made by the COI and the net result was certainly not to make films impact on the 
public more timely and therefore telling'. Interview No.1, Marquand Inquiry, 25-9-1947, CAB 
124/1028.
80 International Trade (One World), script written by Realist. Failure described in Philip Mackie 
memorandum on ‘COI “Feature’’ Films’, 10-5-1949, INF 12/542.
81 The documentary producers Sinclair Road and Mr Alexander (Federation of Documentary Film 
Units) thought the COI ‘tackled programming in a haphazard way. There was no sense of urgency, 
no leadership or imagination'. Interview No.15, Marquand Inquiry, CAB 124/1028.
82 ‘UK Documentary Film Problems 1947’ Grierson, attached to accompanying letter by Grierson to 
Nicholson, 14-8-1947, CAB 124/1025.
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cylinder head of the Sabre Aero engine’ quite accurately describes what the 
package contained.83
Straight information films such as this could be said to be consistent with the 
theoretical principle of informing the public but were inconsistent with film-making. 
Not only were ambitious documentary makers losing enthusiasm for making 
them, distributors were not keen to try to rent them. Cumberland Story, a four reel 
second feature, which was produced for commercial distribution, was turned 
down by all distributors ‘because too political and too dull a subject \ 84 Similarly 
The World is Rich, ‘a grim and harrowing piece full of social conscience, having 
been rejected by all the major renters, has just now found a potential dealer who 
strongly recommends heavy cuts and the removal of “some of all that misery”.85 
Exhibitors were equally loath to show information-led and over-worthy films for 
fear of alienating the audience.
Though the Government was able to make and distribute its neutral ‘information 
films’ for a brief period after the war, by 1947 the situation was becoming 
increasingly untenable. The documentary makers were becoming very frustrated 
and highly critical. The distributors and exhibitors were becoming unhappy. But it 
was the fuel crisis which highlighted the unsustainability of the situation and 
triggered a significant change in direction.
SECTION 2:1947 Review
Following the fuel crisis of 1947 the Government reviewed its approach to 
communications. As outlined in previous chapters the Government came to 
believe that, up to this point, it had failed to communicate its position adequately 
to the electorate. As part of this review it began to change its approach towards
83 ‘Getting on with It’ (Merlin and Films of Fact compilation for CO11946), viewed at BFI.
84 Tritton to Malherbe, ‘Notes on Theatrical Distribution’, 2-12-1947, INF 12/564.
85 Tritton to Sendall, 2-12-1947, INF 12/564. The World is Rich, Films of Fact, 1947.
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newsreels and towards films. It sought to make the films more topical and 
immediate. It created a central unit, the Economic Information Unit, which, 
amongst its other roles, was to coordinate and commission films on economic 
themes. It looked for ways to enhance links with the newsreel companies, and 
started to develop its own ‘official’ newsreel. And it established an informal inquiry 
to study the causes of the breakdown between the COI Films Division and the 
film makers.
In the midst of the fuel crisis itself the COI began to consider how it might better 
exploit the newsreels as an avenue of communication and persuasion. In 
February 1947 it wrote a memorandum on this topic for the official Home 
Information Services committee (IH(O)). The memorandum emphasised The 
enormous coverage and capacity for useful publicity of the newsreels’.86 It 
outlined how, during the war, the Government was able to influence this capacity 
by providing facilities, controlling sources, passing on ‘ready made’ film footage to 
the newsreel companies, and making film stock concessions in return for 
coverage of issues in which departments were interested.87 Since the end of the 
war it had let this leverage slip. The departments still had ‘direct contact’ with the 
companies and the COI maintained ‘close and friendly liaisons’ with the NRA. But 
perhaps the consistent support from the newsreels had made the Government 
complacent.
The COI felt it was time for a more active engagement. It revisited the idea of a 
‘newsreel desk’ and made its functions more explicit. There was a general 
feeling’ amongst the IH(O) committee ‘that the newsreel medium had not been 
exploited to the limit’. It therefore approved the setting up of a newsreel desk.88
86 IH(0)(47)5, Memorandum, ‘Newsreels and Official Publicity', 19-2-1947, CAB 134/356.
87 Ibid.
88 IH(0)(47)3rd, Minutes, 14-3-1947, CAB 134/356.
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No immediate action was taken, however. The subsequent reason given was that 
no suitable candidate could be found.89 But the lack of action was also a 
consequence of much more substantial developments in Government 
communication, the creation of the Economic Information Unit (EIU) and 
Economic Information Committee (EIC).
This Committee, whose origins are discussed in Chapter One, was responsible 
not only for the coordination of economic information but also for commissioning 
films and other information media. Clem Leslie, head of the EIU and chair of the 
EIC, already had experience, in the 1930s, of commissioning films for the Gas 
Coke & Light company.90 Leslie was conscious that part of his remit included 
adding urgency to the communication of Government information. He 
immediately set out to review how films could help do this.
But even before the establishment of the EIC the COI had started to address the 
problem of topicality. In the wake of the fuel crisis it had hastily established a 
reporting unit within the Crown Film Unit. This unit was supposed to develop 
more films which ‘try to get close to the pulse of public opinion, and then do 
something about it.91 ‘We call it “reportage”’ Ronald Tritton, head of the COI 
Films Division, wrote to Sendall, ‘for convenience to distinguish this method of 
making films from “documentary”. Documentary is leisured, often old fashioned in 
technique and made -  alas -  without much sense of timing. It seldom hits the 
public where the public lives, and is often way up in the clouds. Reportage is 
meant to be the opposite kind of thing’.92
89 The IH(O) Committee subsequently claimed that this was because there was not a suitable 
qualified candidate for the position, memorandum, IH(0)(49)16, 2-3-1949, CAB 134/358.
90 See Marquand Inquiry, Interview No.9, Helen de Mouilpied, CAB 124/1028.
91 Ronald Tritton to Bernard Sendall, reference FM 82/83, ‘Crown Reporting Unit’, 16-6-1947, INF 
5/39.
92 Ibid.
276
Chapter 5
Leslie took this much further. In only the second meeting he chaired, in June 
1947, his committee discussed how it could make current films more topical.93 
The EIC wanted to give films an immediacy they currently lacked, and develop 
morale-boosting pictures that gave context to the various crises that people in 
Britain were facing. Robert Fraser, writing to Sendall after the meeting, described 
how they wanted films to imbue the current economic battle with the status and 
urgency of the epic battles of the war. The people of Britain, Fraser wrote, ‘are 
waging a battle for coal, a battle for food, clothes and houses, and a battle for 
exports’, ‘...while the struggle lasts,’ he asked ‘cannot a film be made to chronicle 
regularly the successes and setbacks, the human details and the national 
purposes?’.94
Amongst other proposals the committee members thought about was what to do 
with an industrial film currently being made for non-theatrical distribution, called 
‘Britain Can Make It’. At the time this was a conscientious, unambitious cine- 
magazine usually made up of three separate stories, one scientific, one industrial 
and one social. The EIC wanted to change this into a newsreel. This would not 
only make it feel more immediate and topical but ‘had the additional advantage of 
providing the Central Office with ready-made material for possible supply to the 
commercial newsreel companies’.95
As the summer wore on the committee’s ambitions for this ‘factory newsreel’ 
increased. Until mid September 1947 the intention was to keep it for non­
theatrical distribution. But on the 19th Fraser told the committee that there was a 
chance of getting the film distributed to cinemas nationwide via the CEA. This 
would transform the size of the potential audience. Moreover, Fraser said it could
93 IH(0)(E)(47)2nd, Minutes, 19-6-1947, 'Films on economic and production themes’, CAB 134/361.
94 Robert Fraser to Sendall, 23-6-1947, INF 5/39.
95 IH(0)(E)(47)10th, Minutes, ‘Film Programme -  Factory Newsreel’, 29-8-1947, CAB 134/361.
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still be distributed non-theatrically and the theatrical release would not ‘impede 
the flow of material to the newsreel companies’.96
If the newsreel was to reach this many people, then it had to have compelling 
stories. The same month an advisory briefing committee was therefore formed in 
order to start ‘systematically supplying the COI with material for the factory 
newsreel, and planning the overall policy’.97 Even before the new newsreel was 
produced, this committee began passing stories on to the existing newsreel 
companies. Indeed by October Leslie was already able to report to the Economic 
Planning Board that ‘a method of liaison is now in operation which enables the 
newsreels to draw fairly widely on official suggestions about material and enables 
departments and the Economic Information Unit to put their proposals forward 
effectively. In one week recently the newsreels contained eight different items on 
industrial and economic subjects, all originating from departments’.98
Throughout the autumn the committee discussed how to make the official 
newsreel effective by presenting economic material in a striking way. The EIC 
wanted to show people the dramatic and heroic nature of the struggle ahead, 
'Above all there must always be present a sense of urgency and a feeling of 
activity’.99 But at the same time the newsreel must remain credible. The 
committee stressed that though the main emphasis should be on good news and 
success stories the newsreel ‘must be more than ready to produce bad news for 
its audiences, not only so that they may know the real position, but also because
96 IH(0)(E)(47)11th, Minutes, ‘Economic Information Programme -  Films’, 19-9-1947, CAB 134/361.
97 Ibid.
98 ‘Crisis Publicity -  Note from the Economic Information Unit’, E.P.B. 47, October 1947, T245/2.
99 IH(0)(E)(47)54, Memorandum, ‘Directive on Factory Newsreel’, 6-11-1947, CAB 134/363.
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the presentation of bad news increases the credibility of the rest of the 
material’.100
So excited were they about the potential of the newsreel that though the 
committee considered substituting the current monthly Government film release 
with the new official newsreel they decided that it would be more effective to have 
both.101
This newsreel, and the other proposals being considered by the EIC, were 
already moving rapidly away from the neutral information films envisioned by the 
Government when it decided to set up the COI in 1945. Two people at the COI 
Films Division were very conscious of this movement; Ronald Tritton, head of the 
Division, and Helen de Mouilpied, Chief Production Officer. Since the move first 
became explicit, in June 1947, they had both been considering the implications 
for Government policy. ‘It has been suggested’, Tritton then wrote, ‘that the Films 
Division could ‘do more to inform the public on the situation in the country and 
should be making films planned to lift morale by means of an appeal to the 
emotions comparable to that which was achieved by some wartime films’.102
However, Tritton was uncomfortable with the shift in policy and listed six reasons 
why it might be difficult. The first and most important was that during the war the 
policy line had been ‘clear and straight’. Now, ‘The themes are themselves 
intensely complex. They are confused by politics. They are unpalatable to the 
audience because they have no heroic stature in themselves’.103 Helen de
100 Ibid.
101 IH(0)(E)(47)13th, Minutes, ‘Economic Information - Films Programme’, 31-10-1947, CAB 
134/361. See also ‘Report by Films Subcommittee’ -  based on a meeting held on 23-10-1947, 
IH(O)(E)(47)50, CAB 134/363.
102 Memorandum by Ronald Tritton, 1-7-1947, to Bernard Sendall, Films Division, regarding films 
suggestion, INF 12/564.
103 Ibid.
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Mouilpied agreed, writing that ‘Warfare is rich documentary material, (“the 
dramatic interpretation of reality"). White papers are not’.104
This brought Tritton to his second point, about the audience: The whole country 
is not behind the present methods of tackling the aftermath of war problems. 
Perhaps only half agree with the policies and a further large proportion are totally 
uninterested. The result is that every audience has a large proportion of cynics, 
doubters, the bored and the frankly antagonistic. This makes a pretty formidable 
core of audience resistance’.105 To overcome such resistance the Government 
would have to make considerable adaptation to the current factual films, and 
maybe even expand into non-factual features as well.
De Mouilpied reiterated Tritton’s point, indeed assumed that the Government 
realised that its new ambitions could only be achieved if it expanded from short 
documentaries into producing fictional feature films. ‘In making these 
recommendations’ she wrote, ‘it is assumed that Government film making is not 
necessarily documentary film making, that although documentaries will still have 
their place, the main effort of present Government propaganda can only be made 
through ‘feature’ films of from 10 minutes to 90 minutes in length’.106 De 
Mouilpied seemed already to be assuming that these films should be classified as 
‘propaganda’.
Morale films did not fit the original, politically neutral intention of COI film making. 
They were likely to be more general than departmental. They required argument 
and persuasion rather than straight information. They were unlikely to be aimed 
at a single, specific, direct reaction. These issues were brought home to the 
committee when, in early September, the Treasury refused to approve funding for
104 Helen de Mouilpied, ‘Draft Memorandum on Production Prospects’, 16-7-1947, INF 12/564.
105 Ronald Tritton, op.cit., INF 12/564.
106 De Mouilpied, op.cit., INF 12/564.
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‘The Changing Face of Britain’. This film, though sponsored by Town & Country 
planning, was supposed to have a more general appeal, to ‘lift people’s eyes 
from the fish queues’ and give them some hope for the future.107 The Treasury 
did not think the film was consistent with the remit of Government films.
Until the autumn of 1947 the change in approach to films and newsreels had 
mainly been due to the pragmatic reaction of the EIC to circumstances. A more 
fundamental shift in Government approach required backing from senior 
Government Ministers. This only came after the Paymaster General delivered the 
results of his film enquiry in October 1947.
The Findings and the Repercussions of the Marauand Inquiry
In the summer of 1947 Herbert Morrison decided to set up an informal enquiry 
into the relationship between the COI and the documentary film units, to be led by 
the Paymaster General, Hilary Marquand. The inquiry had been triggered by the 
deterioration of this relationship. Marquand collected information from the COI, 
and interviewed COI officials, Treasury officials and documentary film makers.108 
He split the conclusions of his enquiry into ‘process’ and ‘purpose’. Regarding 
process he concluded that though the film makers were justified in feeling 
frustrated by the various interruptions and cancellations, their problems were just 
as much caused by the natural decrease in demand for documentaries after the 
war coupled with the glut of documentary companies searching for work.109
Regarding ‘purpose’, Marquand’s most serious allegation, and one which was to 
lead to a more fundamental rethink in the Government’s use of film, was that ‘in 
dealing with the most creative and artistic of all media of information, the film, we
107 IH(0)(47)42) Memorandum, ‘COI Films’, in the words of the Director of the Films Division, 3-9- 
1947, CAB 134/356.
108 See Marquand, ‘Documentary Film Enquiry. Terms of Reference’, 9-10-1947, CAB 124/1026.
109 Ibid. Regarding the COI, Marquand particularly blamed, as the documentary makers did, its lack 
of departmental status.
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are tending -  I say no more -  to limit ourselves too closely to mere information. 
Somehow -  perhaps not in every film -  we must get more inspiration. The 
creative spirit should blow more freely’ [his underlining].110 Marquand believed 
that this focus on ‘mere information’ was leading to a slump in motivation 
amongst the film makers and the consequent production of uninspiring films. 
John Grierson (writing from his position at UNESCO in Paris) had already made a 
similar complaint that Government films were not ‘firing the public will’.111
The importance of Marquand’s allegation, and his recommendation deriving from 
it, has to be emphasised. Until 1947 the intention behind Government 
communication had been to provide information. Marquand believed this was 
simply not enough.
Government Reaction to the Problems and to the Marquand Report
Government Ministers and officials could have reacted in a number of ways. They 
could have accepted that it was difficult to make straight information films and 
focused on other means of communication. They could have conceded that the 
Government could not continue to press information films on a general cinema 
audience and reverted to specialised audiences and non-theatrical distribution. 
Or they could have altered Government policy, accepted Marquand’s 
recommendations and not limited themselves to information but let the ‘creative 
spirit blow more freely’. They decided to do the latter.
Robert Fraser, DG of the COI, wrote his reaction to the report on the 1st 
November, ‘We all agree most warmly with what we take to be the sense of the 
main paragraph -  that we must make films that change people’s moods and 
attitudes as well as films that just inform... The creative spirit must find an ally in
110 ibid.
111 ‘UK Documentary Film Problems 1947’ Grierson memorandum, attached to accompanying letter 
by Grierson to Nicholson, 14-8-1947, CAB 124/1025.
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the technique of showmanship, in entertainment value, and in rugged 
promotion’.112 On the 5th November Marquand spoke to Morrison and the Lord 
President agreed.113 In addition Morrison felt the COI should ‘take full advantage 
of the recommendation in paragraph 7c that it should itself initiate the making of 
films of wider scope... [and] The EIC are rightly already taking a wide view of 
their functions in the economic field, and I endorse the recommendation in 
paragraph 8b that they should be encouraged to continue’.114 Martli Malherbe, a 
member of Leslie’s EIU, endorsed the report but added that it was not just a case 
of making films more inspirational, they must have a clear persuasive objective. 
‘COI should appreciate’ Malherbe wrote to Leslie on 11th November, ‘that the 
Sponsor department have, or should have, when they commission a film, a 
definite propaganda purpose in mind'.115 Malherbe's use of the word 'propaganda' 
illustrates how acceptable this previously resisted approach to Government 
communication was becoming.
At 5pm on Wednesday 12th November the Ministerial Home Information Services 
committee met at 11 Downing Street to discuss the Paymaster General’s report 
and Morrison’s response.116 The Ministers not only approved the 
recommendations of the report but supported an even greater use of film. Harold 
Wilson, the new President of the Board of Trade, argued that ‘In addition to these 
considerations an increase in the number of documentary films was important 
from the aspect of public morale, for example it would be helpful if additional films 
could be produced showing various aspects of food production’. Aneurin Bevan 
‘welcomed the proposal in the report that the documentary film unit should be
112 Note by Robert Fraser, response to Marquand report, 1-11-1947, CAB 124/1026.
113 JA Lidderdale, Lord President’s Office, to EM Nicholson, 6-11-1947, CAB 124/1026.
114 Morrison response to Marquand, 11-1(47)12, ‘Documentary Film Enquiry’, 10-11-1947, CAB 
134/354.
115 Malherbe to Leslie, 11-11-1947, CAB 124/1026.
116 IH(47)2nd, Minutes, 12-11-1947, CAB 134/354.
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encouraged by the Government to embark on the production of film which would 
stress the achievements of the present Government in various fields. There 
would for example be room for an impressive film on the results of the housing 
drive’.117
Patrick Gordon Walker, newly appointed as assistant to Morrison on information 
matters, was keen that Marquand's report be put into action quickly and 
‘therefore proposed that he should seek from the Lord President a specific remit 
to follow up the carrying out of the recommendations’.118 Having been given this 
remit Gordon Walker set to work with the COI to shift the films policy, to resolve 
some of the tensions with the Treasury, and to consider how to enhance 
Government film distribution.
There were four important consequences of this shift in 1947. There was an effort 
by Government to force its official factory newsreel into cinemas, alongside the 
existing commercial newsreels. There was a more conscious attempt to expand 
the remit of films and move away from ‘mere information’. There was a concerted 
effort to impose a coherent information strategy on the films programme in order 
to make it a much more effective instrument in the education and persuasion of 
the electorate. Critical in this effort was the employment of John Grierson as the 
new head of the films division in 1948. And there was an attempt to maintain and 
enhance theatrical distribution and to breathe new life into non-theatrical 
distribution. This was not a Government winding down its films operation. Quite 
the reverse, Labour was now consciously trying to use film as an instrument of 
policy.
117 Ibid.
118 JA Lidderdale on behalf of Gordon Walker, 19-11-1947, CAB 124/1026.
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The Government’s Own Newsreel
Clem Leslie recognised that the EIC’s official newsreel had a much greater 
chance of being distributed to cinemas across the country after the Ministerial 
meeting of 12th November 1947. He was keen that this enthusiasm of senior 
Ministers regarding the influence of film be directed towards this as well as other 
specific objectives. He therefore wrote to the Chancellor, ‘knowing his interest in 
films in general’, to point out that the real issue was with distribution, not with 
production. He drafted a note for the Chancellor to write to Morrison, suggesting 
that ‘one ten-minute film a month does not take us very far’ (Leslie ignored the 
trailers and commercially distributed films) and that the Government should aim 
to add the factory newsreel to the film programme. He went so far as to write on 
the Chancellor’s behalf that ‘Efforts are to be made to persuade the exhibitors to 
give it [the factory newsreel] general showing once a month in addition to the 
present free ten minute film’.119
On 11th December 1947 the Chancellor signed this note and sent it to Morrison. 
A few days later Bernard Sendall, head of production at the COI, met up with 
W.R. Fuller, the General Secretary of the CEA, to discuss the issue. At the 
meeting Fuller suggested that, were the Government to make some concessions 
on the ration on film stock for the newsreels, the exhibitors might consider taking 
on another film.120 Sendall took this up with the Board of Trade, telling them that 
the inclusion of the official newsreel in cinema programmes had the ‘strong 
personal blessing of the Chancellor of the Exchequer’.121 The Board of Trade 
then discussed the issue of film with Kodak. Kodak were reluctant to release any
119 SCL (Leslie) to Spicer (Treasury), 9-12-1947, CAB 124/1027.
120 Sendall to Lidderdale, 22-12-1947, INF 12/564. Though Sendall’s letter suggests the concession 
was Fuller’s idea it does seem highly coincidental that the General Secretary of the CEA should 
suggest it just at this moment, unprompted.
121 Sendall to AG White (BoT), 24-12-1947, INF 12/564.
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more film stocks since they were ‘virtual dollar exports’, but it would ‘be prepared 
to act in accordance with whatever decision HMG may come to in this matter’.122
The official newsreel appeared to be making significant progress, but up to this 
point the newsreel companies themselves had not been consulted. It was not 
until one of their regular meetings with the COI, on 2nd February 1948, that 
Ronald Tritton, head of the Films Division, introduced the idea. It was not well 
received. Howard Thomas, Chief-in-Production of Pathe Pictures, ‘made the point 
with some vehemence that the exhibiting side of the Industry was getting tired of 
overmuch propaganda’.123 Though Tritton tried to assuage them by claiming that 
the film would be ‘a feature rather than a news piece’ this did not help.
The newsreel companies were understandably upset. They ‘felt that they had 
been helpful in giving coverage to subjects of interest to the Advisory Committee’ 
in the past, and they considered the factory newsreel ‘to be an invasion of the 
sphere of private enterprise’.124 Neither did Thomas change his mind when 
Tritton took him and Gerald Sanger to one side at the end of the meeting to 
mention the film stock concession.125
The Government consequently gave up on the idea of separate theatrical 
distribution. It did not, however, abandon the plan of producing industrial success 
stories to raise morale and promote emulation. ‘It was suggested’, in EIC 
discussions, ‘that the Government might produce ‘achievement’ items and give 
them to the newsreels’.126 This would have the added benefit of seeming less like 
Government propaganda. The idea was accepted and three months later the 
Ministry of Supply was able to report that many official films were being made
122 AG White memorandum (BoT), 21-1-1948. Watson to Sendall, 16-1-1948, INF 12/565.
123 Tritton to Sendall, 2-2-1948, re the meeting with newsreel companies that morning, INF 12/565.
124 IH(0)(E)(48)2nd, Minutes, 6-2-1948, CAB 134/364.
125 Tritton to Sendall, 2-2-1948, INF 12/565.
126 IH(0)(E)(48)2nd, Minutes, 6-2-1948, CAB 134/364.
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and a good deal of material given to newsreels: ‘A constant supply of material is 
also provided for Newsreels, to draw attention to the assistance given by the 
Ministry in industry and science and to achievements in industry’.127 The 
Government had therefore taken a step towards deliberate news manipulation, 
providing ‘news’ stories aimed at influencing the perceptions of the audience, 
without an official tag attached.
As well as demonstrating the Government’s shift towards an active use of film 
news, this episode illustrates how little it still thought of the commercial 
newsreels. It tended to ignore them unless they could provide an avenue for its 
own material. The difficult experience of the factory newsreel changed this only in 
as far as the COI was now producing film packages unofficially rather than 
officially.
Expanding the Film Remit from ‘Mere Information’
A critical consequence of the Marquand inquiry was the decision to move towards 
inspiration and entertainment. It was now generally accepted within the COI that 
films were not the best means of communicating plain information but were good 
at stimulating feeling. Tritton was very clear about this when responding to a 
letter from Harold Wilson of 25th November which suggested that films were ‘an 
extremely good way of explaining the factual background of many of the 
problems that are embarrassing us at the moment to the general public’.128 
Tritton replied that Films Division, ‘hold the opposite view. We think that film can 
be used to arouse an emotional response, but not to present statistics or explain 
problems’.129 The need to sublimate information was even plainer when it came 
to longer films, such as second features. Philip Mackie, Films Division, wrote that
127 IH(0)(E)(48), Ministry of Supply, Report on Progress of Economic Information, 6-5-1948, CAB 
134/366.
128 Harold Wilson to Morrison, 25-11-1947, INF 12/564.
129 Tritton to Sendall, 1-12-1947, INF 12/564.
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‘With possible second feature projects, we have necessarily first to consider the 
subject, the informational purpose, the “message”. But it is clear that the eventual 
success of each film depends not at all on the informational purpose, but very 
largely on the interest and entertainment value of the characters and the story’.130
Though Films Division had already been trying to move in this direction the 
reaction to the inquiry allowed them to move faster and gain funding for projects 
which might not otherwise have gone ahead. In particular this meant the 
endorsement of the plan to make a number of second feature films. Bernard 
Sendall was pleased that by late January 1948 ‘It is relevant to record that our 
intention to make story documentaries of 3'A to 6 reels is known to Mr Gordon- 
Walker, the President of the Board of Trade and the Lord President, and has 
been welcomed by them'.131
By this time the Crown Film Unit had just finished filming 'A Yank Comes Back’. 
This film shows graphically how Government policy was shifting. The project was 
originally discussed by the EIC in June 1947.132 Leslie thought that a one-reel 
documentary film which showed ‘what reasonable and sympathetic Dominion 
nationals and foreigners thought about Britain’ would ‘stimulate national group 
feeling’.133 This morale boosting picture could be released as part of the monthly 
release schedule in the autumn.
The COI criticised the initial idea as insincere and suggested changes.134 One of 
these was that Burgess Meredith, ‘one of America’s leading actors’, should star in
130 Philip Mackie to Helen de Mouilpied, 17-12-1947, INF 12/133.
131 Bernard Sendall, following dialogue with Woodburn and Campbell, 23-1-1948, INF 12/133.
132 IH(0)(E)(47)2nd, Minutes, 19-6-1947, CAB 134/361.
133 Ibid.
134 IH(0)(E)(47)8th, Minutes, 31-7-1947, CAB 134/361.
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the film.135 Meredith was willing to do so (for the price of his passage from the US 
and expenses) as long as he could also script the film.136 The COI agreed. 
Having then received a brief about the proposed film Meredith also wanted to 
change the structure.137 ‘Important drawback’ he telegrammed from the US in 
October, ‘impossible my opinion to make point effective one reel stop seems 
waste and cramps technique’.138 The 10 minute morale film was subsequently 
extended to two reels and the budget increased.139 A Yank Comes Back was 
eventually completed in July 1948. By that time it had become a four-reel scripted 
second feature, described as a ‘serio-comic film about Britain’s economic 
situation’.140 This is a suitably euphemistic description of a film which is clunky 
and highly contrived.
This was a short film which became a second feature as the approach to films 
shifted. Its successors were less ad hoc. In all the COI planned to make five 
features over the following two years.141 The topics being considered were 
Nursing, Local Government, The Farmer’s Life, and Mental Health Services. 
Each would cost between £25-30,000 to produce.142
The Government also tried to add entertainment values to shorter films. Stafford 
Cripps commissioned John Halas and Joy Batchelor, who ran an independent 
film company specialising in animation, to develop an animated character,
135 Helen de Mouilpied was thinking of Meredith for the part as early as 17-6-1947, after her initial 
conversations with Leslie. Mouilpied to Tritton & Sendall, 17-6-1947, INF 12/544.
136 De Mouilpied to Meredith 2-7-47. Forman to Malherbe on 12-8-1947; Meredith ‘would like to 
write the script’, INF 12/544.
137 Denis Forman, brief for Meredith, 4-9-1947 -  the idea was that the film would overcome 
domestic preconceptions of Britain, namely that ‘Britain’s Lazy, Britain’s Old Fashioned, Britain’s 
Short of Everything, Britain’s Gloomy’, INF 12/544.
138 Meredith telegram, 10-10-1947, INF 12/544.
139 De Mouilpied to Watson, 21-11-1947. Fraser agreed to 2-reeler on 13th October, INF 12/544.
140 Philip Mackie memorandum to Robert Fraser, ‘COI “Feature" Films’, 10-5-1949, INF 12/542.
141 IH(0)(E)(48)56, Memorandum, 'Economic Information Programme -  Feature Films’, 18-3-1948, 
CAB 134/365.
142 IH(0)(48)14, COI Films programme 1948-9, Appendix D; ‘Plans for the Production of Second 
Feature Films’, 26-2-1948, CAB 134/357.
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‘Charley’ for use in Government shorts.143 He was designed to be an easygoing, 
timeless British everyman, who was only able to understand Britain’s current 
difficult situation by experiencing how it got there. In light-hearted historical 
narratives Charley would learn about what life was like before social security 
(Charley’s March of Time), why Britain was so reliant on imports (Robinson 
Charley) and why the price of coal was so high (Charley’s Black Magic).
The COI also commissioned other short films simply to raise morale, such as 
‘What a Life’ and ‘Eye of the Beholder’.144 By July 1948, John Grierson was able 
to comment that ‘In regard to the form of the films themselves there had lately 
been a welcome change. The new cartoon series for instance was a precious 
instrument, and the tendency generally was towards drama and humour’.145
Through 1948 and 1949 the Government sought to make films whose purpose, 
though partly to inform, was more importantly to persuade and direct. The EIU 
wrote in January 1949 that, The monthly release programme, that is to say, gives 
and is intended to give the Government the opportunity of inducing the public to 
accept ideas, and to take actions, which are of practical importance in the 
national interest'.146 And for a period after 1947 the COI was keen to integrate 
values such as drama and entertainment. The Home Film Programme Committee 
was convinced that this was successful. ‘Evidence is becoming available’, the 
Committee wrote in December 1949, ‘that the policy of reserving the monthly 
release for subjects of first-rank national importance which are capable of 
arresting and entertaining treatment is producing results...There is some reason
143 ‘Stafford Cripps, when he became Chancellor of the Exchequer, personally initiated the Charley 
Cartoon series’, Halas and Manvell, The Technique of Film Animation (1976), p.116.
144 The first was originally titled Jeremiahs and Jonahs and distributed as 'What a Life’, monthly 
release, January 1949. Tritton to Grierson, 6-5-1948, INF 5/53.
145 IH(0)(48)7th, Minutes, John Grierson, 2-7-1948, MH 79/588.
146 IH(O), Film Programme Subcommittee, FP(49)1st, Minutes, note prepared by EIU for meeting, 
25-1-1949, INF 12/57.
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to suppose, therefore, that the monthly releases are appreciating in value in the 
eyes of the leading exhibitors’.147
Imposing a Coherent Strategy on the Film Programme
A third consequence of the 1947 shift was the attempt to impose a coherent 
strategy on the film programme. This was now possible since the COI and the 
Economic Information Committee had been given greater latitude to centralise 
decision making on film production and distribution.148 But it was given much 
more emphasis with the arrival of John Grierson as the new head of the COI 
Films Division in April 1948.
It is important to recognise the significance of the Government’s employment of 
Grierson. Clearly one of the main reasons he was brought in was to heal the rift 
between the Government and the documentary units. But Ministers and officials 
were also aware of Grierson’s beliefs about the use of Government information 
and film as a means of education and reform.149 For Grierson state sponsored 
propaganda was a pre-requisite of a modern social democracy.150 In his address 
on ‘Education and Total Effort’ in 1941 he said the role of the state was not 
simply to add to the mass of informational material already ‘thrown at the head of 
the benighted citizen’. It was ‘to give the citizen a pattern of thought and feeling
147 IH(O), Home Film Programme Committee, Monthly Releases, Note by the Chief Distribution 
Officer, Films Division, COI, (Reference FP(49) 11th Meeting, Agenda: Item 4), 29-12-1949, MH 
79/597.
148 Though the EIC and COI had started to plan the films programme in the autumn of 1947 (via the 
film programme sub committee) they were given more latitude after 12th November and much 
greater impetus by the arrival of John Grierson. Morrison, see IH(47)12, CAB 134/354.
149 For example, Sendall to Fraser, 28-8-1947, ‘Even under Socialism there is a wide field of human 
life in which the Public Service has little part to play... the problem is docs beliefs because of 
Grierson and his ‘public process’. Grierson is a socialist and a propagandist; his main interest is in 
the social and political aspects of human life' INF 12/564.
150 Grierson saw, for example, radio and cinema as ‘necessary instruments in both the practice of 
Government and the enjoyment of citizenship’, Grierson on Documentary, p.78.
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which will enable him to approach this flood of material in some useful fashion’.151 
And in the letter he wrote to Morrison and Cripps in 1945, Grierson asserted that 
a Government information service ‘is the instrument by which the Government 
secures the cooperation of the people to national and international ends’.152 The 
decision to employ Grierson, therefore, must surely be considered another 
significant shift away from the neutral transmission of information from state to 
citizen.
As soon as he arrived in his new position Grierson began putting together a plan 
‘to impose a pattern upon the future film programme and to weld it gradually into 
an articulated national service’.153 In this plan the Government’s short films would 
become part of a small number of series, each with its own identity and targeted 
at a specific audience. The purpose of this pattern’ Grierson wrote, ‘was to gear 
production to distribution. Each series would as it were be fitted into a particular 
jig, and those concerned would know from the start what shape and size and 
style a film should take and for what type of audience it was intended’.154 Outside 
instructional or educational films, Grierson separated the domestic programme 
into three areas, Spirit of the Nation; Progress of the Nation; Principles and 
Practices’.155 This would later be translated into a ‘World in Action’ series, a 
‘Report’ series, the Charley films, a This is Britain’ series, a ‘Where do You 
Come From’ series, and a factory magazine.156 Robert Fraser told departments 
that they should ‘should try to fit their individual projects into the pattern
151 John Grierson, ‘Education and Total Effort’, (1941), reprinted in Grierson on Documentary 
(1946), p.209.
152 Grierson to Morrison & Cripps, ‘Nature and Form of a Government Information Service’, 20-11- 
1945, CAB 124/988.
153 IH(0)(48)7m, Minutes, Grierson, 2-7-1948, MH 79/588.
154 Ibid.
155 Grierson, To the Producer, Crown Film Unit, 31-8-1948, INF 5/32.
156 IH(0)(49)24, Memorandum, ‘Information Services Film Programme’, Paper ‘C’, ‘COI Film 
Programme 1949-50 (Series)’, 30-3-1949, MH 79/592.
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proposed... so that official films, instead of being entirely unrelated, should form 
part of a visible design’.157
To oversee this shift Grierson developed a Film Programme sub-committee in 
September 1948. Fraser later said the committee’s creation ‘can already be seen 
as a milestone in the history of Information Service film work’.158 Its intention was, 
he said, to 'advise on an identifiable group of films concerned with social 
progress and achievement’.159 It also had 'the responsibility for guiding the 
programme of films for distribution at home excluding those of a purely specialist 
and instructional nature. This will entail decisions of priority and emphasis, the 
assumption of sponsorship by the most appropriate department and, in certain 
instances, by the COI in its own right’.160 It was therefore explicitly responsible for 
films with a propaganda purpose. It appeared as though the Government was 
adopting the Griersonian model of state film-making.
A Greater Awareness of Distribution
A fourth and final consequence of the 1947 shift was a greater consciousness of 
distribution. After the Marquand inquiry Ministers became more aware that 
distribution was as much, if not more, of an issue than production. When Harold 
Wilson wrote to Morrison strongly pushing for the COI to produce more films, for 
example, the Films Division were grateful for the attention but surprised that the 
President of the Board of Trade did not realise how many films were already 
made and not screened.161 Films Division explained the rudiments of distribution
157 IH(0)(48)7th, Minutes, Robert Fraser, 2-7-1948, MH 79/588.
158 IH(0)(49)24, Memorandum, ‘Information Services Film Programme', 30-3-1949, MH 79/592.
159 IH(0)(48)9m, Minutes, Robert Fraser, 24-9-1948, MH 79/588.
160 Terms of reference of Film Programme Subcommittee (FP(48)1, 23-11-1948), MH 79/596.
161 Wilson to Morrison, 25-11-1947, and subsequent Tritton-Sendall correspondence in December, 
INF 12/564.
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to Leslie who quickly passed these on to Cripps and Gordon Walker.162 By the 
middle of December 1947 JA Lidderdale was writing back to Films Division on 
Gordon Walker’s behalf that he and the Chancellor were very conscious that 
distribution was the problem and not the number of films made.163
This was particularly pertinent since there was much more screen time available 
at this point than there had ever been before. This was thanks to the current lack 
of American films. In August 1947 the Government had imposed a 75% tax on 
imports of American films to stem the tide of dollars leaving the country. The 
American distributors’ association, the MPAA, responded immediately by 
imposing a boycott on American films to the UK. Though British cinemas held 
enough US feature films to show for a few months, after that they would be 
reduced to replaying old films or showing new British films. This included the 
support programmes. Suddenly there seemed to be a gap on British cinema 
screens that needed filling.164
Ministers considered how they could increase the production of British 
documentaries and shorts and ensure a greater number of Government films 
were screened in cinemas.165 Gordon Walker thought that the Government 
should, in the new Cinematograph Act which was due for renewal in 1948, set 
renters and exhibitors a high quota for the screening of British films.166 He was 
'keen to get the Y percentage [for other films and shorts] fixed high enough to
162 Tritton to Malherbe, 2-12-1947, ‘Notes on Theatrical Distribution' (from request by Leslie), INF 
12/564. Sendall also wrote to JA Lidderdale to explain the issue, 5-12-1947, CAB 124/1027.
163 Lidderdale to Sendall on Gordon Walker’s behalf, 16-12-1947, INF 12/564.
164 For a detailed assessment of the so called ‘Dalton Duty’ and its effect on the Government and 
the film industry see Street and Dickinson, The Film Industry and the British Government 1927-84 
(1985), Ch.9.
165 In particular at the meeting on ‘Production and Distribution of British Films for the “Supporting 
Programme”’, 20-1-1948, with Morrison, Wilson, Gordon-Walker et al. INF 12/565.
166 The Cinematograph Act, first passed in 1927 and then renewed in 1938, was the means by 
which the Government sought to promote British film production and distribution. It set minimum 
quotas for the rental and exhibition of cinema films. For more details see Street and Dickinson, 
op.cit.
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provide an incentive for the greater production in this country of documentaries, 
story documentaries and second features’.167
Morrison, talking in the specially convened meeting to discuss the production and 
distribution of British films for the support programme, said he thought the 75% 
tax might be an opportunity to reduce the three hour cinema programme to one 
main feature and two shorts, one of which would be a documentary.168
Though there were problems with these and other suggestions, Wilson took them 
into account when drawing up the Cinematograph Act. Though the Act itself did 
not set a percentage it stated that there would be a quota for first features and for 
the support programme and that the exact figure would wait on discussions with 
industry.169 When Wilson announced that it would be 45% British made for first 
features and 25% for the support programme the exhibitors were stunned.170 This 
was considerably higher than they had expected and they did not think it could be 
fulfilled. Under significant pressure Wilson later lowered the figure for first 
features, but not for the support programme.
Even before the opportunities opened by the new Cinematograph Act the 
Government was having more success distributing its films commercially. In 
February 1948 Fraser was able to boast that ‘About twice as many films had 
been placed with renters in the last twelve months as in any previous year. If the 
feature-length films made during the war by the Service Departments were 
excluded, then about four times as many Government films were receiving
167 Lidderdale to RCG Somervell, 3-1-1948, INF 12/565.
168 ‘Production and Distribution of British Films for the “Supporting Programme”, Minutes, 20-1- 
1948, INF 12/565.
169 Cinematograph Act 1948, Bills, Public, 1947-8, Vol.1, Numbers 26, 44, 63, pp.571-651.
170 See coverage in Kinematograph Weekly, 24-6-1948. For example the reaction to the 25% figure 
for the support programme; ‘It is difficult in the extreme to see where on earth this footage is to be 
found’, in ‘Even Enough Films to Cover Quota Will Not Ease Product Headache’, p.6.
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theatrical showing as in any previous year’.171 Fraser was quick to ascribe this to 
the inclusion of more entertainment, telling the Home Information Services 
Committee that ‘the rising figures for the theatrical distribution were an indication 
that the problem of giving official films a higher entertainment value was being 
tackled not without some success’.172 The figure increased further in 1948 and by 
July Fraser was able to announce that the commercial distribution of Government 
films in 1948 would reach a level ‘sensationally higher than any achieved before 
and five times as great as in war time (if Service made films were excepted)’.173
These commercial successes were, of course, in addition to the agreement the 
Government still held with the CEA. This not only guaranteed the distribution of 
12 Government short films a year and 25-30 trailers in approximately 3000 
cinemas, but, unlike advertising in newspapers or on billboards, guaranteed it 
free of charge. Officials within Government were very conscious of how valuable 
this now was. When the original agreement had been extended in 1946 Mr 
Plumbley of the Home Information Services (Official) committee calculated that 
‘the average weekly cinema audience was about 30 millions, which’ Plumbley 
thought ‘was an audience worth paying for. It had been computed that the free 
publicity given to the Government trailers during the war represented a gross 
value of £3 to £4 millions’.174 Though the agreement had been intended as a 
national concession during wartime the Government clung to it desperately in its 
aftermath. In late 1946, when it seemed the deal might be under threat, Fraser
171 IH(0)(48)3rd, Minutes, 27-2-1948, Robert Fraser, regarding consideration of COI Film Production 
Programme 1948-49 memorandum, IH(0)(48)14. MH 79/588.
172 Ibid.
173 IH(0)(48)7th, Minutes, Robert Fraser, 2-7-1948, CAB 134/357.
174 IH(0)(46)4th, Minutes, Plumbley, 18-7-1946, CAB 124/1013.
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and Morrison managed to convince the exhibitors to extend it for another year.175 
In 1947 and 1948 the Government further cultivated the CEA to ensure the deal 
persisted.176
Shortly after Grierson became controller of the Films Division, in July 1948, he 
described the new distribution situation; ‘opportunities of the moment were 
enormous. The theatres were waiting for new films (though the desire for a 
reduction in Entertainment tax caused the exhibitors to appear hostile), and the 
latest quota arrangements made the possibilities even greater’.177
The Government also sought to enhance its non-theatrical distribution 
programme. In 1947-48 there were 52,244 non-theatrical shows compared to 
46,789 in 1946-7.178 The figure rose further in 1948-9. Particular thought was 
given to the factory audience who were so difficult to reach by other media.179 A 
working party was formed and met twice in 1949 and proposed that 'a 
determined, planned and fully equipped effort should be made in the coming 
winter to restore to the factory film show as much as possible of the widespread 
popularity and influence which it enjoyed during the war’.180
Therefore in 1948 the Government was increasing the number and exposure of 
its films through theatrical and non-theatrical distribution. This included everything 
from 30 second advertisements to short morale films to 45 minute second
175 Though a meeting was arranged between Morrison and the CEA (including Rank) for 20-11-46, 
Sir Alexander King and Morrison were able to reach an agreement to extend the arrangement 
before the meeting (King to Ethel Donald, 16-11-46), CAB 124/1013.
176 Morrison to Fraser, ‘I have been trying to smooth things with CEA’ because relations had 
become rather strained, 15-6-1948. Met with representatives 9-7-1948, CAB 124/1013.
177 IH(0)(48)7ttl, Minutes, Grierson, 2-7-1948, MH 79/588.
178 From preparation for COI Annual Report 1950-51 (compiled Nov 1950-Jan 1952), not published, 
INF 12/345.
179 The working party agreed that ‘factory film shows offer the only certain means of reaching the 
men and women in the factories’, IH(O), Factory Film Shows Working Party, Minutes, 7-6-1949, MH 
79/604.
180 Ibid. The proposals were eventually unsuccessful due to Government economies in information 
services.
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features. It was doing this by adjusting legislation to help some of its own films 
gain screen time. It was leveraging its authority to ensure the continuation of a 
wartime distribution agreement, and it was increasing the number of screenings 
to non-theatrical (often captive) audiences. It appeared as though films were now 
playing an active role in the promotion of Government policy.
SECTION 3: Problems Encountered As A Result Of The 1947 Shift
The Government experienced significant problems as a result of its shift in policy 
after 1947. These problems are important because not only do they help to 
explain why the Government drew back from its newfound commitment to film, 
they also help to indicate why film is such a difficult medium for any democratic 
Government to use. There were three main difficulties. The sudden desire to 
produce topical news and features accentuated the Government’s previous 
neglect of the newsreels and helped lead to a deterioration of relations with the 
NRA in 1948. Secondly, by trying to make inspirational films the Government 
found itself open to charges of propaganda and to complaints from audiences 
and exhibitors. And thirdly, by trying to make entertainment features the 
Government was taking on financial and critical risks that were much greater than 
it initially realised.
Deterioration of Relationship with Newsreels
The newsreel companies were able to handle a degree of neglect from senior 
ministers. They were even willing to accede to the continuation of controls 
although they were unhappy with some of them. But they became frustrated and 
angry during 1948 when the Government first tried to force an official newsreel 
alongside the existing commercial ones, and then sought to control and direct 
access to senior Ministers.
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Shortly after the failure of the factory newsreel the COI wrote a memorandum for 
Ministers regarding their approach to newsreel interviews. Morrison had 
requested that they write this after receiving some criticisms of Ministerial 
appearances. This memorandum was remarkable both in terms of its disregard 
for the previous cooperation of the newsreels with the Government, and as a 
demonstration that Government Ministers were beginning to worry about style of 
communication as well as substance.181
The memorandum told Ministers that though ‘a highly important medium’ the 
newsreel was also a very tricky one. One could not predict who would be in the 
audience and therefore whether there might be a hostile reaction to a Minister on 
screen. The newsreel was ‘a particularly trying test of anyone’s capacity to act 
naturally’. The COI therefore recommended that Ministers consult the COI first, 
and take the advice of a producer or director from the Crown Film Unit. But they 
should not reveal that they had taken any such advice, ‘It would be fatal for any 
such “outsider" to be present at the interview, and most unwise even for the 
newsreel company to be allowed to know that outside advice from other film 
production technicians had been sought’. This shows how, as well as becoming 
much more conscious of their presentation and style, Ministers were being 
encouraged to hide this consciousness.
Already very wary of the media this memorandum increased their desire to 
control their representation and manage their appearances. In the Ministerial 
meeting in which they discussed the advice Hugh Gaitskell described how ‘He 
had safeguarded his position by insisting on giving his personal approval to the 
film before it was shown and by seeking the advice of the Central Office of
181 IS(48)3, Memorandum, ‘Ministerial Newsreel Interviews’, 5-3-1948, CAB 134/458.
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Information’.182 Aneurin Bevan dismissed the medium as light entertainment. 
Morrison re-emphasised that Ministers should just be very careful and take expert 
advice.
The newsreels were estranged still further by the Government’s resurgent 
interest in producing and distributing its own films and by the arrival, in April 
1948, of John Grierson as controller of films. Grierson had no sympathy for the 
newsreel approach. He wanted to promote social engagement and challenge the 
conservative consensus, not to endorse it. He revealed his contempt for the 
newsreels in a conversation with the FO that November, describing ‘the newsreel 
editorial person as a combination of childlike innocence, gross corruption and a 
stupidity only slightly concealed by low animal cunning’.183
Grierson’s feelings clearly influenced his work since in the minutes of their 
meeting in October the newsreel companies wrote that ‘the NRA were not 
receiving cooperation from Mr. Grierson’.184 Unlike Ronald Tritton, to whom the 
NRA gave a present when he left Films Division in August, the newsreel 
executives did not warm to Grierson.
The NRA were equally unhappy that departments now seemed to think the 
newsreels were under the thumb of the COI. Howard Thomas ‘informed 
members’ at the same NRA meeting in October 1948, ‘that Government 
departments now approached the COI for permission to view the newsreels’. 
Thomas ‘contended that far too many people were under the impression that 
newsreels were governed by the Central Office of Information’.185
182 IS(48)1st, Minutes, 10-3-1948, CAB 134/458.
183 CF MacLaren, quoting Grierson from FO-COI meeting. MacLaren note, 12-11-1948, FO 
1110/50.
184 NRA Minutes, min.2659, 28-10-1948, BFI.
185 Ibid.
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The newsreels companies finally decided to act. They decided they would no 
longer hold weekly screenings at the COI and would stop meeting them 
regularly.186 The Foreign Office later described how, ‘Before flouncing out of the 
last COI meeting, they [the newsreels] explained that they felt neglected and 
spurned and that, although they were eager to be guided, no guidance was given 
them’.187
Inspirational Films or Propaganda?
As another consequence of the 1947 shift, the Government soon found itself in 
difficulty over inspirational films. Documentary shorts whose purpose was to 
inspire invariably tended to focus on positive stories and achievements. The 
message behind them being that things were hard but were getting better fast. 
Yet it was very difficult not to elide the efforts to rebuild Britain with an affirmation 
of Labour policy. For example the first film the EIC commissioned, Report on 
Coal, talked about the ‘formidable task’ the NCB took on when it was nationalised 
but that ‘8 months later the Coal Board reported progress’. In its first eight 
months, the film said, there were 30,000 more men employed in the industry, and 
4.5 million tonnes more coal was being mined; ‘Not a perfect figure, but they 
show a profit since the country took over, after years of loss’.188
Similarly, it was difficult for these ‘achievement’ films to resist comparing current 
growth and improvements to the privations of the past. The Government’s 
monthly release for August 1950 was about ‘building a new country’, From the 
Ground Up.189 As the camera panned over building sites, factories, coal mines
186 Ibid. The NRA members began showing the newsreels by invitation in their own cinemas rather 
than at the COI.
187 CF MacLaren, IRD, Foreign Office, 12-11-1948, FO 1110/50.
188 Transcript taken from Report on Coal, CFU for Economic Information Committee, monthly 
release September 1947. Viewed at BFI.
189 From the Ground Up, CFU for Economic Information Committee, monthly release August 1950. 
Viewed at BFI.
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and locomotives, the commentator told the viewer that Today we’re investing 
one-fifth of all our resources... in the making of a new Britain for our children and 
ourselves. We’re rebuilding, modernising, expanding, the whole vast productive 
machine by which we live’. This was contrasted with the view of the past. A child 
was filmed with her face pinned against the glass of a basement flat with bars on 
the windows. ‘What of our cities?’ the voiceover asked, ‘Can we let our children 
inherit a legacy of the past like this?’.190
These films were also increasingly perceived as Government propaganda by the 
audience, by exhibitors, and by the other political parties. This did not necessarily 
mean people objected to them. Those who accepted the position of the films 
tended to condone the propaganda. Those who disagreed with it did not.191 This 
was most clearly demonstrated when Films Division commissioned the Social 
Survey to find out what a preview audience thought about ‘A Yank Comes 
Back’.192 One respondent thought the film ‘A very good idea, makes you feel 
proud of England. Brings back to mind memories we ought to be proud of 
(Dentist’s assistant, 43). A second had ‘Rather mixed feelings about it. Not very 
good propaganda’ (Ironmongery sales manager, 41). And a third ‘Didn’t think 
much of it. Propaganda. A waste of time and money’ (Housewife, 25).193
Some cinemas were also now objecting to screening Government films. In June 
1948, Ken Jones, the chairman of the Birmingham branch of the CEA, told the 
Daily Mirror that “We were happy to give screen time during the war, but we feel
190 Transcript taken from From the Ground Up.
191 See letter from Geo.W.Crowe to SC Leslie, 14-2-1948, re Coal Report: ‘It may or may not 
interest you to know that I strongly object to having propaganda pushed down my throat at a place 
of public entertainment, and for which I have to pay’, INF 12/565.
192 Audience reaction to ‘A Yank Comes Back’-  survey made in August 1948, by HD Willcock. NS- 
132, RG 23/533.
193 Ibid. Quotes from Survey.
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these films are now political propaganda. We should feel the same if the Tories 
were in power”.194
The Conservatives drew increasing attention to the issue of political propaganda 
in films in 1948. In March Boyd Carpenter criticised the film ‘Ours is the Land’ for 
contrasting the current administration’s record on housing with the Governments 
of the 1930s. He quoted the commentary which said, “They promised us houses 
in 1935. Look at Paisley and Dunfermline. Now they have got them".195 And 
during the lengthy May debate on information services A. Marlowe attacked the 
COI for its plans to spend £30,000 on six animated Charley films ‘dealing, I 
suggest, entirely with Government propaganda’.196
Though Ministers strongly denied that films sought to applaud the Government’s 
achievements, it was slightly embarrassing when the Labour Party announced, in 
January 1950, that they would be using some of the COI films as part of their 
election campaign.197
The Risks Associated with Making Entertainment Films
The Government found the integration of entertainment values through the 
development of second feature films even more difficult. Using fiction as a means 
of Government communication required much more depth and nuance than a 
short documentary film made for a specific purpose. Helen de Mouilpied was very 
clear about this after having read a series of suggestions for second features
194 Quoted within article in the Daily Mirror, 14-6-1948, contained within Fraser -  Morrison 
correspondence on CEA deal, CAB 124/1013.
195 Boyd Carpenter, Parliamentary Debates, Adjournment Debate, 19-3-1948, Vol.448, Col.2538.
196 A. Marlowe, Parliamentary Debates, Supply Debate on Information Services, 13-5-1948, 
Vol.450, Col.2339.
197 JAR Pimlott to Morrison, 9-1-1950, CAB 124/85
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from the EIU.198 She told Tritton that the ideas the EIU set out ‘suggest a 
fundamental misunderstanding of what a second-feature film should be. It is not 
an elongated short propaganda film with a nice moral rammed home at greater 
length than in the monthly release films. It must be first and foremost a good story 
in its own right, a story in which characters develop in action. It must entertain. It 
influences people’s opinions only by drawing them into the story and opening 
their hearts and sympathies, but if it is good in this way then people won’t come 
away with a neat synopsis on their lips’ [her underlining].199
De Mouilpied may have been right but this suggested a degree of creativity and 
experiment generally unsuited to Government ministers and officials. Indeed their 
intermittent attempts to put forward feature ideas shows how far many of them 
were from understanding how a fictional film might best represent Government 
policy. In December 1947, after the Ministerial committee had agreed to push 
forward with second features, Gordon Walker wrote to Tritton and Sendall asking 
‘whether you had thought of the possibilities of the short story as a basis for 
shorter features, lasting about % of an hour. De Maupassant and Kipling might 
provide material for a new type of short feature which would at the same time 
make a good deal of use of the documentary tradition’.200 It is not clear how 
Gordon Walker thought de Maupassant or Kipling would illuminate the national 
situation.
The Government did not make any films based on these short stories but it did 
produce a number of others. Life in her Hands, starring Kathleen Byron, was a 
slow-burning drama about a woman who decided to become a nurse after her
198 'Note by the Economic Information Unit -  Second Feature Films’. Tritton to Mouilpied, 22-3- 
1948. These suggestions included a film on cotton, on the black market, on women in the home 
and shipbuilding, INF 12/133.
199 De Mouilpied to Tritton, concerning second features, 7-4-1948, INF 12/133.
200 JA Lidderdale to Bernard Sendall on Gordon Walker’s behalf, INF 12/564, 16-12-1947.
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husband was killed in a car crash. By showing what a rewarding experience 
nursing could be it was intended to encourage women to go into the 
profession.201 Out of True was a film devised to show modern methods at mental 
hospitals to ‘to remove public misconceptions’.202 It also made Waverley Steps, a 
film about Edinburgh, and Four Men in Prison, a Home Office feature on the 
penal system.203
However, as many feature films were attempted and abandoned as were made. 
In May 1949 Fraser asked Philip Mackie to draw up a list charting the history of 
Government feature film making since the end of the Second World War. ‘This is 
one of the most fascinating COI documents I have ever read’ he wrote to 
Grierson when he had received it.204 Though the record with long documentary 
films was reasonably good, with the ‘big-fiction propaganda film - here the record 
is simply ghastly -  false and feeble and fumbling start after start, wasted money, 
strained tempers, horrible wasted effort and talent’. ‘Surely’ he wrote ‘there is a 
great deal to be learnt from all this’.205 That the Government was not well suited, 
for example, to making fictional films.
In addition, ‘the few [non-fiction feature] films that have been completed 
(“Cumberland" and “Yank”) [have been] total distribution flops’. ‘A Yank Comes 
Back’, for example, was originally agreed as a £7,000 one reel film for autumn 
1947 release. It was eventually completed as a four-reeler in July 1948 at a cost 
of over £19,000.206 Despite the protestations of the COI that it had great potential
201 Life in Her Hands (dir. Philip Leacock, CFU, 1951), viewed at BFI.
202 Out of True, CFU 382, Fife Clarke letter to Philip Mackie, ‘Origination of project’, 3-5-1947, INF 
6/33.
203 Four Men in Prison (dir. Max Anderson, CFU), INF 6/410.
204 Fraser to Grierson re Philip Mackie memorandum of 10-5-1949, ‘COI “Feature” Films', 2-6-1949, 
INF 12/542.
205 Ibid.
206 According to Woodbum, letter to Treasury, 3-11-1948. Total cost of the film estimated at 
£19,776, INF 12/545.
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to earn back the expense through commercial distribution, by May 1949 it had 
only received 22 bookings and receipts of £154.207
The problems with “Yank” helped to convince the Treasury that making second 
features was risky and unpredictable. This was compounded in the case of fiction 
films by the problems inherent in measuring their success. If they were not 
‘elongated short propaganda films’ as de Mouilpied suggested, than their 
success could not be measured by the audience’s immediate reaction. Yet 
neither could they be judged solely by their receipts since this would suggest they 
were competing with commercial entertainment films for profit rather than 
communicating an important message.
The growing Treasury scepticism about Government film making coincided with 
major Government budget cuts. Together they helped inaugurate a third phase in 
the Government’s approach to film, when it recognised some of the problems 
associated with producing its own film and relied more heavily on pre-existing 
media, and when it revised its approach to its own production to make it more 
targeted to avoid waste and criticism.
SECTION 4: Collaboration And Retrenchment
Recognition of Difficulties of Film Making
By 1949 the COI was fully aware that there were some very practical problems to 
the production of films. Firstly, each film took a long time to make. This meant 
that by the time one was completed, the political context in which it had been 
commissioned had often passed. ‘ What a Life’, for example, was devised in 1947, 
when the national mood was very gloomy and pessimistic. But by the time it was 
screened, in January 1949, the mood had changed significantly, such that a film
207 Mackie memorandum to Fraser, ‘COI “Feature" Films’, 10-5-1949, INF 12/542.
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about two old men who consider drowning themselves and then think better of it 
no longer suited the country’s temper.
There were many opportunities for films to go wrong. They required lengthy 
gestation, they involved significant numbers of people, and they were often 
delayed by tortuous discussions over distribution. They were, therefore, difficult 
for the Government to control. This control was loosened still further when the 
COI gave independent film makers the freedom to produce films which were 
more creative and engaging. Given the conspicuousness of the eventual product, 
this lack of control made some within Whitehall, particularly within the Treasury, 
very nervous.
Film making was also expensive. The ten minute shorts the Government made 
cost between £3,500 to £6,000, on average.208 Second features cost upwards of 
£25-30,OOO.209 This expenditure became harder to justify after the budget cuts of 
1949 and especially after the French committee recommended the Government 
focus on publicity that had directly measurable effects.
Understanding the Value of Film
But the COI also had a much greater understanding of the advantages of film as 
a means of democratic communication. Films had a profound and long-lasting 
effect. ‘Once successfully made’, Leslie wrote in March 1949, ‘their effect will be 
strong and deep, for they bring to bear upon a large and organised audience 
emotional forces much more powerful than can be given expression in press 
advertising or posters’.210 One of these was ‘the force of example’ which, Fraser 
noted, was not only very powerful but, for many, the ‘main source of social
208 Cost of films based on reference to COI Films made for theatrical release in COI Films 
Programme, 28-2-1950 (FP(O)(50)2), FP(O)(50)3, MH 79/600.
209 Based on budgets for second features agreed in 1948, IH(0)(48)14, Memoranda, ‘COI Films 
programme 1948-9’, 26-2-1948, Appendix D, CAB 134/357.
210 Clem Leslie, 4-3-1949, CAB 134/369.
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advance. People wish to do that which is honoured and admired’ Fraser said, 
‘and the film can do much to set standards in this matter’.211 This was especially 
relevant for lower income groups and for housewives who, the COI’s surveys 
suggested, were much more likely to be influenced by a film than a newspaper 
advertisement.212
Film could provide context for Government policies and prepare the ground for 
the public’s acceptance of them. Grierson tried to explain this to the Treasury in 
April 1949 when it asked him for the rationale behind making a film on Scottish 
Fisheries. ‘Grierson elaborated the view’, O’Donovan of the Treasury wrote, ‘that 
this kind of film was needed as part of a process of “conditioning” the minds of 
the public... with the intention of making them receptive to more direct publicity 
on productivity’.213 These films were, in other words, a realisation of Grierson’s 
concept of giving the citizen a ‘pattern of thought and feeling’.
Grierson was not the only one to defend such films. Robert Fraser argued that 
films without a specific immediate objective could be as influential as those made 
to elicit a quick reaction. For example, of the films and publicity surrounding the 
Colonial Information campaign Fraser said; ‘One cannot however define its 
purpose except by saying that it seeks to make it more likely that the people of 
Britain will act alertly and intelligently and generously in governing their colonies 
and guiding their political future’. Therefore films were, he wrote, inherently better 
for ‘long term information’. 214
But in the constrained economic environment of 1949, as part of their austerity 
drive, Ministers decided to concentrate on ‘action publicity’, or publicity that
211 Robert Fraser, The Film Programme 1949-50 -  A Draft Memorandum on Purposes’, 17-5-1949, 
INF 12/130.
212 See Social Survey on exports, ‘Fill the Ships’, NS87, in IH(0)(E)(47)24, 7-8-1947, CAB 134/362.
213 O’Donovan (Treasury) to Woodburn (COI), 8-4-1949, INF 12/134.
214 Robert Fraser, The Film Programme’, op.cit., 17-5-1949, INF 12/130.
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elicited a clearly identifiable reaction.215 The Treasury took this as an 
endorsement of its scepticism towards film and intervened more frequently in 
production decisions, refusing funding for new features and diluting the autonomy 
of the COI. Grierson was forced to make staff cuts and reorganise the process by 
which films were made. Unhappy about the changes Grierson resigned from the 
COI the following year.
Revision Not Reversal -  Information bv Other Means
The problems inherent in film production led the Government away from the 
Griersonian ideal of socially progressive film-making and away from non-factual 
second features. It persuaded the COI to seek to reduce the risks within film 
production as much as possible. This meant introducing more controls over the 
process, targeting films at specific groups within the population, and working out 
their method of distribution in advance. Furthermore, it led it to look for alternative 
means of distribution, such as television, and to try to use the newsreels more 
effectively.
Between 1949-51 the COI introduced a range of controls designed to reduce the 
costs and the risks of film production. It drew up specifications sheets which 
required departments to lay out the purpose and function of each film they 
commissioned.216 It integrated audience research into film production and 
distribution.217 And, it made the consideration of distribution a pre-requisite to 
each film’s production. The process became, in other words, very similar to that 
of a modern advertising company. A fortnight before the election of October 1951 
Niven McNicoll, head of Films Division after Grierson’s departure, told Fraser that
215 ‘Action publicity’ recommended by Ministerial Information Services Committee, IS(49)1, 25-3- 
1949, CAB 134/459.
216 Fraser, The Shaping of Film Proposals -  Some Notes on Departmental Procedure', 25-9-1951, 
INF 12/542.
217 Niven McNicoll to Fraser, 11-10-1951, INF 12/542.
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‘During the past two years, we have revolutionised the process of examining 
proposals before taking them on as jobs’.218 Not surprisingly, the controls scared 
off some of the documentary directors like Stuart Legg.
The COI also sought to target films at specific groups for a specific purpose. This 
was especially true of films made for non-theatrical release. Each film was now 
supposed to be produced for a selective audience ‘as an instrument shaped with 
a particular purpose in view -  an instrument which we must hold in our hands and 
use consciously and deliberately until we are satisfied that there is no more to be 
got from it as a means of serving that purpose’.219 The emphasis was on using 
any and every means to maximise the audience and reduce cost; ‘we should take 
advantage of all legitimate and unextravagant opportunities, of showing our films 
to all persons who are willing to see them’.220
Making such targeted films made it more difficult to find ones suitable for general 
release. But the Government was now very conscious of the benefits of 
established mass distribution channels, especially if they were cheap or free. 
Therefore it clung onto the CEA deal even though it was looking more and more 
anachronistic. Each year Morrison would meet with the cinema owners and try to 
convince them that the arrangement should be continued. Though in 1947 he 
had put forward a strong ‘national interest’ argument, by 1950 he was resorting to 
vague, general appeals. Telling the people’, he said, ‘keeping the people 
informed -  is a prime essential of democracy in any circumstances, no matter 
what colour the party in power may wear, whether we are at war or in peace, 
whether times are good or bad’.221 The following year, despite not even having
218 McNicoll to Fraser, 11-10-1951, INF 12/542.
219 COI Memorandum, CH Dand (Chief Distribution Officer) to Chief Regional Officers and Film 
Officers, Guidance Paper No.1, Planning for September 1950 to March 1951, 1-6-50, MH 79/607.
220 FP(50)2, Memorandum, Non-Theatrical Distribution, 3-2-50, MH 79/600.
221 Note for LP meeting with CEA, 11-1-1950 (prepared by McNicoll), CAB 124/85.
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made enough films appropriate for general release, the official information 
committee still sought to keep the distribution deal alive.222
But recognising that the arrangement could not be sustained indefinitely, and 
conscious that a new and much more powerful means of distribution was now 
available, the COI turned its attention to television. Television is now emerging 
as a highly important method of distribution for information films, and it may well 
grow one day into the most important of all’, the COI wrote to Ministers in 
1950.223 And fortunately, the Government was on good terms with the monopoly 
broadcaster. As the COI said; ‘Relations with the Television Service are close, 
good, and continuous’.224 And the problem of rights, which had restricted the 
screening of Government films for the first years after the war, had been 
substantially resolved by 1951 (as Tom Wildy has described in his 1988 article, 
‘British Television and Official Film, 1946-51’).225 Therefore by the final year of 
the Labour Government the COI was able to report that ‘Many films had been 
televised during the past two years, and the medium was now also being used 
experimentally for the showing of trailers'.226
By 1949 the Government had also recognised that there were significant 
problems with producing and distributing its own material. It was much easier, 
and cheaper, to collaborate with existing media, especially if such media were 
compliant. It became more conscious of this after its relationship with the 
newsreel companies deteriorated in late 1948. In order to reverse this
222 IH(0)(51)32, Memorandum, 30-10-1951, Though it will not be possible to continue the monthly 
release scheme on a regular basis in the immediate future, it would seem to be very desirable to 
keep open this valuable means of reaching the cinema-going public’, CAB 134/360.
223 IS(50)7, Memorandum, ‘Home Distribution of Official Films’, Note by COI, 9-10-1950 CAB 
124/85.
224 Ibid.
225 Tom Wildy, ‘British Television and Official Film, 1946-51’, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and 
Television, Vol.8, 1988, pp. 195-202.
226 Home Film Programme Committee (HFPC), ‘Distribution of Official Films’, extract from 
IH(0)(51)2nd, Minutes, (note 3-5-1951), MH 79/607.
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deterioration, and to use the newsreels more effectively, the COI finally decided 
to establish a newsreel desk.227 As noted above, it had been planning to do this 
for three years and its repeated failure to establish one before 1949 is indicative 
of the journey the Government made in its understanding of communication. 
Having initially virtually ignored the newsreels it then assumed that it could 
communicate best by creating its own films and pushing its own material through 
the existing media. Eventually it found that in addition to producing its own 
material it was economical and effective to work in partnership with the newsreel 
companies, fostering good relations, suggesting stories, and providing access. 
This was the intention of the appointment of Fred Watts, previously Production 
Manager of Pathe Gazette, to head a newsreel desk at the COI, announced in 
March 1949.228
Evidence from 1950 suggests that his appointment was very successful. In that 
year the COI was defending Watts from more budget cuts. 'As a result of the 
work of the officer concerned’ G. Meara (COI) wrote to P.E. Stephenson 
(Treasury), 'the newsreel companies have been persuaded not only to cover 
many events which they would not otherwise have considered but also to include 
in their newsreels a number of items made up from official material in the course 
of production for other purposes. The result has been, broadly, that a great many 
more items of direct informational value are now getting into the newsreels 
produced for home circulation’.229 Watts was especially valuable since some 
post-war controls, such as the supplementary contracts, were dismantled during 
the course of 1949-50. In addition the NRA decided, at the end of 1950, to stop
227 IH(0)(49)16, Memorandum, 2-3-1949, ‘Newsreels and Official Publicity’, CAB 134/358.
228 IH(0)(49)2nd, Minutes, 3-3-1949, CAB 134/358.
229 Meara to Stephenson, re Films Division, 12-8-1950, INF 12/355.
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attaching Government trailers to the end of each newsreel. The majority of its 
members no longer felt that the trailers dealt ‘with items of “national interest”’.230
Therefore the Government turned away from its more ambitious plans but 
remained convinced of the value of communicating its message via film. Its 
anxieties about producing its own media encouraged it to make it selective and 
targeted (rather than general and ubiquitous) and, wherever possible, to filter 
news through existing organisations.
Conclusion
1945-51 was the first and last time that a peacetime Government tried to use film 
on such a scale to communicate with a domestic audience. When the 
Conservatives came to office in October 1951 they did not disband the COI as 
they had sometimes threatened. They did, however, cut it back significantly. Their 
primary target was Government films. They stopped non-theatrical distribution in 
March 1952. 'Narrow limits were placed on film production -  particularly on films 
for home use’.231 In addition The Crown film Unit was disbanded and it was 
intended that there should be no more home theatrical distribution’.232 By April 
1952, ‘the authorised complement of the [Films] Division was reduced from 165 
posts to 64, of which 24 were for the Central Film Library’ (from which it was no 
longer free to borrow films).233
The extent of film production and distribution by the Labour Government between 
1945-51 has been largely forgotten. This is despite the fact that its scale was 
quite unprecedented in peacetime Britain. In 1949 Robert Fraser wrote that at 
any one time this Government was overseeing the development, production or
230 NRA minutes, min.3391, ‘COI Trailers’, 19-10-1950, BFI.
231 Review of Films Division, November 1952, in ‘Inspection of Duties of Films Division, Feb 1951— 
Aug 1956’, INF 12/409.
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid.
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distribution of approximately 150 films.234 That the great British film-making 
experiment fell away after 1951 does not reduce its importance. Rather it makes 
it the more necessary to understand what happened and its repercussions. This 
chapter has sought to go some way towards this but there is certainly room for 
more research than is possible here.
In retrospect it seems remarkable not only that the Government made so many 
films, but that contemporary audiences sat through them. Of course they 
frequently had no choice, since the films were normally screened as part of a 
cinema programme, or shown during a factory lunch-hour.
For the Government itself, the experience was extremely educational. The many 
problems associated with film-making made Ministers and officials much more 
aware of the complexities of presentation. But they also convinced officials that 
they needed to be pragmatic about the ways and means of getting the message 
across. This belief in pragmatism comes across clearly in an 8-page 
memorandum which Fraser wrote in April 1949, intended as a policy document. 
‘Information is not a function independent of the purposes of society,’ Fraser 
wrote, ‘and informative or persuasive material derives its significance from the 
end to which it is directed. It may have its own integrities of truth and imagination, 
but its purpose is derivative from some national end. Information is not “for its 
own sake”’.235 The simple, idealistic objective of providing basic information for 
the public had given way to a more realistic use of information as an adjunct of 
policy.
Newsreels were like the poor cousin in terms of Government attention towards 
the media. For a long period Ministers had a low regard for them and tended to
234 Robert Fraser Memorandum, The Film Programme 1949-50’, attached to letter to Grierson, 17- 
5-1949, INF 12/130.
235 Robert Fraser, The Film Programme', op.cit., 17-5-1949, INF 12/130.
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ignore them. This neglect seems surprising given Labour’s commitment to 
greater political communication, given the dearth of serious information which 
was communicated via the newsreels, and given that the newsreels reached a 
very large and broad audience that was difficult to access through other media.
Prior to 1947 the Government did not seem to consider the newsreels to be an 
important means of political communication. From 1947-49 it tried to circumvent 
them or, if it used them, tried to do so in a highly controlled manner. Eventually it 
became more conscious of them and sought to create a mutually beneficial 
means of exchanging stories and material. This was a particularly important 
development since it meant the institutionalisation of news management 
techniques.
Labour’s failure to contemplate restructuring the newsreels undermined its 
professed belief in changing the nature of political communication. And this 
failure to initiate change almost certainly accelerated the demise of the 
newsreels. However, the newsreel companies themselves were highly complicit 
in this failure. They sought guidance and consensus rather than freedom and 
confrontation. They had the opportunity to pursue the latter after the war but 
chose not to and to enjoy the twilight of their years cosseted by guaranteed sales 
and monopolistic coverage.
By 1951 cinema attendances were dropping quickly as television grew 
increasingly popular.236 Television was able to break news rather than simply 
replay stories that people had already seen elsewhere. Many cinemas gave up 
showing newsreels as part of their programme. By 1960 three of the five main 
newsreel companies had closed down; Universal News in 1956, British 
Paramount News in 1957 and Gaumont British News in 1959. As the newsreels
236 From a peak of 1,585m in 1945 attendances dropped to 1,396m in 1950, 1,182m in 1955, and 
501m in 1960. Perilli, op.cit. (1983).
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declined in importance, so the Government redirected its attention towards 
television broadcasting. The lessons it had learned with film and newsreels it was 
now able to transfer to this much more powerful medium, television.
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Conclusion
This thesis has sought to demonstrate that 1945-51 was a critical time in the 
development of Government communication in Britain. It was the period in which 
the nature and the extent of communication between the Government, the media 
and the people was transformed.
This is not simply a retrospective judgment but one which was apparent to a 
number of contemporaries. Many of the most senior officials involved -  Robert 
Fraser, Clem Leslie, Francis Williams, John Grierson, John Pimlott -  all wrote 
and commented about Government communication and the Government’s 
relationship with the mass media.
John Pimlott, for example, was so struck by the emerging importance of 
communications and public relations that he took a sabbatical in 1947-8 to go to 
America and write a book about it. In this he argued that communication was now 
an important and inevitable aspect of administration. ‘Modern techniques of mass 
information and persuasion are powerful tools,’ he wrote, ‘and all who seek to 
acquire or maintain power in a democracy must make use of them’.1
Pimlott also argued that information now had to be presented in such a way as to 
have mass appeal and convince people to take action. To do this Governments 
might have ‘to select facts which are most likely to interest the audience; to state 
them in the language of a mass circulation magazine; to repeat them; to use 
other media than the printed word such as broadcasts, motion pictures, comic 
strips; and to follow up with personal contacts’.2 Or, put another way, to manage 
information.
1 JAR Pimlott, Public Relations and American Democracy (1951), p.71.
2 Ibid., p.80.
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This overt acceptance of information management as a necessary aspect of 
democratic governance was new. Though Governments had always sought to 
sustain their legitimacy through communication (promoting good news and 
suppressing bad), this period was novel because, for the first time, there was an 
administration which aspired to genuine popular participation and which 
appeared to have the practical means by which to achieve it.
The administration only came to accept the practicalities of information 
management after its experiences in office. It began with an idealistic hope in the 
potential of a comprehensively informed electorate. This hope gradually 
dissipated as it came to recognise how difficult it would be to achieve. Over the 
same period it became reconciled to the more active use of information as a 
means of persuasion and direction as well as of explanation. This shift from 
idealism to pragmatism was similar to Labour’s approach towards economic 
planning. From initial ideological commitment through disappointed endeavour 
towards a compromise solution.
It is important to understand how it came to this position since its experience 
informed the approach to democratic communication for each subsequent British 
Government. The Attlee Government’s experience is so informative because it 
encompassed three separate, but parallel, approaches. It looked for ways in 
which to restructure the established commercial press in order to guarantee the 
passage of information to the electorate. It collaborated with the state-funded 
monopoly broadcaster to do the same. And, it produced its own media in the form 
of films, pamphlets, books and newspapers.
In examining each of these approaches this thesis has sought to demonstrate 
that not only do they explain the status of communication in 1951, but that they 
illustrate the perennial problems inherent in Government communication within a 
democracy. That it is extremely difficult for a Government to compel commercial
318
Conclusion
media to act as a conduit for political information without appearing 
undemocratic. That a democratic Government cannot work closely with a public 
broadcaster without undermining that broadcaster’s independence and credibility. 
That it is problematic for a Government to produce its own media due to its 
expense and the difficulty of balancing factual detail with popular presentation. 
And that the most intractable problem for a democratic Government is how to 
overcome the general indifference of the people to the information. As G.K. 
Evans of the COI wrote to Robert Fraser in 1949, ‘Government publicity cannot 
hope to educate or inform more than an insignificant fraction of the public 
directly’.3
Having experienced each of these problems the Attlee Government developed a 
range of formal and informal techniques in order to communicate its policies and 
intentions via the existing media. For example, Ministers sought to establish a 
‘common line’ which would prevent ambiguity in presentation. The EIU sought to 
use Ministerial speeches and policy statements to establish ‘news values’ and set 
the news agenda within the independent media. The IRD attempted to infiltrate 
the news and editorial columns of newspapers. The Economic Information 
Committee commissioned media, such as film footage, which could be passed 
‘ready-to-use’ onto news organisations. Departments controlled access to 
information and carefully timed the release of information in a form to promote 
their case. Films Division integrated entertainment values to make information 
more exciting and accessible. And the COI began to target specific groups with 
specially tailored messages. Many of these methods led Government to bypass 
Parliament. Together these equated to a series of techniques which can best be 
described as information management.
3 GK Evans to Fraser and Leslie, ‘Some Comments Regarding Recent Publicity Surveys’, 23-2- 
1949, CAB 124/81.
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The approach to communication in 1951 was not predetermined in 1945. It was 
the result of the circumstances encountered by the Labour Government and their 
reaction to those circumstances. The approach would have been different, for 
example, had communication initially been considered integral to Labour policy. It 
would have been different had the administration not experienced the crises of 
1947, after which it felt justified centralising and coordinating its economic 
information. And it would have been different had not the Cold War, and in 
particular the Czech coup of 1948, not limited the Government’s freedom to 
contemplate alternative structures of press control.
Moreover, the approach was significantly effected by the personalities involved. 
Morrison’s attitude towards communication clearly had a major impact on its 
direction. But it was certainly not the case that all members of the administration 
were convinced of the necessity of communication or converted to it by 1951. 
Four different attitudes can be identified. First, there were those who were 
evangelical about the importance of communication to the modern State. Patrick 
Gordon Walker was one of these. In 1951 he published a theoretical tract, 
Restatement of Liberty, in which he argued that communication was fundamental 
to the process of Government. He had no qualms about using it to persuade as 
well as inform. ‘Persuasion’, he wrote, ‘is particularly necessary to help achieve 
the sorts of natural behaviour that the new State is almost wholly debarred from 
bringing about by the use of its direct powers’.4
The second attitude was characterised by Stafford Cripps. Cripps believed that 
communication was necessary but had reservations about its use and extent. 
Third, there were those who resisted on principle, such as Aneurin Bevan. And 
finally, there were those who paid little attention to communication, like Clement
4 Patrick Gordon Walker, Restatement of Liberty (1951), p.369.
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Attlee. There are now no longer any politicians of the fourth type. Between 1945- 
SI information policy was led by those who believed in its importance, such as 
Morrison and Gordon Walker, but was constrained by other voices in Cabinet, 
such as those of Bevan and Attlee.
The eventual effect of this Government’s experience was seminal. All subsequent 
Governments have been obliged to seek to inform the electorate. The 
Conservatives, who had been so critical of the information services machinery 
whilst in opposition, reduced its budget once in office but still retained almost all 
of it. They even continued the measurement of public opinion, which Harry 
Crookshank, the Conservative Postmaster General, had described in 1944 as ‘a 
public menace’ which employed the techniques of ‘informers, GPU, [and] 
Gestapo’.5 Indeed after the budget of the Social Survey division fell to a low of 
£89,000 in 1953-4, it then grew consistently and by 1970-71 stood at £1.2 million. 
This represented a real terms growth of 580%.6
But the experience also demonstrated to subsequent Governments that 
information management (as opposed to total information or no information) was 
a necessary feature of modern government. This did not simply mean the 
occasional meeting of a Minister with the editor of a national newspaper, but the 
constant and institutionalised organisation of the passage of information from 
each area of Government to the population via the independent media.
This period raised, if not answered, many of the difficult questions which would 
continue to dog the process of communication within a democracy. For example, 
to what degree was it the responsibility of Government to convince as well as to 
inform? Many people might accept that a Government should discourage drink
5 Ibid. GPU -  ‘Glavnoje Politicheskoe Upravlenije’, Soviet Political Police, precursor to NKVD and 
KGB
6 Louis Moss, Government Social Survey, p.24 (staff figures), and p.265 (table 34), ‘Survey Vote, 
Actual and Deflated’.
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driving, but far fewer would agree that it should try to convince people of the 
benefits to Britain of closer European union.
Moreover, when did circumstances justify greater control and direction of the 
media in the national interest? This very question occurred to Clem Leslie during 
the early stages of the Cold War. Given the nature of this new conflict, to what 
extent, Leslie asked Max Nicholson, could the Government direct action at the 
BBC? ‘In wartime’, he wrote, ‘the BBC has within a certain field to accept 
guidance from Whitehall Departments. In peacetime, apart from certain high level 
directives, it is pretty well free to go its own way. Is that state of affairs 
appropriate to a lukewarm war period which affects the home front in ways 
increasingly reminiscent of the war, or should some partial return towards 
wartime arrangements be considered?’.7
Most importantly, this period demonstrated the importance of being aware of the 
line between information and distortion, and of the need for specific safeguards to 
patrol that line. Both the Government and the media have separate agendas 
which, if unchecked, will continually transgress the line. Ministers have a political 
agenda for which they seek popular consent. They may therefore be inclined to 
distort information to ensure they achieve that consent. The media has to attract 
an audience and so they too may manipulate information in pursuit of a greater 
audience.
In 1949 the Government established information officers within the Civil Service. 
As such they were bound by the code of the Civil Service to prevent Ministers 
from overstepping the line between information and distortion. The General 
Council of the Press was set up in 1953 in an effort to draw and to police a line 
for the Press. The BBC Governors and the ITA were intended to do the same in
7 Leslie to Nicholson, 25-1-1951, CAB 124/80.
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broadcasting. Each of these bodies inevitably has a different perception of the 
exact position of the line, influenced by its specific obligations and objectives. 
Therefore the line will, to some extent, always be blurred. Yet only by accepting 
that such a line exists and only by being constantly aware of its transgression, is 
it possible to maintain trust between the Government, the media and the people.
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Appendix A: Committees & Commissions 
Ministerial
Ministerial Home Information Services Committee. 1946-48 (IH)
Terms of Reference:
“To keep under review problems of Government information policy and 
the working of the United Kingdom and to consider such other related 
problems as may be referred to them by the Cabinet.
For these purposes to meet jointly with the Overseas Information Services 
(Ministerial) Committee whenever convenient”
Composition:
Lord President, Chairman (Herbert Morrison)
Chancellor of the Exchequer (Hugh Dalton)
President of the Board of Trade -  (Sir Stafford Cripps)
Secretary of State for Air (Viscount Stansgate)
Secretary of State for Scotland (J Westwood)
Minister of Fuel and Power (Emmanuel Shinwell)
Minister of Labour & National Service (G.A. Isaacs)
Minister of Education (Ellen Wilkinson)
Minister of Health (Aneurin Bevan)
Minister of Food (Sir Ben Smith)
Postmaster General (Earl of Listowel)
Secretariat: John Pimlott and Geoffrey Kirk 
Meetings:
1946: 8-4-46, 28-6-46
1947: 19-5-1947 Qointly with Ol), 31-7-1947, 12-11-1947 
1948: 21.1.48 (amalgamation with Ol)
Amalgamated with Overseas Information Services Committee in January 
1948
Minutes and Memoranda: CAB 134/354, CAB 134/458, CAB 134/459
Ministerial Information Services Committee. 1948-51 (IS)
Terms of Reference:
“To keep under review Government publicity, both at home and overseas, 
concerning home affairs, and the working of Government Information 
Services at home and overseas, and to consider such other related 
problems as may be referred to them by the Cabinet”
Composition:
Lord President, Chairman (Herbert Morrison)
Secretary of State for the Colonies (A. Creech Jones)
Minister of Labour (G.A. Isaacs)
Minister of Health (A. Bevan)
President of the Board of Trade (J.H. Wilson)
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First Lord of the Admiralty (Viscount Hall)
Secretary of State for War (F Bellenger)
Minister of Food (John Strachey)
Minister of Fuel and Power (H.T.N. Gaitskell)
Economic Secretary, Treasury (Douglas Jay)
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (P. 
Gordon-Walker)
Lord Henderson
Joint Secretaries: TAG Charlton (Cabinet Office), D Stephens (Office of 
Lord President), AK Gore (COI)
Meetings:
1948: 10-3-1948, 14-4-1948, 11-5-1948, 15-6-1948, 30-7-1948, 5-11- 
1948
1949: 25-3-1949, 7-11-1949 
1950: 25-7-1950, 22-11-1950 
1951: 12-2-1951
Minutes and Memoranda: CAB 134/458, CAB 134/459, CAB 134/460
Official
Home Information Services (Official) Committee. 1946-51 (IH(O))
Terms of Reference:
“Under the policy direction of the Home Information Services (Ministerial) 
Committee, to review and co-ordinate, where necessary, inter­
departmental action on problems of Government information and the 
working of Government information services with the United Kingdom"
Composition of the Committee:
Director General of Central Office of Information (Chair)
Public Relations Adviser to the Prime Minister 
Representatives of:
Treasury 
Board of Trade 
Home Office 
War Office 
Scottish Office
Ministry of Labour and National Service
Ministry of Health
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Food
Ministry of Fuel and Power
Ministry of Transport
General Post Office
HM Stationery Office
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Secretaries: PH Boon, Geoffrey Kirk 
Meetings:
1946: 11-4-1946, 16-5-1946, 19-6-1946, 18-7-1946, 1-10-1946, 13-12- 
1946
1947: 29-1-1947, 28-2-1947, 14-3-1947, 2-4-1947, 16-4-1947., 4-7-1947, 
5-9-1947, 7-11-1947
1948: 9-1-1948, 30-1-1948, 27-2-1948, 2-4-1948, 30-4-1948, 28-5-1948, 
2-7-1948, 6-8-1048, 24-9-1948, 26-11-1948
1949: 4-2-1949, 3-3-1949, 5-4-1949, 5-5-1949, 14-7-1949, 25-10-1949, 3- 
11-1949, 14-12-1949
1950: 21-2-1950, 25-4-1950, 24-5-1950, 21-6-1950, 20-9-1950, 20-10- 
1950, 15-11-1950
1951: 21-2-1951, 18-4-1951, 20-6-1951, 19-9-1951, 7-11-1951 
Minutes and Memoranda: CAB 134/355-360 (also in MH 79/577-)
Home Information Services: Economic Information Committee. 1947-51 
(IH(0)(E))
Terms of Reference:
“As a Sub-Committee of the Home Information Services (Official) 
Committee, to review and co-ordinate where necessary inter­
departmental action on problems of Government economic information 
and the working of Government economic information services within the 
United Kingdom”
Composition:
Head of Economic Information Section (Chairman)
Director General of Central Office of Information 
Public Relations Adviser to the Prime Minister 
Representatives of the:
Treasury 
Board of Trade
Overseas Information Department of the Board of Trade 
Scottish Office
Ministry of Labour and National Service 
Ministry of Fuel and Power 
Ministry of Health
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
Ministry of Supply
Ministry of Transport
Ministry of Food
Ministry of Works
National Savings Committee
National Coal Board
Secretaries: PH Boon (Lord President’s Office), Mrs IM Schapiro 
(Central Office of Information)
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Meetings:
1947: 12-6-1947, 19-6-1947, 26-6-1947, 3-7-1947, 10-7-1947, 17-7-1947, 
24-7-1947, 31-7-1947, 7-8-1947, 29-8-1947, 19-9-1947, 10-10-1947, 31-
10-1947, 14-11-1947, 12-12-1947, 19-12-1947
1948: 23-1-1948, 6-2-1948, 24-2-1948, 5-3-1948, 19-3-1948, 9-4-1948, 
23-4-1948, 7-5-1948, 21-5-1948, 4-6-1948, 18-6-1948, 9-7-1948, 23-7-
1948, 5-11-1948
1949: 14-1-1949, 21-1-1949, 28-1-1949, 11-2-1949, 18-2-1949, 4-3-1949,
11-3-1949, 22-4-1949, 29-4-1949, 2-6-1949, 8-8-1949, 11-8-1949, 21-IQ-
1949, 5-12-1949, 9-12-1949, 20-12-1949
1950: 6-1-1950, 20-1-1950, 3-2-1950, 3-3-1950, 17-3-1950, 31-3-1950, 
21-4-1950, 12-5-1950, 26-5-1950, 14-7-1950, 28-7-1950, 18-8-1950, 6- 
10-1950, 27-10-1950, 10-11-1950, 24-11-1950
1951: 12-1-1951, 16-2-1951, 9-3-1951, 20-4-1951, 25-5-1951, 8-6-1951, 
13-7-1951,27-7-1951
Minutes and Memoranda: CAB 134/361-373
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Commissions
Roval Commission on the Press 1947-49
Terms of Reference:
Appointed “with the object of furthering the free expression of opinion 
through the Press and the greatest practicable accuracy in the 
presentation of news, to inquire into the control, management and 
ownership of the newspaper and periodical press and the news agencies, 
including the financial structure and the monopolistic tendencies in 
control, and to make recommendations thereon”
Composition:
Sir David Ross (Chair)
Reverend M.E. Aubrey
Neil Beaton (member of the Co-Operative movement)
*John Benstead (trade unionist)
Lady Violet Bonham Carter 
R.C.K. Ensor (scholar and writer)
Hubert Hull (barrister)
Miss Eirwen Owen (formerly deputy regional commissioner for Wales)
\J.B. Priestley (writer and broadcaster)
Alderman Wright Robinson (member of Manchester Education 
Committee, member of Ministry of Education Advisory Committees)
G. Granville Sharp (barrister)
*Lord Simon (industrialist)
Sir Geoffrey Vickers (solicitor)
Sir George Waters (formerly editor of The Scotsman)
*R.H. Wilson (accountant)
Barbara Wright (Wootton) (economist)
G.M. Young (historian)
Secretary: Miss J.J. Nunn
*Resignations
Replacements:
AE Middleton (accountant)
James Bowman (trade unionist)
Report and Evidence: Cmd 7700 (Report of the Royal Commission), Cmd 7690 
(Index to Minutes of Oral Evidence), written evidence submitted to Royal 
Commission contained in B.S.77/3(1)
Minutes and Memoranda: HO 251 (Royal Commission on the Press - Evidence 
and Papers)
Broadcasting Committee 1949-51
Terms of Reference:
“To consider the constitution, control, finance and other general aspects 
of the sound and television broadcasting services of the United Kingdom
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(excluding those aspects of the overseas services for which the BBC are 
not responsible) and to advise on the conditions under which these 
services and wire broadcasting should be conducted after 31st December, 
1951”
Composition:
Lord Beveridge (Chair)
A.L.. Binns 
\James Bowman 
Lord Elgin
Lady Megan Lloyd George
J. Selwyn Lloyd
W.F. Oakeshott
J. Reeves
*Sir William Coates
Mrs. Mary Stocks
*E.A.J. Davies
Secretary: G.R. Parsons
*Resignations
Replacements:
J. Crawford
IAR Stedeford
Dr. Stephen Taylor
Report and Evidence: Cmd 8116 (Report of the Committee), Cmd 8117 
(Appendix H. Memoranda submitted to the Committee)
Minutes and Memoranda: HO 254 (Broadcasting Committee (1949-1950): 
Evidence and Papers)
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Appendix B: Production of Government Information 1945-51 - Home
Press and Poster Advertising
1944-45 1945-
46
1946-
47
1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51
Expenditure 1,393,921* N/A N/A 1,591,000 1,548,208 1,053,140 863,999
T h is  is departmental and HMSO, not MOI (which is included in 'Miscellaneous') -  so not strictly comparable 
Sources: CAB 124/1029, COI Annual Reports 1947 to 1951
Film Production & Distribution
1944-45 1945-46 1946-47 1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51
Production: 
number of reels 
produced (CFU  
and contractors)
136 143 148 145 155 129 117
Distribution: 
number of films 
achieving 
commercial 
release*
10 11 14 21 26 26 15
Distribution: 
number of non- 
theatrical official 
film screenings
56,172 52,249 46,789 52,244 54,172 43,067** 37,967***
Audience: 
estimated non­
theatrical 
audience (mobile 
protection units)
8,951,000 7,160,000 5,497,000 5,312,000 4,928,000 3,528,000 2,814,650
* Calendar year, not financial
** According to COI, fall due to suspension of almost all shows during General Election Campaign 
*** Due to reduction in number of mobile units 
Sources: COI Annual Reports 1947 to 1951
Lectures
1944-45 1945-46 1946-47 1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51
Number of Lectures 25,331 14,852 10,087 18,253 21,668 15,894 20,331
Sources: COI Annual Reports 1947 to 1951, INF 12/217, INF 12/345 -  preparation for annual report 1950-51
Exhibitions & Displays
1946-47 1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51
Number of Exhibitions / 
Displays
- 50 33 34 34
Expenditure on Exhibitions / 
Displays
£65,000 £147,000 £207,000 £211,971 -
Sources: COI Annual Reports 1947 to 1951, CAB 124/1029
The above data on Government Information Services does not include: publications; social surveys; regional 
services other than films, lectures and tours; photographs; reference material; broadcasting
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